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Recognised shortcomings of the comparative political economy literature are its 
relatively static analysis and general bypassing of context-specific explanatory 
variables. The last 20 years of changes in the structural configuration of national 
varieties of capitalism have made it increasingly apparent that the comparative political 
economy literature has conceptual problems in relation to its ability to account for 
institutional change. 
This study seeks to provide an explanation for institutional change in Romania, by 
challenging and stepping away from the traditional elements of change of the 
comparative political economy literature. I revisit the question of the institutional 
transformation of a post-Socialist Central Eastern European (CEE) state, making the 
case for a more dynamic, relational, historically-based, context-specific and agent-
driven analysis of institutional change. Drawing on five overarching literatures – 
varieties of capitalism, Polanyian varieties, economic geography, historical 
institutionalism and class analysis of elites – my thesis hypothesises the existence of 
elites, international forces and labour as the principal drivers of institutional change in 
Romania. In order to examine the unfolding of my approach to the study of institutional 
change, I designed a longitudinal comparative case study based on the examination of 
three Romanian sectors with distinct configurations in terms of their historical legacies, 
spatial and temporal vectors, and structure and composition. The three sectoral 
economies analysed in my thesis are 1) coal mining – an inward-oriented industrial 
branch representative of the Socialist regime, 2) auto – an industrial branch established 
in the Socialist regime with continuity in the newly-established capitalist variety 
through foreign direct investment, and 3) business services – an industrial branch 
created in the early 2000s through the inflow of foreign direct investment. 
The motivation behind implementing a case study was to generate an in-depth and 
extensive understanding regarding the processes of institutional formation and 
institutional change in the context of CEE through the utilisation of the Romanian 
national variety. I used a combination of 38 in-depth semi-structured interviews, 
archival research and newspaper articles and technical reports. 
My findings establish that the dominant elites have captured the Romanian state and its 
institutional configuration, and in the process, influenced institutional change across the 
different sectoral economies. My evidence shows that the dominant elites do not exist in 
a vacuum; instead, these social agents are situated within the institutional setting 
alongside other categories of actors with diverging roles and positionalities. 
International forces act as a force of change with which the domestic elites engage and 
interact triggering institutional change and transformation across the different spatial 
scales of the national political economy. More precisely, the presence of FDI produced 
variations in regional restructuring, driving path destruction (de-industrialisation and 
de-skilling) in coal mining, path re-construction (industrial upgrading and re-
organisation) in auto and path creation in business services within the wider Romanian 
national variety of capitalism over time. The labour class can also act as a force of 
change with which the dominant elites engage and interact within the institutional 
context. However, the picture of labour is institutionally variegated across the different 
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spatial scales of the political economy, with some sectors such as coal mining and auto 
exhibiting a strong and coordinated labour model, whereas other sectors such as 
business services are characterised by a deregulated labour market model typical of 
liberal market varieties. Thus, labour can be driver of institutional change, although not 
as powerful as elites and international forces.  
My findings extend the emergent theory on the CEE region, as well as refine and add on 
to the existing body of knowledge regarding the Romanian national variety since its 
institutional framework is distinct and does not fully replicate the institutional 
configuration of the other CEE political economies. Furthermore, my findings recognise 
the importance of breaking the institutional structure into different spatial scales, as this 
allows us to zoom in on the different spatial configurations – the micro, meso, macro 
and international – at certain moments in time. At the same time, by conceptualising the 
institutional setting relationally, we can monitor and assess the different types of 
exchanges between the existing spatial scales and consequently, measure how they 
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The aim of this study is to advance understanding of how institutional change occurs 
within the Romanian political economy. It challenges the traditional elements of change 
that the comparative political economy literature utilises as explanatory variables to 
account for shifts in the institutional configuration of nation states. As I shall elaborate 
in greater detail, the existing comparative political economy literature contains an array 
of shortcomings, among which the most fundamental are its relatively static analytical 
framework and its incomplete account of context-specific explanatory variables 
( anck , 2007; King, 2007; Birch and Mykhnenko, 2009; Lane, 2011; Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2011; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013; Martin, 2013). The primary context-
specific explanatory variables that should have had a wider and deeper incorporation 
within the conceptualisation of Central Eastern European (CEE) institutional structures 
and institutional change include the pervasive role of the state and power of elites,
1
 the 
importance of historical legacies
2
 and the effect of international forces on national 
institutional configurations.
3
 My objective is to incorporate these three variables within 
my analytical framework and as a result, to introduce a more dynamic, historically-
based, context-specific and agent-driven conceptualisation of institutional change. In 
order to operationalise this approach, I hypothesise the existence of three structural 
particularities specific to the CEE region – the control exerted by dominant elites over 
the structure of the state and the industrial order, the presence and institutional effects of 
international forces over the national configuration, and the role of labour vis-à-vis 
other categories of social agents – as the main drivers of change. 
Research Questions 
My overarching research question is what is the nature of institutional change in the 
Romanian national political economy? and what are the drivers of institutional change? 
In order to develop a comprehensive understanding regarding the principal drivers of 
institutional change, I break the research agenda into three different sections. First, I 
                                                          
1
 Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley, 1998; King, 2002, 2007; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004; King and 
Szeléleni, 2005; King and Sznajder, 2006; Hancké, 2007; Rhodes et al., 2010; Becker and Jäger, 2010; 
Onaran, 2011; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011. 
2
 Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley, 1998; Iankova, 2002; King and Szeléleni, 2005; King and Sznajder, 2006; 
Hancké, 2007; Becker and Jäger, 2010; Rhodes et al., 2010. 
3
 Tickell and Peck, 2003; Peck, 2004; Peck and Theodore 2007; Streeck, 2007; Brenner et al., 2009; Birch 
and Mykhnenko, 2009; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013. 
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begin the investigation by asking who are the elites? present in the Romanian political 
economy. My study recognises the fact that there are continuous membership 
fluctuations in the power structure or dominant coalition of a state, hence I examine 
what are the changing dynamics of the dominant coalition over time? Furthermore, my 
study takes into consideration the fact that the institutional context of the Romanian 
political economy is permeated by variegated exchanges and alliances between different 
categories of social agents with varying degrees of powers and positionalities. Based on 
this, I posit the question how do we map out the evolution of the relationship between 
elite and non-elite members? To analyse the different institutional measures and 
directions driven by elites within the Romanian political economy, I examine the 
research question what role if any do elites play in the Romanian national political 
economy? 
In my study, I highlight that the influence of international forces on the Romanian 
political economy has stimulated the creation of a model of ‘capitalism from without’ 
that depends on the presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational 
corporations (MNCs). Thus, the research question I analyse is to what extent do 
international forces explain institutional change? I analyse what role does FDI play? 
across the Romanian institutional configuration and the three sectoral economies 
incorporated in my study. My argument is that the institutional configuration of the 
Romanian political economy has been influenced by the collaborative arrangements 
between the Romanian government and international forces. More precisely, while 
international forces conceptualised and drove the formation of this externally-driven 
neoliberal order, domestic elites allowed and ratified the consolidation of this external 
order. In consideration of the above, I posit the following research question: who or 
what has facilitated the establishing of an external order? An important aspect that I 
want to emphasize is that while I recognise the existence and role of international 
institutions – such as the World Bank, IMF and European Union – on national models 
from the CEE region, this is not the scope of my thesis. My principal focus is FDI as the 
main driver of restructuring and industrial upgrading. 
In terms of analysing the power and positionality of labour, my study recognises the fact 
that labour is institutionally distinct across the different sectoral economies of the 
Romanian political economy. My expectation from the beginning is to obtain differently 
patterned institutional stories across the different scales of the Romanian variety of 
capitalism. Thus, the question that I analyse is what role does labour play in the 
20 
 
national political economy? Furthermore, the position of labour will not be treated as an 
insular institutional concept, without any connection and affiliation to the other 
institutional actors and elements permeating the Romanian institutional configuration. 
More specifically, I am interested in observing how the position and power of labour 
has changed over time within the Romanian political economy. To capture this, I 
advance the research question what is the changing role of labour? 
Research Design  
I use the case study method in order to construct the theory emerging from the 
institutional context of the Romanian political economy (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
utilisation of a case study allows me to gather rich, detailed and in-depth information 
about the various country-specific institutional elements that have driven institutional 
change and transformation within the Romanian institutional setting (Geertz, 1973).  
One cannot accurately and comprehensively capture the institutional formation of the 
Romanian model without focusing some attention on the Socialist legacies and 
historical traces that constitute the institutional bedrock of this CEE variant. My 
longitudinal case study design embeds the examination of three subunits or meso case 
studies in the Romanian political economy. The three meso case studies that I will 
analyse are: 1) coal mining, 2) auto, and 3) business services. The spatial and temporal 
configuration of each industry is differentiated vis-à-vis the other; however, what is 
really striking is actually the timeframe within which each industry is active. 
The development of the coal mining industry was intensively pursued starting with the 
Stalinist planning period in the 1940s and 1950s, when a strong emphasis was placed on 
heavy and energy-intensive industries (Crowther, 1988). Despite the fact that the 
industry became unsustainable by the mid-1970s (Cernat, 2006), coal production was 
expanded according to the Socialist regime principle “For our country, as much coal as 
feasible!” (Partidul Comunist Român, 1975, 16). Because of intensive exploitation, the 
competitiveness of the principal coal basins and the quality of production declined 
(Shafir, 1985); hence, from the mid-1980s onwards the industry embarked on an 
economic path of decline. The industrial branch was terminated through different phases 
of restructuring driven by the government and international institutions throughout the 
1990s and 2000s respectively (Larionescu et al, 1999; Haney and Shkaratan, 2003; 
Cernat, 2006; National Federation of Mining and Energy, 2010).   
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Similar to coal mining, the auto industry also has a pre-capitalist setup, with its 
historical legacies dating from 1966, when the Romanian car manufacturer Dacia was 
founded in Piteşti (Ştiinţă şi Tehnică, 2016). The size, sophistication and amount of 
investment within the industry expanded throughout the Socialist period, with a second 
car manufacturer being established ten years later in 1976 in Craiova (Lupul Dacic, 
2014; General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016; Historia, 2017a). The economic growth 
and diversification of the auto industrial branch continued during the capitalist era. 
More specifically, in 1994, 1999 and 2008 respectively the industry was displaced by 
inflows of FDI and became integrated within the regional European automotive 
production network (Business Magazin, 2007; Romanian Car, 2014; Adevărul, 2015; 
General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016). Apart from the two main car manufacturers, 
the presence of FDI within the institutional configuration of the auto sector resulted in 
positive spill-over effects on the growth and diversification of the auto components 
industry (Pavlinek, 2004; Javorcik and Spătăreanu, 2005; Dudian, 2011). 
The business services industry is a newly emergent economic path that only became 
active in Romania from the early 2000s onwards (ABSL, 2015). The ownership 
structure of the business services sector is almost completely private and concentrated 
around MNCs (ABSL, 2015; ANIS, 2016). According to industry experts, foreign 
capital permeated the market via three investment waves that have divergent timeframes 
and geographies (Outsourcing Today, 2015). The industry first emerged in Bucharest in 
2003-2004 – the first wave of development (ABSL, 2017). A second wave of 
development followed in 2007 – around the time of Romania’s accession to the EU – in 
tier-two Romanian cities such as Cluj, Timişoara, Iaşi and Braşov. In 2010, the third 
wave of development ensued – business services MNCs started penetrating tier-three 
locations; however, operations in these localities are highly embryonic and have been 
only marginally been developed (Dudian, 2011). Hence, the representatives of foreign 
capital greatly influenced the creation and evolution of the institutional configuration of 
the Romanian business services sector. Furthermore, external influences, in the form of 
the European Union, have also had a transformative effect on the industrial order since 
the country’s accession to the regional bloc (Ban, 2013). 
Considering the above, the three sectoral economies can be periodised in distinct ‘active 
timeframes’: 1) an old industry emblematic of the Socialist era, 2) a continuous industry 
with a pre-capitalist setup and a FDI-based facelift, and 3) a ‘de novo’ industry created 
as a result of the processes of de-industrialisation and tertiarisation brought on by 
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neoliberalism. The geographic positioning of these three sectoral economies is also 
highly diversified. Coal mining is concentrated in a mono-industrial zone in south-
western Romania that has proximity to only small- and medium-sized towns, with the 
regional population being almost exclusively related to the activity of coal output and 
dressing (Ghose and Bose, 2003). Auto is situated at the periphery of two significant 
urban areas that have considerable pools of engineers and technicians specialised in 
automotive and machinery construction – Piteşti and Craiova (Dudian, 2011; Guga, 
2017). While, the spatial configuration of the business services industry is the most 
urbanised, with the majority of players located in the heart of the major cities – 
Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Timişoara, Iaşi and Braşov (ABSL, 2015). 
The implementation of a longitudinal comparative case study design enables me to 
analyse comparatively and longitudinally across the three industries 1) the identity of 
elites and the changing elite dynamics, 2) the role of international forces (FDI), and 3) 
the power and positionality of labour as a social agent. While I recognise that labour as 
a driver of institutional change is less powerful than elites and international forces, I 
succeed to capture its transformative role within the Romanian political economy. 
Finally yet importantly, by adopting a longitudinal case study, I am able to grasp the 
distinct effects that the insertion of FDI (foreign-led varieties of restructuring), and the 
alliance between domestic and foreign elites, have on the institutional configuration of 
labour across the three industries over time. 
Theoretical Contribution  
This thesis is concerned with developing a distinctively interdisciplinary theory-based 
research process. My study synthesises five overarching approaches to the study of 
institutional change within the context of the CEE region: 1) varieties of capitalism 
(VoC), 2) Polanyian varieties, 3) economic geography, 4) historical institutionalism, 
and 5) the theorisation of the concept of elites. I undertake a systematic analysis of the 
different literatures, implementing a bottom up grounded approach to theory and 
constructing a grand theory of institutional change specific to CEE national political 
economies. By reviewing these different approaches, I am able to capture the regional 
characteristics that distinguish the CEE region from other spatial configurations. 
The CEE region is institutionally distinct from high-income Western economies and any 
other developing national varieties for that matter (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; 
Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Ban, 2013; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013; Martin, 2013). 
23 
 
Hence, the utilisation of the Romanian case allows me to generate an in-depth and 
extensive understanding regarding the regional processes of institutional formation and 
institutional change and consequently, refine and extend the emergent theory on the 
CEE region. Furthermore, although there is an array of institutional characteristics 
shared across the entire CEE region, my study accentuates the fact that Romania has a 
differentiated institutional make-up vis-à-vis pre-established CEE typologies 
(Visegráds, Baltic states, peripheral economies of Eastern Europe) in terms of politico-
economic transformation and transition from plan to market (Cernat, 2006; Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2011), process of de-industrialisation and degree of tertiarisation (Becker 
and Jäger, 2010; Onaran, 2011), level of state capacity and proportion of state 
ownership (King, 2007; Feldmann, 2007; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011), historical 
legacies (Cernat, 2006; Martin, 2013), intervention of IFIs and FDI (Nölke and 
Vliegenthart, 2009; Capik and Drahokoupil, 2011; Dudian, 2011; Sass and Fifeková, 
2011), and capacity of the citizenry and organised labour to impact policy formation and 
democratic politics (Ciutacu, 2011; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013). Through an iterative 
process of studying the history, the literature and my fieldwork (both in-depth 
interviews and archival materials), I refine and add on to the existing theoretical case. 
One of the key theoretical contributions of my study is that it adds to the debate that 
national political economies are not institutionally homogeneous; instead, one can see 
the persistence of internal systemic diversity and the co-existence of institutionally 
distinct sectoral economies within a national order. By studying the presence and 
influence of a set of drivers of institutional change longitudinally, I observe institutional 
variegation across the three sectors incorporated in my study. The role and 
posititionality of elites, international forces and labour as drivers of institutional change 
is institutionally divergent across coal, auto and business services. Furthermore, my 
study captures the existence of institutional divergence within a sector. More 
specifically, the examination of the two firm-level case studies in the auto sector reveals 
that distinct institutional logics are pursued at Renault and Ford. This signifies that the 
Romanian national political economy is by no means an ideal type; instead, what we 
have is a national context made up of heterogeneous building blocks that is undergoing 
uneven systemic change, which contributes to the persistence of diversity in capitalism.  
Another major contribution of my thesis is the conceptualisation of a relational 
institutional context fraught by the presence of a multitude of interacting actors, 
institutions and forces that operate at diverging levels – micro-, meso-, macro- and 
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international-level. Moreover, breaking the spatial configuration of the national political 
economy into different integrated or ‘nested’ scales allows me to capture how the 
institutional changes occurring at one level influence the transformation of other levels. 
This ability to zoom in on the different spatial scales or geographies of the state enables 
me pursue theoretical sensitivity and to construct a holistic analysis of institutional 
change. 
Overview of the Thesis 
In Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Perspectives, I begin the discussion by 
emphasizing the different shortcomings of the comparative political economy literature 
in relation to its ability to account for the different elements of institutional change. I 
then justify my selection of the Romanian case by comparing the institutional 
configuration of the Romanian political economy with other CEE typologies – the 
Visegráds and the Baltic states. After that, I identify five overarching approaches to the 
study of institutional change within the context of the CEE region: 1) varieties of 
capitalism (VoC), 2) Polanyian varieties, 3) economic geography, 4) historical 
institutionalism, and 5) class analysis of elites. I include a comprehensive discussion of 
each approach, highlighting its deficiencies and gaps, but at the same time incorporating 
the parts that are scientifically valuable in my own theoretical framework. In the last 
section of this chapter, I stress the need for a new set of drivers of institutional change 
that are sensitised to the structural particularities of the Central Eastern European (CEE) 
region. Based on that, I return to my research questions and the overarching research 
agenda of this study. 
In Chapter 3 Research Methodology – The Qualitative Approaches Implemented, I 
begin by emphasizing to the reader the contextual elements that spurred the initiation of 
this fieldwork. In the following section, I evaluate my data sites – more precisely, I 
analyse the ‘wheres’, ‘whens’ and ‘hows’ of my research. Here, I present the research 
methods that I utilised throughout my study. The main research method that I have 
chosen, which is most closely associated with the naturalistic approach for direct 
observation and apprehension of phenomena within the social setting, is in-depth 
interviewing. However, due to the historical orientation of my study, I recognised the 
fact that in-depth interviewing is not sufficient and/or appropriate as a ‘standalone’ 
research method. To achieve a more comprehensive historical narrative, to capture those 
historical phenomena that in-depth interviewing was unable to account for and to 
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triangulate, I utilised archival research as a complementary method. I analyse the two 
chosen research methods in terms of a range of different methodological and ethical 
issues – appropriateness, sampling, issues of access, managing relations, emotional 
risks, and ethics and personal consequences. I also present how I gathered and analysed 
a collection of supplementary data in the form of newspaper articles and technical 
reports. In the next section of this chapter, I describe the techniques I employed to 
analyse the data that I collected: first, I define the type of analysis my study makes use 
of; second, I discuss the frequency and timing of the analysis; and third, I present the 
different stages of analytical work that were employed. In the following section, I 
discuss my research design. The elements that I have included as part of my research 
design are: the theory of methods, the case study design, the case study selection, a 
discussion regarding the issue of scale and the implementation of longitudinal methods.  
Chapter 4 focuses on The Historical Legacies and Key Moments of Institutional Change 
of the Romanian National Political Economy (1960s-2010s). Chapter 4 is important 
because it identifies the key moments of institutional change and their drivers across the 
Romanian national political economy. Understanding the institutional changes that 
occurred at the national scale allows me to analyse how institutional transformation 
ensued at the sectoral scale. Hence, Chapter 4 develops a periodisation for my empirical 
chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). I begin the chapter by discussing the economic 
orientation or specialisation of the Romanian political economy during the beginning of 
the Socialist regime (1948-1960). In the next section, I analyse the implementation of 
the National Industrialisation Programme during the early 1960s – a long-term 
development project that set the industrial targets for individual industrial branches over 
a period of 20 years. After that, I present the structural problems characterising the 
Romanian industry throughout the Socialist regime. In the following section, I analyse 
the way in which industrial development was pursued between 1965 and 1989 in 
Socialist Romania. I discuss the expansion of industrial production capacities, the 
different types of industrial policies pursued and how they influenced the regime’s 
industrial order, and the key institutional players shaping and controlling the 
configuration of the Socialist industrial order. In the next section, I talk about the fall of 
the Socialist regime and the ensuing period of economic crisis and industrial decline 
during the first decade post-Socialism (1990-1998). Within this section, I also examine 
the various instances of labour unrest that plagued the 1990s. Next, I analyse how 
international forces have shaped and transformed the institutional configuration of the 
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Romanian political economy in the post-Socialist era (mid-1990s-2010s). In the last 
section of this chapter, I look at how the Romanian industrial relations system has 
changed during the post-Socialist era and analyse the most extensive deregulation of the 
Romanian Labour Code. 
Chapter 5 Investigating the Role of Dominant Elites in Influencing Institutional Change 
in the Romanian Coal Mining Sector (1960s-2010s) discusses the position of the coal 
mining sector within the Romanian institutional configuration between the 1960s and 
2010s, and provides evidence of how different types of elites have influenced the 
structure of the industrial order over time. After introducing the chapter, I enter a 
discussion about the identity of elites. I construct a categorisation of ‘elites’, in order to 
highlight the different levels of power and positionalities and thus, capture the 
hierarchical structure of elites. In the following section of the chapter, I capture the story 
of institutional change in the Romanian coal industry, by identifying three instances of 
interplay between the dominant elites and the different forces of change that permeate 
the internal dynamics of the coal mining sector. The two instances of interplay 
embedded within the internal dynamics of the sector are: 1) the interaction between 
dominant elites and industrial policy, and 2) the interaction between dominant elites and 
labour. In the last section, I provide a conclusion in which I reinforce the key analytical 
themes running throughout the chapter and the theoretical contributions I make by 
undertaking a longitudinal study of the Romanian coal mining industry during the 
timeframe 1960s-2010s. 
Chapter 6 Investigating the Role of Elites in Influencing Institutional Change in the 
Romanian Auto Sector (1960s-2010s) discusses the position of the auto sector within 
the Romanian institutional configuration between the mid-1960s and 2010s, and 
provides evidence of how different types of elites have influenced the structure of the 
industrial order over time. After introducing the chapter, I present my findings on the 
identity of the elites influencing the institutional configuration of the industry. I then 
capture the story of institutional change in the Romanian auto industry, by identifying 
four instances of interplay between the dominant elites and the different forces of 
change that permeate the internal dynamics of the sector. The three instances of 
interplay embedded within the internal dynamics of the sector are: 1) the interaction 
between dominant elites and industrial policy, 2) the interaction between dominant 
elites and labour, and 3) the interaction between dominant elites and education. In the 
last section, I provide a conclusion in which I reinforce the key analytical themes 
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running throughout the chapter and the theoretical contributions I make by undertaking 
a longitudinal study of Romanian auto during the timeframe 1960s-2010s.  
Chapter 7 Investigating the Role of Foreign Elites in Creating the Romanian Business 
Services Sector and Influencing Institutional Change discusses the position of the 
business services sector within the Romanian institutional configuration from 2003-
2004 until 2018, and provides evidence of how different categories of elites have 
influenced the structure of the industrial order over time. After introducing the chapter, I 
present some technical data regarding the institutional growth, timeframe and 
geography of the Romanian business services sector. In the following section, I enter a 
discussion about the identity of elites. After that, I capture the story of institutional 
change in Romanian business services, by identifying four instances of interplay 
between MNCs and different forces of change that permeate the internal dynamics of 
this sector. The four instances of interplay embedded within the internal dynamics of 
the sector are: 1) the interaction between MNCs and domestic elites, 2) the interaction 
between MNCs and the educational system, 3) the interaction between MNCs and 
labour, and 4) the interaction between MNCs and industrial upgrading. In the final 
section, I provide a conclusion in which I reinforce the key analytical themes running 
throughout the chapter and the theoretical contributions I make by undertaking a study 
of Romanian business services from the moment the sector was established in 2003-
2004 until 2018.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. I draw an empirical comparison of the central themes – 
elites, international forces and labour – across the three sectoral economies I investigate. 
Furthermore, I present the reader with the contribution of my research, highlighting my 
study’s significance from a theoretical, methodological and empirical perspective. 
Finally, in the last section of this chapter, I identify and acknowledge the main research 









Literature Review and Theoretical Perspectives  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I begin the discussion by emphasizing the different shortcomings of the 
comparative political economy literature in relation to its ability to account for the 
different elements of institutional change. Moving forward, I justify my selection of the 
Romanian case by comparing the institutional configuration of the Romanian political 
economy with other CEE typologies – the Visegráds and the Baltic states. After that, I 
undertake a complex literature review of the social, economic and political institutional 
issues – more specifically, I identify five overarching approaches to the study of 
institutional change within the context of the CEE region: 1) varieties of capitalism 
(VoC), 2) Polanyian varieties, 3) economic geography, 4) historical institutionalism, 
and 5) class analysis of elites. I include a comprehensive discussion in relation to each 
approach, highlighting its deficiencies and gaps, but at the same time incorporating the 
parts that are scientifically valuable in my own theoretical framework. In the last section 
of this chapter, I stress the need for a new set of drivers of institutional change that are 
sensitised to the structural particularities of the CEE region. Based on that, I introduce 
the reader to my research questions and the overarching research agenda of this study. 
2.1.1 A Study of Institutional Change 
An increasingly acknowledged shortcoming of the comparative political economy 
literature constitutes its relatively static analysis and its insufficient accountability of 
context-specific explanatory variables ( anck , 2007; King, 2007; Birch and 
Mykhnenko, 2009; Lane, 2011; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Bohle and Greskovits, 
2013; Martin, 2013). The accent is either placed on whether institutions are defined as 
rules and norms that shape economic activity (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or as specific 
incentives that help structure an economy, influencing and directing its pattern of 
economic change towards growth, stagnation or decline (North et al., 2009), rather than 
the specificity of the institutions themselves, their origins and their evolution. Changes 
in the institutional configuration of European political economies in the last three 
decades – such as the transition from plan to market, the decrease in state-business 
coordination, the process of de-industrialisation, the rise of the service-oriented 
economy and the convergence towards more liberal institutional configurations – have 
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made it increasingly apparent that the comparative political economy literature has 
conceptual problems in relation to its ability to account for institutional change. The 
primary context-specific explanatory variables that should have had a wider and deeper 
incorporation within the conceptualisation of CEE institutional structures and the 
institutional change include the pervasive role of the state and power of state 
representatives,
4
 the theoretical importance of historical legacies
5
 and the effect of 
international forces on national institutional configurations.
6
 Hence, the objective is to 
incorporate all of these institutional variables within my analytical framework and as a 
result, to introduce a more dynamic, historically-based, context-specific and agent-
driven conceptualisation of institutional change. 
2.1.2 Case Selection: Why is the Case of Romania different? 
The research programme was developed for analysis of Romania as a principal case 
study. I justify my choice by utilising three lines of argumentation:  
1) the relatively under-researched Romanian institutional context;  
2) its differentiated institutional make-up vis-à-vis pre-established a) advanced 
capitalist varieties (‘the liberal market economy – coordinated market economy’ 
dichotomy) and b) other CEE typologies (the ‘Baltics, the ‘Visegráds’); and, 
3) the slow and stagist process of transformation, with each stage having different 
dominant drivers and internal dynamics, intensity and timing.  
Scholars characterise Romania as having a weaker-developed domestic economy 
relative to countries of the Visegrád typology, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia, which have undergone a more advanced politico-economic 
transformation, and currently occupy a more advanced position in the capitalist world 
hierarchy (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011). The Romanian national variety of capitalism  
is also associated with a deeper process of de-industrialisation, a stronger tertiarisation 
of the economy and financialised growth, and a heavier dependence on remittances 
(Becker and Jäger, 2010; Onaran, 2011). The rise of the tertiary sector has meant that 
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domestic and foreign capital inflows have been directed towards the financing of a 
business process outsourcing (BPO) and knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) 
industry along with the constant expansion of real estate bubbles, all at the expense of 
industrial re-construction. Romania is also positioned differently relative to the Baltic 
states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which in comparative political economy 
literature are assessed as three cases of the same variety due to their commonalities in 
terms of socio-economic institutions. On a ‘social inclusion – neoliberalism’ spectrum, 
the Baltic states represent the most radical neoliberal cases of CEE national varieties, 
where strong market-oriented forces have resulted in a weak capacity of the citizenry 
and organised labour to impact policy formation and democratic politics (Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2013). Academics also position Romania in the capitalist world economy 
differently to countries located further east such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. These 
are regarded as national varieties with authoritarian political systems, lower levels of 
state capacity and substantial levels of state ownership due to more limited system 
reforms (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011). 
The transition from plan to market and Romania’s institutional transformation have 
been more problematic than the changing dynamics experienced in the Visegráds and 
the Baltic states. Most importantly, Romania’s historical legacies are quite diverse – the 
country experienced one of the strictest and most centralised forms of Communism ever 
existent (Cernat, 2006). This has led to the accumulation and carrying forward of a very 
potent set of patrimonial and clientelistic practices, a phenomenon also experienced in 
my two benchmark categories – the Visegráds and the Baltic states – but to a much 
lesser extent than in Romania. Thus, while the Romanian institutional context has 
undergone a similar process of transformation and neoliberal adjustment as the Visegrád 
and Baltic states respectively, the story of institutional change within the Romanian 
context contains a degree of nuance that needs to be taken into consideration.  
Also, when examining the degree of liberalisation of these states, Romania is the least 
liberalised case among them. This can be explained by the transition strategy based on 
‘gradualism’ adopted in the early 1990s (Lane, 2007; Ban, 2013), as well as the legacy 
of the attempt to construct a capitalist variety based on domestic capital and the 
formation of an inward-oriented system within the first decade post-Socialism. 
Together, these resulted in Romania having a late start on the liberalisation path. The 
insertion of international finance in Romania has not only taken place later, but it has 
also been focused on different sectors. As mentioned above, the principal sector to have 
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been developed in the early 2000s is the service sector – primarily BPO/KPO (also 
known as business services), real estate and banking. In terms of the secondary sector, 
Cernat (2002, 2006) argues that only a partial re-construction and restoration of the 
industrial sector has been achieved. This contrasts with the economic structure of the 
Visegráds, which has been oriented towards the development of a medium- to high-
technology industrial order (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; Martin, 2013), as well as 
that of the Baltics which is specialised in light industries, furniture, wood, petroleum 
processing and low value-added services (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011). Thus, I argue 
that MNCs and foreign capital have indeed consolidated foreign capital dependent 
regimes within CEE; however, there are different types of dependency across the CEE 
political economies – both in terms of degree and type.  
The role of labour as a driver of institutional transformation differs across these 
economies as well. While there has been a general downgrade in the role and power of 
labour in all CEE national varieties, there are divergent paths in relation to this 
decomposition and loss of power. If a spectrum would be drawn, labour in the 
Visegráds would have more power vis-à-vis the Baltic states, where a neoliberal path 
has been pursued that has entailed the complete ousting of labour from sources of power 
(Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011). Romania can be placed somewhere in between these 
two poles; however, since 2011, a massive labour market deregulation package has been 
implemented, placing the political economy much closer to the radical Baltic end of the 
spectrum. The New Labour Code dismantled the institutional and legislative 
foundations in relation to national and economic associations’ collective agreements, 
thus abolishing the national collective bargaining agreement that has been effective 
since 1991, and so institutionalising the negotiation of collective agreement hence 
forward at the sectoral-level or firm-level (Ciutacu, 2011). The 2011 shift in labour law 
aims to promote atypical employment formats, more precisely fixed-term and temporary 
work contracts, it seeks the extension of probation periods and the increasing flexibility 
of working time. Moreover, the New Labour Code seeks to introduce a ‘libertarian ease’ 
for employers to ‘hire and fire’ human resources with less cost for the company (Ban, 
2013). The new labour legislation effectively raises the barriers to trade union formation 
– the new statute of limitation indicates that the formation of a union can be realised by 
15 employees from the same enterprise instead of the previous legal stipulation, which 
stated that the requirement was 15 employees from the same economic branch (Ciutacu, 
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2011). Furthermore, workers’ representatives are only formally recognised if the 
enterprise has over 20 employees (Barbuceanu, 2012). 
Thus, considering the above mentioned, Romania has a significantly different 
institutional configuration relative to the Visegrád and Baltic states, highlighting the 
fact that CEE national varieties are institutionally different from one another. More 
precisely, while the political economies of the CEE region share a set of institutional 
commonalities as I emphasized above, there are structural particularities specific to the 
Romanian case, which makes them scientifically interesting and theoretically important. 
2.2 Analysing and Operationalising the Different Literature Approaches 
I have identified five overarching approaches to the study of institutional change within 
the context of the CEE region – VoC, Polanyian varieties, economic geography, 
historical institutionalism, and the theorisation of the concept of elites. In the following 
sections, I will analyse each of them, discussing their deficiencies but primarily 
highlighting their ‘moving parts’ that will constitute the foundations of my own 
research and the theoretical framework that I utilise. In doing so, I implemented a 
bottom up grounded approach to theory and constructed a grand theory of institutional 













Figure 2.1   Grand Theory of Institutional Change Designed for CEE Region 
 
2.2.1 Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) Approach 
In a now world renowned volume, Hall and Soskice (2001) along with other academics 
developed a compelling narrative of how different institutional compositions influence 
firm behaviour and shape national strategies of high-income, industrialised nations in an 
increasingly competitive and turbulent global economy. The authors conceptualise a 
dichotomy based on two basic configurations: the liberal market economy (LME) and 
the coordinated market economy (CME). Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that the liberal 
market economy, whose primary representative states are the US and the UK, is 
characterised by the prevalence of market-based relations in the five primary 
institutional pillars of the economy: corporate governance/finance, industrial relations, 
vocational training and education, inter-firm relations and firm-employee relations. The 
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arms’ length nature of economic transactions and the market generated flexibility 
creates an environment optimal for radical innovation. Thus, LMEs compete actively 
and successfully in high-tech, high-risk and capital-intensive industries such as banking 
and finance, advanced business services, information technology, and biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals. By contrast, the authors argue that CMEs thrive on long-term, 
stable, consensual and collaborative arrangements between enterprises, between 
enterprises and banks (also, between enterprises and other financial intermediaries e.g. 
insurance companies), and between social partners. Due to a low level of dynamic 
adaptative capacity and market generated flexibility, CMEs create environments less 
suitable for radical innovation; however, they are world market leaders in sectors that 
require gradual, incremental innovation such as heavy machinery, tools, automobiles 
and chemicals. 
Some authors have applied the VoC framework to the political economies of the CEE 
region. Magnus Feldmann (2006, 2007) and in an earlier study Buchen (2005a, 2005b), 
applying the VoC to CEE, have analysed the Estonian and Slovenian models and have 
identified them as instances of the LME and the CME model respectively. In a similar 
study, Cernat (2002) has evidenced the existence of a capitalism à la carte in CEE, with 
some market economies adopting liberal market economy models, whereas others have 
shaped their institutional configuration along the coordinated market economy model. 
Other academics identify the states in CEE as cases of ‘mixed’ or ‘weakly coordinated’ 
market economies. In spite of the perceived global neoliberalising pressures and the 
praise given to CEE post-Socialist states by multilateral institutions for implementing an 
‘open to foreign capital’, privatised, market-oriented capitalist variant, Mykhnenko 
(2007) argues that none of the market economies in CEE resemble the LME model. 
Instead, utilising Poland and Ukraine as case studies, the author labels them as hybrid 
economies and places them away from the ideal type CME end of spectrum. 
Mykhnenko draws on previous academics that have theorised the existence of hybrid 
Eastern European capitalism. One such source would be Elena Iankova and her concept 
of a ‘dynamic hybrid’ applied to tripartism – her argument is that post-Socialist tripartist 
arrangements constitute a subtype of neocorporatist capitalism that have been licensed 
to promote social harmony and institutionalise conflict during the turbulent context of 
economic depression (Iankova, 2002). The other line of research is that of Chavance 
and Magnin (2000), who describe the emergence of mixed market economies in CEE 
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and emphasize the significance of the path-dependent nature of national capitalisms and 
the institutional embeddedness persisting in these spatial contexts. 
Even though the recent literature and array of cross-country comparisons has 
highlighted some of the patterned distinctions among the institutional configurations of 
CEE states, the limitations of the VoC as a framework minimises these studies’ 
accuracy and usefulness for assessing the heterogeneity and specificity of the region. 
First of all, the VoC framework was conceptualised for advanced, high-income 
economies, and its fundamental assumptions were drawn from the idealised US, British 
and German models of capitalism. Thus, to assume that we can simply take these types 
and extend them with minimal structural adjustment to medium-income, less advanced, 
post-Socialist economies takes for granted their fundamentally distinct nature. 
Furthermore, we must realise that from the beginning the VoC framework was based on 
parsimony and designed as a variety based on only two types – the minimum required to 
achieve the concept of variety. Such parsimony underestimates the true diversity of 
capitalism in the core economies the framework was initially designed to analyse; 
hence, it is understood that as we shift to analyse CEE states the framework’s inability 
to capture capitalist diversity is even more evident. In relation to this argument, it is also 
worth pointing out that the CEE countries were explicitly not capitalist varieties until 
varying times during the 1990s; instead, they were transition countries with different 
starting points in terms of the institutional bedrock that underpins a capitalist regime 
(Lane, 2007, 2011; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Martin, 2013). 
Secondly, the VoC framework lacks the built-in capacity to comprehend the influence 
of ‘capitalism from without’ and the impact that international actors have on shaping the 
institutional configuration of nation states. The institutional formation and consolidation 
in Eastern Europe has been substantially impacted by international and global forces 
vis-à-vis Western industrialised states. An adequate mapping of the VoC in post-
Socialist European states requires analysis of the international embeddedness of 
national institutions, and the opposing and conflictual pressures resulting from this 
order. While this body of research recognises the political and economic integration of 
post-Socialist CEE states with Western Europe and the pressures exerted from EU 
membership, it goes on to argue that the domestic core logic of coordination within 
these states isn’t disrupted by an external order. By doing so, Bohle and Greskovits 




Thirdly, the VoC model fails to capture the effect of historical legacies and the bedrock 
of more inert institutional continuity that shapes not only the direction and composition 
of institutional change, but also explains the existence of hybrid institutional models and 
why many post-Socialist countries do not fit the standard VoC framework.
7
 
Through a more complex reading of CEE comparative political economy, Nölke and 
Vliegenthart (2009) take a step towards understanding the regionally specific nature of 
the Visegrád states. The authors demonstrate the Visegrád political economies’ strong 
reliance on foreign capital and MNCs specialised in medium to complex industrial 
activities. The authors posit that the Visegrád economies possess comparative 
advantages as assembly platforms for semi-standardised durable goods, based on 
technologies that have been designed and produced by the MNCs. Based on this feature, 
they adapt the institutional pillars structuring these states and they hypothesise new 
institutional complementarities that reflect the construction of ‘capitalism from without’ 
and external dependency. It becomes evident that the emerging institutional 
complementarities are not a suitable match with either the LME or CME models; hence, 
describing the CEE model as a combination of LME and CME institutional elements 
leads to the identification of a series of superficial commonalities and differences.  
Nölke and Vliegenthart’s analysis and conceptualisation of a third variety – the 
dependent market economy (DME), misses one of the fundamental characteristics of 
CEE economies – that is the pervasive role of the state. The authors fail to observe that 
the role and power of the state is considerably larger than in the advanced, high-income 
economies typically analysed by the VoC approach. Furthermore, in terms of state-
capital interactions, Nölke and Vliegenthart follow the assumptions of King (2007) and 
limit the concepts of personalistic enforcement of laws by patrons to benefit clients and 
rent-seeking activities to the ‘clan’ economies dominating the global periphery of 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. The argument that I advance is that CEE economies still do not confer the 
impersonal right to all citizens, who meet a minimal set of criteria, to form 
organisations; hence, limiting the access to those institutions to the members of the 
dominant coalition – the elites. My claim is that personal ties and patronage still form 
the basis of social organisation and are constitutive elements of the playing field for 
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 Although Feldmann does initially recognise the importance of legacies “before transition and policies 
adopted in the transition period itself” (2007, 388), he still conceptualises the institutional configuration 
of CEE states based on the classic VoC framework and lets the institutional specificity rendered by 
legacies and preconditions fade into the background. 
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social interaction. Instead of a lustration of elites from the dominant coalition, what we 
see is their stability in positions of power and only the modification of the composition 
of this coalition over time. Elites have perfected their ability to assume new roles and 
identities within the existing power structures and thus, continue influencing shaping 
the structure of the state. 
At the same time, by conceptualising only one DME variant, Nölke and Vliegenthart 
automatically assume a homogeneity in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
production systems in the Eastern European states’ form of dependence. By doing so, 
the authors exclude the possibility of varied forms of dependence existing in CEE and 
downplay the institutional richness and diversity of the region. Also, when briefly 
looking at Romania and Bulgaria, Nölke and Vliegenthart categorise the case studies as 
‘cocktail economies’ or political economies stuck in an incoherent institutional 
configuration that is severely underperforming. What is problematic is the fact that their 
arguments are based on Cernat’s study (2006), whose focus is primarily on the first 
decade post-Socialism and Romania’s transition years to a market economy; hence, the 
authors are using outdated information and in the process overlooking the rapid pace of 
transformation that the economy underwent. In a study in 2013, Cornel Ban (2013) 
provides an extension to the DME variety theorised by Nölke and Vliegenthart, 
asserting that in the second decade post-Socialism Romania started to converge towards 
the capitalist variety prevalent in the Visegrád states.
8
 Furthermore, his study 
demonstrates: 1) the existence of alternative forms of dependency in CEE, and 2) the 
perpetual state of change of these political economies. 
A more comprehensive conceptualisation of the VoC framework is provided by the path 
dependency tradition. Rather than stating that CEE economies have an institutional 
configuration based on a mix of LME and CME elements, path dependency varieties are 
sensitised to the fundamental structural particularities of high-income, advanced 
national variants relative to CEE national variants. Drawing very much from Eyal, 
Szelényi and Townsley (1998), King designs a specific dichotomy to capture the 
distinctive features in CEE as a region, comprised of a ‘liberal dependent post-
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means of restructuring’ narrative, stating that the large movements in capital augmented and accelerated 
Romania’s boom during the 2000s, thus resulting in sharp increases in productivity and export 




Communist capitalism’ category represented by Poland and Hungary, while the rest of 
the post-Communist world produces a ‘patrimonial post-Communist capitalism’ model 
best captured by the Russian institutional configuration. While conceptualising the 
former category, the author draws attention to the liberal nature of the state and a high 
degree of external dependency that characterises the economy – that is a high level of 
dependency on FDI and foreign purchasers for facilitating technological transfer, the 
training of labour and the provision of managerial skills. By contrast, post-Communist 
states in the ‘patrimonial’ category rely less on FDI and foreign purchasers, and instead 
the organisational structures and internal arrangements are dominated by patron-client 
arrangements, leading to the capturing of enterprises and the decomposition of the 
Weberian bureaucratic nature of the state (King and Szeléleni, 2005).  
King tries to extend the VoC model beyond rich OECD countries without ignoring the 
specific fundamental features of the CEE region. What the path dependency tradition 
achieves is to not take for granted the historical legacies and cultural aspects specific to 
these states. Instead of simply plotting CEE states on a LME-CME continuum, King 
emphasizes that a more robust analysis has to account for two fundamental factors: 1) 
the marginal role played by organised labour, and 2) the backward technological 
structure as a result of a later process of industrialisation.   
Although King’s liberal-patrimonial dichotomy is based on the Polish and Russian cases 
respectively (2007), I believe it has wider applicability. While the political economies of 
CEE constituting the western rim of the Former Soviet Union can be broadly 
categorised as instances of the liberal type, members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) represent instances of the patrimonial model.
 9
 However, the 
problem with this new variety, similar to the VoC, is that it is formed of only two types. 
I argue that many states in CEE fall in between these two idealised poles. Thus, in an 
attempt to achieve parsimony by limiting his framework to the construction of a mere 
dualism, I believe King fails to fully capture the distinctiveness and specificity of the 
institutional landscape. 
King and Szeléleni (2005) claim that states that are part of the liberal dependent 
capitalist type, encompassing proto-LME and proto-CME elements, have succeeded in 
preserving state capacity and have even increased it in certain institutional areas. This is 
because of the high levels of FDI they have experienced and the more favourable 
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 These would include Russia, Belarus and Moldova. 
39 
 
structure of alliances between the dominant elites – where some partial checks and 
balances have been implemented on the patron-client networks. I, however, argue that 
the role of personal ties and patron-client relationships is significantly underplayed in 
the liberal variety of capitalism. 
Major strengths of the path dependency tradition include its ability to recognise the 
importance of the state in Eastern European economies vis-à-vis the more ‘back-seat’ 
role played by the state in the initial VoC studies. Hall and Soskice (2001) in their 
pivotal work have difficulties in explicitly considering the role of the state; however, 
subsequent authors within the path dependency tradition take a step in the right 
direction (Hancké, 2007; Rhodes et al., 2010). King (2007) not only succeeds in 
grasping the role played by the state in the institutional configuration of these 
economies, but he also attempts to analyse the degree of bureaucratic state capacity – 
hence, avoiding automatically assuming the existence of rational bureaucratic states in 
CEE. Moreover, unlike its predecessors, the path dependency literature pays more 
attention to international pressures. Authors such as Iankova (2002), King (2002, 2007), 
King and Szelenyi (2005) and King and Sznajder (2006) are sensitised to the impact of 
foreign capital, MNCs, technological transfers, skills transfers and multilateral 
institutions – although to varying degrees in terms of strength, form, time and 
implementation.  
Other authors writing within the path dependency tradition include: 1) Becker and 
Jäger, and 2) Myant and Drahokoupil. The taxonomy contructed by Becker and Jäger 
(2010) is based on assessing the role of foreign capital in CEE and observing the 
emergence of different varieties of ‘dependent development’. The distinction is made 
between a regime of accumulation based on dependent industrialisation and a regime of 
accumulation based on dependent financialisation (Becker and Jäger, 2010; Onaran, 
2011). The central assumption is that the industrial export sector constitutes the primary 
force of accumulation in countries with dependent industrialisation such as Poland, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. The authors state that this type of 
development is characterised by a high degree of dependency on imports necessary for 
industrial production; thus, CEE states with such a development structure experienced a 
rising current account deficit throughout the years that has been further worsened by the 
substantial amount of profit repatriations by foreign subsidiaries to their headquarters. 
By contrast, Becker and Jäger argue that in national business systems with dependent 
financialisation as a mode of accumulation such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria 
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and Romania, capital inflows have been directed primarily towards the service sector 
rather than industrial development, leading to a decline in industrial employment and 
fuelling real estate bubbles. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive taxonomy is that established by Myant and 
Drahokoupil (2011). In their book Transition Economies: Political Economy in Russia, 
Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, the authors theorise five varieties that spread across 
the former Socialist regimes in Russia, CEE and Central Asia. Basing their taxonomy 
on forms of international integration and domestic state structures, Myant and 
Drahokoupil have made a clear distinction between a) FDI-based economies (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), b) peripheral market economies 
(Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria), c) oligarchic-clientelistic capitalism (Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia), d) order states (Belarus and Uzbekistan), and e) 
remittance- or aid-based economies (Albania, Moldova, Bosnia Herzegovina, Armenia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).  
In Transition Economies, Myant and Drahokoupil attempt to construct a story of 
economic history, macroeconomic development and industrial policy in 29 Eastern 
European and Central Asian economies. The major contribution of Transition 
Economies represents the summary of massive amounts of statistical data regarding the 
post-Socialist development and transformation varieties in the specified area. In the 
beginning of their study, Myant and Drahokoupil highlight the importance of 
recognising the diversity of the institutional transformation in the 29 states; however, as 
their institutional narrative unfolds, it becomes more and more obvious that the 
discussion is designed around and driven by the Russian case study. The 
conceptualisation of an overarching case ignores the institutional richness of the area 
and the nuanced paths of transformation experienced by the other 28 political 
economies. Furthermore, the study aims to incorporate the historical legacies of the 29 
states – more precisely, the overall Soviet experience, the problems experienced during 
planning and the earlier paths of development pursued in the nineteenth-century – 
however, by the time the study reaches the discussion of post-Socialist transformation 
during the 1990s it seems to have forgotten the effect of historical legacies. Thus, while 
Myant and Drahokoupil identify the importance of historical legacies for post-Socialist 
Eastern European and Central Asian national varieties, they fail to incorporate them in 
their conceptualisation of institutionally diverse paths of transformation.  
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2.2.2 Polanyian Varieties Approach 
Bohle and Greskovits (2013) have constructed a post-Socialist capitalist taxonomy that 
draws on Polanyian varieties. The authors conceptualise the market society as a highly 
dynamic entity, claiming that it is full of inherent tensions and contradictions. 
According to the Polanyian narrative (1944), capitalism represents a multi-scalar form 
of political economy, highly capable of and successful at generating wealth and 
freedom, in exchange for a continuous conflict between the “self-regulating market 
mechanism” and socially protective arrangements against the dangers of such a 
mechanism. This model of ‘moves and countermoves’ constitutes Polanyi’s ‘double 
movement’ – a contradictory and dynamic interplay that contours and legitimises a third 
capitalist foundation – the political sphere. The conceptualisation of a dynamic and 
antagonistic institutional environment where politics is a central dynamic is one of the 
main assumptions and building blocks of my study. 
The authors emphasize the superiority and explanatory power of their framework vis-à-
vis any extensions or adaptations of the VoC model and its application to the post-
Socialist market economies in CEE. In contrast to the weak (almost non-existent) 
inclusion of the political sphere in the analysis of national capitalisms accomplished by 
the LME-CME dichotomy or any of its extensions/derivatives to post-Socialist 
economies in CEE, Bohle and Greskovits’ framework treats the political sphere as a 
central pillar. One of the problems of the study, however, relates to how politics is 
incorporated, and more precisely, the nature of decision-making. The authors design a 
context in which decision-making is controlled by the dominant elites. Nevertheless, the 
concept of elites is not systematically analysed, and there is no clear framework that 
explains the inner functioning and structure of the dominant coalition. Another 
limitation of the study is the fact that it overlooks how conflict between political and 
social agents can act as an element for development. 
The assumption made by Bohle and Greskovits behind their Polanyian-inspired variety 
of post-Socialist capitalist economies is that capitalist development takes place at the 
national scale and within an international order fraught with both risks and 
opportunities, influenced by contradictory push and pull factors, and steered by social 
forces and institutions toward and away from social disintegration, economic 
disorganisation and political breakdown. Bohle and Greskovits give a meaningful 
representation of transformative supranational and transnational agents. This constitutes 
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a key assumption that will be utilised and incorporated in the foundations of my own 
research. 
Bohle and Greskovits assert that post-Socialist capitalism from its inception was 
integrated in a global economy, that entailed not only the growth of ‘markets within 
states’ but more strikingly squeezing ‘states within markets’, thus creating confusion 
with respect to the national fault lines of public authority and limiting social protection 
(Streeck, 2007). As a result, throughout the past two decades CEE states have 
constantly engaged in the appraisal of the benefits and drawbacks of social protection 
and its relative impact on global competitiveness. The authors claim that the result has 
been a new order in which social protective arrangements have been subordinated to 
global competitiveness. This relationship of subordination varies in degree, resulting in 
distinct and comparable varieties of post-Socialist capitalism, where the relative weight 
of ideas and the institutional mix of neoliberalism, welfare capitalism and democratic 
corporatism differs. The authors theorise the existence of three post-Socialist capitalist 
types: a pure neoliberal type in the Baltic countries, an embedded neoliberal type in the 
Visegrád countries, and a neocorporatist type in Slovenia.  
Although the Polanyian-inspired varieties are initially set up as stylised, ideal types, I 
argue that the actual case studies fit into them quite easily – the authors manage to do 
this by utilising data on diverging institutional configurations, levels of social welfare 
provision packages, plus other protectionist measures against the self-regulating market 
forces. At the market-oriented end of the spectrum, we have the radical neoliberal Baltic 
states. The central characteristics of the neoliberal regime include: the introduction of 
market radicalism coupled with minimal compensation for transition costs, and a weak 
capacity of the citizenry and organised labour to influence policy formation and 
democratic politics.  
At the socially inclusive end of the spectrum, the neocorporatist type, represented by 
Slovenia, implements the least radical strategy of marketization, which is mixed with 
more generous levels of social protection and more durable institutional structures of 
social interest representation in order to offset the transformational costs (Schmitter, 
1974). The Slovenian post-Socialist regime adopts a template prone to multi-level 
negotiation between labour, capital and the state, and the achievement of compromise 
between competing interests that is typical of a democratic corporatist polity. The 
43 
 
authors explain that this is (partly) a product of the decisions and actions taken by the 
state’s dominant elites and (partly) a product of Slovenia’s organised labour strength. 
Embedded neoliberalism, the in-between case, represents a more socially inclusive 
regime than the one featured in the Baltic states, due to the ongoing compromise 
between marketisation and social cohesion. However, despite the persistence of social 
welfare provision and its attempt to keep radical market forces at bay, this regime does 
not necessarily result in the creation of efficient systems of democratic government. 
The authors also highlight the existence of a ‘non-regime’ type. The inability to achieve 
some form of balance between the conflicting forces of the most basic of self-regulating 
market rule versus social protective arrangements ultimately leads to institutional 
destabilisation and disintegration. According to the authors, this is exactly the scenario 
encountered in Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia in the first decade post-Socialism. Later 
on, Romania and Bulgaria started to resemble the neoliberal model (however in the 
absence of the identity politics present in the Baltic states), while Croatia converged 
towards the embedded neoliberal model. 
Bohle and Greskovits assert that each of these types is (partly) the product of definable 
historical legacies, and (partly) the specific actions and decisions made by the state’s 
dominant coalitional members. By appraising and accounting for the importance of past 
heritages, Bohle and Greskovits have generated a valuable comparative study of 
political economies that has sufficient explanatory power to demonstrate that the 
institutional divergence and structural differentiation between countries stems from 
those countries’ distinct historical legacies. This is another theoretical concept that is 
taken from Bohle and Greskovits’ post-Socialist capitalist taxonomy and incorporated 
in my explanation of the institutional configuration of the Romanian political economy, 
in order to analyse the identity of actors and institutions, and the existing multi-level 
interactions influencing the institutional context.  
2.2.3 Economic Geography Approach 
This approach entails the positing of the concept of variegation at the core of the 
neoliberalisation project. Neoliberalism is state-led. Because the nature of the state is 
distinct across countries, this renders neoliberalism to be country specific – more 
precisely, distinct neoliberal agendas will be pursued in terms of scale, strength and 
time (Tickell and Peck, 2003; Peck and Theodore, 2007). Moreover, these agendas are 
44 
 
contingent on the specific national context, its specific institutional configuration and 
historical legacies, in that they are neither implemented in the same manner and through 
the same methods across countries, nor do they produce the same outcomes in different 
nation-states: “neoliberal political practice was constructed in and through uneven 
institutional terrains [...] neoliberalisation processes were directly shaped by the legacies 
of the regulatory uneven development and crisis formation within the inherited 
institutional landscapes” (Brenner et al., 2009, 213). What this entails is that the 
presentation of a homogeneous space of exchange flows and the theorisation of 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic system of capitalism is a flawed approach – instead, 
rather than having one universal model there are varieties of neoliberalism.
10
  
Literature differentiates the neoliberal transitions that have occurred in developed, post-
Keynesian states from those that have been implemented in the post-Socialist world. 
While the former have been characterised as ‘soft neoliberal projects’ (Peck, 2004), the 
latter have been defined as ‘harder and more externally driven’ transitions that extend 
beyond the standard deregulation of labour markets and the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises to the wholesale institutional re-construction of capitalism. Brenner et al. 
theorise that a fertile landscape for market-oriented regulatory development is facilitated 
by what they have termed as “conjectural openings, political vulnerabilities, crisis 
points” (2009, 211). More specifically, these moments of impasse provide various 
strategic opportunities for the implementation of market-oriented measures within the 
domestic institutional context. The Romanian post-Socialist institutional context of the 
1990s was permeated by such “conjectural openings, political vulnerabilities, crisis 
points” (2009, 211)  
The Structural Adjustment Programmes dubbed as the Washington Consensus were 
implemented as a set of ‘one size fits all’ policy measures or a generally applicable 
universal neoliberal convergence programmes (Williamson, 1994).
11
 These Programmes 
were aimed at transforming the non-market post-Socialist societies into a vision of the 
free market liberal economy epitomised by the US model of competitive relations and 
minimal government involvement (Gelb and Gray, 1991). Market-led principles were 
meant to solve the problems of over-industrialisation and over-concentration in heavy 
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 From my literature review, the following works theorised the existence of a variation in the 
institutionalisation of neoliberalism: Thelen (2014), Birch and Mykhnenko (2009), Peck and Theodore 
(2007), Albo (2005), Peck (2004), Hall (2003), Tickell and Peck (2003).  
11 
While overall the same across countries, the Structural Adjustment Programmes had some country-
specific adaptations and their implementation was not homogenous across different national varieties. 
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industries via the implementation of an industrial restructuring reform based on a 
laissez-faire approach. According to Birch and Mykhnenko (2009), phase one of the 
neoliberal project in CEE attempted to create a state-led model of Continental 
capitalism based around large, domestically owned industrial enterprises and domestic 
sources of capital; however, this internally oriented strategy of neoliberal adjustment 
proved to be unsuccessful. By the late 1990s, this institutional framework was replaced 
with an externally oriented strategy that aimed to insert the post-Socialist economies of 
CEE in the regional European and global economy via the attraction of FDI and MNCs 
(Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Myant, 2007).
12
  
One of the major advantages of the economic geography approach constitutes its 
property of multiscalarity, which is the connection between international and national 
organisations, and the collaboration between foreign and domestic elites, which are 
integrated in the explanation of the institutional configuration of states and their 
institutional change. Thus, elements of change are treated at multiple levels and rather 
than being explored in a vacuum they are posited within an interconnected system i.e. 
policy formulation and implementation is examined as a process undertaken at both the 
national level and international level; the domestic is influenced by decisions and 
practices implemented by the external, but at the same time the domestic has its own 
policy agenda that can be further adapted to and extended  in a diversified way to a 
regional and even local level. 
The economic geographers also conceptualise and integrate a relational approach 
between capital and labour. My argument is that as neoliberalisation ensues there is a 
changing dynamic between the sphere of labour and that of capital. The restructuring of 
capital automatically reshapes the structure, role and specialisation of labour. Birch and 
Mykhnenko (2009) identify three possible directions or varieties of neoliberal 
restructuring in CEE, which very well illustrate this capital-labour complementarity. 
The first direction is that of severe de-industrialisation, massive decline in traditional 
fulltime employment, the downgrading of economic activities and intense loss of human 
capital skills in both industrial and service sectors. According to the authors, this 
restructuring path fits well with the trajectories followed by Romanian and Bulgarian 
large industrially dependent regions. The second direction is that of re-construction and 
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manufacturing upgrading. It entails the extension of high-technology manufacturing vis-
à-vis the decline of low-technology sectors, a growth in low value-added services vis-à-
vis the stagnation or even decline of high value-added services, and a moderate 
reduction in the degree of over-industrialisation. This restructuring path fits well with 
the trajectories followed by Czech and Slovak large industrially dependent regions. The 
third and last path of re-construction is that of ‘creation’. This path involves the creation 
of an economic structure dominated by the service sector and a moderate decline in the 
level of de-industrialisation. This direction entails a decline in the technological 
capacities of both low-tech, low value-added and high-tech, high value-added industrial 
sectors, while there is a rapid and substantial increase in the technological capacities of 
both low-tech and high-tech service sectors. The authors argue that this type of 
restructuring path is limited to Polish large industrially dependent regions. 
We must be careful when we apply Birch and Mykhnenko’s three possible directions of 
neoliberal restructuring to analyse economies in Eastern Europe. Indeed this framework 
sheds light on some of the central characteristics of these post-Socialist states, but their 
grouping together in clusters might only lead to the identification of some superficial 
similarities while ignoring more unique, macro-, meso- and even micro-specific 
institutional peculiarities that give these states spatial distinctiveness and institutional 
diversity. Moreover, what Birch and Mykhnenko fail to recognise is that states can have 
a mixture of different directions of neoliberal restructuring, rather than encompassing 
large industrial dependent regions following a homogenous, universal market-oriented 
path. Schneiberg (2007) considers the concept of institutional heterogeneity within the 
national configuration and the existence of valuable inputs for the creation of alternative 
paths that exist alongside the main path. The central idea is that in every capitalist form 
there is far more variety beyond the dominant path and that this does not necessarily 
mean that one system will cannibalise the other, leading to the destabilisation of the 
overall system. Moreover, Schneiberg observes the creation of unexpected 
complementarities between the dominant path and the alternative institutional logics. 
Crouch et al. (2009) and Lane and Wood (2009) also find evidence indicating the 
peaceful co-habitation of distinct capitalist varieties within a national political economy. 
In my empirical chapters, I will demonstrate this existence of diverging localised 
economies within the national Romanian variant, with each of the sectors that I 




2.2.4 Historical Institutionalist Approach 
One of the fundamental purposes of this school of thought is to link the past with the 
present and future. The primary assumption is that history represents a story of 
institutional evolution, as North puts it: “history has been characterised primarily as a 
story of institutional evolution in which the historical performance of economies can 
only be understood as part of a sequential story” (North, 1991, 1). The author asserts 
that institutions shape and create the specific incentive structure of an economy, and as 
that structure evolves, it influences and directs the pattern of economic change towards 
growth, stagnation or decline (North et al., 2009). Thus, the history of the world’s 
economies can be divided into two categories: 1) economies experiencing sustained 
economic growth, and 2) economies unable to sustain economic growth.  
In analysing the process of development, North, Wallace and Weingast in their 2009 
book Violence and Social Orders create typologies of entry, classifying societies as 
either open access orders or limited access orders. According to North et al., powerful 
elites have always sought to establish alliances in order to create rents and to limit the 
ability of citizens to form organisations by conferring this right solely to members of the 
dominant coalition – this is what constitutes a limited access order or the natural state. 
There are societies though where there is open entry. The authors state that the central 
institutional factors that differentiate open access orders from limited access orders 
include the prevalence of impersonal networks and the presence of perpetually lived 
organisations.  
North et al.’s assumption – that the dominant elites are stable but by no means static in 
natural states – allows me to analyse the changes in the size and composition of elites, 
but also the interaction between elites and non-elite members. I argue that every 
dominant coalition is formed of multiple subcoalitions. Furthermore, my assumption is 
that there are constant fluctuations regarding the identity and internal distributions of 
the dominant coalition. Compromises have to be made between subcoalitions, and there 
is a continuous renegotiation of rents and privileges. Another central assumption is that 
some of these subcoalitions will suffer from a loss in identity strength and legitimacy, 
ultimately being weeded out and integrated among the non-elite ranks. I argue that elites 
will always attempt to increase the rents they extract and the power they hold over the 
institutional structure – one way to achieve this goal is to tightly control the size of the 
dominant coalition, limiting it to a minimum necessary. The key here is to precisely 
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determine the minimum size at which the elite group will yield enough power to control 
the state and to keep in check competing factions, or at least achieve some temporary 
form of stability. Conversely, my assumption is that different non-elite groups can 
gradually acquire a certain level of legitimacy and decision-making capital, and as a 
result, become new elite members. With time, these new power players can gain 
sufficient power to disrupt other elite subcoalitions and influence the structure of the 
regime or industrial order.   
North et al. claim that in limited access orders, wealth and power is concentrated in the 
same hands – this is a key assumption that mirrors the close intertwining between 
capital and the state prevalent in Romania. Another factor that distinguishes limited 
access orders from open access orders is the prevalence of non-market principles in the 
former, while the latter are based on market-based principles. Moreover, North et al. 
argue that in natural states politicians adopt an interventionist approach to markets. 
Contrastingly, market-oriented principles dominate open access societies, such as high-
income Western economies, where political entry is only limited by a minimal set of 
criteria. It is precisely this institutional configuration, which awards open access states a 
comparative advantage in coping with crises or external shocks, as they can adapt more 
dynamically and champion new policy packages. 
North et al. emphasize that societies are not static entities, eternally stuck within their 
allocated typology; instead, transition can take root in the natural states, when personal 
elite relationships transform into impersonal elite relationships, as elite privileges 
become rights applied to wider segment of the population. They claim that when a 
natural state develops the institutions, organisations, norms and beliefs necessary to 
sustain intra-elite impersonal relationships, the state is on the ‘doorstep’ – more 
specifically, the state is in the process of institutionally upgrading and attaining open 
access order institutions. To meet the doorstep conditions and make the transition to an 
open access order state, societies need to continue the transformation of their intra-elite 
relations.  
Building on earlier research, North et al. (2009, 2013) design a theory of institutional 
evolution that is neither mechanistic nor does it result in the spontaneous emergence of 
new institutional frameworks. Countries do not necessarily incrementally evolve from 
limited access orders to open access orders – this evolutionary path is not always 
applicable, nor is it guaranteed. North et al. (2009, 2013) demonstrate clear cases of 
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stagnation or even regression after decades of positive evolution and sustained 
economic growth. In some instances, states find ways to design and reinforce rules of 
the game that will enable them to resume the pattern of economic change towards 
growth; while in other instances, states experience an institutional involution to a less 
complex and sophisticated type of society, and in some cases states can even experience 
a form of ‘death’ or ‘failure’. Some states can even become stuck in an 
underperforming, less institutionally complex configuration that can act as a 
developmental trap. I argue that these assumptions can be further extended and applied 
to different localised sectoral economies within a national framework.  
One of the major deficiencies of North et al.’s studies (2009, 2013) results from the 
absence of agency or put another way, a limited micro-level reasoning to support their 
arguments and framework. The active agents or actors that permeate the institutional 
context are not introduced to us – we are unaware of the decisions they make, the 
strategies they deploy, the challenges they face, what interactions and exchanges they 
have with other players, the roles they perform and the powers they possess, and what 
are their values, beliefs and norms. Whether they are politicians or entrepreneurs as part 
of the dominant elites, or members of the working class forming the non-elites – we 
have no qualitative insights regarding their identity and the context in which they 
operate. Thus, concepts such as ‘intra-elite impersonal relationships’ and ‘doorstep 
conditions’ seem to have been articulated without any flesh on their bones, and as a 
consequence, they are unable and inadequate to provide a rational and complete 
explanation as to why some states have achieved sustained economic growth, while 
others have been unable to develop.  
On the other hand, I argue that historical institutionalism offers a higher level of 
abstraction and accomplishes a macro-level institutional analysis relative to the VoC. 
The VoC can be characterised as a firm-centred approach, giving micro-foundations to a 
more general theory on the different makeup of national political economies. Although 
the two theoretical approaches do not speak to each other, when taken apart and having 
their ‘moving parts’ operationalised, they can complement each other for what the other 
is lacking. Moreover, the contribution of economic geography provides a multi-level 
conceptualisation of institutions that are positioned within an interconnected system. 
More specifically, institutions and drivers of institutional change of the national 
political economy (the macro level) need to be understood and analysed in connection 
to the variety of sectoral economies (the meso level) punctuating the national order, and 
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furthermore, in connection to the set of firms (the micro level) driving each individual 
sector. The national scale requires to be further integrated within an international 
context that is punctuated by transnational actors and supranational transformative 
forces. Hence, the emerging system is one that establishes a clear framework of 
interconnectedness and communication between the different scales, with each scale 
having the power to influence or trigger institutional changes in the other. Thus, by 
linking together and operationalising the different approaches – VoC, historical 
institutionalism and economic geography – I can build a more accurate and holistic 
picture of institutional change that incorporates a multi-level dimension. Instead of 
constructing another variety of capitalism in CEE, a more nuanced and 
multidimensional story of institutional change will be captured through the inclusion of 
a range of variables, such as the identity of elites vs. non-elites, the diverging internal 
dynamics and the multiplicity of interactive exchanges between institutional actors, and 
the significance of historical legacies as elements and drivers of change. 
2.2.5 Class Analysis of Elites – A Theorisation of the Concept of Elites 
There has been an increased degree of awareness about the existence of a super-rich 
elite group in social sciences (Piketty, 2014); however, this has failed to have wider 
implications for class analysis. Savage (2000) demonstrates that there have been 
profound social transformations in the last fifty years, rendering the existing 
conceptions of class embedded in the classical industrial paradigm outdated. In spite of 
these profound social changes and the erosion of the traditional class stratification, 
Savage (2015) advises one should proceed with caution when declaring the end of 
class.
13
 Taking into consideration the fact that the differentiation between classes has 
strongly accentuated – for example, the growing social inequality between the 
proletariat vs. the super-rich, I agree with Savage that we simply cannot treat the 
concept of class as outdated. The aim is to reposition the concepts of elites and 
dominant coalition within class analysis in the contemporary paradigm, by taking into 
consideration the effect of historical legacies and the specificity of the institutional 
context. According to Skeggs (2015), without fully comprehending and incorporating 
these histories and dependencies, we cannot develop a holistic picture of social practice 
and capture the importance of localities. 
                                                          
13 
Beck and Willms (2004) have labelled class as a ‘zombie concept’, while Giddens (1991) has called the 
concept of class redundant.  
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In order to analyse and measure stratification and inequality, one does not necessarily 
need to use the concept of class. According to Savage (2015), class analysis is about 
politics. My argument is that economic inequalities need to be placed within broader 
social, cultural and political relational networks. This approach draws on Bourdieu’s 
approach regarding class. Bourdieu (1985) talks about the relational attributes of class 
and he argues that classifications are the result of a wider process of contestation and 
struggle. The fortunes of one class are not independent from those of another. Toscano 
and Woodcock (2015) are also concerned with these dynamics of interdependence. 
Moreover, Toscano and Woodcock (2015) highlight the antagonistic politics behind 
class formation, as well as the political nature of class exploitation. Thus, I argue that 
the separation of politics from the notion of class formation would result in a mere 
taxonomic exercise and as in many contemporary writings on inequality from the social 
sciences, the relationship between class and power would be dissolved. Similar to 
Bourdieu (1985), and Toscano and Woodcock (2015), I believe that when analysing the 
concept of class one needs to adopt a relational approach which positions the different 
categories of classes in an interconnected social arena that is punctuated by both 
antagonistic relationships and arrangements of coexistence based on the centrality of 
exploitation and domination. This assumption mirrors the historical institutionalist 
tradition, which when unpacking the concept of political settlements clearly highlights 
the fact that the state is founded on a historically determined balance of power between 
various antagonistic and competing interests (North et al., 2007, 2009, 2013). 
Furthermore, the way in which this theory of class constructs a social arena based on 
dynamic exchanges resembles the Polanyian conceptualisation of an interactive and 
antagonistic institutionalist environment.  
The social stratification in Romania as well as the class system in any other CEE state is 
highly diversified from that of any high-income advanced nation. Of course, that is the 
case with any class system, where social context specificity drives the formation 
divergence and nuance. However, the social agents, dependencies and histories of CEE 
nations have a highly distinct character by comparison to the social structures and 
developments in Western European states. According to the literature, in post-Socialist 
patrimonial national varieties based on client-parent relations such as several of the 
models in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, there is a larger degree of social inequality 
between the upper classes and the lower classes – or, the elites and labour (Cernat, 
2006; King, 2007).  
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The regional literature conceptualises the CEE social arena as a site of struggle and 
contestation between senior state officials and large business group representatives who 
comprise the super-wealthy and powerful class, whereas the working class has suffered 
from a gradual erosion of its powers and a downgrade in its positionality within the 
overarching power structure (Funk and Lesch, 2004; Cernat, 2006; Mrozowicki, 2011, 
2014; Ribarova, 2012; Trif, 2012; Martin, 2013). Central to the politics of class is the 
ability of some groups to exclude others from the coalition or power structure where 
value can be accessed, accumulated and/or converted (Bourdieu, 1989; Lamont, 1992; 
Skeggs, 2015).  
Savage (2015) and Wakeling and Savage (2015) talk about the ‘wealth elite’ as a 
cohesive group, having a composition that is well networked among its members which 
permits it to deploy mechanisms and actions with confidence. This can be linked to the 
assumption that some groups have the power to orchestrate the exclusion of other social 
members. In order for the ‘wealth elite’ to be more cohesive as a group, a reduction in 
the membership of the coalition is set in motion. As North et al. highlight (2009, 2013), 
it is always the weaker institutional players who are the ones are eliminated from the 
existing power structure or coalition.  
I have spoken about the wealth elites or the dominant elites, and I have analysed their 
position vis-à-vis the working class. I will now briefly discuss the players that are in the 
middle between these two classes. According to Cernat (2006), the middle class is 
comprised by a group of low- to mid-level managers and state officials that are 
subordinated to the wealth elites and act as a transmission belt for their exploitative 
actions and strategies. Using the Romanian case study, Cernat further argues that the 
degree of exploitation of the proletariat is considerably greater in the post-Socialist CEE 
region than in high-income Western European countries, where a more robust system of 
checks and balances is implemented that limits the power of wealth elites, such as 
comprehensive welfare systems, collective bargaining and unionisation, formalised 
working conditions, worker rights, etc. 
One can observe within the Romanian social context a redrawing of the wealth elites – 
more exactly, the upper class can be seen as pulling itself away from the other classes, 
with the division between the upper and lower levels of state officials and business 
representatives being larger than that between the overall class of state officials and 
business representatives and the working class. The social structure is defined by tall, 
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hierarchical structures that comprise several layers of mid- and low-level state officials 
and business representatives that also exploit and extract value from the working class. 
Together all these social structures are dominated by the upper elite level (wealth elites), 
who exploits mid- and low-level state officials and business representatives and workers 
in order to access, achieve and convert value.  
So far, I have presented the prevalent social stratification and emphasized the internal 
dynamics between the different social classes, while at the same time emphasising the 
specificity of the social context and class analysis in CEE. I further unpack the issue of 
specificity by looking at the different ways in which wealth elites are powerful. To do 
this I will utilise Mann’s theoretical framework of state and elite power (1984). Mann 
hypothesises two meanings of power: despotic vs. infrastructural. Despotic power refers 
to those actions and strategies performed by the dominant coalition that do not involve 
the routine, institutionalised negotiations with civil society groups; instead, despotic 
powers are associated with less developed forms of society as illustrated by various 
historical states from the past. I argue that there is a strong relationship between Mann’s 
theory of power and North’s conceptualisation of limited access order (2009, 2013). 
Infrastructural power or the power of the state refers to the penetration or central 
coordination of activities of civil society through the state’s own infrastructure – 
making the state a mere instrument of forces (Mann, 1984). Applying this definition, 
Mann argues that Western capitalist societies are despotically weak but infrastructurally 
strong.  My assumption is that this is not completely the case with CEE societies. While 
I do not claim that these post-Socialist varieties are despotically strong and 
infrastructurally weak, my argument is that within these institutional configurations 
politicians are to a much lesser extent controlled by civil society groups and the rule of 
law. Moreover, the relationship between politicians and business representatives is of a 
clientelistic nature (King and Szeléleni, 2005; Cernat, 2006; King, 2007). According to 
various authors, wealth elites in CEE political economies have the tools to 
surreptitiously amass wealth, hold onto power and positions utilising undemocratic 
means, expropriate and siphon earnings and assets, and even find legislative loopholes 
to overturn legal traditions enshrining constitutional rule or private property (Cernat, 
2006; King, 2007; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013; Martin, 2013). Hence, CEE societies 
aren’t as ‘infrastructurally strong’ as their Western counterparts – the weakness of the 
state as a mere instrument of forces has created a set of institutional voids that have 
enabled wealth elites to yield greater power over the industrial structure and exploit 
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civil society. More specifically, the state is characterised by an unbinding structure of 
rules that creates the potential for wealth elites of exploitation and achievement of 
private interests.  
Mann (1984) analyses the different levels of despotic vs. infrastructural power across 
historical state cases and comes up with a four-category taxonomy: feudal (low despotic 
power, low infrastructural coordination), imperial (high despotic power, low 
infrastructural coordination), bureaucratic (low despotic power, high infrastructural 
coordination) and authoritarian (high despotic power, high infrastructural coordination). 
Socialist CEE societies were the closest to the authoritarian ideal type. According to 
Mann (1984), the authoritarian type is comprised of a more institutionalised form of 
despotism, where the competing coalitions cannot escape the infrastructural power of 
the state, nor are they structurally separate from the state – this results in the creation of 
a configuration with high despotic power over civil society groups and the ability to 
enforce this power instrumentally. However, since the transition of CEE states from 
plan to market and their transformation into post-Socialist capitalist varieties, they have 
embarked on a path of convergence towards the bureaucratic type. However, historical 
legacies and context specificity persist and continue to influence the institutional 
configuration of these states – that is why to some extent we can still observe instances 
of despotic power of wealth elites in CEE varieties.  
I will now focus on some of the shortcomings of the literature on class analysis and 
elites. The literature talks about the existence of a professional-managerial service class 
which is distinct from the intermediate and manual working classes (Goldhorpe and 
McKnight, 2004; Benett et al., 2008; Le Roux, 2008; Savage, 2015). According to the 
authors, the professional-managerial service class distinguishes itself from the mid- and 
low-level managerial classes, which in reality are more similar to the intermediate class. 
Writing within the same area of research, Khan (2010) talks about the existence of a 
new meritocratic performative elite culture that is oriented towards achievement and 
intense competitive activity. Furthermore, Liu and Grusky (2013) characterise this 
professional-managerial service class by emphasizing the complex analytical skills 
possessed by its members. The authors highlight how important an elite level education 
is for these social actors who are active in highly dynamic economic sectors, noting that 
the payout for the cognitive skills of the professional-managerial service class is far in 
excess than any other intermediate or working class sets of skills. My main concern here 
is that the conceptualisation of the professional-managerial service class is specific to 
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high-income developed countries. The formation of a professional-managerial service 
class has taken place very late in CEE societies, with the social class being in the early 
stages of development. Furthermore, as Myant emphasized, the newly emerged CEE 
varieties of capitalism of the 1990s had to start “without capitalists and without capital” 
(2007, 105). There were no domestic capitalists and the institutional configuration of 
these states lacked a domestic managerial class. The intervention of foreign capital 
within the industrial structure of these states triggered a process of knowledge transfer 
and skills upgrading, which in turn pushed the development of social stratification and 
the emergence of a domestic managerial class. This can be linked to the assumptions I 
have drawn from the path dependency, Polanyian varieties and economic geography 
approaches – more specifically, the fact that the formation and development of certain 
institutions in CEE states has been externally determined by supranational forces and 
transnational agents.  
Other than that, these studies have a severe deficiency – they fail to extend the concept 
of elites to the political sphere (Goldhorpe and McKnight, 2004; Benett et al., 2008; Le 
Roux, 2008; Khan, 2010; Liu and Grusky, 2013; Savage, 2015). The professional-
managerial service class in its conceptualisation seems to be a product solely of the 
economic sphere. It is true that at times the authors talk of power and influence, 
domination and exploitation, but not much else. There is no construction of a theoretical 
framework regarding the inner functioning of the political sphere, nor are the affiliations 
between the economic and political spheres properly unpacked.  
When talking about modes of accumulation and the mechanisms at work, Savage 
(2015), Piketty (2014) and Grusky (2012) divide individuals into a) those who hold 
substantial portfolios of stock, and thus have a direct interest in the modes of 
accumulation, and b) those individuals who utilise their sets of skills to contribute to the 
strategies of accumulation employed that earn a specific return in exchange for their 
skills. Both of these modes of accumulation are legal and official mechanisms. We 
know that in advanced Western capitalist societies the upper class employs a variety of 
modes of accumulation that tend to be legal, or the borderline of legality, with marginal 
instances tending to be illegal. The institutional context of the CEE region is different – 
what can be seen is an upper class more willing to engage in modes of accumulation 
that transgress legality. Hence, the issue here is one of recognising the importance of 
location and consequently, the specificity of the context. The theoretical frameworks 
constructed by Savage, Piketty and Grusky lack this specificity, having been developed 
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for high-income, developed economies and thus, they cannot simply be applied to a 
post-Socialist context. Another thing to note here is that the capital market in CEE states 
is skeletally developed (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; Ban, 2013).  
Although I draw on a lot from Savage (2015) and it is important that I emphasise how 
much his study has helped me understand the differences between the wealth elite in 
Western capitalist societies vis-à-vis CEE post-Socialist societies, I must underline 
some of the main limitations of this study. First of all, the notion of class is situated 
within the social relations of a single national context. This means that the issues of 
debate that Savage focuses on are parochially British and very different from the issues 
of class in mainland Europe, not to mention in CEE societies. Secondly, Savage does 
state that class analysis is about politics; however, when conceptualising his descriptive 
account and classificatory proposal he fails to capture the antagonistic politics of class 
formation. Thus, instead of developing a relational analysis of class the author shifts to 
a taxonomic one. Toscano and Woodcock (2015) in their critique of Savage also 
highlight this point, stating that social classes and elites don’t exist in a social vacuum – 
instead, what we see is a relationship of interdependence, where the fortunes of one 
order are dependent on those of another order, and furthermore, where the actions of 
one social group influence status of the other. Furthermore, according to Toscano and 
Woodcock, Savage fails to engage in relational analysis when opting to utilise the 
language of ‘privilege’ and ‘advantage’ and rejecting the concept of exploitation. 
Wright also highlights the importance of using the notions of exploitation and favouring 
for understanding class through his ‘inverse independent welfare principle’ – ‘the 
material welfare of exploiters causally depends on the material deprivations of the 
exploited’ (2005, 23). My study attempts to overcome these limitations precisely by 
recognising the role of politics and the conceptualisation of an antagonistic institutional 
context where politics is a central dynamic – as I have drawn from the Polanyian 
varieties approach – and the implementation of a relational perspective between the 
different categories of social actors – based on the approach taken from economic 
geography.  
2.3 Conceptualising New Drivers of Institutional Change – Research Questions 
My study seeks to provide an explanation for institutional change in the CEE region, 
more specifically the Romanian national variety, but I do so by challenging and 
stepping away from the traditional elements of change of the comparative political 
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economy literature. The aim is to introduce a more dynamic, historically-based, context-
specific and agent-driven conceptualisation of institutional change, and in order to 
operationalise this approach, I hypothesise the existence of dominant elites, the presence 
of international forces and the role of labour as the main drivers of change.  
My overarching research question is what is the nature of institutional change in the 
Romanian national political economy? and what are the drivers of institutional change? 
In order to answer this, I break the research agenda into three different sections that will 
unearth the elements of institutional change. 
2.3.1 The Identity and Role of Elites 
First, I begin the investigation by asking who are the elites? present in the Romanian 
political economy. My theoretical starting point is Cernat’s concept of ‘iron triangles’, 
which defines a tightly linked dominant coalition of managers, politicians and trade 
union leaders (as subcoalition groups) that permeated the Romanian politico-economic 
context during the first decade post-Socialism (2006). However, I quickly realised that 
this theoretical framework is representative of a past period and has applicability to a 
specific historical moment, rather than covering the entire timeframe of my study. 
Moreover, this initial identification of elites was designed to explain the institutional 
configuration of the coal mining sector, and as such, does not recognise the institutional 
variety of other regional sectoral economies. Additionally, the concept of ‘iron 
triangles’ was constructed within an institutional context characterised by inward-
orientation, the implementation of populist industrial policies, and the formation of 
capitalism based on domestic capital; hence, there is no consideration given to the role 
of external agents and foreign ownership. The emergence of new FDI-based sectors – 
such as business services, IT, banking and finance – and the identity of the players 
controlling these institutional orders cannot be explained utilising a conceptual 
framework that was designed to explain the inner functioning of a domestically-oriented 
elite structure.  
Previously in this chapter, I have discussed that together elites constitute a dominant 
coalition, formed of multiple subcoalitions or sub-groups of power players. 
Furthermore, another central assumption is that the dominant coalition changes its 
composition and structure over time, hence elites are never static. My argument is that 
there is a continuous process of negotiating positionality within the coalition and the 
allocation of rents (North et al., 2009, 2013). The dominant coalition must constantly 
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pay attention to the development or emergence of existing or new subcoalitions and 
their accumulation of power, as there is a possibility they will attempt to displace the 
existing order and take control of the state. Thus, there are frequent changes in the size 
and composition of the dominant coalition via the exclusion of weak members 
experiencing a loss in legitimacy and the inclusion new strong members. Hence, my 
research question is what are the changing dynamics of the dominant coalition over 
time? Furthermore, to capture a holistic picture of the institutional landscape and the 
variegated exchanges between the different categories of institutional actors, I posit the 
question how do we map out the evolution of the relationship between elite and non-
elite members? 
I then go on to analyse the different institutional measures and directions driven by 
elites within the Romanian political economy through the three industries incorporated 
in my study. In order to examine this, I advance the research question what role if any 
do elites play in the Romanian national political economy? To develop a 
comprehensive understanding regarding the role that elites play, I look at the nature, 
degree, implications, timeframe and geography of these institutional players’ actions 
over the structure and configuration of coal mining, auto and business services.  
2.3.2 The Identity and Role of International Forces 
Failure to consolidate a model of ‘capitalism from within’ in the first decade post-
Socialism, resulted in Romania converging towards an economic model oriented 
towards the liberal spectrum that lies somewhere in-between the dependent market 
category specific to the Visegráds and the radical neoliberal typology identified in the 
Baltics. My study argues that the inflow of external actors within the national political 
economy has led to the formation of a model of ‘capitalism from without’ that depends 
on FDI and MNCs. Hence, my research question to what extent do international forces 
explain institutional change? is examined across each of the industries I analyse. The 
central focus of my study is to capture what role does FDI play? across the Romanian 
institutional configuration. 
I argue for the establishing of an external order, however, my assumption is based on a 
principle of non-coercion. My argument is that this institutional configuration has been 
facilitated via the collaboration between the Romanian state and international forces. 
Domestic political elites facilitated the imposition of a foreign capital-oriented model of 
capitalism by colluding with representatives of foreign capital. While it was the foreign 
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elites who conceptualised and drove this liberal-integrationist institutional order, it was 
ultimately domestic elites who allowed and ratified the consolidation of this model of 
externally-driven capitalism. In consideration of the above, I posit the following 
research question: who or what has facilitated the establishing of an external order? 
Furthermore, just because this external order was facilitated via collaborative 
arrangements between domestic and foreign players does not mean that this interaction 
is always based on collaboration. Instead, the nature and degree of exchanges can at 
times be antagonistic, with domestic and foreign players having diverging institutional 
agendas.  
2.3.3 The Role of Labour 
In light of the changing Romanian political-economic structure and the continuous state 
of flux within the structure of the dominant coalition, I will analyse what role does 
labour play across the national political economy? This research question will be 
investigated across the three industries incorporated in my study. My expectation from 
the beginning was to obtain differently patterned institutional stories due to a variety of 
diverging factors: age of industry, period of active existence of the industry, orientation 
of the industry, mix of institutional actors permeating the context, and institutional 
outcome (failure, stagnation and/or success).   
Furthermore, rather than statically mapping out the role of labour as an element of 
change at a fixed point in time, I observe the incremental modifications that labour as a 
social category has suffered over time by asking the research question what is the 
changing role of labour? When asking this question, I am interested in observing how 
the power and positionality of labour has changed over time across the institutional 
structure of each sector. It is essential to highlight that the position of labour will not be 
treated as an insular institutional concept, without any connection and affiliation to the 
other institutional actors and elements permeating the Romanian institutional 
configuration. Instead, the position of labour will be examined in a dynamic and 
relational setting characterised by a multitude of social actors, subcoalitions and 
institutions. Furthermore, one needs to understand the role of other institutional actors – 
the polity, capital, and international forces – in driving institutional measures and 
directives that influenced changes and the re-configuration of labour conditions. Thus, 
analysing the actors and phenomena that shifted the power and positionality of labour is 




Research Methodology – The Qualitative Approaches Implemented  
 
3.1 Introduction  
I begin the chapter by emphasizing to the reader the contextual elements that spurred the 
initiation of this fieldwork. In the following section, I commence the evaluation of my 
data sites – more precisely, I analyse the ‘wheres’, ‘whens’ and ‘hows’ of my research. 
Here, I present the research methods that I utilise throughout my study. The research 
methods that I have chosen are in-depth interviewing, archival research and the 
collection and analysis of supplementary data in the form of online newspaper articles 
and technical reports. In the next section of this chapter, I describe the techniques I 
employed to analyse the data that I collected: first, I define the type of analysis my 
study makes use of; second, I discuss the frequency and timing of the analysis; and 
third, I present the different stages of analytical work that were employed. In the 
following section, I move on to discussing my research design. The elements that I have 
included as part of my research design are: the theory of methods I situate myself in, the 
case study design, the case study selection, a discussion regarding the issue of scale and 
the implementation of longitudinal methods.  
3.2 Starting From Where I Am 
According to Lofland et al. (2006), the initiation of successful fieldwork requires (at 
least) two elements: 1) intellectual curiosity about a particular subject and 2) gaining 
access to the settings and people from which we can collect the required data. What 
Lofland et al. want to say is that one’s research is influenced by or emerges from 
elements of one’s personal biography. Research can be determined by personal 
experiences and opportunities that allow the researcher to gain access to social settings. 
In other instances, social studies emerge out of curiosity spurred by academic debate, 
class participation and readings. Based on Lofland et al. (2006), ultimately it is when 
the researcher puts both elements together – intellectual curiosity and having access – 
that field studies emerge.  
My identity as a Romanian citizen; my continuous engagement with Romanian news, 
the print and online press, and academic papers/texts; the interaction that I have had 
with individuals involved and/or interested in Romanian political and economic affairs 
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– all of these have provided me with a topic that I was motivated to study. These 
elements of current biography and social reality provided me with imperative physical 
and psychological access to the Romanian social setting of elites, power dynamics and 
industrial structures. These so-called experiences resulted in a high level of interest that 
gave me the motivation and curiosity, which in combination with having access, to 
begin my naturalistic study of the Romanian political and economic context. According 
to Riemer (1977), when utilising immediate biographic experiences as a springboard for 
commencing field studies the researcher engages in what is called opportunistic 
research. Lofland et al. (1984) claim that as social researchers we often make 
problematic in our research what is problematic in our lives.  
‘Starting from where I am’ can result in methodological and ethical problems. In my 
case, the methodological difficulties that I had to manage were avoiding bias; 
controlling relational closeness, which entails building relationships and rapport in the 
early stages of your research vis-à-vis detachment, withdrawal and taking distance as 
fieldwork progresses (Pollner and Emerson, 1983); refraining from telling the story 
(based on my familiarity with the social setting) and instead frame the story based on 
the analysis of the data collected. Despite the existence of some methodological and 
ethical issues, it is believed that ‘starting where I am’ creates the vital connections and 
communication between the personal/emotional side on the one hand, and the 
intellectual work to come on the other (Lofland et al., 2006). Without having a real 
foundation in personal sentiment, research can easily fall into the trap in becoming 
ritualistic, superficial and alienated labour (Roth, 1966).   
3.3 Evaluating Data Sites 
Having identified my research topic, I then had to decide how to best pursue this 
interest – that is analysing the ‘wheres’, ‘whens’ and ‘hows’ of the research in the most 
appropriate and feasible way. My overall goal was to capture rich pictures and thick 
descriptions about the Romanian politico-economic context (Geertz, 1973); more 
precisely, to understand what are the drivers of institutional change within the selected 
three sectors during a relatively prolonged period of time. Data collection took place 
between the 19
th
 of March 2017 and 30
th
 of July 2018, with fieldwork being organised 
into three separate trips: 
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1) The first research trip – took place between the 19
th
 of March 2017 and the 30
th
 of 
April 2017. In terms of analysing the ‘where’, the fieldwork was conducted in 
Bucharest and Timişoara. 
2) The second research trip – took place between the 3
rd
 of July 2017 and the 13
th
 of 
August 2017. The fieldwork was conducted in Bucharest. 
3) The third research trip – took place between the 14
th
 of April 2018 and the 13
th
 of 
May 2018. The fieldwork was conducted in Bucharest, Piteşti, Craiova and Timişoara. 
 
In order to obtain rich data, my study required direct and sustained interaction with the 
participants in the social reality or context that they operate in (Ragin and Amoroso, 
2011). In this instance, in order to achieve the highest level of familiarity with the 
subject of the study the researcher has to opt for direct observation, engagement and 
involvement – thus, choosing to ‘get close’ rather than to strive for objectivity and 
distance. By adopting this approach of direct observation and apprehension of the social 
setting, my study implements a naturalistic epistemology or theory of knowledge 
(Lofland et al., 2006). The research method that I have chosen, which is most closely 
associated with the naturalistic approach for direct observation and apprehension of 
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phenomena within the social setting, is in-depth interviewing. Due to the historical 
orientation of my study, I do recognise the fact that in-depth interviewing is not 
sufficient and/or appropriate as a method to collect data in relation to two of my chosen 
sectors – coal mining and auto – due to the fact that my investigation of the two 
industrial orders commences in the mid-1960s. According to some authors, matters such 
as historical settings or events cannot be properly ‘reached’ through direct apprehension 
(Banks, 2001; Gilbert, 2001; Babbie, 2003, 2008; Lofland et al., 2006). Hence, to 
achieve a more comprehensive historical narrative and to capture those historical 
phenomena that in-depth interviewing was unable to account for, I utilised archival 
research as a complementary research method.  
Thus, my study focuses on utilising mixed methods, or the systematic integration of two 
distinct research methodologies, to develop a comprehensive understanding about how 
institutional change and transformation has occurred within the Romanian political 
economy. The utilisation of mixed methods has permitted me to engage in a more 
comprehensive and synergistic form of data collection and analysis (Lofland et al., 
2006). Hurmerinta-Peltomaki and Nummela (2006) argue that mixed methods add value 
by increasing the validity of findings, informing the collection of the second data 
source, and assisting with knowledge creation. Moreover, Creswell et al. (2007) state 
that studies which incorporate mixed methods gain a deeper, broader understanding of 
the phenomena that are being investigated. According to a range of literatures, the 
utilisation of mixed methodology increases the certainty of findings and interpretation 
(Sieber, 1973; Morse and Chung, 2003; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003; Coyle and 
Williams, 2000). Furthermore, other advantages resulting from the incorporation of a 
mixed methodology in my study include: 1) the collection of rich; 2) filling 
informational gaps; 3) facilitating comparison; and 4) providing methodological 
flexibility.  
While it is important to emphasize the perceived benefit of integrating two distinct 
methodologies, mixed methods studies are challenging to implement (McKim, 2017). 
Conducting mixed methods research required additional time and resources due to the 





3.3.1 In-depth Interviewing 
Appropriateness  
In-depth interviewing was selected as a research method due to its ability to generate 
rich data in relation to the themes emerging from my research questions. This form of 
qualitative research helped contour a comprehensive image of the Romanian national 
variety through the conceptualisation of three industrial branches and their internal 
dynamics throughout time. Implementing any quantitative approach would have only 
resulted in the creation of a parsimonious institutional image (Neuman, 2000; Ragin and 
Amoroso, 2011). Moreover, quantitative approaches favour generality (Berg, 2009), 
whereas the purpose of my study is to generate in-depth knowledge about the Romanian 
political economy as a case, focusing on its structural particularities and key moments 
of historical institutional change (1960s-2010s). Another argument that supports the 
appropriateness of in-depth interviewing for my study relates to the number of 
‘variables’ utilised. In-depth interviewing created a detailed theoretical sketch of the 
Romanian state and sectoral internal dynamics by focusing on a multitude of ‘variables’ 
that uncovered nuances and subtleties. In comparison, the images constructed by 
quantitative approaches utilise a few variables (Dabbs, 1982; Ragin and Amoroso, 
2011), resulting in the creation of parsimonious image that links few attributes or 
variables across many cases. In this instance, quantitative approaches assume that all 
cases are more or less the same with respect to how they came to be the way they are, 
thus ignoring the complexity and uniqueness of social phenomena.                                   
Over a period of 15 months of research, I conducted a total of 38 interviews, out of 
which: 
- 12 interviews were with senior representatives of the auto industry;  
- 20 interviews were with senior representatives of the business services sector;  
- two interviews were conducted with Chamber of Commerce representatives that 
had applicability for all three industrial branches, with one representative having 
a senior role in the Romanian Chamber of Commerce, whereas the other was a 
member of the Romanian-Italian Chamber of Commerce;  
- one interview was conducted with a senior organised labour and social dialogue 
representative that had applicability on all three industrial branches;  
- one interview was conducted with a historian and Socialist regime specialist that 
had applicability for the coal and auto industries;  
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- one interview was conducted with a representative of the state specialised in 
subsidies that had applicability for auto and business services; 
- one interview was conducted with a specialist in the auto industry and Romanian 
industrial relations who works for a consulting firm exclusively dedicated to 
employee representatives and organised labour.  





























All interviews with the exception of one interview carried out with the CEO of Wipro 
were carried out in the Romanian language, the remaining exception was carried out in 
English. Interviews were relatively lengthy, lasting between 50 to 75 minutes, 
depending on how rich and detailed the repondents’ answers to my pre-determined 
questions were, as well as the quantity of probes that I introduced. Considering the elite 
roles and senior positions that my respondents held, I had to limit my interviews to 
more or less one hour as these individuals have very limited time (Conti and O’Neal, 
2007; Stephens, 2007). In terms of the interview structure, I opted for a semi-
standardised or semi-structured format. This entailed the design and implementation of 
a number of pre-determined questions and topics that were asked of each of my 
candidates from a specific sector (and company in the case of auto) in a systematic and 
consistent way (Berg, 2011). The implementation of a structured schedule allowed me 
to make comparisons across interviews and to identify major recurring themes 
(Newmann, 2007), such as the historical turning points of each individual sector, the 
central players permeating the internal dynamics, the structural problems plaguing the 
industrial orders during the Socialist regime, the role of international influences and the 
effects of foreign capital, and the changing role and position of (organised) labour vis-à-
vis other players. The relative flexibility of the semi-structured format allowed me to be 
receptive to new ideas brought up during the interview and to pursue these new areas 
with probes.  
Sampling 
In terms of the sampling strategy employed, I utilised snowball sampling or chain 
referral sampling (Penrod et al., 2003; Owens, 2005; Berg, 2011). In this instance, 
snowballing was the most appropriate sampling strategy because it allowed me to locate 
subjects with the ‘elite-like’ characteristics and roles/positions necessary in the study. 
According to Lee (1993), snowballing strategies are especially relied upon by social 
scientists who study sensitive topics, difficult to reach populations and elite-oriented 
classes.  
I was granted initial access to the research setting by a gatekeeper or guide – an 
executive director at Ipsos – that I had established in 2014, when I was conducting the 
fieldwork for my Masters dissertation. After the finalisation of my Masters, we kept in 
touch and in January 2017, I contacted him again to explain the purpose of my new 
research study and to ask him to facilitate access to potential informants. This 
gatekeeper and informant holds a pivotal position in the hierarchy of one of the top 
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business services MNCs in Bucharest and has been involved in the institutional 
configuration of this sector since its inception in Romania. After I initially interviewed 
him, the gatekeeper introduced me to three other participants within his organisation – 
also at a very senior directorial level – vouching for my legitimacy as a researcher and 
the novelty value of my project. Furthermore, he asked these three participants to act as 
guides themselves and to help me gain greater access to the social setting, by gaining 
the further cooperation of informants.  
In terms of the sampling strategy utilised for gaining access to the auto industry, I relied 
upon another non-probability sample that is very similar to snowballing – convenience 
sampling or availability sampling (Mutchnick and Berg, 1996; Babbie, 2007; Polit and 
Beck, 2007; Berg, 2011). What this category of sample entails is that I chose someone 
who is very close to me to act as a gatekeeper. This gatekeeper holds a hierarchically 
superior role within the institutional structure of Romanian auto and has been working 
within the industry since the late 1970s. This person provided me with very rich 
preliminary information regarding what players from the industry I should speak to, as 
well as shedding light on some of my research questions and what other areas of 
questioning I should pursue during the interviews. The gatekeeper put me in touch with 
an executive director at Dacia/Renault, asking him to act as an interviewee and to 
further facilitate my access to other potential informants that currently play a role within 
the structure of Dacia or industry representatives that were active during the Socialist 
regime.  
I attempted to secure access on my own to Olcit/Daewoo/Ford by sending emails and 
calling the General Secretariat; however, I was unsuccessful at securing any informants. 
In order to gain access, I contacted one of my gatekeepers – a current executive director 
at Dacia/Renault – who I knew had multiple contacts at Olcit/Daewoo/Ford, because he 
had mentioned this during our interview. I confirmed what type of informants I require 
in terms of the managerial level and emphasized my need to also speak with individuals 
that were present within the organisation during the Socialist timeframe. My gatekeeper 
secured me three interviews with central Olcit/Daewoo/Ford players – the Director of 
Production, the Director of Engineering and the General Director. Furthermore, he also 
suggested that it would be “very useful and interesting for me” to speak to the person 




I secured my interview with the consultant in industrial relations working at Syndex 
Romania by utilising a snowball sample. My supervisor put me in contact with one of 
the authors that I have substantially referenced in my literature review – Jan 
Drahokoupil. Dr. Drahokoupil is a specialist in CEE transition economies, MNCs, and 
works for the European Trade Union Institute. I contacted Dr. Drahokoupil via email, 
explaining what my research is about and the difficulty that I encountered in speaking to 
members and leaders of auto trade unions. Getting access to trade union representatives 
was a significant challenge, with all of my attempts being unsuccessful. Dr. 
Drahokoupil recommended I should speak with a Romanian informant, who is a 
specialist in Romanian employment relations and has contacts at both Dacia/Renault 
and Olcit/Daewoo/Ford. I emailed him, stating that Dr. Drahokoupil had referred me 
and highlighting the access obstacles that I was facing. The informant claimed that he is 
well aware of the problems of access and that the trade unions at both companies are 
highly reluctant to speak to researchers. Issues of access will be discussed in more detail 
later. The informant provided me with two contacts: the former trade union leader at 
Ford, who refused to speak to me, and a consultant in industrial relations working for 
Syndex Romania, who as a matter of fact did his PhD on the Romanian automobile 
industry.  
I organised the two remaining interviews by myself, without utilising snowball 
sampling or convenience sampling. These interviews were conducted because of the 
informational gap within my overall data collected, as well as the necessity to either 
corroborate some data or to add further clarification to some topics. I required speaking 
to a specialist in the Socialist regime, in order to be able to sketch out what are the 
historical turning points for the Romanian variety, as well as the evolution of the coal 
and auto industries during that regime. Furthermore, I required speaking to a specialist 
in state relations and the state subsidy system. I contacted via email the following 
institutions: Romania Insider, Invest Romania, the European Commission in Bucharest 
and the Ministry of Finance. Additionally, I also contacted the Ministry of Business 
Environment, Commerce and Entrepreneurship. A secretary from the general office of 
the Ministry of Business Environment, Commerce and Entrepreneurship put me in 
contact with a consultant on accessing state subsidies from Invest Romania, which is a 
foreign investors’ problem solving hub or consulting body working in collaboration 
with the above-mentioned ministry.  
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Issues of Access 
I will now move on to discussing the issues of access that I have encountered. Hunter 
(1995) claims that due to the ‘elite status’ of some participants, elite-oriented studies are 
referred to as “studying up” – this is to reflect the different methodological and ethical 
issues that arise that are not present when studying non-elite populations. Shenton and 
Hayter (2004) argue that for qualitative researchers who study elites one of the obstacles 
is the issue of gaining access. In a similar line of research, Hertz and Imber (1995) 
examine the different range of problems associated with conducting fieldwork in elite 
settings. The authors suggest that the reason why there are so few studies of elites is 
precisely that their very nature is difficult to penetrate. The literature highlights that elite 
subjects purposefully create barriers to block researchers and journalists – a 
characteristic that distinguishes them from other populations (Laurila, 1997; Welch et 
al., 2002; Shenton and Hayter, 2004). Laurila (1997) emphasizes that elites may be 
visible to the researcher; however, that does not mean that they are necessarily 
accessible. Hence, Mikecz argues that in order to gain access to elite subjects a careful 
process of negotiation has to be carried out, which will take a longer time and have 
higher costs than any non-elite study (2012).  
I found that this was not the case with the business services sector. I would argue that 
business services has low access issues to researchers and journalists. The sector is 
defined by a high degree of transparency in camparison to manufacturing-oriented 
industrial branches or any domestically-owned sectors. The people that I spoke to 
displayed a high level of interest in my research study, as well a high willingness to act 
as informants and/or facilitate the cooperation of other potential participants. In terms of 
communication, it was very easy to get in touch with them. Initially, we communicated 
via email. They replied very promptly to emails. Participants showed no reluctance to 
give out their personal mobile numbers. It is important to emphasize that one can easily 
find the details of these individuals online: company websites, ABSL website, linkedin 
and other professional social media platforms. Furthermore, participants were very 
flexible when it came to arranging the interview in terms of date and location.  
If we visualise the issue of getting access on a spectrum, the coal mining and auto 
industries are situated at the opposite end of the spectrum from business services. 
Despite the utilisation of convenience and snowball sampling strategies, the process of 
gaining access was very difficult and took a large amount of time. The individuals from 
these industries displayed a high (auto industry) to complete (coal mining industry) 
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level of reluctance to speak to me. There was one instance when upon contacting the 
leader of a trade union for an interview based on a gatekeeper’s referral, the individual 
claimed that he has never held this position and that he has no knowledge of what I am 
speaking about. Furthermore, there is a low level of transparency that defines these 
industries – more precisely, identifying who the key players are is an issue in itself 
(Mikecz, 2012). Obtaining personal details and contacting these players is another 
obstacle, as contact details are not available online and obtaining them is a very difficult 
process. In order to get in touch with these people you have to know the right person or 
have very strong ties to the industry. According to the literature, social researchers have 
to select the appropriate media in order to contact elite subjects (Conti and O’Neal, 
2007; Stephens, 2007; Mikecz, 2012). Contacting these individuals via the traditional 
media – telephone and email – is not possible. Getting in and establishing contact is 
only possible if you have personal ties to these players or if someone calls on your 
behalf and facilitates an introduction. In contrast to the informants from the business 
services sector, the participants from the coal and auto industries displayed no flexibility 
when it came to organising the interview. As Conti and O’Neal (2007) and Stephens 
(2007) emphasize, it is up to the researcher to be flexible. This is also in line with the 
research on the difficulties of interviewing elites (Conti and O’Neal, 2007; Stephens, 
2007; Mikecz, 2012). 
Managing Relations 
Once the issue of access to the social setting was resolved, I had to consider the issue of 
managing relations or ‘getting along’ with my elite participants. According to Laurila, 
“the mere arrangement of interviews does not mean establishment of successful 
research contact with the managers” (1997, 411). In order to achieve trust and rapport, I 
had to be familiar with the interviewees’ norms of behaviour, adopt the appropriate 
interview/context etiquette and demonstrate that I held a considerable amount of 
knowledge about their sectoral/institutional context (Conti and O’Neal, 2007; Stephens, 
2007).  
The issue of my positionality as a researcher was also considered. I am aware that quite 
often elites will try to influence the interview situation to the point of dominating the 
discussion and challenging the researcher’s views or line of questioning, as well as 
influencing the quality and quantity of the information given (Welch et al., 2002; 
Mikecz, 2012). To mitigate this negative externality, I did extensive research on the 
sectoral/institutional specifics, the participant’s organisation and I tried to find as much 
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information on the participant himself. Studies indicate that preparation for elite 
interviews is vital (Zuckerman, 1972; Berry, 2002; Harvey, 2011; Thuesen, 2011). A 
higher level of preparation will improve the researcher’s positionality vis-à-vis the elite 
interviewee, increasing the “seriousness of the interviewer” (Zuckerman, 1972, 164) 
and building themselves “positive image in order to gain the interviewer’s respect” 
(Harvey, 2011, 434). This will reduce the interviewee’s ability and potential willingness 
to control the interview and to manipulate information. However, there were a few 
instances in which I felt ‘tested’ by the interviewees who became very technical by 
discussing topics heavily oriented towards engineering. Welch et al. (2002) highlight 
that the social researcher can often find himself to be patronised by elite subjects.  
As a result of the level of power, knowledge and control over the level of ‘insider 
information’ to be disclosed, the researcher’s self-presentation and image before elite 
subjects is crucial (McDowell, 1998). According to the literature, “self-promotion 
contributes to gaining formal and personal access and fostering individual rapport” 
(Okumus et al., 2007, 15). As I have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, my 
background as a researcher and the characteristics that I display have a considerable 
effect on the dynamics of the interview. My identity as a Romanian citizen and my 
continuous engagement with these topics constituted an advantage – the distance 
between myself as a researcher and the social setting is reduced due to the quasi-insider 
identity that I possess. According to Sabot (1999), an outsider or someone lacking an 
‘inside view’ is not as well placed as a ‘local’ to collect, understand and analyse the data 
obtained.  
Furthermore, in the context of any former Socialist CEE state, anything that is imported 
or comes from high-income Western economies is viewed with admiration and is 
attributed a superior level of quality. Hence, to gain the credibility of my elite 
participants and to reduce status imbalance, it was crucial for myself as a researcher to 
emphasize my academic, professional and institutional credentials and affiliations 
gained in the UK. Having the appropriate credentials and representing an academic 
system from the ‘right’ type of country was necessary for me to gain access, but also to 
gain the respect and trust of my participants (Zuckerman, 1972).  
Moreover, the fact that I am both a Romanian citizen and a foreign researcher makes me 
both an insider and an outsider. This provides me with both proximity, emotional 
involvement and engagement with the social setting, as well as a certain level of 
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distance from the studied phenomena that allows me to have a clear and unbiased 
perspective – the concept of keeping critical distance (Mikecz, 2012). What this clearly 
shows is that my positionality as a researcher is not a rigid, pre-determined aspect of my 
identity, instead it is fluid. These two identities – insider and outsider – do not form a 
dichotomy, but rather my identity should be viewed on a continuum, and while I am in 
the field, I need to shift my positionality in order to ensure I have successful research 
contact with my participants. Based on Sabot (1999), elites will engage differently with 
fellow compatriots and foreign researchers. The findings of Sabot’s study indicate the 
fact that foreign researchers are trusted more, because they do not pose such a big threat 
to the participant’s status and position, primarily because the work will be published 
within a different country. To this, I would like to add the fact that in Romania all 
Romanian researchers are viewed with suspicion by elites either because elites believe 
that the researcher will run to the press with the information gained or simply because 
they suspect the researcher is not in fact a researcher but a journalist. Consequently, my 
partial outsider identity together with this higher level of attributed seriousness placed 
me at an obvious advantage vis-à-vis Romanian researchers in terms of not only gaining 
access, but also having more leeway with my conduct during interviews. Ostrander 
(1995) actually claims that researchers should not be afraid to ask sensitive questions, 
even if these overstep the bounds of interview etiquette, as this decreases the perceived 
power and status gap between the social scientist and the elite player.  
A common assumption of studies centred around elite players is that the position of the 
elite interviewee is more powerful than that of the researcher. I found this to be true. My 
participants fell into the category of “ultra elites” – that is, when analysing their 
institutional role and position they are or used to be the “most highly placed members of 
an elite” (Zuckerman, 1972, 160). Furthermore, the majority of my participants were 
male, with only two out of the sample of 38 informants being women. As a result, I also 
had to consider my positionality as a 28-year-old woman researcher vis-à-vis a group of 
very powerful men who were in their 40s to even 80s. Romania is still a patriarchal 
country, where men hold primary power and predominate in roles of political 
leadership, moral authority, social privilege and control of property. I found that once 
the preliminary discussion before the interview and the standard initial questions were 
over, my research candidates perceived the interview as an opportunity to have an 
informed discussion. Moreover, they were extremely gallant and I felt they made a real 
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effort to impress me by offering unsolicited pieces of information, advice and further 
cooperation.  
Emotional Risks 
In addition to the several difficult elements of the social setting that made gaining 
access and managing relations problematic, my research setting was problematic in 
another way. I experienced an entire range of emotions during my ethnographic 
fieldwork. There is increasing acknowledgement that social researchers undergo 
emotional distress while carrying out fieldwork (Lofland et al., 2006). Shaffir and 
Stebbins (1991, 1) have argued in the introduction of their book Experiencing 
Fieldwork that “Fieldwork must certainly rank with the more disagreeable activities that 
humanity has fashioned for itself. It is usually inconvenient, to say the least, sometimes 
physically uncomfortable, frequently embarrassing, and, to a degree, always tense.” 
First of all, in the months before my fieldwork trips I suffered from anxiety and fear of 
failure, because I was unsure if I could gain access to a sufficient number of informants 
and to the historical materials that I required. Furthermore, I was very frustrated and 
surprised by the fact that these elite players cannot be contacted via the traditional 
channels. The stark contrast between the business services sector, which was 
characterised by complete transparency and accessibility, and the coal and auto sectors 
which were almost completely sealed off, made me consider the fact that a 
comprehensive institutional study of the latter two might not be possible. There were 
instances in which I actually considered whether I need to drop coal and auto and select 
two other industrial orders defined by a greater degree of access. The fact that coal and 
auto were so problematic made me even question my ability to complete my thesis and 
whether I had made the right decision to select this research project.  
Lofland et al. (2006) claim that the researcher’s emotions towards their participants can 
be displayed on a continuum ranging from extreme distance at one end to complete 
surrender at the other end. Thus, the researcher can experience feelings of loathing, 
marginalisation, sympathy and identification towards their participants. There were 
instances in which I disliked my participants because they attempted to control the 
interview or they appeared to be testing my knowledge and level of preparation. During 
my preparation for the interviews, I experienced moments of dislike when I was 
researching my candidates and came across negative online articles in which they had 
been involved in corruption scandals and criminal cases. Other instances when I 
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experienced negative feelings towards my interviewees include when two of my 
candidates showed up very late to the interview and attempted to shorten it by only 
briefly responding to the questions.  
Contrastingly, there were instances in which I identified with my interviewees, thus 
shifting my position to the surrender end of the distance-surrender continuum (Lofland 
et al., 2006). These were mostly the participants originating from the business services 
sector. These individuals had been very good students during their life, the majority of 
them had achieved at least one if not multiple qualifications abroad, they spoke at least 
one foreign language, they believe in information transparency and accessibility, and 
they valued research. Lofland et al. warn that if identification occurs, it will be difficult 
for the researcher to take a step back and analyse what has been heard and observed in 
an objective way. Other authors have drawn attention to the fact that identification can 
lead to “over-rapport”, “over-identifying” and even “converting” (Miller, 1952; 
Schwartz and Schwartz, 1955; Gold, 1958; McCall and Simmons, 1969). I discovered 
that this consequence materialised when I was writing the first drafts of my business 
services chapter. Instead of having a critical lens and applying it to what my 
interviewees were saying, I was simply restating their claims and taking their words at 
face value. Snow (1993) argues that the temptation to take and reflect the vantage point 
of your participants is especially likely to happen when you write immediately after exit 
from the field. As Snow highlights, I found that the passage of time provided me with 
the necessary distance to develop a functioning critical lens to analyse what was said 
and what was observed. Furthermore, the different iterations of my business services 
chapter allowed me to reflect on and distinguish between what was actually happening 
within the social setting and what my informants thought was happening and their 
perception of the social reality.  
Once I secured the initial access, I started experiencing a sense of information overload 
(Lofland, 1977; Snow, 1993; Lofland et al., 2006). This occurred during both in-depth 
interviewing and my archival research. In discussing the interviewing procedure, I felt 
that there were so many elite players that I had to get in touch with and find out what 
was their opinion and how they interpreted social reality. Because of this, I started to 
have doubts about my observational abilities and questioned if I could capture the 
richness of the social setting. Lofland et al. argue that what is phenomenally interesting 
and theoretically important is most likely to present itself repeatedly and/or remain 
relevant (2006). Also, I realise that as a result of the prolonged and sustained 
78 
 
engagement, the persistent and systematic observation (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Weick, 
1985), the corroboration of interview data with historical archives and a systematic 
review of technical reports and press articles, means that it is very unlikely that I missed 
any of the major social phenomena and events that are scientifically interesting and 
theoretically important.  
Ethical Issues and Consequences 
Within the context of data site evaluation, there were three important and interlinked 
questions that I had to consider from my position as a researcher. First of all, should this 
particular group (elites), setting (Romanian political economy via sectoral structures – 
coal, auto and business services) and situation (institutional change) be studied? Second 
of all, should this group, setting and situation be studied by me? And thirdly, what 
measures must I take to avoid any potential negative consequences that the research and 
its publication might have for the different stakeholders involved in the research – the 
elite participants, myself and the institution I am affiliated with.  
With respect to the first question, this is not a case of research on an oppressed, 
endangered or less powerful group (Tunnell, 1998), nor is it a case of covert research 
that involves the deception of the studied population by the researcher (Bulmer, 1982; 
Allen, 1997; American Sociological Association, 1997). Hence, the answer to the first 
question is that the group, setting and situation should be studied. With respect to the 
second question, I concur that I have the intellectual curiosity, access, academic 
preparation, as well as conscientious concern with ethical and methodological protocols 
for the protection of my interviewees. Ergo, the answer to the second question is also 
affirmative. In relation to the third question, I will perform an evaluation of the ethical 
concerns and discuss the different management strategies I employed.  
The Belmont Report was written as an “analytical framework that will guide the 
resolution of ethical problems arising from research involving human subjects” 
(National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research, 1978, 1). However, recognising the fact that the Belmont Report 
is intended for biomedical and behavioural research leaves the researcher with the 
problem of reconciling the principles and applications of the Report with the realities of 
social research (Ragin and Amoroso, 2011). At best, this means that I will utilise the 
Report as a guide when considering the ethical concerns of my study, and apply its 
principles selectively based on their appropriateness for social research.  
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One of the central obligations that ethnographic researchers must have is respect for 
persons or the human subjects they study. Respect for human subjects means that your 
informants enter the study voluntarily and appropriately informed. To prove that all my 
participants are entering the study voluntarily and adequately informed, I obtained 
informed consent from all 38 interviewees. In order to obtain consent, I explained the 
research procedure, purpose, risks and benefits in a jargon-free language to each 
individual interviewee.  
3.3.2 Archival Research  
The second research method that I used in my study includes the collection and analysis 
of a range of written historical materials that are accessible to the public (Denzin, 1978; 
Lofland et al., 2006). The archival collection that I used is the National Romanian 
Archives located in Bucharest. Access to the Archives has become public since 2009, 
when the declassification of state records took place. This makes the National 
Romanian Archives a collection of official documentary records that were originally 
produced for some special limited audience that was then taken from the private to the 
public domain. The public has now access to any state-, industry- and labour-related 
historical documents, historical and geographical studies, treaties, letters between heads 
of state, government policies and bills, transcripts of state meetings, trade agreements, 
barter dealings etc. dating back to the early 1800s until 1989, which marked the fall of 
the Communist regime. The Archives in Bucharest also host the entire collection of 
documents of the Romanian Communist Party and the Central Committee, making it a 
central source of information for the historical part of my study, primarily the coal and 
auto industries.  
Considering the access problems I had in securing interviews with auto sector 
representatives but especially elite figures from coal mining, archival records acted as a 
complementary source of data to my interview data, as well as being used to corroborate 
information that was provided in the interviews. Furthermore, because of their historical 
orientation archival records were utilised as the primary source of information for 
shaping and contouring the timeline of events and historical turning points between the 
1960s and 1989 – that is the Socialist period of industrial activity – of coal and auto. 
Archives are considered an important category of “unobtrusive measures” (Plummer, 
2001), because they offer large quantities of inexpensive data (Berg, 2009), they are 
relatively non-reactive to the presence of researchers (Webb et al., 1981) unlike in-depth 
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interviews that pose a variety of methodological and ethical problems as I showed 
above, and they are attractive because they use some standardised format and filing 
system that makes it easy to identify and locate pieces of information (Lofland et al., 
2006). In comparison to in-depth interview, archival research was somewhat easier to 
‘navigate’ as a research method; however, I would not go as far as to argue that this 
research method has very few methodological and ethical problems vis-à-vis in-depth 
interviewing. Instead, I would like to emphasize that archival institutions within the 
current Romanian context very much still reflect the structural and procedural problems 
of the former Socialist regime – being very slow and cumbersome to navigate, with 
many unclear bureaucratic hurdles.   
Collection of Data 
The sections of the archival records that I looked at and collected data from are: 1) the 
Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, the Ministry of Exterior 
Commerce, the Import-Export Direction; 2) the Central Committee of the Romanian 
Communist Party, Economic Section; and 3) the Central Committee of the Romanian 
Communist Party, Chancellery Section. The types of documents that were gathered 
include: contracts of incorporation; import and export contracts for parts, components, 
tools, machinery, licenses and technical documentation; working session transcripts 
with senior officials of the Central Committee and industry-related representatives; 
industry performance analyses; reports on capacity expansion and production 
maximisation; Five Year Plan reports; technical reports focusing on strategies to 
implement an import-based industrial plan; technical reports focusing on strategies to 
implement an industrial plan based on developing internal production capacities; 
organisational and labour reports focusing on labour conditions, labour force 
expansions, restructuring, work conflicts and accidents; reports on industrial 
qualification programmes, the organisation of training schemes abroad, and plans to 
expand educational and training programmes in support of industrial activity. The 
historical materials that I collected and analysed cover the time period 1965 to 1989.  
Issues of Access 
In order to gain access to the archival records, I had to make a formal application at the 
institution’s Secretariat to request ‘research access’ for the Study Room of the National 
Romanian Archives. The formal application entailed the completion of a hard-copy 
form with my personal details: name, National Identity card/passport information, 
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profession and institutional details. The form was then submitted at the Secretariat for 
review. I obtained the researcher access card within three working days.  
Prior to my visit to the Archives, I looked at the online catalogue and directory to 
understand what kind of data was stored in the Archives, how the data was stored into 
collections and which were the collections of interest to me, and I tried to identify what 
kind of data was missing (Bradley et al., 1979; Berg, 2009). I did so by utilising the e-
catalogue search tool and inputting key words such as: ‘[coal mining/auto] plan’, ‘[coal 
mining/auto] industry report’, ‘coal production’, ‘coal in Jiu Valley’, ‘opening of pits’, 
‘Dacia’, ‘Olcit’, ‘contract with Renault’, ‘contract with Citroën’, ‘export of 
automobiles’, ‘Ministry of Mining’, ‘Ministry of Machinery Construction’. This 
preliminary investigation revealed the collections that were most appropriate for my 
study – the Import-Export Direction, the Economic Section and the Chancellery Section 
– whose individual catalogues I had to review more closely.  
Upon my first visit to the Study Room, I requested the hard copy catalogue of the 
Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, the Ministry of Exterior 
Commerce, the Import-Export Direction. The catalogue lists the entire documentation 
specific to the Import-Export Direction between 1947 and 1989. I reviewed all the 
document titles and the attached summary/description for each individual artefact 
covering the timeframe 1965-1989. In order to have access to the documents, I had to 
submit an order sheet to the Study Room custodian. The order sheet contained the 
following details regarding the archival document requested: name of ministry issuing 
the document, name of direction/section issuing the document, unique identification 
number, year of issue and issue number. Every researcher is allowed up to ten files per 
order. Once the order is placed the files are delivered within two working days from the 
National Archival storage facility, which is situated in a different location in the south 
of Bucharest. Researchers are allowed to place more file orders as they turn in the files 
that have been investigated and are no longer of use. When the files arrive, the 
researcher needs to verify and make sure the order is correct – the files are counted and 
checked against their ministry title, direction title, unique ID, year and issue number by 
the researcher in the presence of the custodian. If the order is correct, the researcher has 
to sign that he or she is taking ownership of the historical files, which means that he or 
she will be responsible for the documents if they are damaged or stolen. Ownership of 
the files ends when they are returned to the custodian. At the end of a visit to the 
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Archives, upon exiting the research setting, the researcher has to lock his files in one of 
the designated storage facilities in the Study Room.  
Once I finished reviewing and studying the content of the Import-Export Direction, I 
proceeded in the same way with initially, the Economic Section, and then the 
Chancellery Section – first, I reviewed the catalogue list between 1965 and 1989, then I 
submitted the order sheet, I waited for the order to arrive and I systematically reviewed 
the contents of each file.  
Because of the richness of the data, I made multiple orders for each of the three 
collections I utilised in my study. To speed up the process of obtaining the files, once I 
finalised reviewing a file I immediately turned it in, in order to be able to place a new 
order for another archival document. Despite this system of continuous document 
rotation that I attempted to implement, getting access to the archival records proved to 
be very lengthy and slowed down the research process. Another prohibiting aspect 
constituted the fact that none of these historical documents can be found online; hence, 
research cannot be carried out unless the investigator goes through the process of 
gaining research access and then makes physical visits to the Study Room, following 
the process that I described above. Furthermore, an additional aspect that made access 
problematic is the fact that researchers are not allowed to check out any artefacts and 
may only consult them on-site under staff supervision and CCTV. The unique, fragile, 
or sensitive nature of the materials requires certain levels of restriction on their use, 
handling, and/or duplication. More specifically, only some archival records are allowed 
to be photographed or photocopied. For those allowed to be duplicated, the researcher 
has to submit a written formal request to the custodians and pay a fee at the post office. 
In my situation, none of the collections I selected were allowed to be photocopied or 
photographed, instead I was only allowed to take hand-written or computer-written 
notes on my personal laptop. The Archives also restrict what kinds of items can be 
brought into the Study Room from outside, such as bags, clothing, mobile phones and 
cameras, to guard against theft, duplication or risk of damage to materials. Notebooks, 
diaries, scrap paper, writing equipment and your research access card are the only items 
allowed inside the Study Room. Researchers are required to deposit all prohibited items 
in a locker situated outside the Study Room in the reception of the Archives.  
Despite the fact that state records were declassified in 2009 and since then, the 
collections of the Archives have become public, there are some files within the 
83 
 
collections I examined that are still classified due to their status of national industrial 
importance. These were primarily related to the main car manufacturing organisations – 
Dacia and Olcit. This made the issue of access even more difficult, because these 
restricted files were related to my study’s historical turning points. The inability to 
access this information made me think about the historical materials I am potentially 
missing. Eventually the review of other unclassified files with similar themes, the data 
collected in my interviews and the systematic reading of newspaper articles helped me 
fill in the informational gaps.   
The slow process of obtaining files in conjunction with the slow process of 
collecting/recording data in the form of notes rendered the setting difficult and access a 
troublesome undertaking (Shaffir et al., 1980; Friedman and Orru, 1991; Lofland et al., 
2006). Access is further restricted by the fact that the National Archives are a state-
owned institution with rather limited opening hours – more precisely, the Study Room 
is opened Monday, Wednesday and Friday from 08:30am to 03:30pm, and Tuesday and 
Thursday from 08:30am to 07:00pm. However, I want to emphasize that it is likely that 
on the days that the Study Room is opened until 07:00pm and on Friday the custodians 
might pressure the investigators present to leave earlier, with the justification that: 
“tomorrow is another day” or “some of us would like to go home”.  
During my third research trip, access was further impeded by an unexpected and 
unannounced occurrence in the research setting – the National Archives were closed for 
renovation on the 27
th
 of April 2018 for, what was at the time, an indefinite period. The 
custodians communicated the unplanned renovation to researchers, while we were in the 
Study Room on the 25
th
 of April. Because of this, I was forced to reduce my archival 
research by about one week. However, I believe this had marginal effect on my 
research, as I had already identified all the major historical moments that were 
scientifically interesting and theoretically important, and had reached information 
saturation and the reiteration of themes.   
Managing Relations 
Gatekeepers are defined as people or groups who are in positions to grant or deny 
access to a research setting (Feldman et al., 2003; Hagan, 2006; Berg, 2009). 
Furthermore, gatekeepers or guides are indigenous people found among the group or in 
the setting to be studied (O’Leary, 2005). I would argue that in the context of my 
archival research the existence of gatekeepers granted me better access to the research 
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setting through the provision of guidance on where to look for information and how to 
make sense of the information contained within the historical files. In this instance, the 
custodians acted as gatekeepers, or the formal watchdogs who protected the institution 
sought as the target of research – the National Romanian Archives. These individuals 
held pivotal positions within the institution I sought to study; and although, they were 
not high up the hierarchical ranking as the gatekeepers utilised for my in-depth 
interviewing or the elite players involved in interviews, they possessed invaluable 
knowledge regarding the historical data held within the Archives in terms of its content, 
organisation and the access procedures.  
Emotional Risks 
While being immersed in fieldwork, field researchers have been routinely confronted 
with tensions, as well as settings and situations causing emotional distress (Howell, 
1990; Shafir and Stebbins, 1991; Smith and Kornblum, 1996; Lofland et al., 2006).  
The process of conducting archival research was generally complex and very time-
consuming. I experienced feelings of frustration, anger and anxiety due to the 
challenges of identifying and locating the relevant historical documents, despite the 
existence of a standardised classification system. Furthermore, I felt a genuine sense of 
frustration with the overall research process and the internal rules of the Archives.  
Similar to in-depth interviewing, I experienced a feeling of information overload, as a 
result of the large amounts of archival materials. This occurred twice: the first time was 
when I was trying to determine which files were appropriate for my research study 
when reviewing the archival catalogues, and the second time was when I was 
collecting/recording data by taking notes. I have already discussed my first instance of 
information overload – the problem was that there were too many files and I had to 
select the ones that were of central importance to my study. Additionally, the files were 
very large containing hundreds of pages, and difficult to handle because they were 
heavy, with poor bindings and very dusty. Once I secured access to the ‘right’ or 
appropriate files, I experienced another case of information overload. While I was 
reading the information from these selected files, almost all of it appeared as relevant, 
phenomenally interesting and theoretically important. As a result, I wanted to take 
comprehensive notes of all of it, because I was afraid that otherwise I would miss 
recording major scientific phenomenon and central structural aspects of the social 
setting. This made me have doubts about my observational and recording capabilities. 
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However, after careful consideration I realised that it would be impossible to capture 
everything from the social setting.  
Ethical Considerations 
One might perhaps argue that because archival research deals with the collection and 
analysis of written historical materials rather than involving human subjects in a study, 
the questions that I posed as problematic for in-depth interviewing have no 
applicability. Consequently, one might argue that the principles of ‘respect for person’ 
and ‘do not harm’ human participants were not relevant in the context of archival work. 
I would, however, like to re-emphasize the sensitive nature of the topics that I examined 
and the fact that some these key actors are still alive, thus rendering the protection of 
their identity a priority. The guarantee of anonymity via the assurance of confidentiality 
became even more important when I managed to obtain interviews with some of the key 
players emerging from the historical documents. The guarantee of anonymity via the 
assurance of confidentiality was also granted to the gatekeepers that helped me navigate 
the Archives. Furthermore, all data collected during archival research, in the form of 
hand-written notes, has been regarded as strictly confidential and has been held securely 
in a collection of notebooks that are stored in a locked cabinet within my university 
office. 
 
3.3.3 Supplementary Data 
According to Lofland et al. (2006), depending on the research question being posed, the 
character of the setting, the form of research, and so on, the researcher may amass data 
via other methods and from supplementary sources. I collected and reviewed a range of 
online newspaper articles and technical reports in relation to the social setting that had 
to do with my research questions and my topics of interest. These collected materials 
played the role of further expanding my understanding about the actors, the social 
setting and the internal dynamic permeating the setting, as well as triangulating the data 
in order to verify the authenticity of the information that was collected via other lines of 
sight (Denzin, 1978, 1989; Snow and Anderson, 1993) – in-depth interviewing and 
archival research. My search for newspaper articles and technical reports was carried 
out on Google via the use of mostly Romanian key words but also some English key 
words. When conducting my search for materials, I tended to utilise key search words 
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mostly in the Romanian language, primarily because after a few initial searches in both 
languages, I realised that the existing materials in English were relatively limited and 
tended to be written in a very summarised and general format, focusing on broad trends 
and not capturing any of the subtleties of the industry, company or event presented. 
Utilising similar key words, I also reviewed the archival directory containing past 
articles of several central Romanian e-newspapers specialised in economic and political 
affairs: Adevărul, Bursa, Business Review, Business Magazine, Capital, Cariere, 
Euracoal, Economica, Evenimentul Zilei, Gazeta de Sud, Historia, Mediafax, Profit, 
Wall Street Journal, Ziarul Financiar. Table 3.5 contains a range of examples of the key 
words that were utilised in my search for supplementary data. This list is by no means 
exhaustive, as some of these key words suffered slight modifications and/or the addition 







3.4 Focusing and Analysing Data 
Once some data was gathered, in order to make sense of the things I was observing I 
started classifying them by categories of meaning that were pre-established during my 
review and operationalisation of the literature and existent theoretical frameworks. 
According to Lofland et al. (2006, 195), analysis constitutes “a transformative process 
through which raw data is turned into findings and results”. Referencing this process of 
transformation, Wolcott argues that “this transformation process involves at a 
rudimentary level sorting data bits into broad categories, or more abstractly, following 
systematic procedures in order to identify essential features and relationship consonant 
with the descriptive materials (1994, 23-24).    
Type of Analysis 
The results of my study arose through an analytical process that is oriented towards the 
inductive end of the spectrum rather than deduction (Ragin and Amoroso, 2011). With 
inductive analysis the analysis is driven by the data, whereas with deductive analysis the 
analytical process begins with theoretically-derived hypotheses and then proceeds to 
confirm or falsify them utilising data that was gathered according to the theoretical 
principles applied (Lofland et al., 2006; Berg, 2009). Hence, my theoretical 
observations have emerged inductively, or one can claim they are ‘grounded’, in the 
sense that they are emanating from the data that has been newly collected rather than 
being called forth by already existent theoretical frameworks. The findings of my 
qualitative fieldwork are not so much novel discoveries and theoretical breakthroughs; 
instead, they constitute ‘extensions’ and ‘refinings’ of previous work on CEE political 
economy studies (Burawoy et al., 1991; Hunt and Benford, 1994; Morrill, 1995; 
Burawoy, 1998; Snow et al., 2003). Furthermore, my findings seek to shed light on the 
structural particularities of the Romanian institutional configuration that shares a cluster 
of similarities with other former Socialist CEE national varieties, but at the same time 
presents unique institutional characteristics especially from the perspective of the 
industrial orders I examined.  
The inductive nature of my qualitative analysis makes me, as the researcher, the central 
agent in the analysis process. The reason why I hold the primary analytical position is 
because I begin, drive, shape, and end the process of analysis, in comparison to 
deductive analysis that often can be farmed out to independent researchers and various 
software packages.  
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Another aspect that defines the analysis process of my research is its highly interactive 
nature. Just as gathering the data entailed immersion into the social setting, the process 
of analysis required my immersion into the data. There was a period of continuous, 
sustained and systematic episodes of data immersion, in which the data collected from 
my in-depth interviews and archival research underwent several stages of analysis, with 
each stage involving a more refined level of sorting and categorising.  
Frequency and Timing of Analysis 
According to Miles and Huberman, data analysis, which they define broadly to include 
data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification, “occurs 
continuously throughout the life of any qualitatively oriented project” (1994, 10). What 
this means is that analytical work is not something that you begin when you leave the 
field, but rather it should occur persistently, methodically and coterminously with your 
data collection process (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Emerson, 2001). This is precisely 
how I designed the process of analysing my qualitative field data. 
At the end of every day immersed in the field, during which data was collected either 
through in-depth interviewing or archival research or both, data analysis was carried out 
that involved different stages or layers of analytical thinking and sorting. Conducting 
data collection in parallel to data analysis enabled me to start the analysis early on rather 
than allow it to pile up – which would have rapidly amassed an overwhelming body of 
materials to comb through and analyse. Data analysis is already a daunting task, because 
the researcher has the responsibility of finding some scientific significance and/or order 
in the data he or she has collected. This in itself can cause feelings of anxiety, 
frustration, helplessness, inefficiency and even failure. Thus, starting data analysis late 
and furthermore, doing analytical work in a manner that is not systematic and frequent 
will generate even greater feelings of anxiety and can even result in the failure of a 
research project.  
Analysis Strategies 
In the course of analysis, different stages of analytical work were employed that ranged 
from initial to focused. The preliminary stages of analysis took place: 1) during the 
interview process itself, when while questioning my participants I took sparse notes 
about ideas regarding emerging themes and linkages to prior theory that were sparked 
by the things they said (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2001); and 2) while I was 
taking notes and transcribing from the historical files at the Archives. This initial sweep 
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of the material aided me to engage in an incipient form of categorising that is – defining 
what the data is about (Charmaz, 2001), relating the data to my ideas about it (Coffey 
and Atkinson, 1996), and determining how those ideas are refinements or extensions of 
already existing theoretical frameworks (LeCompte and Schensul, 1999; Lofland et al., 
2006). In a way, this ‘early memoing’ was an intermediate step between data collection 
and the first stage of data analysis. During this stage, at the beginning of every interview 
and every visit to the Archives I also wrote my impressions. These were in a very 
summarised format and included information regarding the setting – the building, the 
reception, the waiting room, the office, the Study Room; comments about the person I 
interviewed or the custodian I spoke to; remarks about the quantity and quality of the 
material; and general comments about my feelings experienced during the ‘encounter’. 





Concerning the process of interviewing, all interviews were transcribed by myself 
verbatim – the convention behind this is to transcribe every word, exclamation or pause 
made by the interviewee (Lofland et al., 2006) – on the same day the interview was 
conducted or on the following day, in case I had multiple interviews scheduled that day. 
On average, each interview took between six to eight hours to transcribe depending on 
length and the average speaking rate of interviewees. In the process of writing up the 
interview, questions, ideas and themes emerged – I recorded these in the form of ‘jotted 
notes’ which were later incorporated in the more systematic process of coding.  
The next stage of the data analysis occurred during the reading of the collected data. 
Before commencing the process of coding, I closely and fully read the interview 
transcription or the hand-written notes of the archival file. During this stage, more ideas 
and connections to the existing body of literature were provoked by what was being said 
(Glaser, 1978; Miles and Huberman, 1994). I usually wrote these ideas and connections 
down on the side of the page or notebook in a very schematic format.  
Before commencing the actual coding, I constructed a series of codes that emerged 
inductively from the theory and historical materials that I had studied. Hence, similar to 
my theoretical observations, one can argue that these initial codes were ‘grounded’, in 
the sense that they were emanating from the synthesis of the literature (Lofland et al., 
2006; Berg, 2009). The creation of these preliminary codes helped me understand what 
to expect and what to look for within the data emerging from the in-depth interviews 
and the archival field notes. According to Ragin and Amoroso (2011), the researcher 
needs to consider the possibility that the findings emerging from the collected data 
might disprove his initial ideas about the data. If that happens then the researcher must 
change, refine and extend his ideas about the data, in order for his ideas to reflect the 
data.  
In the following stage of analysis, I began my initial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; 
Charmaz, 2001). I coded my material from both interviews and archival notes line-by-
line. This initial coding process resulted in a highly numerous and varied collection of 
codes. An example of initial coding is provided in Box 3.2. These initial codes closely 
reflected the preliminary codes that I had constructed during my analysis of the theory 
and historical materials; however, some of the findings and emerging themes provided 
further clarifications and extended my initial ideas. For example, according to the 
candidate I spoke to in interview BS_8, the Multimedia Site Manager of a business 
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services MNC in Timişoara, there is still a high degree of labour protection in Romania. 
The interviewee highlighted the fact that there has been some deregulation, which has 
facilitated the better functioning of the business services environment – however, the 
extent and degree of this process has not been sufficient. The interviewee further 
emphasized that the institutional configuration of Romanian labour has not converged to 
a ‘hire and fire’ model, primarily because the current labour legislative framework 
safeguards against redundancy without (very) significant cause. Furthermore, the 
interviewee pointed out that in order for the business services industry to operate more 
efficiently the changes in labour legislation – deregulation – need to continue.   
 
After the phase of initial coding, I engaged in a form of focused coding which as a 
practice is much more selective and more conceptual than line-by-line coding that is 
highly open-ended and entails coding everything (Charmaz, 2001). Focused coding 
built on my initial codes and my ‘grounded’ codes emerging from the synthesis of the 
theory and history. In some instances these focused codes reinforced my initial ideas 
about the data, in other instances they provided further clarification and refinement of 
my initial ideas, while in the remaining cases my focused codes resulted in the 
extension or even the complete reconfiguration of the idea. Box 3.3 provides an 
illustration of such selected and focused codes for the same slice of the interview 
transcript I utilised in the example given above. In this case, the focused codes 
reinforced my initial ideas about the data; however, the evidence emerging from the 
interview – the interviewee’s conceptualisation of the institutional configuration of the 





My analytical ideas and propositions were initially developed through an iterative 
process of studying the theory and historical materials. Once focused coding was 
completed, I started to gather my codes for each research question or across a certain 
topic in order to compare, contrast, count, and further refine and expand my analytical 
ideas and propositions. The categorisation of my focused codes enhanced the analytical 
ideas and propositions I had initially constructed, resulting in the formation of enhanced 
analytical frames. These enhanced analytical frames constituted the building blocks of 
the institutional interactions that I captured for each individual sector incorporated in 
my study. However, it took several iterations of synthesising the theory, the historical 
materials and the data emerging from the fieldwork to fully form each sector’s 
overarching topics, including the propositions and ideas subordinated to them. An 
example of ideas and propositions gathered across a certain overarching topic, which 






3.5 Research Design 
3.5.1 A Theory of Methods 
Based on Kathleen M. Eisenhardt’s paper Building Theories from Case Study Research, 
I decided to utilise a case study in order to construct the theory emerging from the 
institutional context of the Romanian political economy and the three sectoral 
economies during the timeframe of investigation. Eisenhardt’s study aims to build a 
road map for constructing theories from case study research by synthesising: 1) the 
work of Glaser and Strauss on grounded theory building (1967), 2) the work of Miles 
and Huberman on qualitative methods (1984), and 3) the work of Yin on design of case 
study research (1981, 1984); and extends their work in areas such as a priori 
specification of constructs, triangulation of multiple investigators, within case and 
cross-case analyses, and the role of existing literature. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), the selection of cases is a crucial aspect of building 
theory from case studies. More specifically, the selection of appropriate cases controls 
for extraneous variation and helps to define the limits for generalising the findings. 
Cases are chosen for theoretical rather than statistical reasons. Furthermore, Eisenhardt 
argues that the cases may be chosen to replicate previous cases or extend emergent 
theory, or they may be chosen to fill theoretical categories and provide examples of 
polar types. The utilisation of the Romanian case study allowed me to extend emergent 
theory on the CEE region, refine and add on to an existing theoretical case (since the 
Romanian institutional framework is distinct and does not fully replicate the 
institutional configuration of the other CEE political economies), and also identify a set 
of structural particularities (institutional similarities) that are prevalent across the entire 
CEE region. 
In terms of crafting instruments and protocols, Eisenhardt claims that theory building 
researchers typically utilise multiple data collection methods. As I have emphasized 
previously, my study involved the collection of data via three methods: in-depth 
interviewing, archival research and the collection of supplementary data from online 
newspaper articles and technical reports.  
The rationale behind using Eisenhardt’s cross-case searching tactics is the fact that this 
analytical procedure influences the investigator to go beyond initial and thinly 
contoured impressions and images, and forces him (her) to use diverse, structured and 
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focused lenses on the data. The implementation of these tactics enhances the likelihood 
of building accurate and reliable theory – more specifically, theory with a close fit with 
the data. Furthermore, the utilisation of cross-case searching tactics raises the 
probability that the researcher will capture interesting and/or unique scientific 
phenomena, which may exist in the data. Based on Eisenhardt, the tactic that I 
implemented consists of selecting different cases and then constructing a list with the 
similarities and differences between the cases. The reason behind the adoption of this 
tactic is that it enables the researcher to look for the fundamental characteristics of each 
individual case and to identify the subtle similarities and differences between cases. 
3.5.2 Case Study Design 
The utilisation of a case study provides me with extremely rich, detailed and in-depth 
information about the country-specific drivers that have driven institutional change 
within the Romanian context. The motivation behind implementing a case study is to 
generate an in-depth and extensive understanding regarding the processes of 
institutional formation and institutional change in the context of CEE, but I am doing so 
through the utilisation of the Romanian case, which although shares a range of 
institutional commonalities with the other CEE varieties, in fact has a theoretically 
different institutional configuration.  
In relation to my research questions, the implementation of a case study design will 
enable me to visualise the evolution of elite relations over time – whether intra-network 
relations have become tighter or looser; the size of the dominant coalition – whether as 
a grouping it has become more inclusive or exclusive and how membership has shifted 
over time; the nature and distribution of elite networks – how they permeate Romanian 
society and how they influence the institutional structure; the transparency of elite 
actions – whether the actions of elites reflect a more front stage or back stage approach; 
the nature and evolution of the domestic-foreign elite collaboration; and the changing 
dynamics between elites and labour, and more specifically, how one has influenced the 
position of the other.   
Furthermore, I will capture ‘thick descriptions’ on how Romania shifted from a 
Socialist regime that completely rejected the idea of foreign ownership, to a failed post-
Socialist ‘inward-oriented’ capitalist model focused primarily on domestic finance and 
investment, to finally an outward-oriented ‘FDI dependent’ capitalist structure. My case 
study design embeds the examination of three subunits or meso case studies that will 
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explore three different sectors specific to the Romanian national variety. The three meso 
case studies are: 1) coal mining industry, 2) auto industry, and 3) business services 
industry.  
The spatial and temporal configuration of each industry is differentiated vis-à-vis the 
other; however, what is really striking is actually the timeframe within which each 
industry is active. A sample of firms and institutions from each industry were selected 
and analysed. Hence, I operationalise the research by moving along three levels of 
analysis – from the national to the sectoral to the firm level. This allows me to capture a 
more holistic description and more varied nuances of institutional change, and to 
examine how the hypothesised elements of change – elites, international forces and 
labour – have driven institutional transformation across the various levels – the macro, 
the meso and the micro.  
By concentrating on three distinct industries, I am able to demonstrate that the 
establishing of an external order is not distributed in the same way and to the same 
extent across sectors. Furthermore, I also show that the sectors display differentiated 
timeframes of interaction with FDI – more precisely, during the Socialist era coal 
mining was completely isolated from the FDI-driven institutional framework, 
contrastingly business services emerged in the post-Socialist context due to foreign 
capital and MNCs, whereas the auto sector straddles the two timeframes, operating in 
complete isolation from FDI in the first three decades of existence (mid-1960s to mid-
1990s) after which it was displaced by foreign capital. Various research narratives assert 
that the establishing of this external order was done via coercive mechanisms 
implemented by MNCs; however, via the detailed examination of the setting, I 
demonstrate that the scenario was not one based on coercion, but instead on the 
existence of collaborative arrangements between different levels of elite institutional 
players in power. 
In relation to my research questions regarding labour, the implementation of a case 
study design allows me to distinguish between the different categories of labour. At no 
point in my analysis is labour a homogenous actor across sectors. The bargaining power 
of labour as a social agent is institutionally divergent, with labour having considerably 
more power in the heavy industrial sectors vis-à-vis the tertiary sectors (coal mining and 
auto versus business services). Furthermore, I demonstrate that while labour in heavier 
industrial sectors, such as auto, retains some capacity to organise and challenge 
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opposing actors such as management, labour in light industries, such as business 
services, has from the beginning been characterised by a weakly organised and 
fragmented model skewed towards the neoliberal spectrum. By adopting a case study, I 
am able to grasp the distinct effects that 1) the insertion of FDI (foreign-led varieties of 
restructuring), and 2) the alliance between domestic and foreign elites, have on the 
institutional configuration of labour across the three industries.  
In my opinion, the utilisation of this ‘nested’ case study design will generate valuable 
theoretical material that can be valid for other CEE states and their localised sectoral 
economies. Elites permeate all CEE societies – however, in different forms and to a 
different extent – but in all cases the dominant coalition has had a powerful ability to 
influence the institutional transformation of the state and drive the structure and 
configuration of the economic order. Moreover, all CEE countries have experienced 
changes within their dominant coalition, the rise of international forces and more or less 
the exclusion of labour as a leading subcoalition or power player.
14
  
I would like to addres the issue of research design asymmetry and emphasize the fact 
that my historical analysis of the three sectoral economies and their institutional 
configuration stresses the existence of institutional asymmetry across the meso-level 
case studies. The fact that these sectors are differentiated in terms of historical legacies, 
ownership structure, spatial and temporal configuration, and drivers of institutional 
change required the creation of an asymmetrical research design. In fact, the 
implementation of systematic asymmetry was intentional, in order to accurately capture 
the variegated historical paths and institutional frameworks across the sectors. The fact 
that the three sectors are so diverse has meant that I had to use distinct research methods 
in order to study them. 
3.5.3 Case Study Selection 
Romania is analytically interesting because throughout the first decade post-Socialism it 
was the CEE political economy with the most extreme form of institutional incoherence. 
Rather than selecting an already existent blueprint, elites pursued a form of ‘institutional 
bricolage’ that consisted of the combination of different continental, developmental and 
Anglo-Saxon elements of capitalism (Cernat, 2006). The result was the emergence of a 
perverted ‘cocktail capitalism’, which featured a skeletal system with incomplete and 
                                                          
14
 Except maybe Poland, where labour retains relatively high bargaining power but only in the heavy 
industries (Martin, 2013). 
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inefficiently functioning institutions (Cernat, 2006; Ban, 2013). A high degree of 
institutional incoherence also emerged due to the initial conflictual relations between 
domestic interest groups and IFIs. 
As I have emphasized previously, the case of Romania distinguishes itself from other 
pre-established CEE country groupings, such as the Visegráds, the Baltics, the former 
Yugoslav states or more authoritarian regimes located further east. The historical 
evolution of the Romanian national variety is very different vis-à-vis the other CEE 
models. Having a much higher degree of centralisation and authoritarianism, the 
severity of the Communist regime in Romania was much higher (Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2011). Martin (2013) states that Romania’s regime ideology was 
extremely hostile to private ownership, in comparison to the ‘softer’ ideology pursued 
in countries such as Hungary and Poland, where the Central Committee gradually 
expanded private property ownership and the scope for economic activity. In contrast to 
the Polish and Hungarian models, Romania did not experience the same relaxation of 
rules to private enterprise from the mid-1970s onwards, with regards to cooperatives in 
sectors such as construction, retailing, agriculture and manufacturing (Berend, 1996). 
My study analyses three industries with three very diversified ‘active timeframes’: 1) an 
old industry emblematic of the Socialist era, 2) a continuous industry with a pre-
capitalist setup and a FDI-based facelift, and 3) a ‘de novo’ industry created as a result 
of the processes of de-industrialisation and tertiarisation brought on by neoliberalism. I 
want to highlight the fact that I came to these industries or categories through an 
iterative process of studying the history, the theory and my fieldwork. I began this 
process with an initial reading of the theory – according to Ragin and Amoroso (2011, 
118), “It is impossible to initiate a qualitative study without some understanding of what 
concepts might be used to guide the investigation”. The concepts I initially extracted 
were half-formed, tentative analytic frames, with a fluid composition – meaning that 
they would constantly get refined and elaborated within the course of the research 
process. I then looked at the evidence or data – more specifically, the historical 
materials on Romania – in order to see whether the emerging historical data challenged 
or confirmed the initial analytical frames and concepts I had developed. The 
accumulation of historical materials allowed me to go back to my theory to clarify and 
elaborate my analytic frames and concepts. Furthermore, the better understanding of the 
Romanian historical context and the elaboration and focusing of my analytic frames 
(theory) enabled me to develop a deeper understanding of my categories. I went through 
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several iterations of this process – gathering and analysing historical materials 
(historical studies, technical reports, newspaper articles, historical documentaries) and 
then going back to the theory and my analytic frames for refinement, sharpening, 
extension and elaboration. The initial ‘images’ emerging from the iterative process of 
synthesising the theory and historical materials spurred my fieldwork. In turn, the 
fieldwork gathered more evidence that fed back into my analytic frames and the 
elaboration and refining of my categories. This process of analytic induction – the 
synthesis of theory, history and fieldwork – facilitated the construction and clarification 
of my categories (Becker, 1953; Turner, 1953). Hence, one can claim that my categories 


















Figure 3.1   Illustrating the Iterative Development Process of Constructing 
Categories   
 
The spatial vectors of these three industries are also highly diversified. The principal 
location of the coal mining industry is located in the Jiu Valley – a poorly developed 
mono-industrial zone situated in the south-western region of Romania, with proximity 
to only small- and medium-sized towns and relatively distant from the major urban 
clusters, where the majority of inhabitants were dependent on this specific economic 
activity. The geographical space of the auto industry can be mapped around two 
significant urban areas, at the periphery of Piteşti and Craiova. The location of the two 
car manufacturers is highly influenced by the existence and easy access to a large pool 
of labour specialised in engineering and machinery construction skills, proximity to 
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supporting industries and the presence of a strong infrastructure network. Contrastingly, 
the spatial setup of the business services industry is the most urbanised, with the 
majority of such firms located in the heart of the major cities – Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, 
Timişoara, Iaşi and Braşov. The spatial distribution of business services FDI reinforces 
a scenario characterised by the heavy concentration of foreign investment in the capital 
and several other key urban areas: West (Timişoara, Arad), Centre (Cluj Napoca, 
Braşov, Sibiu, Piteşti), North-East (Iaşi, Piatra Neamţ). Table 3.6 illustrates the 
distribution of FDI stock by economic region. 
 
3.5.4 Discussing the Issue of Scale 
As part of discussion about my research design, I need to spend some time explaining 
the concept of ‘nested’ spatial scales or ‘nested’ geographical scales that I have 
borrowed and adapted from the fields of geography and ecology (Swyngedouw, 1997a, 
1997b; Inouye, 1999; Lyle, 2015). When utilising the term ‘scale’, I implicitly refer to 
the territories associated with different levels of the state (or national political 
economy), within and outside the state, and ranked according to their areal sizes, which 
have varying degrees of influence on each other. In order to capture a comprehensive 
story of institutional formation and institutional change, one needs to account for more 
than just the institutional effects of spatial scales or geographies within the national 
political economy or the state. The geographical or spatial configuration of the national 
political economy is situated within an international order fraught by supranational 
institutions and transnational agents; hence, it is essential to recognise the effect of the 
international scale and its underlying institutional agents when analysing the different 
geographical scales that affect a national variety such as Romania.  
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Furthermore, incorporating the concept of scale was highly useful, as it allows me to 
monitor and assess the different types of exchanges and communication between the 
different existing scales. According to Collinge (2005, 189), “Scale discourse is 
powerful because it holds out a totalising perspective, seeking to integrate different 
levels of geographical inquiry”. Thus, when conceptualising my research design, I was 
interested in capturing the relations between the different scales and “the pattern of 
institutional integration” (Jessop, 1994, 14). As I have highlighted previously, the 
conceptualisation of this relational, multiscalar approach was drawn from the economic 
geography literature, which envisages a relational setting characterised by a multitude of 
interacting actors, institutions and forces that operate at diverging levels – firm- (micro), 
sectoral- (meso), national- (macro) and international-level (Lane and Wood, 2009). The 
international level influences the national political economy, along with the different 
localised sectoral economies within the state, down to all the firms within one sector of 
activity. However, this top-down mode of influence and institutional transformation is 
not exclusive; instead, small scales such as the firm- or the sectoral-level can influence 
the macro-level and even the international-level, if the firm or sector is powerful enough 
or has sufficient legitimacy.   
The conceptualisation of nested spatial scales introduced an ease to understanding the 
institutional formation and institutional change within the different levels of the state or 
the different spatial scales within and outside the national political economy. More 
specifically, by breaking the institutional structure into different scales, this allows me 
to zoom in on the different spatial configurations – the micro, meso, macro and 
international – at certain moments throughout my timeframe of investigation (mid-
1960s to 2010s). Moreover, this ability to zoom in on the different spatial scales or 
geographies of the state has enabled me to construct a balanced and holistic analysis of 
institutional change – by allowing me to incorporate the effects and actions of the entire 




The study of institutional change within the Romanian national variety will enable me 
to map out its path of transformation and institutional configuration vis-à-vis the other 
CEE national varieties of capitalism that comparative political economy has analysed. 
Furthermore, the CEE national political economy is situated within international order 
that has driven institutional formation and the construction of a post-Socialist form of 
capitalism, as is the case with the other CEE countries in the region – as Myant 
highlighted, institutional creation has been driven from without by foreign capital and 
capitalists (2007).  
The purpose of selecting three industry case studies as subunits of analysis is to be able 
to compare and contrast how the elements of change – that is the existence of elites, the 
influence of international forces on the institutional order and the changing role of 
labour – influence the structure of my selected industries and subsequently, at a micro 
level how firms within each sector are affected. The purpose is to comprehend the issue 
of institutional change within ‘a big picture context’, while constantly keeping in mind 
that institutional heterogeneity can be present within each spatial scale. This means that 
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the effect of elites, international forces and labour may vary across the different macro, 
meso and micro level of each sector.  
Elites as an element of change has applicability across all three industries; however, its 
effect as an agent of transformation is institutionally diversified. I discuss the 
continuous dominant effect of domestic elites in the traditional sector of coal mining; in 
the auto industry, domestic elites control the industrial order pre-displacement by 
foreign capital, whereas post-displacement influence is primarily exerted by foreign 
elites, with domestic elites taking a more backseat position in the power structure; and 
finally, the business services sector has emerged and developed because of the alliance 
between domestic and foreign elites, with domestic elites acting as facilitators and 
foreign elites playing the role of institutional drivers.  
In terms of international forces, the coal mining sector was influenced during the 
Socialist regime by the imposition of an import-oriented institutional framework based 
on foreign technological resources, whereas in the post-Socialist era international forces 
manifested in the form of IFI-driven restructuring programmes. The auto sector 
experienced a similar import-substitution model during Socialism having some foreign-
oriented collaboration in the form of licensing, while in the capitalist era the 
institutional configuration became characterised by FDI displacement and the 
implementation of an industrial development programme triggered by MNCs. Lastly, 
the business services sector constitutes an archetype of the foreign dependency 
paradigm, being highly influenced from its institutional inception by international 
forces. 
The picture of labour is also institutionally variegated across the three industries. Coal 
mining exhibits the strongest and most organised model of labour. Situated at the 
opposite end of the spectrum, business services is characterised by the highest level of 
fragmentation, reduced legitimacy, skeletal policies of labour protection and a low 
capacity to organise. This places labour in the auto industrial order somewhere in 
between the coal mining and business services sectors. More specifically, the power and 
position of labour is greater than that of business services, with labour in auto 
challenging and opposing other competing groups, but weaker than the coal mining 





3.5.5 The Implementation of Longitudinal Methods 
The reason why I have chosen to use longitudinal research is that it allows me to 
observe the same social actors, settings and phenomena over an extended period. The 
fundamental benefit of this type of extended observational research is that it allows the 
researcher to analyse what changes these social actors, settings and phenomena undergo 
over time. More precisely, in my case the utilisation of longitudinal methods allowed 
me to comprehend the way in which institutional formation and institutional change 
have occurred throughout the Romanian national variety and the three sectors I examine 
during my timeframe of investigation (mid-1960s to mid-2010s).  
The fact that longitudinal methods facilitate this form of observation over time enabled 
me to capture the changing dynamic between the different categories of social actors 
permeating the institutional configuration. As I have emphasized previously, I am 
implementing a relational approach when conceptualising the institutional context and 
the different types of institutions and actors activating in that context. Thus, without 
engaging in extended observational research I would have not been able to capture the 
comprehensive variety of exchanges, alliances and conflicts between elite and non-elite 
players. 
Since longitudinal methods result in prolonged engagement with the social setting and 
extensive data immersion, this type of research help the researcher “construct rich, 
powerful and instructive representations of social life that contribute to the extension 
and refining of social theory” (Ragin and Amoroso, 2011, 78). Moreover, the utilisation 
of longitudinal methods allow the researcher to capture and analyse a breadth and depth 
of evidence about social life in a systematic way. 
Furthermore, the fact that my study is retroactive, meaning that it takes advantage of 
historical data, makes it ideal for capturing the importance of historical legacies in 
institutional formation, especially in the context of national varieties such as those of 
CEE where the institutional effect of historical traces is fundamental. Additionally, the 
fact that longitudinal methods are sensitised to capturing (institutional) changes over 
time, makes them suitable to map out the key moments of historical change within the 
Romanian institutional configuration and capture how institutional transformation has 
taken place at the different spatial scales – micro, meso, macro and international – 




The Historical Legacies and Key Moments of Institutional Change of the 
Romanian National Political Economy (1960s-2010s) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 identifies the key moments of institutional change and their drivers across the 
Romanian national political economy. Understanding the institutional changes that 
occurred at the national scale allows me to analyse how institutional transformation 
ensued at the sectoral scale. Hence, Chapter 4 develops a periodisation for my empirical 
chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Furthermore, the analysis of institutional change at the 
national-level enables me to measure how the different sectoral economies have the 
capacity to influence institutional transformation across the wider national system.  
I begin this chapter by analysing the implementation of the National Industrialisation 
Programme during the early 1960s – a long-term development project that set the 
industrial targets for individual industrial branches over a period of 20 years. After that, 
I present the structural problems characterising the Romanian industry throughout the 
Socialist regime. Next, I analyse the way in which industrial development was pursued 
between 1965 and 1989 in Socialist Romania. In the next section, I talk about the fall of 
the Socialist regime, the factors that led to the Romanian Revolution in December 1989 
and the execution of the long-time Communist Party leader Nicolae Ceauşescu and his 
wife Elena Ceauşescu. Furthermore, I analyse the period of economic crisis and 
industrial decline that characterised the first decade post-Socialism in Romania. Within 
this section, I also examine the various instances of labour unrest that plagued the 
1990s, which emerged as a reaction to the various institutional measures imposed by the 
dominant elites from the political sphere to restructure and/or terminate different 
sectoral economies of the national political economy. By the late 1990s, the inward-
oriented industrial policies and internally-based development schemes were replaced 
with externally-oriented strategies emphasizing the promotion of competitiveness by 
attracting foreign investors and liberal market types of collaboration with a variety of 
international players. Hence, I analyse how international forces have shaped and 
transformed the institutional configuration of the Romanian political economy in the 
post-Socialist era (mid-1990s-2010s). In the last section of this chapter, I look at how 
the Romanian industrial relations system has changed during the post-Socialist era and 
analyse the most extensive deregulation of the Romanian Labour Code. 
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Figure 4.1   Identifying the Key Moments of Institutional Change across the Different Scales of the Romanian National Political 
Economy (1960s-2010s) 
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4.2 The Implementation of a National Industrialisation Programme (1960s-1980s) 
During the early 1960s, Romania embarked on an institutional programme whose 
objective was the implementation of internal development schemes for individual 
industrial branches. The programme was a long-term development project that set the 
industrial targets for a period of 20 years. Aside from the objective of industrialisation, 
the programme sought to meet the demands and necessities of the internal Romanian 
market. Based on my examination of historical materials (National Romanian Archives 
Files 3064/22/1972; 3064/40/1972), in 1960 Romania prioritised: 1) creating an energy-
based economy and capitalising on the internal reserves of raw materials that contained 
coal, oil, natural gas, and ferrous and non-ferrous metals; and 2) the re-development of a 
severely lagging machinery construction industry (which included auto) which in 1960 
covered approximately only 15-20 per cent of internal market necessities, with the aim 
to satisfy 70-75 per cent of internal market necessities by 1985. These development 
propositions were well highlighted during one of my interviews with a senior member 
of the CC of the Romanian Communist Party. According to the former Minister of 
Machinery Construction (1969-1989) and Vice President of Government (1987-1989) 
(interview code A_10): 
“I told you, there were two central ideas or objectives – industrialisation and 
meeting the market necessities. The first central idea was the 
industrialisation programme of Romania. The second central idea was the 
meeting the needs of the internal market, because Romania had set itself a 
very ambitious program of industrial development starting from the internal 
market needs. The market started with some internal industrialisation 
programmes based on individual industries… industrial branches. First of 
all, the first central idea was harnessing Romania’s raw materials. Romania 
held reserves of oil, gas, coal, copper, zinc and so on. Apart from raw 
materials, we had to create a massive programme of industrialisation for 
machinery construction. Romania until 1962 had an underdeveloped 
machinery construction industry, the only exceptions constituted: petroleum 
equipment and agricultural machinery. The industrialisation programme was 
combined with the internal market necessities. Of course, the programme 
was all on paper, but ultimately the necessities within the internal market 
pushed us to create, to develop, to satisfy the country’s demand for 
machinery. The fact was that in 1960, 1962 we were satisfying around 15 to 
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20 per cent of the internal demand; however, by 1985 we were meeting up 
to 75 per cent of demand on all types of machinery.” 
What the quotation highlights is the decision taken at the central level – the leadership 
of the Romanian Socialist Party – to pursue the implementation of a mass 
industrialisation programme in the institutional structure of the Romanian Socialist 
model. Furthermore, the interviewee clearly emphasizes the regime’s favouritism 
towards the expansion of extractive industries and machinery construction. The decision 
to trigger the process of industrialisation of the Romanian institutional configuration 
was taken by the central leadership (CC of the Romanian Socialist Party), in order to 
shift the economic orientation and industrial structure of the regime from a low-level 
industrialisation model to a high-level industrialisation model defined by more complex 
and diversified internal production capacities and technological resources.  
4.3 The Structural Problems of Romanian Industry during the Socialist Regime 
From the archival research that I have conducted and the analysis of interviews, it has 
emerged that the coal mining and auto industries were punctuated by a variety of 
problems during the Socialist regime. However, I would like to emphasize that these 
were not insular cases of deficiency; instead, this was an endemic phenomenon and key 
structural feature of the Romanian Socialist regime, with the majority of industrial 
branches within the national political economy presenting these symptoms. 
One of the central problems highlighted in the archival materials was the inability of 
enterprises to meet the levels of planned output that were established by the State 
Planning Committee, due to the low-quality of manufactured products, outdated and/or 
insufficient machinery and tools, shortages and/or a lack of high-quality replacement 
parts, and an inadequate horizontal industry that could not ensure the timely and 
sufficient delivery of high-quality complementary goods (National Romanian Archives 
Files 3064/33/1973; 3294/163/1981; 3294/7/1982;  3294/234/1982). 
Another negative aspect permeating the Romanian Socialist regime, which has 
consistently emanated from the archival materials, is that the cost of production often 
exceeded the sales price of goods. This economic deficiency was especially prevalent 
across the coal mining and auto sectors (National Romanian Archives Files 
3064/52/1976; 3294/7/1982).  
110 
 
Another central issue emerging from the data is in relation to the inferior quality of 
manufactured products that the Socialist regime’s industries produced (Coal Marketing 
International, 2019; interview code A_9; National Romanian Archives Files 
3064/52/1976; 3294/7/1982; 3294/71/1987). This is again not an insular instance, but 
the endemic characteristic of all Romanian industrial branches during Socialism. In.  
4.4 Industrial Development: The Expansion of Industrial Production Capacities 
during the Romanian Socialist Regime (1965-1989) 
The Socialist period of my study, covering 1965 to 1989, is defined by an institutional 
structure designed for the expansion of industrial production capacities in all industrial 
branches deemed of national importance by the leadership of the Romanian Communist 
Party – the CC. The expansion of production capacities was especially pursued in the 
two industries with a ‘stellar’ Socialist status – coal mining and auto.  
4.4.1 Industrial Policy in Romania during the Socialist Era 
The historical timeframe of the expansion of production capacity (1965-1989) can be 
divided into two distinct periods, during which the Romanian Socialist political 





External Dependency on Technological Imports and Foreign Collaboration (1965-
1973) 
Based on my investigation of archival materials and the analysis of in-depth interviews, 
between 1965 and 1973 the industrial policy programme that was implemented in the 
Romanian Socialist regime promoted a high level of dependency on technological 
imports, licenses and foreign collaboration. The institutional configurations of all 
Romanian industrial branches had inadequate technological resources: outdated and 
insufficient machinery and tools, shortages and a lack of high-quality replacement parts, 
an underdeveloped pool of specialised labour, and inferior process upgrading and 
innovations.
15
 Consequently, industrial upgrading and the development of internal 
production capacities could not be carried out by relying solely on the utilisation 
internal resources.
16
 As a result, the realisation of the national production plan and the 
process of industrial upgrading were highly dependent on the perpetuation of this open, 
import-dependent economic paradigm that facilitated the creation of internal production 
capacities based on foreign technological resources and foreign collaboration.
17
 
Furthermore, I argue that the national industrialisation programme and the expansion of 
industrial production capacities in all industrial branches deemed of national importance 
by the CC were driven and supported by the presence of technological imports, licenses 
and foreign collaboration within the institutional configuration of the national political 
economy. This topic will be analysed in much greater depth in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
Import Substitution Industrialisation and the Creation of an Autarchic System (1973-
1989) 
The expansion of production capacities continued to dominate as the regime’s 
overarching institutional framework between the mid-1970s and 1989. However, what 
could be seen was a complete transformation of the methods through which the process 
of industrialisation was executed and the intensification of production was pursued. My 
archival research and in-depth interviews revealed that starting from 1973; the 
leadership of the Romanian Communist Party shifted the institutional configuration of 
all industrial branches by reducing foreign collaboration and minimising the 
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 National Romanian Archives Files 3064/33/1973; 3064/52/1976; 3294/163/1981; 3294/7/1982; 
3294/234/1982; 3294/280/1983; 3294/48/1986; 3294/177/1989; 3354/38/1980; 3354/46/1981; 
3294/65/1982; 3354/3/1987; 3354/26/1988. 
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 Interviews: A_1, A_3, A_4, A_5, A_6, A_8, A_9, A_10, S_4. 
17
 National Romanian Archives Files 3064/27/1971; 3064/112/1971; 3064/40/1972; 3064/67/1972; 
3064/81/1972; 3064/108/1973; 3064/26/1975; 3064/74/1975; 3064/104/1976; 3294/163/1981; 
3294/7/1982; 3294/198/1982; 3294/268/1982. 
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dependency on technological imports.
18
 Hence, the changes in industrial policy driven 
by the CC and implemented across all industries gradually transformed the orientation 
and positioning of the Romanian Socialist regime – shifting from a relatively high 
degree of openness and strong reliance on foreign collaboration to a model defined by 
inward orientation and the promotion of internal resources and production capacities. 
There were two principal reasons behind the implementation of this inward-orientated 
institutional model, which emerged from my archival and interview analysis. The first 
reason behind the decision to cut foreign technological imports and to minimise the 
level of external dependency of the Romanian industry was driven by the desire to 
create a national industrialisation programme based on the development and promotion 
of internal production capacities.
19
 The new economic model envisaged the 
development of all industrial necessities internally and the elimination of any form of 
‘import-related’ type of collaboration with agents from ‘the West’. The only accepted 
and sought out collaborative arrangements were export agreements. The second reason 
that emerged out of the collected data is that Nicolae Ceauşescu decided to liquidate 
Romania’s external debts (Romanian Academy, Archives of Oltenia no. 25, 2011). The 
system implemented was based on an institutional model of import reduction and export 
maximisation. This resulted in the creation of a huge strain on the country’s finances. 
Furthermore, the inefficient spending of the amounts obtained from taxes paid by the 
population accelerated the formation of a crisis within the financing system of the 
national political economy, and because of this, the CC had to gradually reduce the 
funds allotted to various local public works. To save even more, a programme of 
rationing the basic food consumption was put into practice. Unfortunately, the funds 
reduction did not succeed in taking the Socialist regime out of the financial crisis it was 
going through. The former Minister of Machinery Construction (who was also Vice 
President of Government) explained the implementation of the inward-oriented 
institutional model very clearly, highlighting the two principal reasons I mentioned 
above (interview code A_10): 
“The reduction of imports was a problem! The reduction of imports meant 
that we had to make extraordinary efforts to assimilate internally. We did 
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 National Romanian Archives Files 3064/99/1973; 3064/108/1973; 3064/19/1974; 3064/26/1975; 
3064/74/1975; 3064/52/1976; 3064/104/1976; 3294/65/1982; 3294/280/1983; 3294/390/1984; 
3294/4/1986; 3294/150/1986; 3294/238/1986; 3294/309/1986; 3294/53/1987; 3294/71/1987; 
3294/177/1989; 3294/329/1989.  
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 National Romanian Archives Files 3064/99/1973; 3064/108/1973; 3064/19/1974; 3064/26/1975; 
3064/74/1975. Interviews: A_3, A_4, A_5, A_6, A_8, A_9, A_10, S_4. 
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not have the necessary money to do this, because all our money went to the 
re-payment of our external debt; whereas, we needed to buy technical 
documentation, we needed to buy equipment and components, we couldn’t 
make it all ourselves!” 
The process of reducing technological imports and foreign collaboration accelerated 
throughout the 1980s.
20
 This further strained the regime’s financing system to the point 
of economic collapse. According to the industry representatives, Romanian industrial 
branches were not self-sufficient; instead, their existence and growth depended on an 
array of imported ‘items’. The liquidation of external debt in conjunction with the 
promotion of internal production capacities meant that industrial branches were 
allocated insufficient levels of investment funds, thus rendering the importation of 
necessary materials, components, equipment, technical documentation and specialised 
training impossible. Without these imported ‘items’, the institutional configuration of 
the majority of Romanian industrial branches was no longer sustainable.  
4.4.2 Key Players Shaping the Institutional Configuration of the Industrial 
Order (1969-1989) 
During the Socialist regime, control and decision-making powers over the Romanian 
industrial branches was held by the CC of the Romanian Communist Party – ‘the CC’ – 
who acted as the ruling political apparatus. Hence, the CC is the central influencer of 
the institutional configuration of the two industries that I analyse. The CC was divided 
into two bodies: the Permanent Bureau of the Executive Political Committee and the 
Secretariat of the Romanian Communist Party.
21
 The CC would communicate its 
decisions in relation to the structure and direction of the state to the State Planning 
Committee, which had the role to formulate the Five-Year Plan. The State Planning 
Committee would then engage in a process of collaboration with the appropriate 
ministries, in order to design the plan for each individual industry. In my case, the State 
Planning Committee closely interacted with the Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology 
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and the Ministry of Machinery Construction respectively, to determine the direction and 
structure of the two industrial sectors.
22
  
To ensure that the plan for a specific industry was met, the State Planning Committee 
and the ministry controlling the respective industrial branch would closely interact with 
the other supporting/collaborating industrial branches in order to secure materials, 
components, equipment, technical assistance, technical documentation, investment 
funds, skilled labour, infrastructure etc. The State Planning Committee utilised each 
individual ministry controlling an industrial branch as a transmission belt to 
communicate and implement the plan at the sectoral-level through the general directors 
of the Industrial Complex.  
At the enterprise-level, the elites formulated strategies to meet the targets received from 
‘above’ and were under the constant supervision of the Industrial Complex who 
monitored whether the plan was met.
23
 The directors of enterprises were also elites 
forming their own elite sub-coalition that was distinct from the other sub-coalitions 
presented.  
Together these three levels of elites – the national-, the regional- and the enterprise-
level, captured the state and formed the ‘control system’ underpinning the institutional 
configuration of the Romanian industrial order. Decision-making regarding the 
direction of an industrial branch, whether it was regarding the opening of new operating 
sites, the maximisation of production at existing factories, technological upgrading, the 
supply of parts and materials, the provision of infrastructure, or the training of labour, 
the allocation of investment funds, took place at the highest national level (the CC). The 
macro-level operationalisation of the plan was then carried out by the State Planning 
Committee and appropriate ministries, and afterwards the institutional measures were 
conveyed down the ‘control system’ to the sectoral-level (Industrial Complex) and 
ultimately, the enterprise-level. What this entailed was an intricate web of collaborative 
arrangements and communication channels between the different levels of elites, in 
order to ensure that the ‘control system’ was implemented and functional at all times. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 reveal that the CC had a considerably stable membership across both 
its constituting bodies – the Permanent Bureau of the Executive Political Committee 
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and the Secretariat of the Romanian Communist Party – throughout the four electoral 
terms (1969-1989). Executive power was concentrated in the hands of very few social 
agents that occupied roles and positions in several central political institutions 
controlling the structure of the Romanian Socialist state. The members of the Permanent 
Bureau included: the leader of the regime (Nicolae Ceauşescu), his wife (Elena 
Ceauşescu) and the head ministers of the primary ministry branches forming the 
Government of the Romanian Socialist Republic. These social agents also formed the 
executive leadership of the different inter-ministerial committees and represented the 
central authority of Great National Assembly of the Communist Party. This reinforces 
an idea that I continuously highlight throughout my study – the ‘multiplicity of roles’ of 
elites permeating the institutional structure of the Romanian political economy. There is 
an obvious overlap in the membership of the Permanent Bureau and the membership of 
the Secretariat of the Romanian Communist Party – there are political representatives 
with a position in both bodies of the CC across the four electoral terms (1969-1989), 
with some political players having membership in both the Permanent Bureau and the 
Secretariat during the same electoral term.  
At first glance, the membership of the Secretariat might appear to be more diversified, 
including a wider array of “new” social agents. The membership of the Secretariat is 
formed of the leader of the regime, the head ministers of the primary ministry branches 
and the deputy ministers/minister counsellors forming the Government of the Romanian 
Socialist Republic. The social agents that appear as ‘unknown’ – more specifically, the 
political players that are not included in the membership of the Permanent Bureau – are 
in fact the deputy ministers and/or minister counsellors of the ministers that are 
members of the Permanent Bureau. This means that these “new” and “unknown” social 
agents are affiliated and/or subordinated to the key players controlling the most 
powerful political institution – the Permanent Bureau. My argument is that these deputy 
ministers and minister counsellors are an extension of the political powers and 
positionality of ministers and act as representatives of the key political players of the 
Permanent Bureau. There is actually more overlap in the membership of the CC than 
what is perceived, because the social agents permeating the power configuration are not 
independents; instead, they are affiliated and/or represent extensions of other key 
political actors. Hence, power is concentrated in the hands of the same political players 
– a very restricted group with a positionality in all the central political institutions 
shaping and controlling the structure of the Romanian Socialist state.  
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Figure 4.3   The Multi-levelled Institutional Structure of Political Players 
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Figure 4.4   The Multi-levelled Institutional Structure of Domestic Elites 
Controlling the Auto Industry during the Socialist Regime (1965-1989)
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4.5 The Fall of the Romanian Socialist Regime and the Ensuing Period of 
Economic Crisis and Industrial Decline (December 1989-1998) 
Halfway through the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980), the regime’s economic order 
began to experience a slowdown. The economy was plagued by a series of negative 
characteristics: low quality of production; industrial shortages of materials, components 
and machinery; labour market saturation; low labour productivity; cost of production 
exceeding the sales price of produced goods; and an overall stagnating growth in all 
industrial branches (Cernat, 2006; Ban, 2012). After decades of growth, oil output 
began to decline; the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 forced Romania to import oil at price 
rates too high to permit its newly built petrochemical plants to operate profitably. 
Furthermore, coal, electricity and natural gas production levels fell short of the targets 
set out in the plan, further worsening the rapidly deteriorating state of the Romanian 
economy. A devastating earthquake in 1977, followed by a severe drought that crippled 
agriculture, an overall macroeconomic climate with rising interest rates, a slump in 
foreign demand for Romanian goods, and the escalating price for petroleum-based 
imported goods pushed the country into a balance of payments crisis (Ban, 2012). The 
oil shocks of the 1970s in combination with the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions 
permeating the Euro-Atlantic capitalist core created conditions for a debt crisis in 
Socialist countries such as Romania (Blyth, 2002; Kotkin and Gross, 2009).  
At great economic and political costs, the Romanian Socialist regime decided to repay 
its foreign debt in full and in the span of only a few years (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
The decision has been labelled as irrational, with the literature characterising the 
Romanian model as an oddity (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). This is because other 
developing Socialist countries in CEE affected by the 1980s debt crisis successfully 
asked for debt rescheduling and ‘haircuts’ for creditors (Ban, 2012). The Ceauşescu 
regime’s decision to pay its sovereign debt in full and within a relatively short 
timeframe – instead of defaulting or opting for more attractive debt restructuring 
conditions – was strongly influenced by the ideas and principles the regime used to 
define and pursue institutional development. More specifically, the regime’s underlying 
ideas highlighted the importance of continuing the process of industrialisation and the 
implementation of unencumbered policy sovereignty. Consequently, Ceauşescu’s 
response to the ensuing debt crisis was characterised by the design and application of a 
radical austerity package in conjunction to the creation of an inward-oriented 
institutional framework that supported a policy mix of import reduction, export 
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promotion, the termination of foreign capitalist collaboration and disengagement with 
Western finance capital, and the sole reliance and expansion of internal production 
capacities utilising indigenous capital and technological resources. The regime’s debt 
reduction policies imposed during the 1980s created a climate of terrible hardship for 
the Romanian population. The strong export orientation resulted in reduced supplies of 
food, clothing, footwear and gasoline. Shops with increasingly empty shelves, long 
queues for everyday items that could last up to several hours, and a growing need to 
turn to the grey economy to procure every day necessities became the realities of the 
1980s Romanian consumer (Dragomir, 2008). Furthermore, in an attempt to slash 
private and public consumption even further, we saw the introduction of food rations, 
regular electricity and heating cuts (even during sub-zero temperatures) and massive 
health spending cuts that effectively banned the importation of medical supplies (Ionete, 
1993). Gradually, the austerity programme made it impossible to sustain decent working 
conditions and led to the formation of a precarious work model. Within the expanding 
import substitution industrialisation framework, management attempted to meet the 
increasingly ambitious export targets through increased work intensity, night shifts, 
working Sundays, and higher quotas at no extra pay (Ban, 2012). 
In the spring of 1989, the regime leadership announced that Romanian’s foreign debt 
had been paid in full. Furthermore, the political economy had accumulated a budget 
surplus of 8.2 per cent and exports valued at around 10 billion US dollars – this 
represented only 3 billion US dollars less than the considerably larger Polish economy 
(almost double in size) (Ban, 2012). However, while the more libertarian Socialist 
economies of the CEE region were stagnating in 1989, Romania’s economic condition 
was far worse, especially when examining GDP indicators. More specifically, while 
Romania experienced an annual growth rate of 11.2 per cent between 1971 and 1980; 
during the 1980s, this figure dropped to 2.6 per cent primarily because of the massive 
drop of -5.8 per cent registered in 1989 (Ionete, 1993; Amsden et al., 1994). This 
massive decrease in economic growth further confirmed the failure of the austerity 
package and the programme of forced assimilation via import substitution.  
The Romanian Revolution was an instance of violent civil unrest that erupted in 
Romania in December 1989 as part of the Revolutions of 1989 that occurred across the 
Eastern Soviet Bloc (Cernat, 2006). The Romanian Revolution started in Timişoara and 
soon spread throughout the entire  country, ultimately culminating in the summary trial 
by a ‘kangaroo court’ and execution of the long-time Communist Party leader Nicolae 
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Ceauşescu and his wife Elena Ceauşescu (Deputy Prime Minister). The Revolution 
marked the end of 42 years of Socialist rule in Romania. What makes the Romanian 
case unique is that it was the only violent overthrow of a Marxist-Leninist government 
in the Warsaw Pact and the only removal of a regime that resulted in the execution of its 
leader. 
Social and economic malaise had been present in Socialist Romania since the early 
1980s, when the regime’s debt reduction policies and austerity measures created a 
climate of terrible hardship for the Romanian people (Ionete, 1993; Ban, 2012). In 
response, the Romanian population sought revolution and a change in government – this 
movement gained momentum from the other similar instances of civil unrest in 
neighbouring nations from the Soviet Bloc (interview code S_4). In an attempt to 
appease the masses, the Communist leader Nicolae Ceauşescu made a public speech 
that was broadcasted to millions of Romanians on state-owned television. The speech 
was similar to most of Ceaușescu's speeches over the years, making liberal use of 
Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and delivering a litany of the achievements of the ‘Socialist 
revolution’ and the Romanian ‘multi-laterally developed Socialist society’. Ceauşescu 
addressed an assembly of approximately 100,000 people in Bucharest’s Palace Square 
(now Revolution Square). Senior party officials made great efforts to make it appear 
that Ceauşescu was still very popular and in control of the structure of the state, 
organising several busload of workers, under threat of being fired, to come to Bucharest 
and support the regime’s leadership with cheers, applauses, red flags, banners and large 
pictures of Ceauşescu (interview code S_4). Apart from the people in the front rows that 
had been brought by the Communist Party, the people in the assembly remained 
unresponsive. About two minutes into Ceauşescu’s speech, some in the crowd actually 
began to jeer, boo, whistle and yell insults at him – a reaction unthinkable for most of 
his rule. The assembly soon turned into a protest demonstration. 
Over the course of the next few days, the majority of rank-and-file military members 
switched from supporting the regime’s leadership to backing the protesters ( irshman, 
2009). A series of riots, street violence and murder erupted in several of the larger 
Romanian cities over the course of roughly one week (Sebestyen, 2009). This resulted 
in the Communist leader fleeing the capital city Bucharest together with his wife on the 
22
nd
 of December. The swift escape via helicopter effectively portrayed the couple as 
both fugitives and amplified their guilty image to the public (interview code S_4). 
Captured in Târgovişte, the couple was tried on the 25
th
 of December 1989 by a military 
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drumhead tribunal on charges of genocide, damages to the national economy and abuse 
of power to execute military actions against the Romanian people. The couple was not 
given access to an appropriate defence, nor were they given any time to prepare their 
defence (interview code S_4). They were convicted on all charges, sentenced to death, 
and immediately executed on the 25
th
 of December 1989. What is perhaps most striking 
is the fact that the political players that convicted the Ceauşescus were part of the same 
dominant coalition – key political players that were part of Ceauşescu’s power 
configuration  that controlled the structure of the Romanian Socialist state (interview 
code S_4). These political players went on to form the transition government in the 
newly formed democratic regime.  
There was a state of economic chaos after the Revolution and fall of the Socialist 
regime in 1989 (Cernat, 2006). The industrial landscape of the 1990s was characterised 
by a general lack of capital, inefficient investments, the low level of productivity of 
operations, an obsolete industrial apparatus and a shortage of materials, an outdated 
array of inferior quality products, production costs exceeding the sales price of 
manufactured goods, poor sector-level management, the absence of a customer culture, 
limited innovative capabilities, an outdated supplier network, excessive labour, and 
extreme levels of account payables (World Bank, 1998; Cernat, 2006; Ban, 2012; 
Moghioroşi, 2014). Thus, the institutional configuration of the Romanian industry was 
plagued by an acute financial crisis during the 1990s. 
Perhaps contrary to public expectations, the collapse of Socialism and the immediate 
impact of the economic reforms resulted in a severe ‘transition recession’ – also termed 
as the ‘Great Post-communist Depression’, the ‘great transitional recession’, or the 
‘great output contraction (Kolodko, 1999, 2000, 2002; De Broeck and Koen, 2000; 
Rosefielde and Kuboniwa, 2003). Romania experienced a steep decline in GDP. The 
length and depth of the transition recession in the Romanian national variety was not 
foreseen. In the context of the CEE region, different CEE national political economies 
experienced different variants of transition recession in terms of both length and 
intensity (Cernat, 2006). For example, ‘J-shaped’ countries such as Poland, Slovenia 
and Hungary experienced growth by 1994. According to Cernat (2006), Romania is part 
of the group of the countries that experienced an ‘L-shaped’ trend in economic growth. 
What this tells us is that the initial transitional years culminated into a sharp drop in 
economic growth, followed only by a gradual and incomplete recovery (Martin, 2013). 
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Following a period of 10 years of post-Socialist transformation, in 2000 Romania was 
yet to reach its 1990 GDP level.  
The early 1990s were characterised by a deep scarcity of financial resources necessary 
for the operation and survival of domestic enterprises. The collapse of the Socialist 
cooperation system and international trading linkages within CMEA combined with the 
intense regional/international competition brought on by trade liberalisation resulted in 
the emergence of a financial crisis (credit crunch) for Romanian enterprises. Domestic 
banks had very limited funds and were constrained by major commitments and 
extensive portfolios of non-performing loans (Cernat, 2006). In 1990, a two-tier 
banking system was established in Romania, with the National Bank of Romania (the 
BNR) as the central bank and several commercial banks as secondary financial players. 
By 1998, 47 commercial banks had been set up, out of which 36 were Romanian (seven 
state-owned, five owned by domestic private capital, eight founded using foreign 
private capital and 16 private with foreign and/or domestic capital) and 11 were 
subsidiaries of foreign banks (Doltu, 2000). The state-owned banks were the most 
powerful players, owing approximately 64.2 per cent of assets (Cernat, 2006). Their 
central business activity was comprised of loans to the private sector, with foreign-
owned private banks catering to the needs of the multinational sector and domestically-
owned private banks servicing the domestic small- and medium-sized enterprise sector. 
According to Cernat (2004), domestic private banks were both small and fragile, often 
plagued by bankruptcies and scandals. 
The process of restructuring of the Romanian banking system occurred at a later stage 
during the transformation decade and was much more gradual vis-à-vis the process of 
restructuring of the banking sector in the Visegráds (Cernat, 2004, 2006; Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2011; Martin, 2013). According to the EC (2001a, 2001b), in 2000 the 
banks that were still in state ownership accounted for a proportion of 35 per cent of 
credit stock, despite the fact that a more active policy package had been implemented 
since 1997 to privatise the banking sector. In the 2001 Progression Report towards 
accession status, the EC stated that the Romanian banking system was underdeveloped, 
with total assets representing less than 30 per cent of GDP, domestic credit slightly over 
10 per cent of GDP and deposits amounting to approximately 20 per cent of GDP (EC, 
2001a, 2001b). According to Cernat (2006), the client-parent relations between 
politicians, business representatives and bankers supported the continuation of financial 
practices prevalent during the Socialist period. These included soft budget constraints 
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and a high level of availability of credit at uncompetitive interest rates for ‘national 
champions’ and enterprises that were protégés of the state – practices that led to a high 
proportion of ill-performing loans (Bohle and Greskovits, 2013). In a 1997 assessment, 
57 per cent of loans in the Romanian banking system were classified as non-performing 
vis-à-vis 29 per cent registered in the Czech Republic, 10 per cent in Poland and 4 per 
cent in Hungary respectively (EBRD, 1998: 133 in Martin, 2013). The weak state 
capacity and skeletal regulatory regime paved the way to cementing a system 
characterised by widespread fraud (Cernat, 2006). Cernat (2004) argues that in an 
institutional architecture defined by unstable and weak rules and codes, the trilogy of 
financial restructuring, privatisation and deregulation created asset-stripping and rent-
seeking opportunities for patrons and their clients in the Romanian banking system. The 
representatives of capital took advantage of their privileged position in the political 
spectrum in order to be ‘first served’ in the licensing of new banks, thus turning the 
Romanian financial sector into a ‘cash-cow’ to be used as a source of personal wealth 
accumulation by key political players and the representatives of capital (Gallagher, 
2005).  
The privatisation paradigms implemented in Romania throughout the 1990s were the 
most erratic and slow among CEE political economies (Cernat, 2006; Martin, 2013). 
Earle and Telegdy (2001) argue that the most common form of privatisation constituted 
management and employee buyouts (MEBOs); however, MEBOs could only be carried 
out with the help of substantial state financial aid. Moreover, the authors claim that the 
voucher privatisation programme was just a window-dressing exercise, with the purpose 
of maintaining the illusion that the labouring class was regarded as an influential 
institutional player and to consolidate façade citizen ownership rights. OECD (1993a, 
1993b) data indicates that only 30 per cent of approximately 6,300 Romanian state-
owned enterprises were privatised via free vouchers by comparison to 97 per cent in the 
Czech Republic and 55 per cent in Poland respectively. According to Earle and Telegdy 
(2001), the implication of foreign and international agents in the process of privatisation 
in Romania was marginal vis-à-vis other CEE political economies – by the end of 1998, 





The Romanian government was on the verge of a macroeconomic crisis by the mid-
1990s, facing collapsing revenue streams and escalating costs that increased even 
further the already high public sector deficit and deepened the fiscal crisis (Gaspar, 
1998). Faced with a liquidity crisis, the government was unable to provide investment 
funds to domestic enterprises for either organisational/technological restructuring or 
basic day-to-day running of operations. When analysing domestic private investors, the 
institutional context of the 1990s included very few players (Cernat, 2006). When it 
comes to analysing the types of investments that characterised the institutional setting, 
privatisation schemes, capital flight and government bonds dominated since they were 
considered ventures that offered higher, short-term and less risky returns vis-à-vis the 
long-term, high risk investments in de novo domestic production capacities. As Myant 
has put it, the institutional context in post-Socialist political economies in the CEE 
region was defined by an absence of capitalists and capital (2007). 
To overcome this credit crisis, cash-strapped enterprises adopted short-term and/or 
‘informal’ solutions, such as short-term loans, they coerced credits from clients, 
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suppliers and other business partners, and they engaged in the evasion of tax obligation 
payments (Martin, 2013; Bartlett, 1998). However, I need to emphasize that these were 
short-term and transient measures, in the long term their utilisation was not sustainable, 
and as such, investment resources had to be secured from outside of the CEE region 
from a range of international players – foreign banks, International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), MNCs and portfolio investors. As Drahokoupil argues (2008a, 
2008b), the initial institutional framework and internally-oriented strategies of 
neoliberal adjustment focused on the creation of domestic production capacities via the 
utilisation of domestic sources of investment, indigenous technological resources and 
domestic talent. Similarly, Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) argue that the resulting 
Romanian institutional configuration of the 1990s was a post-Socialist inward-oriented 
form of capitalism with minimal liberal characteristics. However, by the late 1990s 
these inward-oriented industrial policies and institutional directions proved to be 
unsuccessful. Instead, they were replaced with externally-oriented strategies 
emphasizing the promotion of competitiveness by attracting foreign investors (Birch 
and Mykhnenko, 2009). 
4.5.1 Exploring the Labour Crisis of the Late 1990s 
By the late 1990s, the economic crisis plaguing the majority of Romanian industrial 
branches triggered a so-called crisis of the labouring class. The labouring classes 
reacted to the institutional measures imposed by the dominant elites from the political 
sphere by challenging the decision to restructure and/or terminate various sectoral 
economies of the national political economy (Cernat, 2006; Myant and Drahokoupil, 
2011). More specifically, the instances of labour unrest represented the efforts of the 
labouring classes to impede the process of industrial decline. In fact, by attempting to 
stop the process of industrial decline, labour sought to maintain its power and position 
within the existing power structure. As I have emphasized in Chapter 2, there are 
constant fluctuations regarding the identity and internal distributions of a dominant 
coalition (North et al., 2007, 2009, 2013). Compromises have to be made between 
subcoalitions and there is a continuous renegotiation of rents and privileges. Every now 
and then, some of these subcoalitions will suffer from a loss in identity strength and 
legitimacy, ultimately losing their powers and positionality. Central to the politics of 
class of is the ability of some groups to exclude others from the coalition or power 
structure where value can be accessed, accumulated and/or converted (Bourdieu, 1989; 
Lamont, 1992; Skeggs, 2015).  
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Regional literature characterises the institutional configuration of the CEE region as a 
site of conflict, struggle and contestation between key political players and the 
representatives of large business groups – the super-wealthy and elite class, whereas the 
proletariat or labouring class has suffered from a continuous loss of power and 
positionality within the overarching power structure of the state (Funk and Lesch, 2004; 
Cernat, 2006; Mrozowicki, 2011, 2014; Ribarova, 2012; Trif, 2012; Martin, 2013). 
Cernat (2006) talks about the existence of an alliance between politicians, directors 
(managerial elite) and labour (trade union leaders) that dominated the Romanian 
institutional configuration during the first decade post-Socialism. According to Cernat, 
by the end of the 1990s, the polity and capital succeeded in ousting labour from the 
alliance and thus, we saw the re-emergence of a new dominant coalition with a much 
more restricted membership and higher concentration of power. Ultimately, by tightly 
managing the structure and composition of the dominant sub-coalition, the dominant 
elites placed institutional control of Romanian industrial branches in the hands of fewer 
levels of individuals from fewer spheres of influence. In doing so, the proportion of 
rents distributed to each dominant elite member rose, as the overall extracted wealth 
was now divided amongst fewer social partners (Cernat, 2006; North et al., 2009, 2013). 
Hence, despite the unfolding of various instances of labour unrest, the labour class did 
not succeed in preventing the implementation of an institutional path of severe de-
industrialisation, massive loss of full-time employment and wholesale downgrading of 
economic activities and skills (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2009). 
Described as the most violent and well-organised instances of labour unrest during the 
1990s, the Mineriadas represented a series of mass demonstrations in the coal mining 
sector that threatened to destabilise the entire institutional structure of the Romanian 
political economy (Cernat, 2006). In order to prevent the re-emergence of this internal 
crisis, the dominant elites orchestrated the gradual and consistent delegitimacy of the 
labouring classes, ultimately dismantling the CME-like model of industrial relations and 
reconstructing it based on LME principles (Ban, 2013; Trif, 2007, 2012). Hence, one 
can argue that these instances of labour unrest at the sectoral-level influenced a process 





4.6 International Forces and their Effect on the Institutional Configuration of the 
Romanian Political Economy (late 1990s-2010s) 
I argue that international forces act as a force of change with which the domestic elites 
engage and interact triggering institutional change and transformation across the 
different spatial scales of the national political economy. Together the two categories of 
institutional players designed and implemented a variety of institutional directions – 
institutional paths of destruction, institutional paths of re-construction and industrial 
upgrading, and institutional paths of creation – and drove the implementation of labour 
policies that significantly transformed the institutional configuration of the state (Birch 
and Mykhnenko, 2009). 
The end of the 1990s marked the establishing of new foreign-led institutional paths 
within the Romanian national political economy that resulted in the termination of 
various industries, the creation of new industries, while other industries embarked on a 
process of re-construction and upgrading. The implementation of these institutional 
paths was driven by the insertion of FDI and supranational policy (emanating from the 
World Bank and IMF) into the national political economy and supranational policy 
emanating from various international institutions (Larionescu et al., 1999; Haney and 
Shkaratan, 2003; Cernat, 2006; Dudian, 2011; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013; Ban, 2013; 
Martin 2013). Thus, the institutional context saw a radical shift in the type of industrial 
policies pursued – more specifically, the institutional orientation changed from a series 
of inward-oriented, populist schemes of industrial development to liberal market forms 
of foreign collaboration and industrial transformation (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2009). 
The impact of international forces and foreign agents was far from being institutionally 
homogenous across the national political economy (Boyer, 2005; Crouch, 2005; Crouch 
et al., 2009; Scheneiberg, 2007). The intervention of foreign capital had diverging 
institutional effects on the different sectoral economies of the post-Socialist Romanian 
capitalist variety. What this indicates is that the presence and actions of international 
forces created differentiated sub-national concentrations of governance and industrial 
policy, or put another way, drove the formation of diverging institutional paths that exist 
in parallel within the national economy (Voelzkow et al., 2006a, 2006b; Crouch and 
Voelzkow, 2009; Crouch et al., 2009). More precisely, if we compare the institutional 
configuration of coal to that of auto and assess the role played by international forces 
within each industrial branch during the 1990s, the former sector is characterised by the 
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implementation of a foreign-led institutional path of destruction, whereas the latter 
experienced the implementation of a foreign-led institutional path of re-construction and 
industrial upgrading.  
CEE economies have attracted considerable amounts of FDI starting with the 1990s. 
While the first decade post-Socialism was dominated by manufacturing-oriented FDI 
flows, service-oriented FDI began to accelerate within the geographical region starting 
with the early 2000s (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Sass and Fifeková, 2011; Iosof and 
Vasloban, 2013; Martin, 2013). According to Capik and Drahokoupil (2011), the first 
receivers of service-oriented FDI were the more economically developed and politically 
stable Visegrád states (however, in this perspective Slovakia proved to be a quasi-
laggard). The second wave of service-oriented FDI was experienced by Romania and 
Bulgaria. FDI flows began to enter this region starting with 2003-2004, with the trend 
accelerating considerably after the two countries joined the EU in January 2007 
(McKinsey & Company, 2006; Profiroiu et al., 2008; Dudian, 2011; Ban, 2013; Iosof 
and Vasloban, 2013). 
In the early 2000s, the Romanian national variety did not possess the necessary 
(domestic) capital and capitalists to create this new institutional path or new sectoral 
economy. Hence, the creation of the new institutional path required the presence of 
capitalist forces ’from without’ in the form of MNCs and foreign capital (King, 2007). 
The regional literature argues that external dependency and reliance on foreign capital is 
a central characteristic of the CEE region (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2011; Ban, 2013; Martin, 2013). Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) argue that 
external dependency in conjunction with the absence of indigenous resources – 
capitalists and capital – have resulted in the creation of a weakly coordinated or softly 
regulated post-Socialist institutional framework. 
The emergence of the business services sector in Romania during the second decade 
post-Socialism involved a break from the heavy industry-oriented past and the creation 
of a new institutional path that co-existed alongside the older and more traditional 
sectoral economies. According to Birch and Mykhnenko (2009), this scenario of 
structural adjustment across the CEE region entailed a moderate degree of de-
industrialisation and a moderate development of services. However, as far as the 
development of technological capacities in Romania is concerned, the institutional 
configuration of business services was characterised by the rapid and significant growth 
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of high-tech services, as well as the development of more downstream non-analytical 
service-based activities (Högselius, 2003).  
4.7 The Transformation of the Romanian Industrial Relations System: The Labour 
Reform in 2011 
The existent literature on industrial relations in CEE post-Socialist political economies 
talks about a weak and fragmented trade union system (Crowley and Ost, 2001). 
According to Mrozowicki (2011, 2014) and Stanojević and Klarič (2013), the trade 
union movement suffered a gradual decline in power in CEE throughout the three 
decades of post-Socialism despite the active struggles in some states to resist the 
neoliberal turn. The loss of trade union power can be explained by a combination of 
factors. Firstly, the Socialist legacy of compulsory trade union membership, which 
meant that no efforts had to be made to recruit new members and ultimately retain them, 
was no longer applicable. Secondly, although the ‘servicing model of unionism’ was 
deeply embedded and had a long-lasting tradition, it became increasingly difficult for 
trade unions to provide various services to its members, due to the economic 
deterioration, limited resources and declining membership fees (Ost, 2005). Economic 
deterioration and reform packages led to the restructuring and closure of a multitude of 
state-owned unionised enterprises, which triggered a fall in trade union membership and 
consequently, the decline in the amount of union resources (Trif, 2012; Trif, 2007). 
Collective bargaining agreements in CEE are primarily undertaken at the firm-level, 
with multi-employer agreements’ existing but applying to a selective sample of 
enterprises (Funk and Lesch, 2004). Furthermore, authors speak about the deterioration 
of labour standards (Woolfson, 2007) and the flexibilisation of working conditions 
(Ban, 2013). Hence, the regional literature conceptualises the existence of a labour 
regulation model in CEE that is highly skewed towards the neoliberal spectrum. 
In 2011, the centre-right Romanian government under Prime Minister Emil Boc 
introduced the most radical statutory changes to collective bargaining and trade union 
law since the fall of the Socialist regime. These changes to the institutional 
configuration of industrial relations were designed and implemented by domestic elites 
from the political sphere; however, these institutional players did not act independently. 
Instead, the supranational regulatory policy emanating from the EU has strongly 
influenced national-level policy (Lillie and Greer 2008). Moreover, there was a push 
from FDI representatives to deregulate the institutional framework of industrial 
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relations across CEE (Trif, 2012; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009). According to Ban 
(2013), under the Boc and Tăriceanu governments (2005-2011), international forces 
have driven the neoliberal transformation of the Romanian society and its economy. 
Furthermore, the author claims that an alliance emerged between the state and the MNC 
sector that sought to weaken Romanian industrial relations and bring them in line with 
those of regional competitors. Thus, the argument that I am making is that international 
forces played an important role in influencing labour policy within the Romanian 
institutional configuration and ultimately, driving labour market deregulation through 
the most radical industrial relations reform to collective bargaining and trade union law 
in post-Socialist Romania. These changes to collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) 
and trade union law reinforced the existence of an industrial relations institutional 
complementarity in the Romanian political economy strongly resembling that present in 
LMEs (Clark and Almond, 2006; Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Deeg, 2012; Doellgast, 
2012; Ban, 2013). Labour and social legislation was dramatically modified as the New 
Labour Code was approved at the beginning of the year, followed by the ratification of 
the Social Dialogue Code (Barbuceanu, 2012; Domnişoru, 2012). Practically, the New 
Labour Code dismantled the institutional and legislative foundations in relation to 
national and economic associations’ collective agreements, thus abolishing the unique 
national collective bargaining agreement that had been effective since 1991 (Ciutacu, 
2011). Ban (2013) and Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) emphasize that similar policy 
measures were implemented in all the CEE states.  
Based on the new legislation, collective bargaining was institutionalised from that 
moment onwards at the sectoral-, the group- (group of units) and the firm- (unit) level. 
The institutional framework of a single, unique CBA was replaced by a framework with 
multiple, ‘specific’ or more individualised agreements. Furthermore, my findings 
indicate that until 2011 CBAs had an extended coverage, including parties that were not 
involved in the actual negotiation or parties that had no affiliation to any of the 
negotiating partners (Ciutacu, 2011). However, under the new legislative framework 
CBAs apply only to signatory parties, meaning that the employees of new entrants need 
to negotiate their own CBA. Because of the New Labour Code, most CBAs are 
established at the firm-level (unit). As such, the new legislative framework has shifted 
power and control towards the employer. Employers favour and accept the negotiation 
and signing of firm-level CBAs, because under the period of enforcement of the 
contract strike action is declared forbidden. De facto, the new collective bargaining 
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legislation enables the employer to protect himself from industrial unionism (i.e. across 
an industry). At the group- and sector-level, this constraint on strike action does not 
exist – thus, making employers increasingly unwilling to sign CBAs at a broader scale.  
These legislative changes to CBAs were accompanied by an institutional transformation 
of the power and entitlements granted by the Labour Code to trade union leaders 
(Barbuceanu, 2012; Domnişoru, 2012). The institutional modification to the Labour 
Code resulted in the downgrading of trade union leader powers. The new legislation 
stated that the payment of hours/days worked as trade union activities were now 
unconstitutional. Furthermore, trade union leaders were no longer protected during their 
term against wrongful dismissal. This is seriously repressive legislation that was 
designed to not only weaken the position of trade union leaders, but also to make the 
position undesirable to workers and as a result, to refrain from organising.   
4.8 Conclusion 
During the first two decades of Socialism, Romania was a primarily agrarian economy 
with a weak and underdeveloped industrial sector (Burakow, 1981). It was not until the 
early 1960s that the leadership of the Romanian Socialist Party decided to pursue the 
implementation of a national-level industrialisation programme. My investigation of 
archival documents revealed that the two main institutional outcomes sought were 1) 
the creation of an energy-based economy based on the utilisation of indigenous reserves 
of raw materials and 2) the re-development of the machinery construction industry and 
all its subordinated industrial divisions.  
The historical period 1965-1989 is defined by the expansion of industrial production 
capacities in all industrial branches deemed of national importance by the leadership of 
the Romanian Communist Party. As I have shown earlier, the historical timeframe of 
the expansion of production capacities can be divided into two distinct periods during 
which the Romanian Socialist political economy pursued highly differentiated industrial 
policies and programmes of industrial development. The analysis revealed that between 
1965 and 1973 the industrial policy programme implemented in the Romanian Socialist 
regime promoted a high level of dependency on technological imports, licenses and 
foreign collaboration. The institutional structure of all Romanian industrial branches 
had inadequate technological resources and as a result, the realisation of the national 
production plan and the process of industrial upgrading were highly dependent on the 
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perpetuation of this open, import-dependent economic paradigm. The historical period 
1965-1973 was one of industrial growth, diversification and upgrading – an institutional 
trajectory driven by the collaboration between domestic elites from the political sphere 
and foreign elites in the form of technological imports. Starting from 1973, the 
leadership of the Romanian Communist Party shifted the institutional configuration of 
all industrial branches by reducing foreign collaboration and minimising the 
dependency on technological imports. The new economic model envisaged the 
development of all industrial necessities internally and the elimination of any form of 
‘import-related’ type of collaboration with social agents from ‘the West’. My analysis 
highlighted the fact that the re-orientation of industrial policy obstructed technological 
upgrading and diversification across the majority of Romanian industrial branches. The 
reduction of imports and the reliance on internal technological capacities resulted in an 
industrial structure plagued by insufficient and inappropriate technology and materials. 
The majority of Romanian industrial branches embarked on a process of ossification 
that started in the Socialist period and continued after 1990. 
The Romanian Revolution was an instance of violent civil unrest that erupted in 
Romania in December 1989 and marked the end of 42 years of Socialist rule in 
Romania. After the fall of the Socialist regime, a state of economic chaos ensued. As I 
discussed previously in the chapter, there were a series of structural problems that 
permeated the institutional context including a general lack of capital, inefficient 
investments, low productivity levels, an obsolete industrial apparatus, shortage of 
materials, an outdated product portfolio, production costs exceeding the sales price of 
manufactured goods, poor sector-level management, lack of a customer culture, limited 
innovative capabilities, an outdated supplier network, excessive labour, and extreme 
levels of account payables. The persistence of the economic crisis triggered a so-called 
crisis of the labouring class. More specifically, in the late 1990s the labouring classes 
challenged the institutional measures implemented by the dominant elites from the 
political sphere, who sought to restructure and/or terminate various sectoral economies 
of the national political economy. The different instances of labour unrest constituted 
the efforts of the labouring classes to retain their identity strength and legitimacy within 
the existing power structure. However, the late 1990s marked the exclusion of labour 
from the overarching power structure of the state, with the alliance between the polity 
and capital capturing the state apparatus and Romania’s industrial orders. 
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My analysis revealed that starting from the late 1990s, a set of foreign-led institutional 
paths were established across the Romanian political economy. The implementation of 
these institutional paths was driven by the insertion of FDI into the institutional 
structure of Romanian capitalist variety. Hence, the Romanian institutional framework 
saw a radical shift in the type of industrial policies pursued – more specifically, the 
institutional orientation changed from a series of inward-oriented, populist schemes of 
industrial development and re-organisation to liberal market forms of foreign 
collaboration and industrial transformation (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2009). The presence 
of international forces and foreign agents was not institutionally homogenous and had 
diverging institutional effects across the different sectoral economies of the post-
Socialist Romanian capitalist variety. If we compare the institutional configuration of 
the three sectors my study analyses and assess the role played by international forces 
within each sector, coal mining is characterised by the implementation of a foreign-led 
institutional path of destruction, auto experienced the implementation of a foreign-led 
institutional path of re-construction and industrial upgrading, and business services 
involved a break from the heavy industry-oriented past and the creation of a new 
institutional path driven by foreign agents. 
In 2011, the centre-right Romanian government introduced the most radical statutory 
changes to collective bargaining and trade union law since the fall of the Socialist 
regime. The modifications to the Labour Code further weakened the powers and 
positionality of the labouring classes within the structure of the state, positioning the 
configuration of industrial relations more towards the LME end of the spectrum. The 
changes to the institutional configuration of industrial relations were designed and 
implemented by domestic elites from the political sphere; however, these institutional 
players did not act independently. The EU played an important role in influencing 
labour policy within the Romanian institutional configuration and ultimately, driving 
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This chapter discusses the position of the coal mining sector within the Romanian 
institutional configuration between the 1960s and 2010s, and provides evidence of how 
different types of elites have influenced the structure of the institutional order 
throughout time. 
The second section of the chapter is a discussion about the identity of elites. I construct 
a categorisation of ‘elites’, in order to highlight the different levels of power and 
positionalities and thus, capture the hierarchical structure of elites. There is a clear 
distinction between ‘dominant elites’ and other competing ‘elites’, with the former 
having a superior position and predominant decision-making powers within the 
institutional configuration of the political economy.  
In the third section, I capture the story of institutional change in the Romanian coal 
industry, by identifying two instances of interplay between the dominant elites and 
different forces of change that permeate the internal dynamics of the coal mining sector. 
The first instance analyses the interaction between the dominant elites and industrial 
policy. The second instance examines the interaction between dominant elites and 
labour that defines the institutional context of Romanian coal mining. The instances of 
interplay between the dominant elites and the different forces of change represent the 
central framework that I use to illustrate how institutional change is driven within the 
sector, what are the different types or varieties of change that occur, who are the main 
actors who drive the change and how the identity of these main actors has or has not 
fluctuated over time, and when does the change occur or what is the timeframe of the 
change. 
In the fourth section of this chapter, I re-consider the key moments of institutional 
transformation emerging from the preceding empirical analysis and draw conclusions 
on how the interplay between the different categories of social agents influenced the 
institutional setting of the coal mining sector throughout time. 
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5.2 Identifying and Mapping the Identity of Elites in the Romanian Coal Mining 
Sector 
In order to understand how transition and institutional change have occurred through the 
dominant elites within the Romanian coal mining sector, an analysis regarding the 
identity of players has to be carried out. The variegated neoliberalism (Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2013) and historical institutionalist (North et al., 2007, 2009, 2013) 
literatures fail to systematically unpack the concept of ‘dominant elites’ and are unable 
to design a framework that explains the inner functioning and structure of the dominant 
coalition. Moreover, the two literatures fail to construct a hierarchy of elites. There are 
diverging levels of power, roles and spheres of influence within a power structure – a 
fundamental aspect that the two literatures do not incorporate in their explanation of 
elites. Furthermore, there is no distinction being made between the categories of ‘elite’ 
and ‘dominant elite’ to reflect the fact that even among the elites there is a leading sub-
coalition of power, and one or more sub-coalitions that are inferior in terms of power 
and positionality to the ‘dominant sub-coalition’.  
5.2.1 Role of Domestic Elites from the Political Sphere within the 
Institutional Structure of the Romanian Coal Mining Sector  
The dominant elites from the political sphere captured the state and through the state 
they captured the coal mining sector, due to the fact that private ownership was not 
allowed during the Socialist regime (Ban, 2012; Martin, 2013). Control over the sector 
has been retained by the dominant elites throughout the timeframe of my thesis, despite 
the fact that there have been major fluctuations in the structure and composition of the 
dominant coalition. This confirms the validity of North et al.’s (2007, 2009, 2013) 
assumption that elites are stable but not static. The dominant elites co-exist alongside 
other competing categories of social agents within the institutional setting. 
During the Socialist regime, state control and decision-making powers were 
concentrated in the hands of the CC of the Romanian Communist Party – ‘the CC’. The 
CC was divided into two bodies: the Permanent Bureau of the Executive Political 
Committee and the Secretariat of the Romanian Communist Party. The members of 
these two bodies were dominant elites that controlled and captured the Romanian state. 
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The CC along with the State Planning Committee and the individual ministries 
constituted the dominant sub-coalition.
26
 The composition of these bodies has been 
constant throughout the Socialist period, with the dominant elites retaining their 
positions of power. Rather than seeing fluctuations in the composition of the dominant 
sub-coalition, what we see is a rotation of dominant elites and their occupation of 
different positions within the same sub-coalition, strongly reinforcing the concept of the 
‘continuity of elites’. This becomes very evident when we observe the composition of 
the Permanent Bureau of the Executive Political Committee and the Secretariat of the 
Romanian Communist Party. The membership of the two bodies of the CC remains 
homogenous and highly limited to a small number of players over the four electoral 
terms (1969-1989), which indicates a high concentration of power in the hands of a 
stable group of central players.   
Furthermore, what emanates from the archival materials is a ‘multiplicity of roles’, with 
the dominant elites holding multiple positions within the national-level state 
institutions.
27
 If we compare the composition of the two bodies of the CC we can 
observe a strong overlap in membership during the four electoral terms between 1969 
and 1989. Furthermore, the membership of the CC, the State Planning Committee and 
the individual ministries is also strikingly similar, with a large proportion of dominant 
elites occupying a position in all three institutions.
28
 This is in line with North et al.’s 
(2009, 2013) conceptualisation of a context where the dominant elites always seek to 
establish alliances, in order to create rents and to limit the ability of citizens to form 
organisations by conferring this right solely to members of the dominant sub-coalition. 
At the same time, the historical materials reveal an institutional context that is defined 
by the ‘blurring of sphere delimitations’. This is a concept that highlights the continuous 
interaction and collaboration between the political and economic spheres of elites that 
results in the creation of a setting permeated by constant association and congruity to 
such an extent that the demarcation of the two spheres become indistinct. There is no 
clear separation between political and economic agents, with economic agents 
occupying positions within the state structure and performing political roles. 
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The CC would communicate its decisions in relation to the structure and direction of the 
state to the State Planning Committee, which had the role to formulate the Five-Year 
Plan. The State Planning Committee would then engage in a process of collaboration 
with the appropriate ministries, in order to design the plan for each individual 
industry.
29
 In the context of coal mining, the State Planning Committee closely 
interacted with the Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology to determine the direction and 
structure of the coal mining sector. To ensure that the plan for the coal mining sector 
was met, the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology 
would closely interact with the other ministries of supporting industries to secure things 
such as investment funds (Ministry of Finance), qualified personnel (Ministry of 
Labour), machinery and tools (Ministry of Automobile Construction, Ministry of 
Machinery-Tools, Electro-technics and Electronics, Ministry of Heavy Machinery 
Industry, Ministry of Technical Material Supply and Control of Fixed Assets 
Management), chemical products and alloys (Ministry of Chemical Industry, Ministry 
of Metallurgic Industry), infrastructure (Ministry of Transport and 
Telecommunications), the importation of machinery and licenses (Ministry of Exterior 
Commerce and International Economic Cooperation), and the distribution and use of 
coal in power plants (Ministry of Energy).
30
   
Archival records showed that the CC and the State Planning Committee communicated 
the central strategies and targets to each industrial branch.
31
 The State Planning 
Committee together with the Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology would communicate 
and implement the coal mining plan at the sectoral-level through the general directors of 
coal mining Industrial Complexes.
32
 The Industrial Complexes subordinated to the 
Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology acted as transmission belts, having performed the 
role of transforming institutional measures formulated at the central-level into practical 
individual business plans and targets that were then allocated to the different enterprises 
from the coal mining sector. Furthermore, the Industrial Complexes controlled and 
shaped the direction of the entire extractive and energy-oriented industrial branch by 
taking the strategies and targets formulated at the central-level and imposing and 
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monitoring their implementation an enterprise-level. Based on this, my argument is that 
the directors of coal mining Industrial Complexes were a sub-coalition of elites that co-
existed with the dominant elites, but which were inferior in terms of positionality and 
power. These players were the industry representatives at a regional level, but also 
occupied senior level positions within the Communist Party.
33
 This reinforces the 
concept of the ‘multiplicity of roles’ of the elites and, how elite power is highly 
concentrated. 
At the enterprise-level, the elites formulated strategies to meet the targets received from 
‘above’ and were under the constant supervision of the Industrial Complex who 
monitored whether the plan was met.
34
 The directors of coal mining enterprises 
constituted their own unique elite sub-coalition that was different from the other sub-
coalitions that I have introduced in terms of both power and positionality. More 
precisely, the power and positionality of enterprise-level coal mining elites was lower 
than that of elites at the national- and regional-level. In this sense, enterprise-level elites 
didn’t influence industrial policy or formulate strategies and production targets; instead, 
this category of social agents acted as ‘implementers’ of these institutional measures 
emanating from the regional and national institutional level.
35
 It is however important to 
understand that this category of players clearly distinguishes itself from the labour class 
in the coal mining industry.  
5.2.2 Role of Labour vis-à-vis Other Social Agents within the Institutional 
Structure of the Romanian Coal Mining Sector  
In order to capture a rich picture of the dominant elites and to thickly describe the 
structure and composition of the dominant coalition (Geertz, 1973), I examine the 
identity and role of the political sphere vis-à-vis labour. If focusing on the position of 
the dominant elites from the political sphere in a vacuum and as insular social agents, I 
would fail to identify all the players with power to capture the state and influence the 
direction of the coal mining industry. Thus, by adopting this relational approach, I 
recognise the interplay between the different categories of dominant elites and the 
structural dynamism that defines the institutional context. 
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By comparison to the labour classes from other industries, coal miners have always 
distinguished themselves as a unique sub-category of the Romanian proletariat (Velica 
and Shreter, 1993; Larionescu et al., 1999; Cernat, 2006; Boboc, 2009). Mitchell (2013) 
talks about how coal mining gives its working class and their unions a high degree of 
power and legitimacy within the institutional setting. This is due to the conditions 
surrounding the coal mining industry that give it a special status vis-à-vis other 
industries. First of all, the geographical positioning of coal mining is highly isolated and 
remote, with coal mining representing the primary industrial activity within the area. 
The geography of Romanian coal deposits is highly concentrated, with the composition 
of deposits being divided into lignite and hard coal (pit coal) (National Federation of 
Mining and Energy, 2010). Approximately 95 per cent of the lignite reserves are located 
within the Olteniţa mining basin within a 250 square kilometre radius in three distinct 
counties – Gorj, Vâlcea and Mehedinţi, while the remaining deposits present both low 
economic potential and low caloric content, thus resulting in the termination of any 
lignite mining activity outside the Olteniţa exploration site (FRD Center, 2014). Over 
90 per cent of hard coal reserves are located in the Jiu Valley basin within one county – 
 unedoara (Euracoal, 2015). The Olteniţa and Jiu Valley mining basins are mono-
industrial zones situated in the south-western part of Romania with proximity to only 
small- and medium-sized towns, whose principal economic activity is coal mining. The 
Romanian coal context is thus typified by highly concentrated power. The concentration 
of reserves and the localised power make the Olteniţa and Jiu Valley mining basins the 
sole foci of my study. 
Second, the geographic remoteness of the Jiu Valley and the relatively small size of the 
towns that were established near the extraction sites lead to the formation of a very 
tightly-knit community. This collective culture based on strong bonds of solidarity of 
the mining community is further reinforced by the harsh conditions in which miners 
work. The process of coal extraction is dangerous – the probability of death or serious 
injury is very high (Boboc, 2009). On a day-to-day basis coal miners find themselves 
confined in dark and narrow spaces for extended periods of time. At the same time, coal 
is bulky and requires many men to move it around.  
Third, because of this close association between coal miners, it becomes more difficult 
for management to control and direct coal miners and as a consequence, labour 
representatives assume considerable power and legitimacy, and in turn, are often a 
leading section of the working class. The central argument of Mitchell’s book is that 
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coal mining communities led as the driver to mass democracy. I argue that democracy is 
only one example or instance of an institutional direction or gain. I want to extend 
Mitchell’s argument and assert that coal miners have the capacity to act as drivers of 
institutional change, rather than restricting their collective power solely to influencing 
institutional change in the form of democratic transition. More specifically, miners have 
been able to use their structural and associational power to leverage a number of 
institutional gains, including that towards democracy (Wright, 2000; 2009; 2013). By 
taking this approach, I capture the varied and multi-faceted ways in which the 
institutional configuration of a state can be transformed, rather than limiting the effect 
that coal miners have on the state to a clear-cut institutional end.  
The coal mining labour class is privileged in many countries (Mitchell, 2013); however, 
the extent of this privilege becomes more evident within the context of a Communist 
state (Cernat, 2006). Romanian coal miners had considerably higher salaries vis-à-vis 
workers from other industrial branches, and benefitted from entire range of perks and 
facilities which included: religious holiday bonuses, all-expense paid vacations, free 
access to hotels and inns owned by the mining Industrial Complexes, the provision of 
accommodation by the mining Complex, the provision of transportation to and from 
work, paid energy bills, food vouchers and coal quotas (Cernat, 2006; Larionescu et al., 
1999). Furthermore, coal mining labour representatives had decision-making powers 
alongside the dominant elites from the political sphere within the ruling state apparatus. 
In fact, what I argue is that labour representatives were part of the elites, constituting a 
different sub-coalition or a different category from a diverging sphere of influence. This 
is in line with North et al.’s (2009, 2013) argument that each coalition is formed from 
multiple sub-coalitions, and that there is an extensive interactive network between these 
sub-coalitions and their members.  
The institutional setting is fraught by tensions and changes (Bohle and Greskovits, 
2013), with the configuration of the coal mining sector experiencing constant 
fluctuations in the structure and power dynamics of the dominant elites (North et al., 
2009, 2013). The struggle for power and positionality is continuous – while some 
categories of elites succeed in retaining their position within the dominant coalition, 
others categories of elites such as labour are downgraded to a non-elite status. Coal 
mining labour representatives lost their elite status and the position of their sub-
coalition lost its power and legitimacy within the ruling state apparatus. The interaction 
between dominant elites and labour will be explored in detail further in the chapter. 
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5.2.3 Role of Foreign Elites within the Institutional Structure of the 
Romanian Coal Mining Sector  
The Romanian coal mining sector has always been defined by a high degree of inward 
orientation and a completely domestic ownership structure. Unlike the automobile 
manufacturing and business services industries, where MNCs and foreign capital have 
played a significant role in shaping and influencing the institutional configuration of the 
two industrial orders, coal mining is defined by the absence of such external forces.  
Presently, it is the only industry within the Romanian national variety that is 100 per 
cent owned and controlled by the state.  
However, what can be observed during the 1960s and 1970s, at the height of the 
Romanian Socialist regime, is the consistent importation of technological resources and 
licenses (National Romanian Archives Files 3064/33/1973, 1973; 3064/52/1976). My 
argument is that this early interaction with international forces paved the way for future 
foreign collaboration, as well as led to the creation of a built-in mechanism that allowed 
the intervention of other types of international forces in the institutional configuration of 
the coal mining sector.   
Figure 5.1   Intervention of International Institutions within the Configuration of 
Coal 
 
In 1999, the World Bank and the IMF are the first international institutions to exert 
influence on the institutional context of the coal mining sector. Access and decision-
making powers were negotiated and awarded by the dominant elites from the political 
sphere, who allowed the World Bank and the IMF to direct and have control over the 
process of restructuring of Romanian coal mining (Larionescu et al., 1999; Haney and 
Shkaratan, 2003; Hamlin and Cobarzan, 2006). The EU, the second international 
institution, started to exert influence on the institutional configuration of the Romanian 
coal mining sector during the pre-accession period (European Institute in Romania, 
2004; Politico, 2016). Similarly, access and decision-making powers were negotiated 
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and awarded by the dominant elites from the political sphere, who allowed the EU to 
have control over the structure and direction of the sector. After Romania’s accession to 
the EU in January 2007, the dominant elites together with the EU accelerated the 
process of restructuring and continued facilitating the process of termination of the 
industry (Euracoal, 2015, 2017; Visegrad Plus, 2015; EESC, 2016; Europa, 2018; 
Climate Analytics, 2019). The restructuring of the coal mining sector, which began in 
1997 (Larionescu et al, 1999) and continues until the present day (Euracoal, 2017), is an 
instance of institutional change designed and implemented by the dominant elites in 
collaboration with other international institutions. The purpose of this section is to 
recognise the role of international institutions – such the the World Bank, IMF and EU 
– however, I do not analyse these any further since that is not the scope of my thesis. 
5.3 Elite Relations and Dynamics of Change in the Romanian Coal Mining Sector 
(1960s - 2010s) 
The dominant elites co-exist with other forces of change within the institutional context. 
As I have highlighted previously, the setting is defined by dynamic exchanges, in the 
form of collaborative arrangements and conflict, between different types of players and 
forces, rather than their isolated, non-relational existence. Thus, to capture the story of 
institutional change in the Romanian coal industry, I have identified two instances of 
interplay between the dominant elites and different forces of change that define the 
internal dynamics of the coal mining sector: 1) the interaction between dominant elites 
and industrial policy, and 2) the interaction between dominant elites and labour. 
5.3.1 Elite Relations, Industrial Policy and Institutional Change in the Coal 
Mining Sector 
I argue that industrial policy has to be seen as a force of change with which the 
dominant elites engage and interact within the institutional context of the coal mining 
industry – introducing new paradigms and then re-shifting them, and in the process 
exerting institutional change by re-shaping the internal dynamics of the industrial order.  
The industrial order has the longest established historical timeframe in my study, 
followed by auto and business services. Coal mining has a long-established tradition 
within the Romanian national variety, pre-dating the influences of the Socialist Regime. 
From my research, it has emerged that the first coal mining activities took place in the 
Jiu Valley in 1840, with the opening of surface exploitation sites in Vulcan, Petroşani 
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and Petrila (Deleanu, 1955). The first and largest exploitation site in Petrila was 
established through a consortium between the Princes Maximilian and Egon Fürtenberg, 
Count Otto Chotek, and the Barons Luis and Moricz Haber (Realitatea de Hunedoara, 
2018). In 1848, the mass exploitation of the Jiu Valley coal mining basin commenced 
(Velica and Shreter, 1993). In 1947, Romania is proclaimed the Socialist Republic of 
Romania and as part of the central planning Stalinist-inspired regime, where a strong 
emphasis is placed on heavy and energy-intensive industries, coal mining becomes a 
key national strategic industry (Crowther, 1988; Boboc, 2009). The expansion of coal 
production was pursued via two methods: 1) the additional development of existing 
production capacities, and 2) the opening of new exploitation sites (National Romanian 
Archives Files 3064/33/1973; 3064/52/1976).  
Figure 5.2   Evolution of Institutional Frameworks Pursued throughout the 
Socialist Regime in Coal and other Romanian Industrial Branches 
 
The main institutional players driving and controlling the expansion of coal production 
were the CC of the Romanian Communist Party, The State Planning Committee, the 
Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology (Head Minister: Catargiu Irimie, Deputy Minister: 
Huidu Emil) and the general directors of the Jiu Valley and Banat mining Industrial 
Complexes. The macro programme of coal production maximisation consisted of a 
series of measures and tasks that were delegated to players of the ruling coalition. The 
descriptive material and relational implications about the players in charge of the 
expansion of production capacity are based on archival data.
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As I have established in Chapter 4, the Romanian industrial order was characterised by 
a high degree of dependency on imported resources and foreign collaboration during the 
1960s and early 1970s. Thus, in the first decades of the Socialist regime, the coal 
mining sector was defined by a massive inflow of technological imports – this industrial 
policy was designed and implemented by the dominant elites. The historical materials 
that I have analysed indicate that from 1973 onwards the dominant elites have started to 
obstruct technological upgrading through technological imports. Instead, the dominant 
elites resorted to the implementation of an industrial policy based on the promotion of 
autarchic production capacities and the creation of an insular economic paradigm based 
on old technological reserves. The reduction of imports and the reliance on internal 
technological capacities resulted in an industry plagued by insufficient and 
inappropriate technology and materials, and as such Romanian coal mining embarked 
on a process of ossification that started in the Socialist period and continued after 1990. 
Table 5.1 exhibits a significant drop in production that occurred within the mono-
industrial area of Jiu Valley. The decrease in production is a major historical moment 
that marks the beginning of the process of industry death or termination.  
The Structural Problems of Socialist Planning in the Romanian Coal Mining Sector 
(1960s-1989) 
My investigation of the archival materials has revealed that throughout the Socialist 
regime the coal mining sector was defined by the inability to realise the planned 
production levels due to outdated and insufficient machinery and tools, shortages and a 
lack of high-quality replacement parts, an underdeveloped pool of specialised engineers, 
and inferior mining process upgrading and innovations. I shall elaborate on my findings 
in detail below.  
In his book Socialist Planning, Michael Ellman argues that the Socialist economic 
mechanism was an economic system, whose orientation was directed towards the rapid 
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quantitative increase of production through heavy industrialisation, but which did not 
address the problems emerging from the intensive regime of economic growth (1979). 
Furthermore, Ellman claims that the fundamental problem of Socialist regimes 
constitutes the ad hoc character of planning and the creation of ‘slack’ plans. Ellman 
(1978, 250) defines a ‘slack’ plan “as a plan which provides for less output than is 
possible, or more inputs than are necessary”. Ellman (1979) attributes the existence of 
‘slack’ plans within Socialist regimes to the deficiencies in the coordination of the 
various sectors of the economy; the difficulties in the transmission of information 
within the national system; the problems of coordination between future investments 
and current economic plans; the performance indicators measured in volume 
production, leading to waste and lack of care with costs and product quality; and excess 
demand for consumer goods.  
According to the U.S. Library of Congress (2017a, 2017b), the forecasted target output 
of 86 million tonnes annually for the period 1982-1985 proved to be unrealistic and as a 
result, was revised to 64 million tonnes per year; however, by 1985 actual realised 
output stood at only 44 million tonnes in total.
37
 During my archival research, I have 
found evidence regarding the inability of an extensive number of mines and exploitation 
sites to meet the production plan. An example of an exploitation site that enters this 
category is the  orăşti Mine. “In 1975 due to difficulties encountered in panels 3 and 4 
the recalculated coal production approximated 77.6 per cent of the total mine capacity, 
whereas the productivity of the exploitation process equalled only 74 per cent of the 
planned level (National Romanian Archives File 3064/52/1976, 115). The same coal 
mining technical report provided evidence that there was a failure to meet planned 
output at the Sotânga Mine, where pre-established levels were set at 700 thousand 
tonnes per annum and only 680 thousand tonnes were achieved (National Romanian 
Archives File 3064/52/1976, 92). A protocol of the meeting of the Standing Bureau of 
the Executive Political Committee indicates that the ‘problem of unrealised production’ 
had been a constant reality present throughout the entire 1970s and that continuous 
efforts were made to enlarge the exploitable reserves and to expand the work front in 
order to meet the Five-Year Plan (National Romanian Archives File 3354/38/1980). 
The principal aspects highlighted by the general directors of the mining complexes 
include the insufficient and inappropriate technological capacities of production, and the 
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 In 1988, output totalled 58.8 million tonnes. 
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low usage indices on specific machinery and equipment. In the transcript of a working 
session with the senior officials of the coal mining industry (National Romanian 
Archives File 3294/65/1982), the Minister of Geology (Ion Lăzărescu) stated that the 
greatest two impediments that contribute to the unfulfilment of planned production are 
the inappropriate functioning of technology and machinery, and the lack of supervision 
over technological capacities. In the same working session, the General Director of the 
Rovinari Mining Complex (Emil Huidu) highlighted the fact that machinery and 
equipment are severely outdated, and that the wear and tear indices are very high. The 
reason behind this is reinforced by the Director of the Rovinari Coal Mining Enterprise 
(Bercea Nicolae), who emphasizes the lack of technological upgrade, the shortage of 
replacement parts and the inappropriate servicing. Moreover, the General Director 
(Ştefan Marin) of the Motru Mining Complex further underlined the existence of 
outdated technology, stating that some activities are carried out manually and that there 
is an urgent need to mechanise the entire process. From the same working session, it 
also emerged that technology wasn’t the only problem – a shortage of specialised labour 
characterised the mining complex.  
These issues related to organisation and technology optimisation were corroborated 
with: 1) the points raised in a note of explanation published in 1982 on the development 
of lignite and brown coal production during the period 1982-1990 (National Romanian 
Archives File 3294/234/1982), and 2) the emerging themes in the minutes of a working 
session in 1989 with the key players from the Ministry of Mining, Ministry of Oil and 
the Central Department of Geology (National Romanian Archives File 3294/177/1989). 
In an older technical report compiled by the Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology 
(National Romanian Archives File 3064/33/1973), the unfulfilment of the production 
plan is attributed to the following: the failure to ensure the timely delivery of 
replacement parts to the central equipment and machinery (excavators, dumping 
installations and belt conveyors); land slides and flooding in certain quarries; 
organisational shortcomings in relation to technical activities, supply system, 
inspections, repairs, servicing and maintenance; and, difficult hydrological and 
geotechnical conditions within specific quarries/pits.  
Futhermore, in the protocol of a meeting of the Political Executive Committee in 1988, 
Nicolae Ceauşescu provided an assessment of the status of the coal extraction industry, 
highlighting the principal shortcomings of the industrial order: “[…] we must prioritise 
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and secure the timely delivery of materials and parts that are incorporated into finished 
products; […] the recovery and use of materials are not firmly enforced, we must 
increase this recovery; […] we must attempt to stay within the material consumption 
levels in all enterprises; […] we need to improve quality and raise the technical level of 
products; […] and we need to implement measures to increase labour productivity 
based on the good organisation of the business activity, production process, 
mechanisation, automation, robotisation […]” (National Romanian Archives File  
3354/26/1988). 
Despite the fact that the industry became unsustainable in the 1970s (Cernat, 2006), coal 
production continued to be expanded according to the Socialist regime principle “For 
our country, as much coal as feasible!” (Partidul Comunist Român, 1975, 16). Because 
of intensive exploitation, the competitiveness of the principal coal basins and the quality 
of production declined further (Shafir, 1985); hence, from the mid-1980s onwards the 
industry embarked on a path of decline. 
Industrial Policy in the Romanian Coal Mining Sector during the Socialist Era: 
Dependency on Technological Imports and Foreign Collaboration 
I will now move on to discussing the type of industrial policy pursued in the first part of 
the Socialist regime and its effects on the institutional configuration of the industry – 
more specifically, the creation of an import-oriented institutional framework. Based on 
my analysis of the archival materials, I argue that in order to compensate for these 
inappropriate technological capabilities, the dominant elites from the political sphere 
facilitated the creation of an import-oriented institutional framework, which entailed a 
high dependency on technological imports and licenses.  
Archival records indicate a high dependency on technological imports, licenses and 
foreign collaboration that was present across the entire mining sector during the 1960s 
and early 1970s (National Romanian Archives Files 3064/27/1971; 3064/112/1971; 
1971; 3064/67/1972). An example to illustrate this dependency on imports constitutes 
the Rovinari Mine (National Romanian Archives File 3064/33/1973), where 95 per cent 
of repairs, maintenance and spare parts were secured from imports. The State Planning 
Committee signed a contract with the foreign company Krupp to supply excavation and 
dumping machinery. Furthermore, to ensure the import of replacement parts for 
electrical tools, machinery automation and core components, necessary for processes 
such as the ‘cold’ vulcanisation of belts and maintenance bands with metal insertions, 
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that cannot be internally produced, a group of specialists carried out negotiations with 
foreign companies from the German Federal Republic – this process was also controlled 
and managed by the State Planning Committee. Under the direction of the Ministry of 
Labour, the Ministry of Mining and the State Planning Committee, the re-qualification 
of ten engineers from the Rovinari Mine that were sent abroad was carried out, along 
with the internal re-qualification of numerous engineers and sub-engineers by a 
commission of foreign specialists that were hired to carry on-site training. Another 
example which highlights the dependency of coal mining on foreign technological 
resources is the Jilţ-Sud Mine. A technical report produced in 1976 by the senior 
officials of the mining Industrial Complexes highlighted the fact that “[…] the share of 
imported components, parts and materials in total equipment is 39.12 per cent, […] 
excavating and pile-driving machines are being developed in cooperation with the 
foreign company Krupp […], some supplies and equipment are needed that are not 
manufactured in the country, and there are also expenses for the import of technical 
documentation and materials, as well as technical assistance, training of employees” 
(National Romanian Archives File 3064/52/1976, 164-165). 
The emerging narrative from the archival materials reinforces the dependency of 
Romanian coal mining on technological imports, licenses and foreign collaboration. The 
process of technological upgrading was highly dependent on the perpetuation of this 
open, import-dependent economic paradigm that facilitated the creation of production 
capacities based on new, foreign technological resources. Furthermore, the archival 
materials shed light on who are the drivers behind the implementation of this import-
oriented institutional framework. The drivers behind this institutional framework are the 
dominant elites – the CC, the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Mining, and 
other ministries supporting and collaborating with the Ministry of Mining. The 
dominant elites were highly aware of the deficient indigenous technological base and as 
a result, they sought to mitigate this competitive disadvantage. In addition, it was 
common knowledge among the members of the CC and State Planning Committee that 
in order for the industry to achieve technological upgrade and develop up-to-date 
internal production capacities, it needed to assimilate foreign technological resources 
and integrate them into the configuration of the industrial order. Through the 
implementation of this industrial policy, I argue that the dominant elites ushered in a 
new institutional paradigm based on the interaction with international forces. By 
altering the internal dynamics of the coal mining sector in this way, the dominant elites 
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exerted institutional change on the industrial order. Furthermore, I argue that these early 
foreign exchanges and collaborative arrangements that the dominant elites from the 
political sphere facilitated became the bedrock of institutional continuity, paving the 
way for future interaction with international forces within the institutional configuration 
of the coal mining sector.  
Industrial Policy in the Romanian Coal Mining Sector during the Socialist Era: Import 
Substitution Industrialisation and the Creation of an Autarchic System 
I shall now examine the changes in industrial policy that occurred during the Socialist 
period, more precisely how the import-oriented institutional framework was dismantled 
and replaced by an inward-oriented system based on autarchy and internal production 
capacities. What emerged from my archival investigation is that starting with 1973, the 
dominant elites re-shifted the orientation of the institutional configuration of the coal 
mining sector by reducing imports and minimising the dependency on technological 
imports. The decision to cut foreign technological resources was driven by 1) the 
national industrialisation programme, which promoted the development of internal 
capacities, and 2) the regime’s external debt payment plan, which focused on the 
elimination of foreign imports and the boosting of exports. Extensive evidence 
regarding this shift in industrial policy was found in a variety of technical reports in the 
Archives. One such report was produced by the Ministry of Exterior Commerce and 
International Economic Cooperation and stated that tight control should be exerted over 
the import of tools and machinery, and that transactions should be coordinated by the 
Ministry of Machinery-Tools and Electro-technics (National Romanian Archives File 
3064/99/1973). In a different document issued by the CC and State Planning 
Committee, it was specified that all ministries, central-, regional- and city-level 
apparata, Industrial Complexes and enterprises are required to decrease the level of 
imported materials, machinery, components, installations, licenses and trainings in order 
to meet the targets of the Five Year Plan and the new import levels stipulated within the 
assimilation programme (National Romanian Archives File 3064/19/1974). 
Furthermore, the document emphasized that the development of indigenous production 
capacities should have priority and that the elimination of imported technologies would 
allow the industrial branches to pool and focus their resources on the expansion and 
diversification of internal production.  Based on the investigation of a series of technical 
reports of individual mines, before the reduction of technological resources and the 
assimilation programme was begun, mining enterprises imported approximately 50 to 
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60 per cent of their technological necessities from foreign suppliers from either other 
satellites of the Soviet Bloc or from Western capitalist economies. By 1976, the 
proportion of imported equipment, machinery and materials had been reduced 
significantly, ranging between 10.78 to 39.12 per cent per mining enterprise (National 
Romanian Archives File 3064/52/1976).   
The rationale behind this strategy was that technological absorption and integration 
would take place together with the development of indigenous capacities, hence 
eliminating the need for imports. “[…] The Ministry of Exterior Commerce and 
International Economic Cooperation is entrusted with the task of continuously reducing 
the proportion of imports […] a priority will be given to the reduction of imports 
through the intensification of assimilation and the internal production of materials and 
components that constituted a significant proportion of imports […] special attention 
will be awarded to allow imports that complement products that haven’t been 
sufficiently integrated internally” (National Romanian Archives File 3064/99/1973, 
1973, 75). The process of technological import reduction accelerated throughout the 
1980s (National Romanian Archives Files 3294/65/1982; 3294/71/1987; 
3294/177/1989; 3294/329/1989). This information was corroborated by a key elite 
player who was Minister of Machinery Construction (1965-1985), Deputy Prime 
Minister (1985) and Minister of Energy (1986-1987) who stated that (interview code 
A_10): 
“The reduction of imports was problematic! As we reduced imports, we had 
to make massive effort to assimilate internally for which we did not have the 
necessary funds, because all the money went to pay off the external debt. 
And we needed to import specific documentation, certain equipment; we 
could not do everything on our own.”  
My analysis of the archival materials revealed that the decision to reduce imports and to 
minimise the dependency on foreign technological resources was made at the most 
central level – the CC (National Romanian Archives Files 3064/99/1973; 3064/19/1974; 
3064/52/1976). The CC conveyed this institutional measure to the State Planning 
Committee, which had the role to implement it in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Mining, Oil and Geology and the other supporting ministries (National Romanian 
Archives Files 3064/99/1973; 3064/19/1974; 3064/52/1976). Hence, my argument is 
that the dominant elites from the political sphere were the drivers behind this shift in 
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industrial policy and re-orientation of the institutional configuration of the coal mining 
sector. By altering the framework of the industrial order from an import-oriented model 
to an inward-oriented one, the dominant elites exerted institutional change. However, it 
has emerged from my research that the decision to drastically reduce technological 
resources was a contentious issue among some of the dominant elite players and that 
some members of the coalition tried to oppose the implementation of this institutional 
framework (interview code A_6, A_10, S_4). The reason behind this push against the 
elimination of imports was the realisation of some political representatives of the 
Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology (later Ministry of Mining) and the ministries 
collaborating with the coal sector, as well as the directors of the Mining Complexes that 
the Romanian political economy did not have the necessary indigenous production 
capacities to sustain and develop the coal industry on its own. According to the former 
Minister of Machinery Construction (1965-1985), who was a key representative of the 
CC during the Socialist period (interview code A_10): 
“The decision to reduce imports was made by the Party. They said – “from 
tomorrow onwards we will only allocate you this amount of money!”. It was 
the State Planning Committee and the CC. Our people [representatives of 
the Ministry of Mining, Oil and Geology] protested that it would be 
impossible to reduce imports on a year-by-year basis to such an extent, it 
would be impossible to create this amount of new internal capacities. We 
had lots of confrontations.”  
By examining the historical materials of the State Planning Committee, what emerged 
was that only a partial process of integration and technological absorption took place – 
this was due to the fact that the process of import elimination was undertaken too 
rapidly and the Romanian industry had neither the time, nor the funds, nor the expertise 
to develop such an extensive array of supporting industries to complement the coal 
mining sector (National Romanian Archives Files 3064/99/1973; 3064/19/1974; 
3064/52/1976; 3294/65/1982). Instead, the abrupt elimination of imports resulted in the 
unavailability of high-quality components and equipment necessary for the maintenance 
and servicing of exploitation equipment, and the absence of the latest process 
innovations, techniques and operational expertise (interview code S_4, A_10). The 
former Minister of Machinery Construction, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Energy reinforced this idea (interview code A_10): 
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“You should know that quality problems and the drop in standards arose 
when imports were reduced. It was a mistake that we tried paying the 
external debt. The assimilation was forced and so, quality problems arose.” 
To compensate for these insufficiencies the coal mining sector had to rely on sub-
standard components and equipment that were internally produced, often with great 
delays and at a cost that exceeded the sales price (National Romanian Archives Files 
3064/33/1973; 3064/19/1974; 3294/65/1982; 3294/71/1987). According to a technical 
report uncovered during my archival investigation, the senior management of the 
Rovinari Mining Complex highlighted the fact that the lack of imports led to an 
inability to carry out high-quality repairs, which in turn resulted in the frequent 
decommissioning of machinery (National Romanian Archives File 3064/33/1973). In 
light of these consequences, the argument that I am advancing is that by eliminating 
technological imports and foreign collaboration, the dominant elites obstructed 
technological upgrading and diversification. Instead, the institutional context shaped by 
the dominant elites is one characterised by autarchic production capacities and the 
utilisation of old technological reserves. The investigation of archival materials reveals 
that this insular approach has had a negative impact on the structure of the industry.  
Economic Overview of the Romanian Coal Mining Sector in the Post-Socialist Era 
(1990-1999) 
I will focus on providing the economic overview of the coal mining sector. According 
to a study carried out by the World Bank (1998), the Romanian coal mining sector was 
plagued by an acute financial crisis throughout the 1990s. In May 1998, the National 
Enterprise of Pit Coal and the National Enterprise of Lignite were amongst the largest 
indebted state-owned companies, having an accumulated debt of 953.8 billion 
Romanian Lei and 412.4 billion Romanian Lei respectively (World Bank, 1998). When 
undertaking my analysis of the archival materials during the timeframe 1970-1989, the 
following characteristics arose regarding the economic specificities of the sector: poor 
sector management, low level of productivity of operations, low caloric content of 
extracted coal reserves, inauspicious geological conditions, production costs exceeding 
the sales price of coal, obsolete technology and shortage of materials, inefficient 
investments, excessive labour, and extreme levels of accounts payable.
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3294/7/1982; 3294/65/1982; 3294/234/1982; 3294/71/1987; 3294/177/1989. 
156 
 
In spite of these financial issues, coal mining was unique vis-à-vis other industries in 
terms of the level of state subsidies (Larionescu et al., 1999). For example, in the first 
half of 1997 total state subsidies equalled 187.2 billion Romanian Lei, out of which a 
proportion of 55.8 per cent were directed towards coal mining. According to the World 
Bank (1998), instead of being allocated for the re-equipment and modernisation of 
exploitation sites, these subsidies were utilised to increase the salaries and benefits 
awarded to the coal mining labouring class. This aspect emerged throughout my 
interviews as well (interview code S_3, S_4). According to my interview with a 
historian specialised in the Romanian Communist regime and the historical legacies of 
Socialist economic structures (interview S_4): 
“The money from the aid package was not used in the way it was supposed 
to. You see, the intention of these funds was to orchestrate the industrial 
resuscitation of the industry. Instead of this, the money was used to award 
bonuses and pay increases to the leaders and workers of coal mining. And 
you must understand, the entire industry was favoured. You know, we like 
to claim in the media that it was only the leadership, yes the leadership 
controlled, but the labour in coal mining by comparison to the average 
Romanian worker was doing much better and benefitted from perks that the 
average citizen didn’t [...] The other part of the money was pocketed by the 
leaders of the regime. From the top we had the representatives of the 
ministry [Ministry of Energy], then the leaders of the National Enterprises 
and finally the leaders of individual enterprises [coal mines]. The money 
was divided starting from the top and everyone got their share. As you 
know, this money was used to start many of the domestic, privately-owned 
enterprises that emerged during the 1990s that had and still have close 
relations with the state. They are favoured by the state, they have a lot of 
partnerships with the state, they usually always win the so-called public 
bidding contracts that the state offers, and so on. ”     
As the quotation presented above highlights, specific elite sub-coalitions appropriated 
the state subsidies and utilised them for their own personal interests. These sub-
coalitions included high-level political representatives at a ministry-level, senior-level 




It soon became clear, however, that such levels of subsidisation were unsustainable in 
the face of the other demands on the shrinking national budgets (Cernat, 2006). From 
this recognition followed the decision to embark in 1997 upon the restructuring of the 
coal sector (Haney and Shkaratan, 2003). In order to reduce the burden of subsidies on 
the budget, the closure of loss-making mines and the downsizing of the sector’s labour 
force began. 
What has arisen from my interview with a historian specialised in the Communist 
regime is that the process of restructuring and the measures designed to transform the 
coal mining sector were severely delayed by various sub-coalitions of elites (interview 
code S_4). These were directors of coal mines and labour representatives who had a 
vested interest in making sure that the position of coal mining as an industrial order 
didn’t lose its significance within the Romanian institutional configuration, as this 
would lead to their loss of power and positionality within the ruling structure.  
In the following section, I will discuss the process of restructuring of the coal sector that 
began in 1997.  
Role and Effect of Industrial Policies on the Restructuring of the Romanian Coal 
Mining Sector 
The process of restructuring was pursued by the domestic elites through the 
implementation of two emergency ordinances: Ordinance no. 9 from 14
th
 of April 1997 
and Ordinance no. 22 from 19
th
 of August 1997 (Legex, 2017a; Legex, 2017b). 
The two emergency ordinances were designed and implemented by the dominant elites 
from the political sphere, or the acting government, in conjunction with other elite sub-
coalitions, which included the trade unions and the leadership of the Coal Régie 
Autonome. Despite the fact that trade unions and the Coal Régie Autonome officially 
declared that they were not included in the consultations and decision-making process, 
Larionescu et al. (1999) argue that the creation of these ordinances was a negotiated 
process between all the different categories of elites from: ministry-level, National 
Enterprise-level-, and coal mine-level, including the leaders of organised labour. My 
assumption is that to avoid any form of backlash from coal miners, the trade union 
leaders and the Coal Régie Autonome did not want to appear involved in the process of 




Ordinance no. 9 implemented a series of welfare protection measures for those whose 
employment contract would be terminated because of collective dismissal through the 
implementation of restructuring, privatisation and liquidation programmes (Larionescu 
et al., 1999). These measures included the payment of a monthly non-taxable 
compensation package equal to the net average wage, with the number of payments 
being determined by tenure. Based on the criterion of tenure, three types of packages 
were offered: 1) a total of six net average monthly wages to employees with a tenure of 
below five years, 2) a total of nine net average monthly wages to employees with a 
tenure of between 5 to 15 years, and 3) a total of twelve net average monthly wages to 
employees with a tenure of over 15 years (Legex, 2017a). An additional payment worth 
three net average wages for those employees residing in a mono-industrial region, 
where unemployment exceeded 12 per cent, or for those in a highly specialised 
profession (Portal Legislativ, 2017a). 
Ordinance no. 22 implemented a series of welfare protection measures for those 
employed in the mining industry and in geological exploration activities (Larionescu et 
al., 1999). By comparison to Ordinance no. 9, Ordinance no. 22 introduced the 
possibility of voluntary dismissal, with the social welfare protection measures entitling 
workers to ask for ‘dismissal on demand’ in exchange for a one-off compensation 
package determined by tenure (Legex, 2017b). Three types of packages were offered: 1) 
a compensation package worth 12 net average monthly wages to employees with a 
tenure of below five years, 2) a compensation package worth 15 net average monthly 
wages to employees with a tenure of between 5 and 15 years, and 3) a compensation 
package worth 20 net average monthly wages to employees with a tenure of over 15 
years. Legislation stipulated that under Ordinance no. 22 those who opted for voluntary 
dismissal and received compensation were not elegible to be re-hired in the mining 
sector for at least a year (Portal Legislativ, 2017b).  
Blinded by the compensation packages offered through Ordinance no.22, which at the 
time represented a small fortune for the Romanian working class citizen situated in a 
region such as that as Jiu Valley (Cernat, 2006), a massive number of coal miners opted 
to voluntarily terminate their employment contract and exit the mining sector, thus 
leading to an extensive, unexpected exodus of the workforce. According to the 
Secretary of State of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, it was expected that 
Ordinance no. 22 would lead to the dismissal of approximately 15 per cent of the coal 
mining labour force. In reality, in September 1997, the first month the ordinance was 
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implemented, 14,870 miners from the National Enterprise of Lignite and 14,825 miners 
from the National Enterprise of Pit Coal opted for voluntary dismissal (Larionescu et 
al., 1999). Between October and December 1997, an additional 33,000 coal miners were 
dismissed through Ordinance no. 9 and Ordinance no. 22. Over a period of fourth 
months, the application of the two emergency ordinances resulted in the decrease of the 
total coal mining labour force of 173,000 by 36 per cent (National Federation of Mining 
and Energy, 2010). 
In 2012, the Romanian coal mining sector entered a major process of re-organisation 
(Visegrad Plus, 2015). Under the recommendation and instruction of the EU, the 
government initiated the vertical integration of the industrial order (Euracoal, 2015). On 
the lignite side, the dominant elites from the political sphere orchestrated the merger of 
mines and exploitation sites with the respective lignite-based power plants into the 
Olteniţa Energy Complex – the largest producer of coal-based energy, which is 
responsible for 99 per cent of the total lignite production. According to the National 
Agency for Mineral Resources, there are a total of 197 of lignite perimeters in Romania; 
however, after the process of restructuring exploitative activities take place at only 12 of 
these sites that represent opencast pits, with the activity in the remaining 185 having 
been terminated (Euracoal, 2017). The reserves supply the Turceni and Rovinari power 
plants with installed capacities of 1,650MW and respectively 1,320MW, but also 
Craiova and Işalniţa, which are located further south (Transelectrica, 2017). 
By comparison to lignite, the process of re-organisation of pit coal production proved to 
be more problematic. The National Agency for Mineral Resources data shows the 
existence of 54 hard coal perimeters in Romania distributed between the Petroşani 
Mining Basin (34) and the Lupac-Anina Mining Basin (20) (Euracoal, 2015). In 2011, 
the National Hard Coal Company had only a total of seven active underground 
exploitation sites: Lonea, Livezeni, Petrila, Vulcan, Uricani, Lupeni and Paroşeni. As of 
September 2012, the dominat elites from the political sphere merged these sites with the 
hard coal-based power plants forming the Hunedoara Energy Complex. The Hunedoara 
Energy Complex has two distinct operating units: National Society for Mine Closure Jiu 
Valley and the Mining Division. The National Society for Mine Closure Jiu Valley has 
been tasked to oversee the closure of three economically unsustainable mines by 2018 – 
Uricani, Paroşeni, and Petrila,
39
 while the Mining Division of Hunedoara Energy 
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Complex has been tasked to continue the operation of the remaining four pit coal mines 
– Lonea, Livezeni, Vulcani, and Lupeni, which are regarded as financially viable in 
terms of profitability and return of investment. The hard coal reserves supply the 
Paroşeni and Mintia power plants with installed capacities of 150MW and respectively 
1,075MW (Transelectrica, 2017). 
Hence, my argument is that via the implementation of a set of industrial policies the 
dominant elites from the political sphere drove the massive restructuring of the 
Romanian coal mining sector, ultimately orchestrating the termination of this industrial 
order. 
5.3.2 Elite Relations, Labour and Institutional Change in the Coal Mining 
Sector 
The variegated neoliberalism approach overlooks the way in which conflict and tensions 
between political and social agents can act as driving elements for development and 
institutional change (Streeck, 2007; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013). In order to accurately 
capture the internal dynamics of the institutional configuration and the various 
typologies of exchanges and interactions between different categories of agents, I 
conceptualise an institutional setting permeated by tensions, conflict, collaboration and 
alliances between different levels of agents with diverging positionality, elite and non-
elite, that is in a continuous process of change and re-combination. To fully comprehend 
the fluctuations within the internal dynamics of the coal mining sector, I analyse the 
changing alliances and affiliation between the dominant elites and other social actors – 
in this case the coal mining labour. 
My assumption is that the coal mining labour class has to be seen as a force of change 
with which the dominant elites engage and interact within the institutional context of the 
coal mining industry. Using the Mineriadas or the miners’ revolts in Romania during 
the 1990s, I shall highlight that coal miners had the capacity to act as drivers of 
institutional change at key turning points throughout history. In fact, using the 
Mineriadas I will show that labour representatives were part of the dominant elites, 
constituting a different sub-coalition or a different category of elites from a diverging 




Figure 5.3   Timeframe of the Mineriadas (1990-1999) 
 
Between 1990 and 1999 there were a total of six Mineriadas. My analysis reveals that 
the early Mineriadas from 1990-1991 vis-à-vis the late Mineriadas from 1999 had 
diverging purposes and impacted the institutional context differently. I will analyse the 
two diverging timeframes, focusing on the role and positionality of the dominant elites 
and labour represenatives, and how the internal dynamics between the two categories of 
players fluctuated from the beginning of the 1990s to the end of the 1990s. 
The Structural Particularities and Institutional Implications of the First Instances of 
Labour Unrest in the Romanian Coal Mining Sector (January 1990-September 1991)  
Between January 1990 and September 1991 there were a total of four Mineriadas. My 
argument is that within the institutional context of this period the dominant elites 
managed to utilise coal miners as an instrument of manoeuvring to implement various 
measures and forms of institutional change. In the context of the early Mineriadas, the 
institutional change consisted of the supressing of the political opposition – either the 
historical parties
40
 or the newly emerging political faction that was an association of 
newer and younger politicians that had more liberal-oriented views of the state,
41
 and in 
the process ensuring the continuity of the dominant elites from the Socialist regime. 
After the fall of the Socialist regime, rather than having a lustration campaign through 
which the dominant elites from the political sphere – remnants of the Socialist regime – 
were ousted from the new capitalist order and held accountable for their actions as 
players in the Socialist political arena (Gallina, 2008; Martin, 2013), what can be seen is 
that the newly elected temporary government was formed from players from the former 
regime – the National Salvation Front (Cernat, 2006; interview code S_4). This 
substantiates my argument regarding the fact that the institutional configuration is 
defined by the continuity of the dominant elites, despite the fact that there was a regime 
transition. 
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By awarding coal miners this type of legitimacy within the institutional context, the 
dominant elites increased the power and positionality of an already privileged labour 
class and enhanced the influence of organised labour representatives who already had an 
elite status. It is thus only via the interaction and collaboration between the dominant 
elites and labour that the suppression of the political opposition was achieved. The 
agenda of the political opposition entailed: 1) the dissolution of the newly elected 
government, 2) the withdrawal of Ion Iliescu – the leader of the National Salvation 
Front, and 3) the elimination of the Security, the secret police agency during the 
Socialist regime, which was claimed to have transitioned into the newly established 
regime and to have infiltrated all major institutions and economic sectors (Evenimentul 
zilei, 2010a). The transitioning of the Security reinforces the recurring concept of the 
continuity of the dominant elites and their unencumbered transition from the state 
Socialism to capitalism.   
I argue that a collaboration between the political and the labour sphere was necessary, in 
order to ensure that the political opposition and their supporters didn’t gain legitimacy 
and in the process, destabilise the existing dominant sub-coalition (interview code S_4). 
President Iliescu made a national announcement calling for “labour solidarity”, calling 
on all organised labour to march on Bucharest and defend the country against the 
‘dangerous, extremist intellectuals’ (Cernat, 2006). The entire political opposition and 
anti-National Salvation Front protesters were labelled as “fascist elements” and 
“organised groups”, who were undermining the newly installed democratic regime 
(Iliescu aduce minerii în Bucureşti în frunte cu Miron Cozma! Mineriada 28-29 ianuarie 
1990!, 2014). This substantiates my claim regarding the fact that the coal mining labour 
class has to be seen as a force of change in itself with which the dominant elites engage 
and in the process, exert changes within the institutional context of the coal mining 
industry. 
Led by their key labour representative, Miron Cozma, coal miners were directed by the 
Romanian Intelligence Service to the key locations where protesters were situated: 
University Square, in front of the National Theater, inside the Faculty of Geology, 
inside the Students’ League headquarters, inside the Faculty of Linguistics, inside the 
Faculty of Mathematics, inside the Institute of Architecture, and at the National 
Peasantry Christian and Democratic Party and National Liberal Party headquarters (14 
iunie 1990 – Venirea minerilor la Bucureşti,  2011). All of these institutions were 
destroyed and the Romanian Television was taken over by these ‘paramilitary’ groups 
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that were collaborating with the police and the Romanian Secret Service (interview code 
S_4). The successful instrumentation of this state capture was achieved through the 
collaborative arrangement between the dominant elites – senior political representatives 
of the former regime – and the coal mining labour class and its representatives 
(interview code S_4). There was an allowance made by key officials of the state 
(National Salvation Front) for miners to act as control and security mechanisms, 
substituting for law and order, which led to the emergence of an enlarged dominant elite 
sub-coalition – more specifically, the leadership of organised labour was positioned 
alongside the dominant elites from political sphere within the power structure of the 
Romanian political economy.  
Furthermore, the early 1990s were characterised by a lack of free press (Cernat, 2006). 
Instead, what can be seen is the unilateral reporting of news by the Romanian 
Television which was controlled by the National Salvation Front. According to the 
historian specialised in the Romanian Communist regime, written press in the form of 
newspapers and magazines was also controlled by the dominant sub-coalition, with the 
only independent publication Free Romania being banned (interview code S_4). The 
control of the media is another way through which the dominant elites managed to 
capture and retain control over the state.  
The inclusion of labour within the elite coalition becomes even more obvious when we 
analyse how coal miners collaborated and aligned themselves with various social agents 
– police forces, army, secret service agency, organised labour from other industries, 
under the instruction of the dominant elites. The enhanced powers and positionality 
awarded to coal miners is also evident from the degree of protection given to the labour 
class by the security forces. From the moment when they arrived in Bucharest, coal 
miners were escorted to where the historical party supporters and political opposition 
was gathered. Throughout each mass demonstration, coal miners and security forces 
‘worked together’ to stifle the political opposition. And when the revolt was finally 
over, the security forces escorted the coal miners to the train station to make sure they 
returned safely to the Jiu Valley. The fact that there was no investigation or prosecution 
of the coal miners who destroyed the many institutions and historical landmarks, and 
who engaged in the violent attacks is another indicator of the superior positionality of 
the labour class within the institutional framework (Comunismul în România, 2015). 
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The first three Mineriadas represent the association between the dominant elites and the 
labour class against players from outside the dominant sub-coalition with completely 
opposing views and political agendas. The fourth Mineriada is however about the 
arising internal tensions and conflict between the dominant elites, the divergence of the 
dominant sub-coalition into two different factions with distinct ideologies and 
ultimately, the alliance of one faction with the coal mining labour class against the other 
faction. Due to this internal friction within the dominant sub-coalition, which threatened 
the stability and rent extraction opportunities of players, it became necessary that one of 
the competing factions win the conflict. Officially, the fourth Mineriada had no political 
motivation behind it. In reality, there were tensions within the dominant sub-coalition 
between two key players of the political sphere – the President (Ion Iliescu) and the 
Prime Minister (Petre Roman) (Cernat, 2006). What was initially a homogenous and 
congruent elite grouping, soon bifurcated into two factions with increasingly 
differentiated political views and ideologies that were struggling to retain power and to 
capture the state. According to the historian specialised in the Romanian Communist 
(interview code S_4), the ‘Iliescu’ faction consisted of ‘old’ players from the former 
regime – Ceauşescu’s former inner circle, with very traditional Socialist and patrimonial 
views of the state; whereas the ‘Roman’ faction was an association of newer and 
younger politicians that had more liberal-oriented views of the state.  
The fourth Mineriada was a carefully designed and implemented stratagem, a tactical 
move through which the ‘Iliescu’ faction aligned itself with the coal miners against the 
‘Roman’ faction, in order to promote institutional measures that closely resembled a 
patrimonial variety of capitalism (King, 2007). To capture the state and to delegitimise 
the ‘Roman’ faction, the ‘Iliescu’ faction closely collaborated with the coal mining 
labour class (primarily the leadership of organised labour), empowering coal miners to 
act independently as control and security mechanisms, substituting for law and order, 
and in the process undermining the legitimacy of the state. By doing so, the ‘Iliescu’ 
faction increased the powers and positionality of trade union leaders who already had an 
elite-level status. The newly established political-labour collaboration exerted 
institutional change, as the political apparatus was transformed and the continuity of the 
‘old’ elites, members of the former regime, was secured (interview code S_4).  
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The Structural Particularities and Institutional Implications of the Last Instances of 
Labour Unrest in the Romanian Coal Mining Sector (January and February 1999)  
I will now direct my analysis towards the last two instances of labour unrest and 
highlight how they differ from the labour movements from the beginning of the 1990s. 
The Fifth and Sixth Mineriadas took place in January respectively February 1999, with 
the violent demonstrations erupting as a response of the coal mining labour class to the 
process of restructuring of the coal mining sector, which was designed and implemented 
by the dominant elites (Mineriada ianuarie 1999, Part 1 to  Part 10, 2010). 
There is an obvious shift in power dynamics and the legitimacy of coal miners as social 
agents: if in the 1990-1991 Mineriadas, coal miners exhibited clear strength and 
decision-making powers in the social dialogue with dominant elites, it was now 
apparent that the labour class was losing its significance, and as such struggling to retain 
positionality within the power structure of the state. Furthermore, it was highlighted 
during my interview with a historian specialised in the Communist regime that the 
dominant elites were no longer interested in engaging in a collaborative arrangement 
with the labour class and its leadership (interview code S_4). What we see is the 
elimination of organised labour representatives from the elite coalition and their 
integration amongst non-elite social agents. At the same time, coal miners lost their 
privileged status within the overall labour class structure. Having served their purpose 
as either instruments of delegitimising the political opposition or mechanisms for 
downgrading the status of a competing sub-coalition, the dominant elites sought to limit 
the size of the dominant sub-coalition. Ultimately, by tightly managing the structure and 
composition of the dominant sub-coalition, the dominant elites placed institutional 
control of the industrial order in the hands of fewer levels of individuals from fewer 
spheres of influence. In doing so, the proportion of rents distributed to each dominant 
elite member rose, as the overall extracted wealth was now divided amongst fewer 
social partners.  
This shift in the power dynamics of the dominant sub-coalition re-emphasizes the 
concept that elites are stable but not static. There are constant fluctuations in the internal 
dynamics and the identity of members of the dominant sub-coalition. The institutional 
setting is defined by the continuous process of negotiating positionality within the 
coalition and the allocation of rents. What we see is the exclusion of weak members and 
the re-affirmation of strong members. The concept of the continuity of elites is 
reinforced – that is, the position of power of the ‘old’, former Socialist regime political 
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players within the ruling state structure remained stable vis-à-vis the position of the 
leadership of organised labour, which was only awarded a temporary position of power.  
The coal miners threatened to march on Bucharest if the government failed to meet their 
demands. In the context of an industry suffering from severe losses and accumulating 
debt, coal miners formulated the following requests: universal wage increases of 35 per 
cent, the cancellation of the mine closures at Dâlja and Bărbăteni and a fund of 200 
million US dollars to be utilised as a compensation package for workers going into 
retirement (the equivalent of 500 US dollars per miner per month) (Mineriada ianuarie 
1999, 2010). The government refused to meet these demands and as a result, coal 
miners began their march from Petroşani to Bucharest in January 1999. The violent 
protests from January 1999 were ended at Cozia – an event that has been labelled as 
“The Peace of Cozia” (Mineriada ianuarie 1999, 2010). An agreement was reached 
between the trade union leaders and the Prime Minister Radu Vasile. The Prime 
Minister reassured coal miners that the activity at the Dâlja and Bărbăteni mines will 
not be shut down and that none of the miners implicated in the fifth Mineriada will be 
charged or criminally investigated. None of these promises were kept and as a result, in 
February 1999 the miners marched towards Bucharest once again. 
The February 1999 Mineriada is considered to be a failure vis-à-vis the January 1999 
Mineriada. First of all, the January protests were much more aggressive and the number 
of miners marching towards Bucharest was substantially larger (an exact number is not 
known, as sources vary, but there is a consensus that around 20,000 coal miners joined 
the mass demonstration) (Digi24, 2015). Second of all, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
managed to better prepare and organise the police forces that set up the roadblock. And 
third of all, as they marched towards Bucharest, coal miners no longer succeeded in 
gathering more supporters as they had done three weeks before. This time there were no 
other social groups that supported their cause and they were not given any food and 
shelter from the local authorities in the towns that they passed through (Mudavaflex, 
2010). 
Similar to the fifth Mineriada, the mass demonstrations in February represented the 
attempt of a struggling labour class to retain its position and decision-making powers 
within the changing power dynamics of the institutional setting. The dominant elites 
were no longer interested in maintaining a collaborative arrangement with the coal 
miners and their labour representatives. The weakening of the labour class and the 
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exclusion of organised labour representatives from the dominant sub-coalition becomes 
even more evident when we take into account that the active prosecution of coal miners 
ensued (interview code S_4). Coal miners were no longer under the protection of the 
dominant elites as they once had been. Furthermore, we no longer see the alliance 
between coal miners and the security forces, when the labour class acted as a security 
mechanism in itself and substituted for law and order (interview S_4).  
There is a visible decrease in the power and legitimacy of the labour class and its 
representatives between the fifth and sixth Mineriada, despite the fact that timeframe-
wise they were only three weeks apart. By the sixth Mineriada, coal miners were 
considerably more weakened as a social coalition vis-à-vis the dominant elites. This 
assessment results from their less successful attempt to organise and march on 
Bucharest. According to Digi24 (2015), the total number of demonstrators in the 
February 1999 Mineriada was approximately one fourth of that in January. Furthermore, 
their declining legitimacy is evident due to their inability to gather support from other 
groups of social agents (Cernat, 2006). Last but not least, the discrepancy in power 
between labour and the dominant elites is most striking when we observe the ease with 
which the last Mineriada was suppressed (interview code S_4).  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the dominant elites are the primary drivers of institutional 
change within the Romanian political economy. The dominant elites have captured the 
state and its institutional structure, and in the process they have managed to capture the 
coal mining sector. The principal aspects that have emerged throughout this chapter are 
that the dominant elites are a stable, but not static social group, and the ‘continuity of 
elites’ is a defining feature of the internal dynamics of the Romanian political economy. 
Furthermore, what this chapter has highlighted is the fact the dominant elites hold 
multiple positions within the ruling state structure, resulting in an institutional context 
with highly concentrated power.  
The dominant elites permeate the institutional setting throughout time alongside other 
categories of social agents – elite and non-elite. Rather than being insular forces and 
acting independently within the institutional setting, the dominant elites and other social 
agents engage in different forms of collaboration and conflict (Streeck, 2007; Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2013). Although the assumption is that elites are stable, there are constant 
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fluctuations within the composition of both the dominant elite sub-coalition and the 
other competing elite sub-coalitions (North et al., 2007, 2009, 2013). Some sub-
coalitions of elites can achieve dominant elite status, while others lose their legitimacy 
within the ruling state structure and are downgraded to a non-elite status. 
What has emerged throughout the chapter is that the institutional configuration of the 
coal sector is fraught by a continuous process of interaction between the dominant elites 
and different forces of change – interaction that has exerted institutional change and 
shaped the direction of Romanian coal mining. The interaction between the dominant 
elites and industrial policy in the Socialist era showed that the coal mining sector was 
defined by outdated and insufficient technological resources.
42
 The dominant elites were 
highly aware of the deficient indigenous technological base and as a result, they sought 
to mitigate this competitive disadvantage through foreign collaboration. To compensate 
for these inappropriate technological standards, dominant elites facilitated the creation 
of an import-oriented institutional framework, which entailed a high dependency on 
technological imports, licenses and technical documentation.
43
 Consequently, the 
process of technological upgrading became highly dependent on the perpetuation of this 
open, import-oriented economic paradigm that facilitated the creation of production 
capacities based on new, foreign technological resources. However, the institutional 
configuration of the coal mining industry underwent a massive transformation starting 
with 1973, when the dominant elites shifted the orientation of industrial policy by 
reducing imports and minimising the dependency on technological imports. My findings 
indicate that the decision to cut foreign technological resources was driven by 1) the 
national industrialisation programme, which promoted the development of internal 
capacities, and 2) the regime’s external debt payment plan, which focused on the 
elimination of foreign imports and the boosting of exports. The institutional outcome 
was the creation of a new inward-oriented industrial order that was based on old 
technological reserves and the development of indigenous technological capacities. In 
the post-Socialist era, the dominant elites facilitated the restructuring of the industrial 
order via a series of institutional measures: 1) the implementation of two emergency 
ordinances, and 2) the development of a vertical integration programme that sought the 
termination of loss-making sites and the re-organisation of profitable sites. Thus, I argue 
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that industrial policy has to be seen as a force of change with which dominant elites 
engage and interact within the institutional context of the coal mining industry, 
introducing new paradigms, then re-shifting them and finally terminating the sectoral 
economy altogether, and in the process exert institutional change by re-shaping the 
structure of coal.  
The other instance analyses the interaction between the dominant elites and labour that 
shaped the institutional context of Romanian coal mining. The post-Socialist capitalist 
taxonomy drawing on Polanyi overlooks how conflict between political and social 
agents can act as an element for development and institutional change (Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2013). To capture the full extent of the dynamism of the institutional 
context and the wide-ranging types of interaction between different categories of social 
agents, I conceptualised an institutional configuration fraught by tensions, conflict, 
collaboration and affiliations between different categories of social agents, elite and 
non-elite, from diverging spheres of influence that is in a continuous process of 
transformation. In order to capture the fluctuations within the internal dynamics of the 
coal sector, I analysed the changing alliances and affiliation between elites and other 
social actors – in this case, coal miners and their labour representatives. By comparison 
to the labour classes from other industries, coal miners have always distinguished 
themselves among the more unique sub-categories of the Romanian proletariat (Velica 
and Shreter, 1993; Larionescu et al., 1999; Cernat, 2006; Boboc, 2009; Mitchell, 2013). 
To examine the question of the power of coal miners and their ability to exert 
institutional change on the Romanian political economy, I analysed the case of the 
Mineriadas, which were a series of six of miners’ revolts that took place throughout the 
1990s (Larionescu et al., 1999; Cernat, 2006; Evenimentul Zilei, 2010a, 2010b; Digi24, 
2015; Jiu Valley Portal archival videos). What can be observed is how the role and 
positionality of coal miners and their labour representatives changed from the early 
1990s to the end of the first decade post-Socialism. Initially, the institutional setting was 
defined by the alliance between dominant elites and the labour class, with the dominant 
sub-coalition utilising coal miners to suppress any form of political opposition and 
contestation emanating from competing elite sub-coalitions. By the end of the 1990s, 
the institutional context underwent a series of changes and we no longer see the 
prevalence of a collaborative arrangement between the dominant elites and the labour 
class. Instead, collaboration turned into conflict and what can be observed is the 
massive loss of power and positionality of the labour class in conjunction with the 
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instrumentation of a process of delegitimisation and downgrading of organised labour 
representatives from an elite to a non-elite status by the dominant elites. Coal miners 
struggled to retain their powers and positionality in the elite structure of the state; 
however, the dominant elites succeed in taking away their collective powers and ousting 
them from the elite coalition.  
Within the continuously changing institutional context, I also capture the fluctuations in 
the composition of the dominant elites and emphasize how this composition has 
gradually become more exclusive over time. In order to maximise benefits and to better 
manage the interactive exchanges, I argue that the dominant elites have imposed a 
mechanism that tightly controls the size of the dominant coalition, ultimately decreasing 
its membership over time, and in the process, placing institutional control of the 
industrial order in the hands of fewer levels of individuals from fewer spheres of 
influence. Having served its purpose as tools of annihilation of political opposition and 
institutional transformation, I show that organised labour was stripped of its powers and 
delegitimised as a member of the elites.  
Considering the role it plays in the institutional context of the coal sector, I argue that 
the interaction between the dominant elites and the other forces of change – industrial 
policy and labour, has had a transformative influence on the industrial order and its 
institutional configuration. More precisely, the interaction has resulted in the 
obstruction of technological upgrading, the restructuring and re-organisation of the 
industrial order, and the delegitimisation of the labour class, which all together have 
accelerated the ossification of the Romanian coal industry that was already plagued by a 
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This chapter discusses the position of the auto sector within the Romanian institutional 
configuration between the mid-1960s and 2010s, and provides evidence of how 
different types of elites have influenced the structure of the institutional order 
throughout time.  
By focusing on the particularities of the institutional configuration of auto, I aim to 
capture some of the regional distinctiveness of the Romanian national variety. The auto 
sector is a unique instance of an industrial branch established during the Socialist 
period, as part of the CC industrialisation programme, which has been displaced and 
restructured by neoliberal transformative agents during the post-Socialist era. Unlike 
many energy-intensive, Stalinist-oriented industries with a ‘star status’ – a prime 
example would be coal mining – that died shortly after the end of the Socialist period in 
Romania, the auto sector represents a success story that overcame the post-transition 
economic depression of the 1990s, and experienced exceptional growth and 
diversification after its displacement by foreign capital. Furthermore, I consider the 
institutional trajectories of both Dacia and Olcit and aim to identify the structural 
particularities that are prevalent across the two case studies. By comparing and 
contrasting the two micro-level units, various nuances are captured and I demonstrate 
that the sector has not developed homogenously in terms of timeframe, size, geography, 
level of complexity, post-privatisation structural developments and institutional 
complementarities.  
In the second section of this chapter, I explore who are the institutional players 
influencing the configuration of the Romanian auto industry over time. The identity of 
the elites shaping and controlling the structure of the sector is distinct from that of coal 
mining. More specifically, during the Socialist period, dominant elites from the political 
sphere controlled the structure and direction of the industry; however, from the 1990s 
onwards there was a shift in roles and a re-configuration of power. FDI displaced the 
structure of auto, with MNCs taking control of the industry and domestic elites taking a 
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more backseat role within the structure of the overall elite coalition. I also analyse the 
power and positionality of organised labour in auto, highlighting the fact that the labour 
model is defined by a high level of unionisation, skilled labour and extensive training 
schemes, and average wages greatly exceeding the national average. 
The third section captures the story of institutional change in the Romanian auto 
industry by identifying and analysing four instances of interplay between the elites and 
the different forces of change permeating the internal dynamics of this sector. The three 
instances of interplay embedded within the internal dynamics of the auto sector are: 1) 
the interaction between elites and industrial policy, 2) the interaction between elites and 
labour, and 3) the interaction between elites and education. 
In the fourth section of the chapter, I re-consider the key moments of institutional 
transformation emerging from the preceding empirical analysis and draw conclusions 
on how the interplay between the different categories of social agents influenced the 
institutional setting of the auto sector throughout time. 
6.2 Presenting my Findings on the Identity of Elites in the Romanian Auto Sector  
The configuration of elites differs throughout the three sectors, highlighting the fact that 
each sector is defined by institutional specificity. In order to capture the story of 
institutional change within the auto sector and to understand how it diverges from that 
of coal mining and business services, the concept of ‘dominant elites’ has to be 
systematically unpacked and its constitutive elements analysed.  
I have emphasized that coal mining has been defined by an inward-oriented structure of 
ownership and control that managed to remain stable throughout time, despite the fact 
that there have been major fluctuations in the composition of the domestic dominant 
coalition. In comparison to the stable ‘domestic nature’ of coal mining ‘dominant 
elites’, after an initial period of state ownership and control the auto sector was 
displaced by FDI and became integrated within the European automotive global 
production network in the late 1990s, thus resulting in the change in identity and 
configuration of ‘dominant elites’. International forces experienced an increase in 
identity strength and legitimacy, ultimately being integrated into the ‘dominant 
coalition’ alongside the domestic elites. At the same time, the power and positionality of 
domestic elites suffered a downgrade. Thus, to understand the role of ‘dominant elites’ 
and how institutional change has occurred within this sector, international forces were 
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examined in relation to domestic players. Furthermore, the concept of institutional 
change was treated as a result of the interplay of domestic and foreign elite actors, and 
any changes they encounter in terms of power and positionality over time.  
6.2.1 Role of Domestic Elites from the Political Sphere within the 
Institutional Structure of the Romanian Auto Sector 
In order to map the identity of domestic elites from the political sphere, I divide the 
timeframe of the auto sector into two periods: 1) the Socialist period (1966-1989), 
which existed from the moment the industry was created, and 2) the post-Socialist 
period (1990-present), which represents the moment the regime transitioned from a 
planned- to a market-economy, followed by the gradual development of the Romanian 
capitalist variety that is a process that continues today.  
During the Socialist period, dominant elites from the political sphere controlled the 
structure and direction of the auto industry, as any form of private ownership and 
enterprise was prohibited. Control exerted by these domestic elites was stable during 
this period despite the fact that with time there have been changes in the positionality of 
actors and a rotation of roles within the sector’s internal dynamics (North et al., 2009, 
2013). This emphasizes the fact that domestic elites displayed continuity in their role as 
drivers of the institutional configuration. Furthermore, there were diverging levels of 
power among the domestic elites from the political sphere.  The members of the 
dominant elite coalition during Socialism include the senior officials of the CC with its 
two main governing bodies – the Permanent Bureau of the Executive Political 
Committee and the Secretariat of the Romanian Communist Party.  
Similar to Chapter 5, the main argument that I want to advance is related to the 
existence of a constancy of power of the dominant elites. In terms of the membership of 
the CC of the Romanian Communist Party, the composition of elite players remained 
stable and concentrated throughout all four ‘electoral’ terms from 1969 to 1989. This 
reinforces my concept of the ‘continuity of elites’ during this period, as there is a high 
concentration of stable power. Also, similar to the coal mining sector I have found that 
dominant elites retained multiple positions within the national-level institutional 
configurations, reinforcing my concept of a ‘multiplicity of roles’. My findings reveal 
that the institutional configuration is defined by the existence of a strong overlap 
between the memberships of different national-level institutions. This becomes very 
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clear when we analyse the membership of the Permanent Bureau and the Secretariat, 
which clearly indicates that dominant elites play dual roles. Simultaneously, I want to 
strongly emphasize that the institutional configuration is permeated by the continuous 
interaction and formation of alliances between elite members from the political and 
economic spheres. This constant association and the ‘multiplicity of roles’ results in the 
formation of an overall group or coalition, where the demarcation of the two spheres – 
political and economic – becomes indistinct. Furthermore, the evidence that I have 
unearthed shows that members of the economic sphere – the directors of enterprises – 
were highly embedded in the political sphere, due to their high-level of involvement 
into the Communist Party and the fact that the enterprise is state-owned. What this 
means is that we don’t have a real representation of domestic capital.   
In the context of auto, my findings reveal that the State Planning Committee closely 
collaborated with the Ministry of Machinery Construction in order to manage the 
structure and direction of the auto sector. To ensure that the plan, the bedrock of the 
Socialist economy, was met, the State Planning Committee and Ministry of Machinery 
Construction would actively collaborate with other supporting ministries in order to 
ensure the delivery of various necessities: investment funds (Ministry of Finance), 
qualified personnel (Ministry of Labour), machinery and tools (Ministry of Machinery 
Construction, Ministry of Machinery-Tools, Electro-technics and Electronics, Ministry 
of Heavy Machinery Industry, Ministry of Technical Material Supply and Control of 
Fixed Assets Management), chemical products and alloys (Ministry of Chemical 
Industry, Ministry of Metallurgic Industry), infrastructure (Ministry of Transport and 
Telecommunications), and the importation of machinery and licenses (Ministry of 
Exterior Commerce and International Economic Cooperation).
44
 Furthermore, evidence 
shows that decisions related to the signing of licensing agreements, the Five-Year 
Production Plan, import-export quotas, the creation of new car models, and the supply 
of parts were formulated by the State Planning Committee in conjunction with the 
representatives of foreign capital – Renault and Citroën.  
Archival records showed that the CC and the State Planning Committee communicated 
the central strategies and targets to each industrial branch.
45
 Each industrial branch was 
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organised into an Industrial Complex. An Industrial Complex could have several 
enterprises under its control and direction – more specifically, the Automobile Industrial 
Complex had a total of 13 enterprises: two car manufacturing enterprises, 10 
components suppliers, one exterior commerce enterprise and one technical support and 
service unit. The Industrial Complex acted as a transmission belt, having performed the 
role of transforming institutional measures into practical individual business plans and 
targets that were then allocated to the different enterprises from the automobile sector.  
Hence, the Industrial Complex controlled and shaped the direction of the entire 
industrial branch by taking the strategies and targets formulated at the central-level and 
imposing and monitoring their implementation at enterprise-level. Based on this, my 
argument is that the directors of the Industrial Complex were a sub-coalition of elites 
that co-existed with the dominant elites, but which were inferior in terms of 
positionality and power.  
At the enterprise-level, the elites formulated strategies to meet the targets received from 
‘above’ and were under the constant supervision of the Industrial Complex who 
monitored whether the plan was met. Directors of automobile enterprises constituted 
their own unique elite sub-coalition that was different from the other sub-coalitions that 
I have introduced in terms of both power and positionality. More precisely, the power 
and positionality of enterprise-level elites was lower than that of elites at the national- 
and regional-level. In this sense, enterprise-level elites didn’t influence industrial policy 
or formulate strategies and production targets, instead they acted as ‘implementers’ of 
these institutional measures emanating from the regional and national institutional level. 
However, it must be understood that these players clearly differentiated themselves 
from workers in the auto sector.  
The “new” dominant elites within the Romanian post-Socialist variety are constituted 
by the members of Government. Their composition has remained considerably stable 
throughout Romania’s history as a capitalist variety. Despite the rise and fall of multiple 
ruling Governments, elite players have continuously engaged in a form of political party 
and sub-coalition migration, in order to ensure their positionality within the new power 
configuration.  
The Government has strongly influenced the structure and direction of the auto industry. 
Based on interviews with nine industry representatives occupying senior executive 
positions in the two firms of my sample (interview codes A_1 to A_9), the senior-level 
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officials that interact most closely with the auto industry include: the Prime Minister, 
the Minister of Industry, the Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Finance, 
Minister of Labour and the Minister of Environment. According to a current executive 
director at Dacia (interview code A_1): 
“When we were working at the privatisation contract we had to pass by all 
the ministries: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of 
Transportation, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Labour […] and the 
Prime Minister of course.” 
The quotation indicates that acting as drivers of institutional change, the dominant elites 
allowed and facilitated the displacement of the industry by FDI – the process of 
privatisation would have not been possible without domestic elite approval. 
Furthermore, the Government has created a favourable institutional context by offering 
various subsidies, creating infrastructure and issuing ‘business friendly’ policies to 
promote the development of auto.  
The nature and degree of the interaction between the Romanian state – the dominant 
elites from the political sphere – and executive directors in auto firms has evolved 
significantly from the Socialist period until present. During the Socialist period, 
executive management represented an extension of the state, with enterprise directors 
acting as a transmission belt for the institutional measures formulated by the CC. 
Socialist ideology was based on the contouring and promoting strong personalities as 
‘pillars of society’, who most often had ties to the Communist Party and possessed 
decision-making powers with regards to an area of the state (Cernat, 2006; Ban, 2012). 
However, the dynamics of the state-capital relationship changed with enterprise 
privatisation and the inflow of foreign capital, with market principles now dictating the 
terms of the relationship. From acting as an extension of the state, the enterprise and its 
executives are now in a continuous process of ‘courting’ the state in order to obtain 
various advantages in the form of subsidies, business-friendly policies and 
infrastructure-related benefits (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Bohle and Greskovits, 
2013; Martin, 2013).  
The interaction between the firm and the MNC headquarters has also shifted in terms of 
nuance over time – more precisely, foreign management captured the structure of auto 
enterprises and downgraded the position of domestic management within the power 
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configuration. According to a former executive director at Olcit (and later Daewoo) 
(interview code A_7): 
“They [Daewoo] brought the tier-1 management. By tier-1, I mean 
President, Vice President. At tier-2, there were a total of 10 executive 
managers and 10 deputies – they [Daewoo] occupied the executive roles, we 
[ domestic managers] were the deputies. As this was a mixed enterprise 51-
49 per cent, they were the executives and we were the deputies.” 
Similarly, when discussing who makes the strategic investment decisions within the 
company, one of the key executive directors at Dacia argued that (interview code A_1): 
“We do not make any investment decisions on our own [domestic 
management]. Everything related to investment decisions is orchestrated at 
the central level [Renault]. Dacia [Romanian subsidiary] can think about 
what investments it would like to make, what developments it would like to 
pursue, it consolidates a plan and then finally it goes to the ‘king’ for 
approval.” 
The two quotes presented above highlight very well how the representatives of foreign 
capital have captured the institutional configuration of the two Romanian auto 
enterprises, and how domestic management took a more ‘backseat’ role within the 
power configuration. The imposition of foreign managerial resources indicates a high 
level of external dependency of the subsidiary and at the same time, a high level of 
centralised control exerted by the MNC headquarters. Furthermore, the quote shows that 
the Romanian auto industry was captive to the decisions and strategic direction imposed 
by the central leadership at the headquarters, thus having no autonomy to decide the 
direction of the domestic subsidiary.  
However, as the institutional context underpinning the industry matured, domestic 
managerial talent matured as well, and the phenomenon which can be observed is a re-
integration of Romanian management within the senior managerial elite. One of the 
current executive directors at Dacia emphasized this shift in internal dynamics very well 
(interview code A_1): 
“[The inflow of foreign capital meant that] all the key management 
positions were taken by the French. […] French managers took over the 
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positions of Director of Finance, Director of Industry, Director of 
Commerce, Director of Quality, Director of Mechanics, Director of 
Components, Director of Logistics and Director of Manufacturing. […] 
Only two managerial positions were not occupied by French individuals – 
Human Resources and Engineering which was held by me. So, this is how it 
began. Afterwards, things started to evolve slowly in the sense that the 
number of expats in key managerial positions started to decrease. Gradually, 
intermediary managerial positions began to be occupied by Romanians. 
Currently, all the key positions in Manufacturing, Assembly, Bodywork, 
Dye-works and Pressing are occupied by Romanians.” 
The evidence presented above clearly indicates that after an initial loss in power and 
positionality that occurred at the time of the privatisation and during the first few years 
post-privatisation, domestic management started to gradually win back some its 
decision-making powers. What this shows is that the degree of external dependency of 
Romanian auto subsidiaries has decreased and the level of centralised control exerted by 
the headquarters is lower. Domestic management has developed stronger decisional 
powers, improving its positionality vis-à-vis foreign management, and as a result, it has 
gained a higher degree of autonomy of its activities and operations from the centralised 
control imposed by the headquarters. 
6.2.2 Role of Foreign Elites within the Institutional Structure of the 
Romanian Auto Sector 
Representatives of foreign capital – managers of MNCs – constitute primary players in 
the transformation and evolution of the institutional configuration of the Romanian auto 
industry in the post-Socialist period. The presence of foreign agents within the internal 
dynamics of the industry dates back to the Socialist period (Ion Mihai Pacepa in 
Historia, 2017a; Historia, 2017b, Lupul Dacic, 2014). More precisely, the establishment 
of the two state-owned auto enterprises Dacia and Olcit was undertaken through 
institutional collaboration between t the dominant elites from the political sphere and 
representatives of foreign capital – Renault and Citroën.
46
 The type of institutional 
collaboration that was prevalent during the Socialist period was the licensing 
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agreement, as any form of foreign ownership was prohibited by the Communist Party 
(Cernat, 2006; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013; Martin 2013). This early interaction with 
representatives of foreign capital paved the way for future foreign collaboration, as well 
as led to the creation of a built-in mechanism that allowed the intervention of other 
types of international forces in the institutional configuration of the sector. 
The post-Socialist period was marked by the establishing of a more embedded and 
complex type of domestic-foreign institutional collaboration. The state facilitated the 
privatisation of the industry by allowing MNCs to acquire the two national players. 
There are three instances of FDI displacing the institutional order of the industry: 
1) the formation of the mixed enterprise Rodae Craiova in October 1994 through a 
joint-venture between Automobile Craiova S.A. (Olcit) and Daewoo, with a 49-51 per 
cent split or a $156.12 million – $149 million equity capital split (Romanian Car, 2014; 
General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016)
47
; 
2) the acquisition of a 51 per cent stake in Dacia by Renault for $50 million in 1999 
(Radio Free Europe, 2001; Ziarul Financiar, 2012a; Bursa, 2014); and, 
3) the acquisition of 72.4 per cent stake in Automobile Craiova S.A. (Olcit) by Ford 
Motor Company for $57 million in 2008 (BalkanInsight, 2008; BBC, 2008; 
Evenimentul Zilei, 2009; General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016). 
In all three instances of FDI, MNCs held a dominant position within the ownership 
structure of the enterprise. Despite the strong influence and presence of representatives 
of foreign capital throughout the Socialist period, the institutional configuration of the 
sector was primarily controlled by domestic elites from the political sphere. I argue that 
the post-Socialist auto industry has been captured by foreign elites. What can now be 
observed is a shift in roles and a re-configuration of power. As highlighted above, the 
domestic-foreign power dynamics are now controlled by foreign elites, with domestic 
elites taking a more backseat role within the structure of the overall elite coalition. To 
better illustrate this, from my investigation of interviews with industry representatives 
and industry press it emerges that foreign managers are the players who orchestrated the 
upgrade of internal technological processes and resources, as well as modernised the 
entire product portfolio of the Romanian auto industry. Foreign capital also triggered 
the re-qualification of labour and introduced more efficient organisational structures. 
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Furthermore, foreign management directed the externalisation of certain segments of the 
value chain as well as stimulated the inflow of foreign components manufacturers 
within the institutional configuration, thus determining the expansion of the Romanian 
auto horizontal industry. A former executive director at Dacia emphasized the story of 
‘industry capture’ very well (interview code A_5): 
“The return of Renault at Dacia meant the radical transformation of the 
plant which was fully modernised. Investments were made to upgrade 
technological processes and products. So, on the one hand we saw the 
modernisation of the plant and technological capabilities, on the other the 
modernisation of products. […] We were directed to make substantial 
changes in our distribution network. Renault made us modify our sales 
outlets – we had to build new sales points and develop new projects 
designed and approved by Renault, which promoted the brand image and 
the brand products. We had to invest in new machinery and equipment, and 
the re-qualification of people. Dacia established an automobile 
academy/institute in Bucharest, where we qualified our people from a 
mechanic level to a General Director level. We were also involved in these 
modernisation/re-qualification programmes. Gradually, all the outdated 
buildings, machinery and labour skills typical of a Communist institution 
were transformed into modern institutions typical of today’s international 
car manufacturers. […] The introduction of new technology and the 
modernisation of processes led to a decrease in the labour force. Moreover, 
employment levels fell also due to externalisation. More precisely, the plant 
only kept its actual automobile production activities, whereas the production 
of components was externalised. This led to the creation of a range of 
enterprises, external to the Dacia plant, with their own labour force that 
specialise in the production of a certain type of component or set of 
components. A large proportion of the dismissed Dacia labour force went to 
work for these components producers. […] The return of Renault to 
Romania had an extraordinary impact on the formation and network 
ramification of the components industry, with the French giant encouraging 
the relocation of multiple international components suppliers – a fact which 
triggered the re-qualification and internal stability of the labour force.” 
181 
 
Both Renault and Ford have increased their ownership stakes within Dacia and 
Automobile Craiova S.A. (Olcit) respectively. At present, Renault owns 99.42 per cent 
of the share capital of Dacia (Mediafax, 2010; Ştirile ProTv, 2014; Libertatea, 2018), 
whereas Ford acquired the remaining shares through two consecutive bids in 2009 
(Capital, 2009; Gazeta de Sud, 2009; General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016).
48
 Thus, 
my argument is that while the representatives of foreign capital have increased the 
degree of control they hold over the structure and direction of the industry, divestment 
resulted in the gradual loss of power of domestic elites. In this sense, foreign elites have 
assumed an even greater positionality and level of legitimacy in the interaction with 
domestic elites and vis-à-vis other social agents permeating the institutional 
configuration.  
6.2.3 Role of Labour vis-à-vis Other Social Agents within the Institutional 
Structure of the Romanian Auto Sector 
My argument is that organised labour in auto is in fact an elite force that challenges the 
other social actors permeating the institutional context – I will elaborate on the instances 
of conflict later on when I analyse the interaction between labour and elites. 
Similar to coal mining, I argue that industrial relations in the Romanian auto sector are 
different from the typical institutional template associated with CEE political 
economies. The labour model is defined by a high level of unionisation and 
furthermore, it did not experience the fall in union membership prevalent in other 
industries – this contrasts the weak union movement and low union membership present 
in the business services sector. According to my interviews with senior executives from 
both Dacia and Ford, union membership exceeds 80 per cent in both enterprises.
49
 
Moreover, the labour model is based on skilled labour and extensive training, with there 
being a continuous, long-term investment in skill and competence development (Jürgens 
and Krzywdzinski, 2009). The Romanian auto sector is characterised by high wages, 
with average wages greatly exceeding the national average (Carieră, 2015). There is a 
considerable degree of labour involvement in managerial decision-making, and labour 
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representatives are engaged in a constant process of negotiation with management. All 
of these institutional features indicate that the sector displays elements of a ‘high-road’ 
labour model (Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992).  
6.3 Elite Relations and Dynamics of Change in the Romanian Auto Sector (1960s - 
2010s) 
The institutional context is permeated by a variety of social agents, with diverging 
power and positionalities, which co-exist and interact with other forces of change. What 
I want to highlight is the degree of dynamism that characterises the institutional setting. 
I conceptualise a spatial and temporal dimension defined by continuous exchanges, in 
the form of both collaboration and conflict, where the players and forces of change do 
not exist in isolation. These exchanges have had disruptive and creative effects on the 
institutional structure of the industry – displacing the existent institutional logics and 
replacing it with a new institutional model, and triggering a process of upgrading and 
the creation of new internal capacities. To construct a comprehensive story of 
institutional change in the Romanian auto industry, I have identified three instances of 
interplay between dominant elites and different forces of change that are embedded 
within the internal dynamics of the sector: 1) the interaction between dominant elites 
and industrial policy, 2) the interaction between dominant elites and labour, and 3) the 









6.3.1 Elite Relations, Industrial Policy and Institutional Change in the Auto 
Sector 
Similar to coal mining, I argue that the industrial policy package applied has to be seen 
as a force of change with which the different categories of elites interact within the 
institutional configuration of the auto industry.  
During the 1960s and early 1970s, auto was characterised by the massive importation of 
components and the acquisition of technical documentation from foreign players from 
the automotive sector
50
 – this industrial policy was designed and implemented by the 
dominant elites from the political sphere. According to the archival materials that I have 
analysed, from the mid-1970s the dominant elites imposed the gradual reduction of 
technological imports and thus, curtailed the process of externally-driven technological 
upgrading, in favour of an autarchic system based on internal production capacities and 
indigenous technological reserves.
51
 The incremental elimination of technological 
imports resulted in the stagnation of technological progress and the emergence of 
massive quality problems that plagued domestic production until the displacement of 
the industry by foreign capital. In this new, externally-driven industrial policy, MNCs 
dismantled the ‘old’ technological capacities that were outdated and inefficient, 
replacing them with new imported technology and, thus facilitating a comprehensive 
process of upgrading and the restructuring of entire industry. I argue that since the 
intervention of foreign elites technological transfer and upgrading have occurred 
continuously and much more systematically by comparison to the Socialist legacies of 
the sector. 
The Establishment and Development of the Romanian Auto Sector during the Socialist 
Era (1960s-1980s) 
According to an interview with the former Minister of Machinery Construction between 
1965 and 1985 (interview code A_10), until 1960 all machinery-oriented industrial 
branches were severely underdeveloped within the Romanian political economy. In 
order to meet the needs of the internal market and to create an indigenous technological 
base, the CC formulated an industrialisation programme with individual development 
objectives for each industrial branch. The auto sector was only established in 1966 
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(Historia, 2017a), despite the existence of legacies of the automotive sector dating back 
to the 1940s, with trucks being manufactured at Braşov; off-road vehicles being 
produced at Câmpulung; and, the existence of a range of components factories 
(Ştiinţă&Tehnică, 2016). 
During the early 1960s, a license was wanted for a medium-sized automobile with a 
cylindrical capacity between 1,000 and 1,300 cm
3
, and a production plan between 
40,000 and 50,000 automobiles per annum (Ion Mihai Pacepa in Historia, 2017a). The 
following car producers participated in the bidding war: Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, Alfa 
Romeo and Austin. Foreign collaboration between Dacia and Renault was established 
after the historical visit to Bucharest of the French President Charles de Gaulle in 1966 
(National Romanian Archives Files 3064/40/1972; 3064/81/1972; 3064/108/1973). 
According to my interviews with industry representatives, Renault was chosen because 
it was owned by the French state, as private companies were viewed with suspicion by 
the Communist Party. In 1968, the State Planning Committee together with Renault and 
the French state negotiated and signed the 10-year licensing agreement (National 
Romanian Archives Files 3064/40/1972; 3064/81/1972; 3064/108/1973; 3064/26/1975; 
3064/74/1975). The licensing agreement stipulated that initially the French side would 
supply the delivery of components and parts, while the Romanian side would conduct 
the assembly of components collections into automobiles. After this initial phase, the 
licensing agreement imposed the domestic assimilation of a range of components 
through the creation of internal production capacities. The Committee negotiated these 
industrial policies with the Ministry of Machinery Construction, and together the two 
institutions formulated the institutional measures to be implemented at the regional-
level by the executive directors of the Automobile Industrial Complex Piteşti. 
Due to technical and economic reasons, the offer made by Renault for the model 
Renault 12 was withdrawn – the model was in the testing phase and production was 
about to start soon in France in the second half of 1969. Instead, Renault allowed Dacia 
to begin assembly of an intermediary product (until the Renault 12 model would be 
ready for production). Initially, the Renault 16 model was chosen as the intermediary 
product, but in the end the Renault 8 model was selected, which was the cheaper and 
less technologically sophisticated option (Polytechnic University Bucharest, Faculty of 





 of August 1968, the production of Dacia 1100 began. On that historical day, 
Nicolae Ceauşescu left from Colibaşi (now the town of Mioveni) in Romania’s first 
ever-manufactured automobile. The Dacia 1100 was a model under the license of the 
Renault 8 (Historia, 2017a). According to the licensing contract, all parts and 
components were supplied by the Renault and assembled in Romania at Colibaşi – so, 
technologically speaking, the car was a Renault 8. As mentioned above, the Dacia 1100 
was regarded as an intermediary product in the ten-year contract signed with Renault. 
Key political players of the Communist regime attended the launch of the Dacia 1100: 
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Ilie Verdeţ, Constantin Drăgan and Manea Mănescu ( istoria, 
2017a). 
Between 1968 and 1972, approximately 44,000 Dacia 1100 models were produced 
(Polytechnic University Bucharest, Faculty of Electric Engineering, 2010). During the 
1960s-1970s, the price of a Dacia was approximately 70,000 Romanian Lei, or the 
equivalent of a one-bedroom apartment (Ştirile ProTv, 2013; 4Tuning, 2017). Despite 
the steep price, demand was higher than the factory capacity. In 1970, a small frontal 
aesthetic modification was made to the model. During the same year, the Dacia 1100S 
was produced, however, in a very limited edition – the model had a stronger engine and 
was utilised by the police and in race-driving.  
In August 1969, the Dacia 1300 model entered production under the license of the 
Renault 12. The model (a four-door sedan with a front-wheel drive) was showcased at 
the auto salons in Bucharest and Paris (Polytechnic University Bucharest, Faculty of 
Electric Engineering, 2010). Between 1970 and 1980, Dacia developed an entire 
portfolio of both automobiles and utility vehicles using the Dacia 1300 model as the 
basic concept. This portfolio includes: Dacia 1300L (“L” standing for “lux” as in 
“luxury”); Dacia 1300LS (“LS” standing for “lux super” as in “super luxury”) created 
specifically for central Communist Party members; in 1973 the station wagon model is 
launched; in 1975 the pick-up model Dacia 1302 is conceptualised (but it wasn’t 
produced until 1982); and a van/patrol wagon, the Dacia D6, a copy of the Renault 
Estafette model was produced.
52
 At the 1979 auto show in Bucharest, the re-styled 
version of the Dacia 1300 model was presented – the Dacia 1310.
53
 This was the first 
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model to appear after the licensing contract with Renault expired. During 1978-1979, 
the Dacia 1310 Sport model was also produced. In the following year, at the 1980 car 
exhibition the ‘Braşovia’ was presented – a coupé model based on the 1310 produced at 
a factory in Braşov. Also, in the early 1980s, Dacia produced the 2000 model which 
was based on the Renult 20 – this model was specifically produced for the Central 
Communist Party elite and was only available in black or blue (production was very 
limited). In 1981, the Central Party leadership gave its permission for the inception of 
production of a two-door model – the Dacia Sport 1410, which was manufactured for 
the privileged youth. This presentation of the portfolio of models produced by Dacia 
between 1969 and 1981 was synthesised using materials from Polytechnic University 
Bucharest, Faculty of Electric Engineering. 
The period between 1966 and 1978 (under the license of the Renault 12) is characterised 
as one of progress and economic development for the Romanian automobile industry.  
As mentioned above, in 1979 the ten-year accord between the French and Romanian 
government expired, and as a result, Dacia began producing automobiles based on 
indigenous technological capabilities and resources (Ştirile ProTv, 2013; Bursa, 2014). 
The termination of the ten-year licensing agreement with Renault was coupled with the 
autarchic institutional framework implemented pursued by the CC. Complete ‘forced’ 
assimilation and the termination of foreign collaboration proved a highly complex and 
overwhelming process that had numerous negative externalities, as I will discuss later in 
this chapter. The elimination of foreign resources triggered a continuous drop in the 
quality of automobiles manufactured at Colibaşi. 
During the 1980s, after the withdrawal of Renault from Dacia, the Romanian state 
invested heavily in the development of domestic production capacities,
54
 but 
unfortunately, the focus was on quantity rather than quality. The Dacia factory was not 
equipped with any of the modern technological resources available on the market. The 
factory would have needed to have access to foreign technological resources; instead, 
Dacia had to rely on its own internal production capacities. In the attempt to keep up 
with production capacity expansion but also to streamline its in-house activities, several 
activities at Dacia, including the manufacturing of specific components, were 
externalised to newly established enterprises from the horizontal industry at: 
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Topoloveni, Scorniceşti, Slatina, Drăgăşani, Costeşti, Turda and Oradea 
(Ştiinţă&Tehnică, 2016).   
According to Constantin Stroe (Ştiinţă&Tehnică, 2016), it became obvious throughout 
the Socialist regime that the Romanian auto sector could not keep up with the evolution 
of automobiles in Western economies; however, the technological quality of Romanian 
products was superior to those auto products from other CEE Socialist regimes such as 
Poland, the USSR and Yugoslavia (which were all benefitting from licenses). 
In 1973, the State Planning Committee decided to further develop the Romanian auto 
industry via foreign collaboration by specialising in the production of a small-sized 
automobile with low-fuel consumption (National Romanian Archives File 
3064/104/1976). In this sense, there were two failed attempts to establish collaborative 
arrangements: 1) the formation of a mixed enterprise with Renault in 1973, and 2) the 
formation of a mixed enterprise with Volkswagen in 1974 (Lupul Dacic, 2014; Historia, 
2017a). Because neither Renault nor Volkswagen representatives expressed their 
interest to collaborate on the production of a low fuel consumption automobile, the 
State Planning Committee pursued the formation of an industrial and financial 
collaboration with Citroën. The way in which the Romanian state decided to further 
expand the Romanian auto industry during Socialism and the fact that it was the sole 
decision-maker when it came to selecting the ‘foreign’ partner to establish a mixed 
enterprise substantiates my argument of a very strong state controlling the institutional 
configuration of the national political economy. 
It is important to highlight that Romanian-French collaboration had long-established 
legacies – prior to the licensing contracts present in the automobile sector, during the 
1950s Romania had established licensing agreements with the French for household 
appliances (television sets), industrial computers and energy machinery (Lupul Dacic, 
2014). This type of Romanian-French collaboration carried on throughout the rest of the 
Socialist regime: in 1980, for example, the Mixed Romanian-French Commission 
managed no less than 56 scientific and technical cooperative alliances in machinery 
construction, extractive industry, energy industry, construction and building materials, 
light industry, agriculture, stockbreeding, information technology, chemistry, biology, 





 of December 1976, the formation of the Mixed Romanian-French Enterprise 
Olcit was announced in Paris, followed by the announcement being made on the 30
th
 of 
December 1976 in Bucharest (National Romanian Archives Files 3294/198/1982; 
3294/268/1982; 3294/280/1983; 3294/238/1986). The joint stock value was 500 million 
Francs (the equivalent of 100 million US dollars) and the share split of the mixed 
enterprise was: the Romanian Socialist state 64 per cent (owned by the state-owned 
enterprises: the Automobile Industrial Complex Piteşti and the Exterior Commerce 
Enterprise “Autodacia”) and Citroën 36 per cent (General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 
2016). The contract of incorporation of the Mixed Romanian-French Enterprise Olcit 
was signed by the State Planning Committee and George Taylor (President of the 
Citroën Board of Directors), together with other dominant elites from the political 
sphere: Vice-Presidents Gheorghe Oprea and Ion Păţan (who was also Minister of 
Exterior Commerce and International Economic Cooperation), Ioan Avram (Ministry of 
Machinery Construction), Nicolae Ionescu (Secretary of State at the Ministry of 
Exterior Commerce and International Economic Cooperation) and Raoul Delaye 
(Ambassador of France in Bucharest) (National Romanian Archives File 
3064/104/1976). The financing of the ‘Olcit’ deal was done through governmental 
securities issued by the Romanian government (through the Romanian Bank of Exterior 
Commerce) and loans issued by 13 French banks (coordinated by the French-Romanian 
Bank). Furthermore, the State Planning Committee in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Machinery Construction oversaw and managed the process of integration and the 
development of internal production capacities. According to the contract, the Olcit 
enterprise was supposed to assimilate 49 per cent of technological capacities, the 
domestic horizontal industry was in charge of integrating 23 per cent of production 
capacities, with the remaining 28 per cent being supplied by Citroën (General Director 
Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016). The Committee and the Ministry of Machinery Construction 
formulated and transferred these institutional measures to be implemented at the 
regional-level by the executive directors of the Automobile Industrial Complex Piteşti. 
Prime Minister Manea Mănescu welcomed at Bucharest a delegation of Citroën senior 
executives together with a group of bankers led by the Credit Lyonnai Bank Guvernor 
(Claude Pierre-Bresolette) and the General Director of the French Bank of Exterior 
Commerce (François Giscard d’Estaung). The official visit ended with the approval of 
the financing for the Olcit Mixed Enterprise. The ceremony was also attended by the 
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Romanian Bank of Exterior Commerce Governor (Vasile Voloşeniuc). The licensing 
agreement with Citroën was for the production of two models: 
1) Citroën Visa Spécial – known in Romania as the Olcit Special, and 
2) Citroën Visa Club – known in Romania as the Olcit Club. 
In 1979, the opening of the Olcit factory in Craiova should have taken place; however, 
the actual assembly of the first automobile took place in 1981, and it was only in 1982 
that mass production commenced. Planned production was set at 30,000 units in 1979, 
80,000 units in 1980 and 130,000 units in 1981 respectively (National Romanian 
Archives File 3294/280/1983). There were, however, massive delays and planned 
production targets were not met. This led to the initiation of discussions by the French 
side with the leading authorities in Bucharest regarding the state of the Romanian-
French investment. A series of meetings took place: 
1) on the 5
th
 of March 1980 – a meeting between the President of the Board of 
Directors of Citroën (Jacques Lombard), the Romanian Prime Minister (Ilie 
Verdeţ) and Nicolae Ceauşescu (National Romanian Archives File 
3294/163/1981); and, 
2) on the 25
th
 of July 1980 – Nicolae Ceauşescu visited the Citroën factory. This 
visit also facilitated the dialogue between the French side and Ioan Avram 
(Minister of Machinery Construction), Cornel Burtică (Vice Prime-Minister of 
Government and Minister of Exterior Commerce and International Economic 
Cooperation), Ştefan Andrei (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and presidential 
counsellor Vasile Pungan (National Romanian Archives File 3294/163/1981). 
There were two major factors that resulted in Olcit not being able to honour the terms of 
the licensing contract. Firstly, the Romanian factory couldn’t produce and supply on a 
continuous basis the agreed 49 per cent of parts and components for the production and 
assembly of automobiles. Secondly, Ceauşescu blocked the facilitation of certain loans 
necessary for the importation of components and parts that were proposed by the 
French. This measure was adopted in line with the central institutional framework of 
technological integration and assimilation, and the reduction of imports in the form of 
components, equipment, machinery and licenses. This resulted in the inability of Olcit 





engine utilised on the Olcit Special and Olcit Club 11R had a larger fuel 
consumption than what was stated in the initial design specifications, due to 
modifications in the aerodynamic coefficient (National Romanian Archives File 
3294/198/1982). In contrast, automobiles produced in France using the same engine met 





engines utilised on the Olcit Club 11RL model (production 1984-1988) and the 
Olcit Club 12TRS respectively (National Romanian Archives File 3294/238/1986). 
Because the Romanians breached contract terms at the beginning of the 1980s, great 
financial problems and political tensions ensued (Lupul Dacic, 2014). A series of 
discussions and negotiations were facilitated, in order to improve the financial situation 
of the Olcit Mixed Enterprise.  
“A delegation, led by Ioan Avram (Minister of Automobile Construction 
Industry), was sent to France in order to negotiate and discuss ways of 
improving the situation at Olcit with the French authorities, the executive 
team of Citroën and the senior executives from various financial institutions 
and banks” (National Romanian Archives File 3294/268/1982, 1982).  
The French side proposed lay-offs at the Olcit factory in Craiova, as well as the 
reduction of production capacity – measures that were both rejected by the central 
authorities in Bucharest. Hence, the cooperation between the Romanian Socialist state 
and Citroën was interrupted for a year and a half. During that timeframe, Olcit 
registered very low production levels: 10,000 units were assembled per annum versus 
the 120,000 units per annum as set out in the plan (National Romanian Archives File 
3294/268/1982).  
Until 1981, France had a trade surplus with Romania, due to the fact that Romania 
imported technological capabilities at very high prices for many years (Historia, 2017a). 
However, from 1981 onwards, trade balance turned in favour of Romania – this took 
place simultaneously with the worsening of Romanian-French political relations. In the 
1970s, Romania had difficulties in exporting products to France due to high customs 
duties (15 to 24 per cent of product value). As a result, Ceauşescu came up with the 
initiative to establish a Romanian-French bank to finance joint-projects, raise the share 
of Romanian exports on the French market and reduce the trade deficit. As the volume 
of bilateral exchanges reduced drastically towards the mid-1980s and France started to 
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accumulate a trade deficit, Romanian-French relations deteriorated further. 
Simultaneously, at a supranational level, France stopped supporting Romania in 
renewing its accords (dating back from the 1970s) with the European Economic 
Community, as well as its agreements with the Common Market (Historia, 2017a). 
Romanian-French cooperation was resumed in 1984, when Romanian specialists 
managed to rectify the main quality and reliability problems that were highlighted by 
the French. However, conflict and tension re-emerged when the Romanian side installed 
parts and components licensed for Dacia automobiles on the Olcit Club 11RM model 
without having authorisation (Romanian Car, 2014). To resolve the newly arisen 
problems, Aurel Duma (Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) had a 
discussion with the French Ambassador Michael Rougagnou in Bucharest on the 21
st
 of 
February 1986. Aurel Duma proposed that the authorities in Paris analyse the possibility 
of reducing the customs duties for the Citroën Axel 11R model, which was sold in 
France. This issue was later resumed on the 18
th
 of April 1986 in Paris by the Minister 
Counsellor Valeriu Tudor in a meeting with Deputy Director Régis de Bélenet from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gheorghe Crăiniceanu (Vice-President of the Romanian 
Bank of Exterior Commerce) discussed the same issue with the President of the French 
Bank of Exterior Commerce on the 23
rd
 of September 1986. Instead of reaching some 
form of compromise, another conflict arose – more specifically, the Romanian 
authorities wanted to be backed up by the French state in convincing Jacques Calvet 
(President of PSA Peugeot Citroën Group) to accept the escalation of the sales price of 
the Citroën Axel 11R model, and furthermore, to take over half of the production at 
Craiova (as had been agreed in the contract signed in December 1976) (Lupul Dacic, 
2014). The President of the French Bank of Exterior Commerce pointed out that the 
Olcit venture had no financial feasibility. 
Although the Olcit factory had a maximum capacity per annum of 130,000 units, 
between 1984 and 1988 only 60,184 units were produced (Romanian Car, 2014).  




 of November 1986 a delegation formed of 
representatives of the Ministry of Automobile Construction, Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International Economic 
Cooperation, and Olcit Mixed Enterprise carried out a series of talks in Paris 
in order to improve the financial and economic situation at Olcit Mixed 
Enterprise […] The Romanian side wants to continue the cooperation with 
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Citroën in order for Olcit to fulfil the production levels and targets that were 
pre-established in the contract […] so that the enterprise becomes a model 
of advantageous economic cooperation as was set out in the initial contract 
signed in 1976. The Romanian delegation claimed that the primary concern 
is to eliminate losses and to undertake a viable economic activity, and to do 
so the reduction of production costs has to be achieved at an overall 
enterprise level” (National Romanian Archives File 3294/238/1986).  
Olcit continued to have financial difficulties all throughout the second half of the 1980s. 
There were continued efforts to address these issues; however, none of the solutions 
proposed proved successful. Unlike its successful ‘star’ sibling Dacia, Olcit proved to 
be a more problematic business venture. 
Technological Deficiencies of the Romanian Auto Sector during the Socialist Era 
My investigation of the archival materials has revealed that throughout the Socialist 
period the auto sector was characterised by the inability to realise the production plan 
imposed by the CC, low-quality of manufactured products, and an inadequate horizontal 
industry that could not ensure the timely and sufficient delivery of high-quality 
machinery, tools, replacement parts and materials.
55
 These findings were corroborated 
with the data emanating from the ten interviews conducted with industry representatives 
(interview codes A_1 to A_10) and one interview conducted with an industry specialist 
(interview code S_6). I shall elaborate on my findings in greater detail below. 
The analysis of archival materials and semi-structured interviews has indicated that 
quite often these issues defining the industry were linked. According to a decree 
produced by the State Planning Committee and Ministry of Machinery Construction, the 
production plan of Olcit was not met in 1981 due to recorded delays in the supporting 
industries related to production capacities in the chemical industry, the machinery 
industry and the light industries (National Romanian Archives File 3294/163/1981). 
Similarly, in the transcript of a working session with the senior officials of the 
automobile sector, the General Director of Dacia (Nicolae Matea) highlighted that 
production volume wasn’t met in 1982 due to the fact that the horizontal industry and 
the R&D institutes could not produce components and materials at the required 
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technical standards (National Romanian Archives File 3294/7/1982). According to 
Nicolae Matea (National Romanian Archives File 3294/7/1982, 14): 
“[…] Dacia has been contracted to produce 19,886 automobiles, out of 
which 12,045 automobiles are intended for Western markets, […] we have 
only realised 2,649 automobiles out of the total (22 per cent). […] The 
problem is regarding the quality of finishes, more precisely the inside and 
outside appearance of the automobile. We [our industries] are dependent on 
a range of materials that we cannot produce and we haven’t developed any 
solutions. For example, the problem of our steering wheel production. Our 
Industrial Complex needs to utilise an imported cellidor material.” 
In the same session, the  ead of the CC Nicolae Ceauşescu drew attention to the fact 
that several export contracts were terminated due to existing quality issues at both Dacia 
and Olcit (National Romanian Archives File 3294/7/1982, 71). 
“I have noticed that it has been proposed to expand export levels at Dacia. 
We need to revise export levels at other products as well. […] We need to 
revise export levels at Olcit and increase our quotas. However, we have the 
issue of quality. We have suffered a lot due to the issue of poor quality 
levels. Of course, repairs and servicing has also been problematic, but our 
primary issue has been quality. We have to make changes, so that our entire 
production meets export quality levels. All 90,000 Dacia automobiles 
should be suitable for export. I agree to 5-6 per cent failing quality 
standards, those we can improve and sell internally, but out of 90,000 units, 
80,000 units at least need to meet export quality standards. The problem [of 
quality] is an older issue of ours. We exported in 1979 21,000 units out of a 
total production of 50,000+, in 1980 we reduced exports to 17,000 units and 
in 1981 exports were further reduced to 15,000 units. Instead of expanding 
exports as our production levels have risen, we have reduced exports and 
increased automobile imports.” 
These issues related to unachieved production volume, low production quality and the 
insufficiencies of the horizontal industry were corroborated with: 1) points raised in 
technical-economic studies produced in 1983, 1986 and 1989 (National Romanian 
Archives Files 3294/280/1983; 3294/48/1986; 3294/238/1986; 3294/110/1989), and 2) 
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the emerging themes in the minutes of two working sessions in 1988 with the key 
players of the CC and the Ministry of Machinery Construction (National Romanian 
Archives File 3294/154/1988).  
Other institutional deficiencies permeating the sector during the Socialist period 
include: delayed investments to expand capacities in the horizontal industry, the non-
correlation of the number of personnel with the realisation of physical production which 
resulted in periods when the enterprises in the industry were overstaffed or understaffed, 
and inferior internal processes of upgrading and innovation (National Romanian 
Archives Files 3294/309/1986; 3294/71/1987; 3354/46/1981; 3354/3/1987). 
Industrial Policy in the Romanian Auto Sector during the Socialist Era: Dependency on 
Technological Imports and Foreign Collaboration 
In order to compensate for these inappropriate technological capabilities and weakly 
developed internal production capacities, the dominant elites facilitated the creation of 
an import-oriented institutional framework, which entailed a high dependency on 
licenses and technological imports. This is similar to the institutional trajectory pursued 
by the dominant elites in the coal mining sector. 
The institutional structure of the industry was based on the formation of licensing 
agreements – the acquisition of technical documentation by the State Planning 
Committee from foreign French automobile players. After the creation of the industry, 
growth and development continued to exhibit a high dependency on technological 
imports and foreign collaboration that was present across both enterprises during the 
Socialist period until 1973 at Dacia and 1982 at Olcit respectively.
56
 A very good case 
that illustrates the significant degree of dependency of Romanian auto makers on 
foreign imports was found in the Memo regarding the operational difficulties in 1982-
1983 of the Mixed Enterprise Olcit Craiova (National Romanian Archives File 
3294/198/1982). According to the Memo: 
“To ensure the production plan of 85,000 automobiles in 1982-1983 it is 
necessary to import a total of 30,960 collections [of components] by the end 
of the year. […] The acquisition of technological resources from Citroën 
worth 3.3 million Francs complementary to the Romanian technological 
resources (worth 3.9 million Francs) necessary for the modifications made 
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to Olcit bodywork production lines and bodywork accessories […]. Sending 
a commission of Olcit technicians to Citroën for qualification in design-
related activities […].” 
Another example that illustrates this dependency on foreign technology is the 
importation of complete knock down (CKD) kits. In an interview with a former senior 
executive director at Dacia, it was highlighted that the realisation of internal production 
was dependent on CKD kit imports from Renault, which complemented the indigenous 
technological means. He pointed out that the technological transfer was a contractual 
clause negotiated by the State Planning Committee and Ministry of Machinery 
Construction upon the signing of the licensing agreement with Renault. Similarly, in a 
technical-economic report produced 1982, the State Planning Committee authorised the 
order of CKD kits (30,960 kits in total) necessary for the realisation of the 1982-1983 
Olcit production plan (National Romanian Archives File 3294/198/1982). In the 
minutes from a working session, the Head of the State Planning Committee, the 
Minister of Machinery Construction and senior officials from the other supporting 
ministries discussed the control and management of imported replacement parts, 
electrical tools, robots, automation machinery and core components from leading 
Western suppliers such as: Widia, Sandwick, Northon, and Feldmuhle (National 
Romanian Archives File 3294/268/1982). It has emerged from both archival materials 
and interviews that under the direction of the State Planning Committee in conjunction 
with the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Machinery Construction, pools of 
engineers and technical specialists from both Dacia and Olcit went through a process of 
re-qualification by being sent abroad to carry off-site training at Renault and Citroën 
respectively (National Romanian Archives File 3294/198/1982). Furthermore, a 
commission of foreign specialists from Renault and Citroën undertook the internal 
qualification of engineers through on-site training programmes at Dacia and Olcit 
respectively. Hence, one can argue that the implementation of this industrial policy 
based on the importation of technological resources and foreign sets of skills triggered a 
process of industrial upgrading and the institutional development of the sector. 
The narrative emerging from my analysis of archival materials and semi-structured 
interviews reinforces the dependency of car manufacturing on licenses, technology 
imports and foreign collaboration. The processes of industrial upgrading and 
technological evolution were highly contingent on the functioning of this open, import-
dependent economic paradigm that facilitated the creation of internal production 
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capacities based on new, foreign technological resources. I have corroborated the 
findings from the archival materials with the findings from the interviews in order to 
highlight who are the drivers behind the creation of this import-oriented institutional 
framework. The drivers behind the implementation of this institutional framework are 
the dominant elites – the CC, the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Machinery 
Construction and the ministries supporting and collaborating with the Ministry of 
Machinery Construction. There was a wide consensus among the senior industry 
representatives that I interviewed that the sector had inadequate technological resources 
and that in order to achieve technological upgrade and develop internal production 
capacities, there was a need for foreign collaboration and the assimilation of foreign 
technology into the configuration of the industrial order.
57
 I argue that through the 
implementation of this import-oriented model, the dominant elites introduced a new 
institutional paradigm based on the interaction with international forces. This 
contradicts the Socialist rhetorical devices that reinforced inward orientation and the 
absence of foreign influence. Thus, by transforming the institutional structure of auto in 
such a way, the dominant elites triggered institutional change in the industrial order. 
Moreover, I argue that these early foreign interactions and collaborative arrangements 
facilitated by representatives of foreign capital became the bedrock of institutional 
continuity, paving the way for future interaction with international forces within the 
institutional configuration of the auto sector.  
Industrial Policy in the Romanian Auto Sector during the Socialist Era: Import 
Substitution Industrialisation and the Creation of an Autarchic System 
My analysis of archival materials and interviews with ten industry representatives 
(interview codes A_1 to A_10) and one industry specialist (interview code S_6) 
revealed that starting with 1973 at Dacia and 1982 at Olcit respectively, the dominant 
elites re-shifted the orientation of the institutional configuration of the industrial order 
by reducing foreign collaboration and minimising the dependency on technological 
imports. There was a massive shift in terms of the industrial policy pursued by the CC 
and implemented across the institutional configuration of auto. This is similar to the 
industrial policy programme pursued in the coal mining sector.  
Comprehensive evidence was unearthed in a variety of historical materials regarding 
this industrial policy shift. According to a technical report produced by the Ministry of 
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Exterior Commerce and International Economic Cooperation, the State Planning 
Committee and the Central Statistical Department, rigorous control was exerted and 
aimed to reduce the imports of tools and machinery (National Romanian Archives File 
3064/99/1973). “The Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International Economic 
Cooperation has the role to pursue the continued reduction of imports […] primarily 
through the intensification of assimilation and the domestic production of those 
materials and products which constitute as imports of the departmental proportion […] a 
high degree of importance will be awarded to analysing those products that have an 
unsatisfactory degree of integration” (National Romanian Archives File 3064/99/1973, 
45-46). The logic behind this industrial policy was that technological absorption and 
integration would take place together with the development of domestic capacities, 
hence eliminating the need for imports. This shift in industrial policy was corroborated 
by my ten industry representatives (interview codes A_1 to A_10) and one industry 
specialist (interview code S_6). According to a former senior director at Dacia 
(interview code A_3): 
“Assimilation played the role of enabling the domestic production of 
components necessary for the manufacturing of automobiles [...] We 
together with Renault designed an assimilation programme based on stages, 
with each stage achieving a higher percentage of integration and reducing 
the level of import necessities.” 
In the transcript of a meeting with members of the CC, the State Planning Committee, 
the Ministry of Machinery Construction and the supporting ministries, Nicolae 
Ceauşescu emphasized that “every industrial enterprise must understand that we cannot 
import any longer over the level set out in the plan, that we must take steps to 
accomplish the compulsory integration, we have to speed it [the process of integration] 
up and force it, even beyond what is established” (National Romanian Archives File 
3294/7/1982, 71). The dominant elites accelerated the process of technological import 
reduction and the degree of assimilation.
58
 This narrative of intensification of inward 
orientation and reliance on internal production capacities came out of my interviews 
with industry representatives as well. According to the former Minister of Machinery 
Construction (interview code A_10), the degree of assimilation at Dacia was increased 
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from 75 per cent in 1972 to 83 per cent in 1976 to 99 per cent by 1988. Similarly, a 
former executive director at Olcit and later Daewoo (interview code A_8) highlighted 
that although the licensing agreement with Citroën stipulated 72 per cent domestic 
technological integration, the Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation and the State Planning Committee sought to increase the degree 
of assimilation to 85 per cent by the end of 1986 (National Romanian Archives File 
3294/238/1986; General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016). 
The decision to reduce imports and to minimise dependency on foreign technology was 
made at the top of the elite hierarchy – the CC.
59
 The CC transmitted these industrial 
policy measures to the State Planning Committee, which together with the Ministry of 
Machinery Construction and other supporting ministries, were in charge of 
implementing these institutional measures. Thus, I argue that the dominant elites were 
the principal drivers behind this re-orientation of the internal dynamics of auto, and by 
modifying the institutional framework of the industrial order from an externally-
dependent, import-oriented model to an inward- and export-oriented model the 
dominant elites exerted institutional change. 
The historical materials and interviews revealed that the process of technological 
integration proved to be very difficult – this was due to the fact that the rapid 
elimination of technological imports resulted in the inability of the auto industry along 
with the other supporting industries to develop the necessary internal production 
capacities to compensate for loss of foreign technological resources. The abrupt 
reduction in imports resulted in significantly lower volumes of materials and 
components, as well as a massive drop in the quality of parts and machinery necessary 
for the production of Dacia and Olcit. According to a former executive director at Olcit 
(later Daewoo) (interview code A_8): 
“The idea is that there was a great need for imports; however, with the 
assimilation programme imports were severely reduced. So what did we do? 
We tried to replace these imports as much as possible […] This was 
achieved only on a small scale and so, we started to experience a shortage of 
components in the horizontal industry. The horizontal industry could no 
longer deliver the volumes we were asking for! They [the horizontal 
industry] received very little funds and could no longer meet our demands. 
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And this was the primary reason why the licensing agreement with Citroën 
collapsed.”   
Furthermore, a former executive director at Dacia emphasized the decreasing quality 
standards (interview code A_5):  
“There was a massive reduction in imports and investments, so basically 
everything that led to progress was cut out. In this context, the main slogan 
was “Produce Everything in Romania!”  owever, no country can produce 
absolutely everything internally, and in the case of auto international 
collaboration is necessary. This direction resulted in the massive decrease in 
quality of the [Dacia] automobile. I will tell you something, during 86-87 
we had serious quality complaints from the countries we exported to. The 
Enterprise of Exterior Commerce together with the Automobile Industrial 
Complex made a request to the CC to import components totalling 160 US 
dollars per car that would significantly improve quality levels and resolve 
quality complaints. Well, this request was not granted even though 160 US 
dollars per car was nothing. ” 
Alongside the gradual reduction of technology imports, the import-oriented model was 
defined by the gradual elimination of foreign collaboration with the two foreign players 
– Renault and Citroën. Based on archival materials, the licensing agreement with 
Renault was terminated in 1978 (National Romanian Archives Files 3294/163/1981; 
3354/46/1981), whereas Citroën began to express its intention to exit the mixed 
enterprise agreement in 1986, with the final withdrawal from the agreement taking place 
in 1991 (National Romanian Archives Files 3294/238/1986; 3294/154/1988; Gazeta de 
Informaţii, 2017).
60
 In light of these institutional features, the argument that I am 
advancing is that by eliminating technological imports and foreign collaboration, the 
dominant elites obstructed technological upgrading and diversification. As my 
interviewee pointed out above (interview code A_5), “[...] basically everything that led 
to progress was cut out”. A former senior director at Dacia (interview code A_6) 
illustrated the stifling of technological upgrading and industrial progress further:  
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“These guys, the ones from the Committee [‘CC’] and from Planning [State 
Planning Committee], they cut everything. They killed us! We couldn’t do 
anything. I couldn’t buy anything. We had these performance standards that 
we had to meet, well how could anyone meet them like this? When you 
weren’t allowed anything.”   
Instead, the institutional context shaped by the dominant elites was one characterised by 
autarchic production capacities and the utilisation of outdated technological reserves 
and inefficient internal production capacities. The investigation of archival materials 
and interviews revealed that this insular approach had a negative impact on the structure 
of the industry.  
Structural Problems of the Romanian Auto Sector before Privatisation 
A state of economic chaos was installed post-Revolution (Cernat, 2006). The early 
1990s were a period characterised by a general lack of capital, which in turn resulted in 
a lack of investments at Dacia, Olcit and the entire array of supporting industries – a 
fact that prevented technological modernisation and the assimilation of newly developed 
and complex technological resources (Constantin Stroe in Ştiinţă&Tehnică, 2016). 
Other structural problems of the Romanian auto sector included: a used industrial 
apparatus, an outdated array of products, the absence of a customer culture, a fragile 
financial structure, insufficient financial resources, limited innovative capability and an 
outdated supplier network (Bursa, 2014; Ziarul Financiar, 2014). The Government 
attempted to artificially stimulate the industry in the early 1990s; however, these 
domestic institutional measures proved to be unsuccessful (Cernat, 2006; Birch and 
Mykhnenko, 2009; Constantin Stroe in Ştiinţă&Tehnică, 2016). 
According to my interviews with industry representatives (interview codes A_1 to 
A_10) and an industry specialist (interview code S_6), the key players behind the 
structure and direction of the sector realised that the only way to save the industrial 
order from bankruptcy was through foreign collaboration. According to a current 
executive director at Dacia (interview code A_1):  
“Mr. Stroe [the former General Director] knew that the only way to save 
ourselves was for us to be adopted by a foreign family, otherwise we would 
have been goners.” 
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Furthermore, according to the consultant in industrial relations and industry specialist 
that I spoke to (interview code S_6): 
“There was no doubt that the industry was dying and if it wasn’t for foreign 
capital we wouldn’t have an auto industry in Romania today. They [Dacia 
management] realised this and as I have been told time and time again – 
Stroe, the patriarchal father, started searching for a foreign partner that 
Dacia could merge with. It was the same at Olcit, without foreign capital it 
wouldn’t have survived.”     
 ence, both Dacia and Olcit were looking for a foreign ‘family’ that was interested to 
adopt them. The central institutional player who led the privatisation discussions and 
negotiations was the State Property Fund. During the privatisation negotiations with the 
foreign auto players – Renault and Daewoo – the Fund had very little bargaining power 
vis-à-vis foreign elites. There is an obvious discrepancy in the degree of power and the 
positionality between the foreign auto players and the Romanian institutional players. 
This links to my previous argument – more precisely, the fact that at the time of 
privatisation foreign capital became the primary driver of the institutional configuration 
of the industry, whereas domestic elites took a more ‘backseat’ role within the existing 
power structure. Despite all the efforts made by the Fund and the Ministry of Finance, 
Renault and Daewoo managed to impose all of their conditions – more precisely, a very 
low selling price for the plant and a comprehensive package of fiscal incentives. One of 
the former executive directors at Dacia illustrated very well the limited bargaining 
power of the Romanian players vis-à-vis Renault and Ford, and how the foreign car 
manufacturers succeeded to impose all of their conditions (interview code A_3): 
“Financial incentives were awarded for an extended period. This is how it’s 
done. It was the same for Ford. Until Tăriceanu [Minister of Industry] didn’t 
give a certain percentage and a certain number of years of tax deductions 
and other exemptions there was no deal. This is how it was with Renault, 
this is how it was with Ford. There was an entire list of requests that we had 
to fulfil.”  
Failure to sign a privatisation agreement meant the ‘death’ of Dacia and Olcit, which 
would have also translated into devastating effects on the horizontal industries affiliated 
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to Romanian auto. The foreign players – Renault, Daewoo and Ford – were very much 
aware of what the consequences were if Dacia and Oltcit went into bankruptcy. 
The Effects of FDI Displacement in the Romanian Auto Sector (mid 1990s-2010s)  
In order to secure the foreign capital investments, the Romanian state offered subsidies 
in all three instances of FDI – Daewoo, Renault and Ford. It has emerged from my 
interviews that the domestic elites negotiated from an inferior position of power and that 
the terms of the negotiation process were dictated by the MNC players.
61
 More 
specifically, the representatives of MNCs stated their terms and in order to secure the 
investments, domestic elites had to accept them and provide the appropriate fiscal 
incentives.   
Renault obtained fiscal and customs incentives for a period of five years, equivalent to 
an interest-free loan of 150 million US dollars per year, which by derogating five laws 
in force imposed the adoption of a governmental emergency ordinance (Bursa, 2014). 
The incentive package given to Renault included the following items: 
1) deferment of value added tax payments in relation to internal market automobile 
sales from own production for a period of three years; 
2) exemption of taxes (custom duties and value added tax) on imports of technological 
equipment, machinery and tools necessary for retrofitting operations; 
3) exemption of income tax for a period of five years starting from the first financial 
transaction that registered a profit but no longer than eight years; 
4) exemption of value added tax on goods acquired in Romania, which are depreciable 
assets; 
5) the allowance of a 65 day difference from the foreseen deadline according to law 
118/1996, in relation to the establishing and utilisation of the Public Road Special Fund 
for the transfer of the 5 per cent quota of the value of manufactured automobiles, for an 
established period of five years starting from the date of the full payment of the share 
price; and, 
6) the possibility of importing a certain quota of Renault automobiles in Romania 
exempt from custom duties.  
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Interviews: A_3, A_5, A_7, A_8, A_10, S_6. 
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According to Ordinance no. 109/2008, the government set conditions for the production 
of 810,000 vehicles and 1.5 million engines at Ford Craiova between the 1
st
 of January 
2013 and 31
st
 of December 2017 in exchange for obtaining 75 million Euros from the 
Ministry of Public Finance (Gazeta de Sud, 2016). A study compiled by the European 
Institute in Romania confirmed that the state offered Daewoo financial subsidies 
between 1994 and 2001; however, it did not disclose the value and composition of the 
incentive package (2004). I was unable to find this information, as my interviewees 
refused to answer this question and both the industry and business press fail to elaborate 
on this matter.  
Based on my interviews with industry representatives and my analysis of the business 
press, foreign capital displacement triggered an extensive process of technological 
upgrading, knowledge transfer and the re-organisation of other value chain segments.
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Major investments were made in order to introduce the new production lines, to create 
the planned production capacities, to re-technologise and re-organise the primary 
production sections, and to supply and install the necessary construction machinery and 
electronic tools. New standards of quality and productivity were introduced that 
displaced the existing indigenous work model. Furthermore, knowledge transfer was 
carried out through extensive training programmes, with hundreds of engineers being 
sent abroad for re-qualification. Additionally, foreign specialists were brought in order 
to carry in-house training schemes and re-education programmes. Foreign elites also 
succeeded in transforming the structure of the distribution system, and in introducing a 
new model of servicing and repairs throughout the entire country. These are all 
constitutive elements within a story of institutional change influenced by foreign elites 
via the implementation of new industrial policy, the transfer of technology, and the 
implementation of new models and standards within the auto industrial order.  
In order to illustrate how foreign elites influenced the re-organisation of industry 
configuration, the process of technological upgrading and the transfer of knowledge, I 
will utilise Daewoo as my primary case study. After FDI displacement, Daewoo made a 
series of initial investments at its subsidiary in Craiova, in order to supply and install the 
main plant machinery and equipment. According to an internal company document 
provided by one of my interviewees, the total cost of the investment made by Daewoo 
in 1995-1996 was 472.34 million US dollars (General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016). 
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 Interviews: A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4, A_5, A_6, A_7, A_8, A_9, A_10. Other sources: Ştirile ProTv, 2013; 
Ziarul Financiar, 2014; Gazeta de Informaţii, 2017.  
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The largest part of the investment was directed towards the re-technologisation of the 
engine and gearbox sections, which accounted for 372 million US dollars. Furthermore, 
a total of 880 employees were sent to South Korea for re-qualification – four sets of 
skilled workers were sent throughout 1995 for 3-months training schemes, as well as 
129 specialists from all departments of the plant. As far as the distribution system is 
concerned, Daewoo created a dealership structure, having 43 dealerships spread across 
the country. A servicing and repairs activity was introduced to complement the sales 
and distribution network – with 34 servicing points being established across different 
counties, out of which 15 offered non-stop servicing. 
 
Lastly, I analyse the secondary effects of FDI displacement, more precisely the 
development of the components industry. The presence of FDI within the institutional 
configuration of the auto sector resulted in positive spill-over effects on the growth and 
diversification of the auto components industry (Pavlinek, 2004; Javorcik and 
Spătăreanu, 2005; Dudian, 2011). It was highlighted in several of my interviews with 
senior industry executives that the presence of two large international car manufacturers 
– Renault and Daewoo, which would later be taken over by Ford – triggered the 
institutional growth of the components industry which started to occur from the early 
2000s onwards.
63
 The institutional outcome that followed was that multiple components 
producers relocated to Romania in order to be close to Renault, Daewoo and later Ford 
(ACAROM, 2015).  
                                                          
63 
Interviews: A_1, A_2, A_5, A_9, A_10. 
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Furthermore, I want to highlight that as with the production of automobiles, the 
components industry in Romania is controlled by large foreign investors. Ban (2013) 
and Dudian (2011) draw attention to the formation of a range of automotive-oriented 
economic clusters within the Romanian national variety that are linked to the overall 
European auto production network. According to the Association of Automobile 
Constructors Romania or ACAROM (2015), international components manufacturers, 
including Continental, Bosch, Delphi, Daimler, Hella, Pirelli, Dräxlmaier, Schaeffler 
and Yazaki, have set up greenfield operations primarily in Western Romania (Timişoara 
and Arad components-based clusters) and Central Romania (Cluj, Sibiu, Braşov, Argeş 
and Olt components-based clusters). ACAROM emphasizes that the players dominating 
components production engage not only in the manufacturing of low- and medium- 
value added components (tires, wiring, laminates, ball bearings, planet wheels, tappets, 
timing belts, airbag systems, seat belts etc.) but also in the production of capital-
intensive, high-skill dependent, high-end components (gear boxes, advanced 
microelectronics, robotics, optical solutions, transmission systems, engines etc) – with 
some having established R&D facilities: Continental, Bosch, Hella, Dräxlmaier, 
Schaeffler and Yazaki. 
Based on Radosevic and Rozeik (2005), I argue that foreign capital has had important 
spill-over effects on the restructuring of the components industry. Similar to the auto 
industry, the presence of foreign capital orchestrated an extensive process of 
technological upgrading, knowledge transfer and the re-organisation of the Romanian 
components industry (Constantin Stroe in Ştiinţă&Tehnică). According to a former 
executive director at Dacia (interview code A_3), some of the domestic components 
suppliers established during the Socialist regime, which were plagued by outdated 
technological resources and insufficient capital, were acquired and integrated into the 
major foreign components producers that entered the Romanian market, who sought to 
take advance of their pool of skilled labour and long established relations with Dacia or 
Olcit. Furthermore, he highlights that major investments were made in order to re-
technologise and re-organise these existing components suppliers, which were behind 
the standards of quality and productivity required in the Western markets.  
The presence of foreign components manufacturers also influenced an extensive process 
of knowledge transfer through the organisation of training and re-qualification 
programmes for labour specialised in auto in the Piteşti and Craiova areas (interview 
codes A_4, A_5). According to a former senior director at Dacia (interview code A_5), 
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the integration of foreign components suppliers within the Romanian market resulted in 
thousands of engineers and technicians participating in training schemes organised by 
foreign specialists, with some hundreds of engineers being sent abroad for more 
extensive and specialised re-education programmes. Additionally, a current executive 
director at Dacia (interview code A_1) and a former executive director at Olcit/Daewoo 
(interview code A_9) argued that the presence of foreign components suppliers has had 
massive transformative effects on the infrastructure of the area that they are located in, 
financing and driving the creation of transportation links (roads, rail), building massive 
storage facilities and stimulating the development of other supporting industries that 
feed into the components industry. Thus, my argument is that similar to Romanian car 
manufacturing, the Romanian components industry has undergone a process of 
institutional transformation influenced by the representatives of foreign capital via the 
creation of new production capacities, the process of technological upgrading, the 






6.3.2 Elite Relations, Labour and Institutional Change in the Auto Sector 
The argument that I want to advance is that organised labour has acted as an elite force 
by challenging foreign elite power in the post-Socialist era. This has resulted in an 
interaction between organised labour and representatives of MNCs, in which each 
category of elites attempted to capture and maintain control over the institutional 
structure of the sector. I will illustrate this by presenting different instances of labour 
unrest at Dacia.  
On the morning of the March 24, 2008, workers from all departments at Renault’s 
Dacia plant in Mioveni went on a three week strike until April 11 that resulted in a loss 
of approximately 180-200 million euros for Renault (Capital, 2008; Hotnews, 2008; 
Mediafax, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). According to the Dacia trade union leader Nicolae 
Pavelescu, over 80 per cent of employees participated in the strike (Gazeta de Sud, 
2008). In an attempt to stifle the conflict, management utilised a series of tactics of 
strike breaking, intimidation and threats; however, these all proved unsuccessful (Guga, 
2017). Organised labour secured a decisive victory and as a result, the company’s 
management conceded to organised labour’s most important demands regarding wages 
and working conditions (Adăscăliţei and Guga, 2015). The unionists obtained a 360 
RON salary increase per month and an annual bonus of 900 RON, which combined 
translated into a salary increase of 435 RON per month per employee, while in 2006 the 
medium salary per month in Romania was around 600 RON (Mediafax, 2008a; 
Subiectiv, 2008).  
While the 2008 strike is the most exceptional example of social unrest, it is not the sole 
example when the organised labour at Dacia exhibited elite powers and challenged 
foreign elites. According to Guga (2017), trade union movement at Dacia underwent a 
process of revival in the early 2000s, when the labour model shifted from ‘labour 
weakness’ and defence strategies to a model of labour unrest and offence strategies. 
Although largely unchallenged in the first years post-privatisation, in February 2003 a 
strike erupted at Dacia, with organised labour protesting against the massive layoffs, the 
stagnant wages, the intensification of work and the raising of productivity standards, 
and the implementation of a dictatorial regime on the shop floor (Amos News, 2003; 
Curierul Naţional, 2003; Adăscăliţei and Guga, 2015). What must be understood is that 
the trade union at Dacia already had a significant level of power in the early 2000s – it 
had a high degree of control over the shop floor, it had gathered support among its 
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members for the process of privatisation and restructuring, it eliminated competition, it 
maintained its associational strength and ensured official trade union policy was 
followed. However, the conflict with management in 2003 marked the strengthening of 
the Dacia trade union and its emergence as a challenger of foreign elite power. 
Paradoxically, instead of this post-privatisation restructuring triggering the weakening 
of the trade union’s position within the enterprise, organised labour at Dacia embarked 
on a process of unprecedented strengthening (Guga, 2017).  
Faced with the growing uncertainties of labour flexibilisation and de-localisation, 
organised labour at Dacia went on offence again in 2013. On March 20 2013, workers 
from all departments of the Vehicle Plant stopped work (Auto Industry, 2013;  Dacia 
Group, 2013; Mediafax, 2013; Wall Street Journal, 2013; Ziarul Financiar, 2013a). The 
trade union claimed that the number of participants in the strike was as high as 5,000, 
while media reports ranged from 1,000 to 6,000 participants (Adăscăliţei and Guga, 
2015; Guga, 2017). A range of demands were voiced which included: the need for 
management to stop undermining the process of collective bargaining, the speeding up 
of management-organised labour consultations, a 25 per cent increase in the base wage, 
maintaining the current overtime pay system, eliminating the alcohol test and security 
checks upon entry and exit from the plant, and improving working conditions, 
especially managing a better relationship between workers and shop floor supervisors 
(Dacia Group, 2013). The next day on March 21 2013, management met some of the 
strikers’ demands including: speeding up consultations, the awarding of Christmas and 
Easter bonuses, the maintaining of the current overtime pay system, the elimination of 
the alcohol testing when entering and exiting the plant, and the promise of a joint 
management-union wage renegotiation. The union accepted the offer and the strike was 
called off. Just comparing how fast management conceded to the strikers’ demands in 
2013 vis-à-vis 2008 is an indicator of the increase in strength of the trade union against 
the representatives of foreign capital or foreign elites. Management has understood the 
importance of maintaining stable relationships with the workers and the need to strive 
for the continuous appeasement of the trade union. Renault’s continuous attempt to keep 
labour in check is clearly reflected in the year on year growth of gross average wage. 
Apart from showing its year on year commitment to raise wages, in a communique in 
2013 the Renault management listed the wage and non-wage benefits it offered its 
employees at Dacia: 
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“[…] we briefly present some of the provisions that are currently in force 
and were also valid in 2012: a guaranteed minimum wage for skilled 
workers of 1,918 RON; in 2012, apart from their wages workers enjoyed 
Easter and Christmas bonuses of 873 RON gross and 957 RON gross 
respectively; gift vouchers worth 60 RON for the 8
th
 of March granted to all 
women employees; Christmas vouchers worth 60 RON; profit sharing bonus 
of 1,240 RON gross; holiday bonus of 1,276 RON; food vouchers; free 
meals for a total of approximately 11,500 employees; subsidised 
transportation; various aid packages (for marriage, death etc.); days off paid 
at base wage rate apart from the ones granted by law in situations such as 
family events (childbirth, marriage, death), changing of domicile, blood 
donation, etc. […]” (Dacia Group, 2013). 
In order to highlight its continuous effort to the employees’ and region’s economic 
welfare, management has also disclosed the size of investments in production expansion 
and activity diversification.   
 
We don’t observe a similar model of labour unrest at Ford’s subsidiary in Romania, 
instead the institutional structure of the car manufacturer at Craiova is permeated by a 
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stronger degree of labour weakness and defence strategies. What this indicates is that 
the institutional configuration of Romanian industrial relations is marked by 
heterogeneity, with the auto sector displaying instances of organised labour of varying 
levels of ‘coordination’: strong coordination at Renault vs. weak coordination at Ford. 
This is in line with Schneiberg’s argument that every institutional model is defined by a 
variety of institutional logics that exist in parallel with one another (2007). As I argued 
in Chapter 3, to be comprehensively understood, national models need to be broken 
down into different spatial scales and the different spatial scales need to be analysed in 
order to capture the structural particularities that define a national political economy. 
There is institutional divergence and variety between the different sectors of a national 
model; however, one can encounter institutional differentiation even between the firms 
of a single sector within the national model.  
Organised labour at Ford’s subsidiary in Craiova was not able to position itself in such a 
way as to challenge the foreign elites. I argue that there are three institutional 
particularities that prevented organised labour to act as an elite force within the internal 
dynamics of the Ford enterprise. First of all, the size of the plant in terms of number of 
employees is significantly smaller than Renault’s subsidiary – this translates into 
smaller trade union membership and a weaker voice of organised labour against 
management. Second, technological activities at the plant in Craiova are skewed 
towards downstream non-analytical and non-R&D activities such as production and 
assembly, whereas Renault’s subsidiary encompasses an entire range of technological 
activities from downstream to complex upstream segments of the value chain including 
design and R&D. Thus, the level of skills and the degree of investment in training and 
education is much lower at Ford than at Renault. Employee skill level has a direct effect 
on the degree of power that labour can command against management – the more 
skilled the workforce the more power it will have to pursue an aggressive pay policy 
and to demand improved working conditions under the threat of strike action. Thirdly, 
FDI displacement by a US car manufacturer might have resulted in the internal 
company dynamics shifting towards more liberal market economy institutional 
complementarities (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Clark and Almond, 2006; Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009). According to Ferner et al. (2004) and Ferner and Almond (2006), US 
MNCs tend to be inflexible and insensitive to the structural particularities of national 
political economies and furthermore, they tend to act as ‘emissaries’ of the American 
system. More specifically, some authors argue that subsidiaries of US MNCs will 
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attempt to emulate the institutional configuration of the US system in the location they 
have been situated (Ferner et al., 2004; Ferner and Almond, 2006; Edwards et al. 2013). 
In my case, foreign elites or representatives of foreign capital would have worked 
against the development of a strongly coordinated industrial relations model at Craiova, 
and hence, limited the voice of organised labour (the Trade Union of Ford Automobiles 
Craiova) in order to avoid instances of labour unrest or to have management’s decisions 
challenged. 
6.3.3 Elite Relations, Education and Institutional Change in the Auto Sector 
When analysing the overarching institutional structures of the political economy, we 
observe a strong degree of institutional complementarity between the key moments of 
institutional change of the auto industry and the development of the educational system. 
The educational system specialised in auto was created by the dominant elites as an 
institutional support mechanisms for the domestic production capacities that had 
developed during the Socialist era. Hence, my argument is that education acts as a force 
of change with which the dominant elites engage and interact within the institutional 
context of the auto industry. 
According to a key representative of the automotive-oriented educational system 
(interview code A_11), the first Auto Engineering University was established in Piteşti 
in 1969 as a response to the formation of the licensing agreement between Dacia and 
Renault. During the timeframe of the licensing agreement, there was a high level of 
institutional collaboration between the plant and the university, with specialists from 
Dacia being integrated within the university and vice versa. Furthermore, Dacia acted as 
a patron to the university, supplying the necessary equipment and sponsoring the 
creation of laboratories. Apart from managing a tight institutional cooperation with 
higher education, Dacia facilitated the formation of a nexus of alliances with all the 
technical colleges from the region. What this institutional landscape indicates is a high 
level of institutional complementarity between the spheres of education and labour, with 
the presence of one enhancing the returns of the other (Aoki, 1994; Hall and Soskice, 
2001). The growth of the car and components industry throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
triggered the diversification of the educational system, which in order to keep up with 
the labour demands of Dacia and Olcit expanded its portfolio of specialisations – for 
example, the University in Piteşti opened new departments specialised in industrial 
electronics and information systems, and the technical colleges expanded their support-
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related specialisations in the Argeş region. The high level of institutional collaboration 
between car manufacturers and educational institutions continued throughout the post-
Socialist period. The nature and degree of this ‘communication’ between institutional 
spheres is similar to the concept of institutional complementarity (Aoki, 2000; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Clark and Almond, 2006; Hall and Gingerich, 2009). The two 
institutional spheres mesh quite neatly together resulting in the creation of an 
institutional blueprint skewed towards the CME typology. More precisely, the 
institutional sphere of education and training in Romanian auto displays CME-like 
features. My literature review has highlighted that the Romanian political economy isn’t 
the only CEE state that displays CME-like institutional particularities in some of the 
institutional spheres of specific industries (Feldmann, 2006, 2007; King, 2007; 
Mykhnenko, 2007). 
The formation of the educational system that supported the production capacities at 
Craiova took place later (interview codes A_9, A_11). Initially, the main educational 
institution within the region was the Olcit technical college. The pool of necessary 
engineers and specialists was supplied by the University in Piteşti. It was only in the 
early 1990s that we saw the formation of a department specialised in automobile 
engineering within the University of Craiova. This coincided with the acquisition of 
Olcit by Daewoo. The late development of higher education in Craiova can be explained 
using a model of institutional heterogeneity or variegation, where an institutional model 
can be permeated by the presence of differentiated logics that exist in parallel (Jackson, 
2003; Schneiberg, 2007; Jackson and Sorge, 2012; Vidal, 2014; Kirchner and Beyer, 
2014). This is the case with the Romanian automotive educational system – similar to 
the industry formation, development has not taken place homogenously and at the same 
time across the educational sphere. I argue that there were three factors that have 
contributed to the late and lesser development of the automotive educational system in 
Craiova: 1) the relative size of the plant in terms of number of employees, 2) the 
technological activities at the plant were skewed towards downstream non-analytical 
and non-R&D activities, thus rendering it unnecessary to develop a higher educational 
system, and 3) the University of Piteşti could ensure the timely supply of graduates 
required by both car manufacturers present in the national political economy (interview 
codes A_9, A_11). Based on my interviews with a key representative of the automotive-
oriented educational system (interview code A_11) and a former executive director at 
Olcit/Daewoo (interview code A_9), we can observe a similar type of institutional 
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collaboration at Craiova between the enterprise – whether it was Olcit, Daewoo or Ford 
– and the educational institutions within the region throughout time. Furthermore, over 
time the MNC players acted as patrons for the educational institutions, supplying them 
with equipment and technology (interview codes A_9, A_11).  
The context is permeated by an inter-institutional automotive collaboration between the 
University of Piteşti and the University of Craiova. According to a key representative of 
the automotive-oriented educational system (interview code A_11): 
“The collaboration between us [University of Piteşti] and them [University 
of Craiova] has been continuous. We have had meetings, protocols, joint 
participations at science fairs, joint development projects, these types of 
things.” 
Hence, the two car hubs do not exist in isolation. There is a clear communication flow 
and knowledge transfer between the two educational institutions. What this institution-
institution type of collaboration indicates is the existence of a tight level of coordination 
within the industry’s educational system typical of a coordinated market economy.  
Furthermore, the institutional complementarities between the spheres of education and 
labour have enabled the formation of joint research collaborations and projects between 
the universities and enterprises. I will use the collaboration between the University of 
Piteşti and Dacia to illustrate this. The University has allocated Dacia an entire 
department in order to engage in R&D, design and technological testing (interview code 
A_11). The projects within the department are undertaken together by both specialists 
from Dacia and senior academic figures, as well as students. Among the projects the 
research group has focused on include: the creation of the electric vehicle, engine 
optimisation programmes, and the development of propulsion systems. Aside from this 
research activity, Renault Technologie Roumaine (RTR) – Dacia’s R&D centre – is 
involved in the University’s Masters Programme (interview codes A_1, A_11). 
Specialists from RTR launch research projects that students can participate in – which if 
sufficiently creative can be taken over and implemented within the enterprise.    
Romania has had long-established historical legacies of apprenticeships, especially in 
the heavily industrialised sectors. However, major budget reductions, a wide range of 
poorly developed reform strategies and the massive wave of de-industrialisation in the 
first decade of the post-Socialist era transformed vocational education into ‘undesirable 
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remains’ of the former regime (Ban, 2012). In order to supplement the theoretical 
education provided to students with practical knowledge, foreign auto players 
collaborated with the representatives of the educational system in order to establish 
practical courses or apprenticeships (interview code A_11). Hence, I argue that the 
needs of foreign capital in conjunction with the institutional support provided by the 
educational sphere influenced the re-instatement of the apprenticeship system within the 
institutional configuration of Romanian auto. The apprenticeships that are obtained 
through an application process take place in Year 3 and Year 4 in parallel to the 
formative education provided by the university. In order to avoid timetable clash, the 
university has to closely coordinate with the enterprise to make sure students are able to 
fulfil their responsibilities to both the university and the employer – this indicates a high 
level of institutional collaboration between the car manufacturer and educational 
institution. Apprenticeships last between three to six months, with students having the 
opportunity to work in any of Dacia’s or Ford’s departments. Students are required to 
choose a project and based on the project’s specialisation they are assigned a supervisor. 
In order to complete the apprenticeship, students need to submit their project which will 
be assessed and graded. Apprenticeships are just another instance of institutional 
complementarity between the spheres of education and labour within the national 
political economy, with the institutional particularities of the Romanian auto system 
being skewed towards a CME type.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the dominant elites are the primary drivers of institutional 
change within the Romanian auto sector. The dominant elites have captured the state 
and its institutional structure, and in the process they have managed to capture the auto 
industrial order. One of the principal aspects that has emerged throughout this chapter is 
that during the Socialist period the structure and direction of the industry was controlled 
by domestic elites. Similar to coal mining, domestic elites facilitated the access of 
international forces – in the form of licensing agreements and technological imports – as 
indigenous production capacities and technological resources could not alone sustain 
and drive the development of auto. The institutional trajectory of the sector diverged in 
the first decade post-Socialism, when after a period of economic turmoil foreign capital 
displaced the industrial order and dismantled the model of inward-orientation. This 
emerging paradigm strongly contrasts with the coal mining paradigm, which has always 
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sought to restrict the degree of interaction with foreign forces, limiting it to licenses and 
technological imports, and has rejected the intervention of FDI.  
The dominant elites have permeated the institutional setting of auto from industry 
inception until present alongside other categories of social agents with diverging 
positionalities and from different spheres of interest. Rather than being insular forces 
and acting independently within the institutional context, dominant elites and other 
social agents engage in different forms of collaboration and conflict. Although the 
central assumption that I have made is that elites are stable in terms of their control over 
the industrial order, as I have shown there are constant fluctuations within the 
composition of both the dominant elite coalition and the other competing elite 
coalitions. In some cases, elite groups can challenge the status of the dominant 
coalition, and in the process destabilise it, resulting in a significant loss of power and 
ultimately in a downgrade to an inferior position within the elite structure. This is what 
happened to domestic elites during the key moment of institutional change when foreign 
capital privatised the sector and took over the Romanian auto enterprises. Domestic 
elites – both representatives of the state and domestic managers – took a backseat role in 
the interactions with representatives of foreign capital and lost a significant degree of 
decision-making power regarding the structure and direction of the industry. In other 
cases, elite groups can challenge the power and position of the dominant coalition, but 
without destabilising it. Instead of seeing the downgrade of dominant elites, what can be 
observed is a moderate limitation of the powers of the dominant coalition and the 
strengthening of voice of other competing elite groups in their negotiations with the 
dominant players. The instances of labour unrest that I have presented are exactly such 
interactions between the dominant elites and organised labour, when the latter group 
challenged the position of the dominant coalition and in the process, succeeded in 
extracting a series of benefits and keeping in check the powers of the Dacia 
management.  
Throughout the chapter, it has emerged that the institutional setting of auto is permeated 
by a series of interactions between the dominant elites and different forces of change, 
which have driven institutional change and have shaped the configuration of Romanian 
auto. The interaction between the dominant elites and industrial policy is the first 
interaction that I have analysed. Elites influenced the process of technological 
upgrading via the utilisation of technological imports and licensing agreements within 
the institutional structure of the sector. Initially, an import-oriented institutional 
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framework was imposed which resulted in the industrial order to heavily rely on 
machinery and equipment, parts and materials, and training and specialisation from 
foreign suppliers. The dominant elites from the political sphere triggered a shift in the 
industrial policy by reducing the importation of foreign technological resources and 
instead, focusing on creating an autarchic model based on the promotion of internal 
production capacities. Thus, the import-oriented institutional framework was dismantled 
and replaced with an inward-oriented, self-sufficient institutional model that relied upon 
outdated indigenous technological resources. The outdated technological base combined 
with the economic difficulties and lack of capital that plagued the Romanian political 
economy in the first part of the 1990s made domestic elites realise that foreign 
collaboration was necessary to ensure the survival of the industry. Hence, domestic 
elites facilitated the access of foreign capital and allowed the industrial order to be 
displaced by MNCs. Foreign capital displacement triggered an extensive process of 
technological upgrading, knowledge transfer and the re-organisation of other value 
chain segments. Furthermore, major investments were made in order to introduce new 
production lines and to re-technologise the outdated plants, new standards of quality and 
productivity were adopted, and extensive training programmes were carried out both on-
site and abroad. A secondary impact of FDI inflows within the Romanian auto sector is 
the emergence and growth of the components industry. Major foreign components 
suppliers followed Renault and Ford, establishing a presence within the domestic 
institutional configuration and further increasing Romania’s level of integration with the 
European auto production network. Large investments were made to stimulate the 
industrial upgrading of the institutional structure of the domestic components industry, 
which was significantly behind the standards of quality and productivity required in 
Western markets. The presence of foreign components manufacturers also influenced an 
extensive process of knowledge transfer through the organisation of training and re-
qualification programmes for labour specialised in auto in the Piteşti and Craiova areas. 
Furthermore, the presence of foreign components suppliers has had massive 
transformative effects on the industrial structure of the area that they are located in, with 
massive investments having been made to facilitate the expansion of production 
capacities, the creation transportation links, the construction of storage facilities and the 
development of other supporting industries that feed into the components industry. 
The interaction between dominant elites and organised labour is the second interaction 
that I have looked at. The labour model of Romanian auto contradicts the typical CEE 
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industrial relations literature, which characterises organised labour in post-Socialist 
economies as weak and fragmented. More precisely, industrial relations in Romanian 
auto are not skewed towards the LME model. Using a series of instances of labour 
unrest at Dacia, I demonstrated that organised labour acted as a counter-elite force by 
challenging foreign elite power in the post-Socialist era. The interaction between 
organised labour and representatives of foreign capital was of a competitive and 
conflictual nature, with each category of elites attempting to capture and maintain 
control over the institutional structure of Dacia. The result of the management-trade 
union conflicts was the strengthening of voice of organised labour and its ability to re-
negotiate working conditions, while at the same time limiting the powers and degree of 
control of Dacia’s management over the structure of the enterprise. At the same time, 
the interaction between representatives of foreign capital and organised labour has 
revealed that the auto sector displays an organised labour model of varying levels of 
coordination and strength. I did not observe a similar model of labour unrest at Ford’s 
subsidiary in Romania, as organised labour (the Trade Union of Ford Automobiles 
Craiova) wasn’t able to position itself in such a way as to challenge the foreign elites. 
This indicates that industrial relations in the Romanian auto sector are marked by 
institutional heterogeneity. 
The third interaction that I have discussed is between elites and education. At the 
macro-level we saw a state-industry collaborative arrangement, with the dominant elites 
from the political sphere creating an educational system specialised in auto in order to 
provide institutional support to the key players from the sector. Throughout time, the 
growth of the car manufacturing industry combined with the expansion of the 
components industry had spill-over effects on the development and diversification of 
the educational system. Beyond the macro-level interaction, there is an extensive array 
of collaborative arrangements at the micro-level between auto enterprises and 
educational institutions – both universities and technical colleges. For example, I have 
shown the existence of joint research projects between auto players and higher 
educational institutions, where academics, industry specialists and students work 
together to develop specific technologies and processes. Furthermore, Dacia and Ford 
act as patrons to the universities in Piteşti and Craiova respectively, supplying them 
with the necessary equipment and sponsoring the creation of laboratories and 
specialised teaching courses. The apprenticeship programme is another such instance of 
collaboration between educational institutions and auto players. Based on this evidence, 
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I argue that the institutional context is defined by a high degree of institutional 
collaboration or strong complementarity between Romanian car manufacturers and 
educational institutions – more specifically, the two spheres of the political economy 
mesh together quite neatly, creating an institutional configuration that is skewed 
towards the CME typology. Moreover, my analysis has revealed that the institutional 
context is permeated by inter-institutional collaboration between the two main 
universities – Piteşti and Craiova. This highlights the fact that there is a clear 
communication flow and knowledge transfer between the two educational institutions. 
Institution-institution types of collaborations further emphasize the existence of a high 
level of coordination within the industry’s educational system that is typical of a CME.  
Considering the role it plays in the institutional context of the auto sector, I argue that 
the interaction between elites and the other forces of change – industrial policy, labour 

















Investigating the Role of Foreign Elites in Creating the Romanian Business 
Services Sector and Influencing Institutional Change (2003-2018) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the position of the business services sector within the Romanian 
institutional configuration from 2003-2004 until 2018, and provides evidence of how 
different categories of elites have influenced the structure of the industrial branch 
throughout time. 
The reason why I have chosen to analyse business services is because it represents a 
relatively newly established and fast growing sector within the institutional structure of 
the Romanian political economy. Because of these characteristics of novelty and 
dynamism, the sector has been insufficiently researched. Furthermore, there is very little 
insight regarding who are the actors shaping and controlling the institutional 
configuration of the sector and what are the internal dynamics between these actors. 
Business services has a different institutional framework vis-à-vis the institutional 
make-up of other industrially-oriented sectors that are deemed as traditional for the 
Romanian national variety of capitalism, such as the two other sectors that I am 
investigating – coal mining and auto. To explore the distinct institutional configuration 
of business services, I examine the development of the sector historically and the 
influences that have affected its structure and composition over time.  
In the second section of this chapter, I present some technical data regarding the 
institutional growth, timeframe and geography of the Romanian business services 
sector.  
The third section of the chapter is a discussion about the identity of elites. The identity 
of the elites shaping and controlling the structure of the business services sector is 
distinct from that of coal and auto. The representatives of foreign capital, or more 
precisely the managers of MNCs, are the primary drivers behind the emergence and 
evolution of the sector. However, MNCs do not exist independently as sealed containers 
or insular entities within the institutional structure of the sector; rather, they are 
positioned within the wider institutional context alongside other types of social actors. 
Thus, I explore who are the other actors present within the institutional setting alongside 
the representatives of foreign capital – more precisely, domestic elites (government and 
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local/regional level state authorities) and labour. Furthermore, the chapter strives to 
capture the different types of exchanges and networks between these divergent 
categories of actors with varying degrees of power and positionality that permeate the 
internal dynamics of business services.  
In the fourth section, I capture the story of institutional change in the Romanian 
business services industry, by identifying four instances of interplay between MNCs 
and different forces of change that permeate the internal dynamics of this sector. The 
four instances of interplay embedded within the internal dynamics of the sector include 
1) the interaction between MNCs and domestic elites, 2) the interaction between MNCs 
and the educational system, 3) the interaction between MNCs and labour, and 4) the 
interaction between MNCs and industrial upgrading.  
In the fifth section of the chapter, I re-consider the key moments of institutional 
transformation emerging from the preceding empirical analysis and draw conclusions 
on how the interplay between the different categories of social agents influenced the 
institutional setting of the business services sector throughout time. 
7.2 Identifying and Mapping Elites in the Romanian Business Services Sector 
The ownership structure of the business services sector is dominated by strategic 
investors and entrepreneurs that have been primarily active during the last 14 years 
(ANIS, 2016). The business services sector is almost completely privately-owned and 
concentrated around MNCs in one of the three broad areas of interest (by categories of 
supported processes) (ABSL, 2015; ANIS, 2016). According to KPMG, approximately 
25 per cent of the professionals employed in business services are involved in the 
information technology area (ITO and R&D). A similar percentage is employed in 
customer relations such as business process outsourcing and shared service centres 
(BPO and SSCs). The remaining 50 per cent work in finance and accounting, banking, 
insurance and financial services (BIFs), and human resources (HR) (Romania Insider, 
2015). The vast majority of private, foreign entities dominating the sector provide a 
portfolio of services combining several categories of business processes (ABSL, 2015, 
2018a). Five of 20 representatives of the business services industry highlighted that over 
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95 per cent of the industry is controlled by foreign capital (FDI), and the indigenous 
companies are small and their activities have a small impact within the sector.
64
 
Hence, the primary players in the creation and evolution of the institutional 
configuration of the Romanian business services sector are the representatives of 
foreign capital – the managers of MNCs. Based on the 20 interviews with business 
services representatives, it was highlighted that MNCs were the drivers of business 
services investments and the creators of this institutional niche within the national 
political economy. Thus, I can argue that within this chapter the dominant elites that 
have established and shaped the institutional configuration of the industrial order of 
business services are foreign investors. Business services are institutionally distinct 
from coal and auto, since from inception the institutional configuration of the industrial 
order has been dominated by foreign capital representatives, while domestic political 
players have played a secondary supporting role throughout the entire timeframe of the 
sector.  
However, foreign investors are not the only social actors that played a role in the 
development of this sector. Instead, what can be observed is also the presence of 
endogenous forces in the form of domestic elites that have driven institutional change 
and shaped the configuration of the business services sector within the national 
Romanian variety of capitalism. Domestic political players are also part of the elites, 
forming their own elite sub-coalition that is distinct from that of representatives of 
foreign capital. As I have stated above, their positionality and degree of power is 
considerably lower; however, we must not make the mistake of overlooking their ability 
to drive institutional change. Domestic political players had a direct impact on the 
establishment and development of the sector, having the power to decide whether FDI is 
realised or not through the facilitation of the necessary licenses and permits for the 
business to operate within the national context. Furthermore, as I shall discuss in greater 
detail further in the chapter, domestic elites have created a system of institutional 
incentives that is aimed at attracting new foreign capital, but also directed towards the 
growth and development of already established MNCs players. Another instance of 
institutional support that is facilitated by domestic political players is the creation of 
collaborative arrangements between the representatives of business services and the 
Romanian educational system. There is evidence to support that domestic political 
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players have pushed for the establishment of an educational system that is attuned to the 
needs of the sector, and in the process, the two spheres – capital and education – 
converged on similar institutional practices resulting in a level of institutional 
complementarity (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Jackson and Deeg, 2006; Hall and Gingerich, 
2009; Hancké, 2009). 
7.3 Findings about the Institutional Growth, Timeframe and Geography of the 
Romanian Business Services Sector 
The sector of business services includes all the companies whose economic activity is 
within the area of Shared Services Centres (SSC), Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), 
Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO), and Research and Development (R&D).  
The emergence of the business services sector has been one of the greatest 
achievements of the Romanian economy in the last two decades. The sector has grown 
from less than 200 employees in 2004 to 120,000 employees in 2017 (ABSL, 2017, 
2018b; Business Review, 2018). Four out of 20 industry representatives, emphasized 
that the sector registers an annual growth rate of 17-19 per cent and that the number of 
jobs in the sector will rise to 200,000 by 2020.
65
 This information is corroborated by 
sector analysts who also expect business services jobs to reach the ‘200,000 jobs’ mark 
by 2020 (Business Review, 2016). According to an industry study carried out by KPMG 
(Actmedia, 2016), the main industry players have plans to expand their operations in the 
upcoming two years. Approximately 50 per cent of the companies involved in the 
KPMG study are considering providing new services to current and prospective 
customers, whereas around 18 per cent intend to enlarge their operations by offering the 
same portfolio of services to new customers.  
Sector turnover is experiencing the same upward trend – in 2012 total sales revenue 
from business services was around €500 million, whereas in 2014 the sector generated 
€1.5 billion (The Diplomat, 2015; Romania Insider, 2015). In 2014, the business 
services sector accounted for 1.4 per cent of gross domestic product and business 
services professionals constituted 1.9 per cent of the country’s active population – since 
then the contribution of the sector has grown (Business Review, 2015; ABSL, 2017). 
According to two executive directors of business services MNCs and members of 
Association of Business Service Leaders in Romania, in 2016 the industry accounted for 
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1.6 per cent of gross domestic product and industry jobs represented 2.0 per cent of the 
country’s working population (interview codes BS_13, BS_14). There are currently 265 
business services centres in Romania, specialised in all four types of activities – BPO, 
SSCs, ITO and R&D (Business Review, 2016). This figure is also projected to grow.  
The business services sector is one of the most recently developed institutional orders 
within the Romanian national variety, having established its institutional foundations 
around 2003-2004 (Dudian, 2011). Out of the total 20 sector representatives 14 stated 
that business services emerged sometime during 2003-2004,
66
 with two sector 
representatives placing the emergence of business services in the second half of the 
1990s.
67
 However, the two interviewees highlighted the fact that you can hardly 
categorise the activities undertaken by MNCs during the 1990s as business services, 
rather they were ‘very basic call-centre-type activities’.  
All 20 interviewees characterised the industry as being within the ‘infancy stage’ and 
‘very far from mature’. Furthermore, three executive directors and members of ABSL 
underlined the fact that only since 2013-2014 has the sector started to ‘appear on the 
international map’ and have a considerable footprint, and that until then its impact was 
negligible.
68
 According to industry experts, foreign capital permeated the market via 
three investment waves that have divergent timeframes and geographies (The Diplomat, 
2015). The presence of these waves has also been reinforced in the interviews that I 
have carried out.  
The first-tier investment location is Bucharest. The literature review and the semi-
structured interviews have revealed that foreign investors first targeted the capital, with 
FDI inflows starting to penetrate the market in the early 2000s. According to two sector 
representatives in Bucharest who are also members of ABSL, in 2017 between 60,000 
and 70,000 people were working in business services in Bucharest (interview codes 
BS_12, BS_13). Industry analysts confirmed this figure, stating that approximately 60 
per cent of total business services sector employees are concentrated in Bucharest 
(ABSL, 2017).  
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Based on my investigation, a number of secondary investment destinations emerged 
around the time Romania became a Member State of the EU (interview code BS_13). A 
massive opening-up of the Romanian market to business services was highlighted 
throughout four of my interviews that coincided with accession to the EU.
69
 The 
second-tier investment locations are: Cluj, Timişoara, Iaşi and Braşov. According to 
five of my interviewees, each of these four major cities focuses on a particular type of 
economic activity and has a specific cluster specialisation.
70
 Furthermore, what was 
consistently emphasized by 11 sector representatives, senior executives of business 
services MNCs in Timişoara and Bucharest, was that second-tier locations have only 
been partially exploited by investors and there is significant untapped potential.
71
  
Moreover, the industry has grown so rapidly that according to seven of my interviewees 
a third-tier location has emerged.
72
 The information that I have unearthed highlights the 
‘embryonic’ status of these investment locations, with their development only occurring 
from 2010 onwards. Third-tier investment locations include cities such as Sibiu, 
Craiova, Piteşti and Piatra Neamţ. An essential aspect emanating and corroborated 
throughout the interviews is the fact that so far third-tier locations have only been 
marginally exploited and that there are substantial investment opportunities to be 
accessed. One MNC executive and founding member of ABSL illustrates the untapped 
potential of tier-two and tier-three locations in Romania (interview code BS_14): 
“When you look at Romania you only have one one-tier city which is 
Bucharest and Bucharest still has some potential, but we haven’t looked at 
tier-two cities, I mean there are a few sparks here and there. We have gone 
to Timisoara, IBM has gone to Braşov, Capgemini and a few other, 
Amazon, have gone to Iaşi. With the exception of Cluj which is like the 
Silicon Valley and is saturated with IT, there is not so much exploitation 
that has happened. […] I think business will migrate out of Bucharest, 
because Bucharest is also... there is a fight for talent, everybody is stealing 
each other’s people, so it [FDI] will go to smaller towns, to tier-two or to 
tier... I’m not even talking about tier-three, I’m talking about tier-two 
because we haven’t even exploited Romania to tier-two level at all, there is 
a lot of potential there. I am talking just basic cities like Galaţi, there’s only 
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Arcelor Mittal there, that too because they have a mill and they have some 
people who work there, but anybody else?” 
The quotation that I have presented above highlights the strong investment potential for 
business services MNCs to relocate outside the Romanian capital. Furthermore, the 
quotation emphasizes the fact that there is significant potential to expand the business 
services sector to other secondary and tertiary locations. Moreover, according to seven 
sector representatives, due to the saturation of Bucharest as the primary investment 
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7.4 Elite Relations and Dynamics of Change in the Romanian Business Services 
Sector 
Aside from being forces of institutional change and creation themselves, MNCs exist in 
parallel to other forces defining and shaping the institutional context of business 
services. As I have stated earlier, the social landscape that I have conceptualised is one 
based on dynamic and continuous exchanges between different networks and levels of 
actors that can be of a collaborative or conflictual nature, that can have creative or 
destructive effects, that can determine the displacement or upgrading of the 
configuration of the sector, or that can lead to the imposition or transfer of various 
institutional measures and knowledge. Consequently, to properly sketch out the story of 
institutional change in the Romanian business services industry, I have detected four 
instances of interplay between the MNCs and different forces of change: 1) the 
interaction between MNCs and domestic elites, 2) the interaction between MNCs and 
education, 3) the interaction between MNCs and labour, and 4) the interaction between 














7.4.1 MNCs, Elite Relations and Institutional Change in the Business 
Services Sector 
Understanding and capturing the role played by domestic political elites – that is the 
government and regional-/local-level state authorities – is key to analysing the 
development of the institutional configuration of the Romanian business services sector 
and the internal dynamics between its constitutive players. 
In order to understand what kind of interaction takes places between these two 
categories of players and how this interaction influences the institutional setting, I look 
at the range of policies designed and implemented by domestic political elites and 
measure what is the effect of the state apparatus.  
In the following section, I focus on the licenses and permits that have been awarded to 
the sector that I investigate throughout this chapter. The granting of licenses and permits 
by domestic political elites to MNCs has facilitated the emergence of the business 
services sector. The argument that I put forward is that it is the collaboration between 
foreign and domestic elite players that has led to the creation of a new institutional order 
within the Romanian political economy.  
The Bureaucratic Structure of the Romanian State and the Issuing of Licenses and 
Permits to Business Services Players 
A total of 15 out of 20 industry representatives described the process of establishing a 
subsidiary and the interaction with government and regional-/local-level state 
authorities as extremely complex, opaque and containing excessive bureaucratic 
procedures.
74
 MNCs experienced difficulties in obtaining the necessary licenses and 
permits to operate within the sector. 
Based on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking from 1-190, Romania 
places 45
th 
in 2017, being outperformed by its CEE counterparts – Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia – and only surpassing Hungary. While it is true that in terms of 
the Starting a Business indicator Romania outperforms all four Visegráds, if we look at 
the three indicators related to licenses and permits – Dealing with Construction Permits, 
Getting Electricity and Registering Property – Romania scores considerably lower vis-
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à-vis all the other CEEs. The existence of a complex, opaque and cumbersome 
bureaucratic structure has resulted in business services industry players actively pushing 
for the improvement of market conditions through the creation of clear and predictable 
regulatory frameworks and the elimination of excessive bureaucratic obstacles 
(interview codes BS_1, BS_9, BS_12, BS_14). 
 
 I believe that this highly bureaucratic environment with cumbersome procedures to 
obtaining licenses and permits has resulted in industry players believing that domestic 
political elites do very little to support the development of the industry. This context 
defined by excessive procedures and a slow decision-making process constitutes a 
historical legacy representative of the Socialist regime. All 20 industry interviewees 
emphasized that the process of shaping this new institutional order is dominated by 
MNCs and defined by the absence of the government and regional-/local-level 
authorities. The executive director of a MNC subsidiary in Bucharest illustrates this 
perception very well (interview code BS_12):  
“The industry emerged organically. If you ask me it was the companies – 
they were the drivers. Each company came, knew its targets, did its 
research, looked for an office, and started the recruitment process. At one 
point there was this ‘trend’ if you want to call it that – the outsourcing at the 
beginning of the 2000s in this Eastern region of Europe. And companies 
started to come to Romania in line with this trend. So clearly, the companies 
were the drivers. Locally, I could not tell you that there is any contribution.” 
Hence, there is a debate between the issues of cumbersome procedures vs. absent state 
that must be addressed. The perception that the institutional setting is defined by the 
absence of domestic political elites must not be taken at face value. The process of 
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obtaining authorisation to start up a business within the Romanian institutional context 
entails two stages that all investors have to follow (Oficiul Naţional al Registrului 
Comerţului, Legea Nr. 359/2004, 2004). In the first stage, MNCs had to obtain 
preliminary licenses and permits that are necessary for the construction/establishment 
phase prior to the registration of the subsidiary. The licenses and permits included are: 
the Town Planning Certificate, the Construction Authorisation, the Environmental 
Approval and the Fire Hazard Approval. In the second stage, MNCs had to obtain the 
authorisation for the actual functioning of the business at the Trade Register Office. 
Thus, domestic political elites had a direct impact on the establishment and 
development of the sector, having the power to decide whether FDI is realised or not 
through the facilitation of the necessary permits and licenses for the business to operate 
within the national context. 
 
Institutional State Support in the Romanian Business Services Sector: The Provision of 
Land 
I will now analyse the issue of land access. The implication of the government and 
regional/local-level state authorities is not only restricted to the issuing of licenses and 
permits, instead what can be seen are instances in which the state representatives offer 
the industry players institutional support via the allocation of land. According to the 
executive director of a major industry player in Bucharest (interview code BS_17): 
“These are private initiatives. [...] if we are talking about large companies 
the state has nothing to do with it, usually the state provides land, but that 
might also be bought [by the MNC].” 
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Again, there is the reinforcement that the state is absent or there is insufficient 
participation of domestic political elites, and that this institutional order has been driven 
solely by MNCs. However, this is not the case. Land provision has been utilised as an 
investment incentive by the state to attract foreign capital within the national political 
economy. More precisely, state representatives offer land suitable for construction or 
office space (or a combination of both) to MNCs looking to establish subsidiaries in 
Romania either for free or at a very attractive price. These types of incentives tend to be 
awarded when the investment is over a specific level or ceiling in terms of value and/or 
the number of jobs created directly. Furthermore, these investments are utilised as an 
aid for the MNC subsidiary during its infant development stages and tend to be over a 
pre-determined timeframe. This type of incentive has been widely used within the 
Romanian business services sector, as well as other industries such as IT, car 
manufacturing and its related and supporting industry – components manufacturing 
(Bursa, 2016; News, 2016; Ziarul Financiar, 2016c). As I have shown in Chapter 6, the 
Romanian state utilised such an investment incentive within the institutional 
configuration of the auto sector in order to facilitate the establishing of strategic 
alliances with Daewoo, Renault and Ford. This institutional measure facilitated by the 
state has been accompanied by a low range of real estate prices offered by office 
developers that are significantly more attractive than what the other CEE countries have 
to offer (McKinsey, 2015 in ABSL, 2017; Bursa, 2018). 
When comparing Romania to the other CEEs, what can be observed is that the provision 
of land as an investment incentive within the business services industry is a common 
practice throughout the entire CEE region (ABSL, 2015). The executive director of a 
leading business services MNC and founding member of ABSL captured the story very 
well (interview code BS_14): 
“Many years back like seven I was looking to set up shop in Poland, so I 
was exploring Gdansk which is a city in the north of Poland, so I went there 
to have a look just to see what is happening. As it happens the city 
investment board said: ‘come and have a look, we will show you, we will 
share a presentation etc etc’, but they did much more than this. So apart 
from the regular benefits and incentives that normally you would offer to an 
investing body they said: ‘listen if you are really keen about setting up shop 
I’ll tell you what, I’ll give you an office for the next six months and I will 
charge you one Euro per month for it; we realised you are the new investor 
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coming in, you want to invest, you need to set up an office, you need to get 
going etc etc, have interviews, get people on board etc. It’s a pain to do that 
and it’s a lot of money, so it takes time, so I will tell you what – we will 
give you offices, let’s give you an office for the next six months and we will 
charge you one Euro per month because we can’t do it for free as we are a 
government agency. Offices are yours, you have everything: Internet, 
printers, the complete works – use it! Because you are investing in our city’. 
This is the mayor telling me this and that’s the level of foresight. Now was I 
impressed? Yes I was. This guy wants to promote business in his city. In 
Poland they are called presidents, the President of that... whatever. Similar 
in Wroclaw many years back, even earlier, in 2007... we went there in 2007 
December. Crazy – the kinds of things the mayor or the city council does to 
promote business in the city – it’s incredible.” 
As the quote emphasizes, the argument that the state is absent is not valid. The 
institutional configuration of CEEs has been designed in such a way that it now contains 
a range of built-in support mechanisms to attract and retain foreign capital within the 
business services industry. I recognise that the quote offers a characterisation of Poland 
and perhaps only contours an institutional template for the CEE region, rather than 
directly speaking about the Romanian context. I do not have any specific interview data 
related to Romania – this is a shortcoming that can be mitigated by future research.    
Institutional State Support in the Romanian Business Services Sector: The Allocation of 
Cash Incentives 
Next, I will look at another type of institutional support that is awarded to the business 
services industry in the form of cash incentives (Bursa, 2016; News, 2016). This 
mechanism adopted and implemented by domestic political players to support the 
development of the industry is also in stark contrast to the argument made by my 
industry representatives of weak state support and lack of implication. The aid offered 
by the state to the industry actually translates into a form of institutional collaboration 
between the two categories of elites.  
From the European Commission’s point of view, cash incentives awarded to foreign 
capital are regarded as state aid and thus, they fall under the regulation of the 
Commission. EU legislation imposes certain limitations on the degree of aid awarded to 
each region within the EU taking into account factors such as the level of development 
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and urbanisation, the regional level of GDP, the regional level of unemployment etc. 
The Romanian state favours underdeveloped regions and the purpose of cash incentives 
is to trigger the growth and development of tier-two and tier-three regions, such as 
smaller towns and even rural areas. To drive the growth and the ‘catching up’ of these 
underdeveloped regions, domestic political elites are offering larger levels of investment 
aid in comparison to the levels offered to tier-one locations (ABSL, 2015). According to 
the ABSL technical reports that I analysed, this differentiated cash incentive system 
resulted in the creation of an inter-regional competition between the primary and 
secondary regions to attract aid.  
 
As with access to land, cash incentives are not restricted to the Romanian political 
economy and are utilised as an institutional support mechanism by all economies within 
the CEE region (ABSL, 2015). As Table 7.4 shows, cash incentives are of different 
types (based on job creation, training, vocational training, government grants) and have 
various eligibility criteria that the investor has to adhere to in order to receive the aid. 
The fact that cash incentives are a recurrent type of institutional support throughout the 
CEE region shows that domestic political elites have created a collaborative system 
with foreign elites in each national political economy, which makes it attractive for 










Institutional State Support in the Romanian Business Services Sector: The Allocation of 
Tax Incentives 
In parallel to the institutional support measure of cash incentives facilitated by the 
Romanian state, domestic political players offer a range of tax incentives to stimulate 
the growth and development of business services – I will examine the tax incentives in 
the next section. This is also an argument that supports the issue of state implication and 
the fact that there is a collaborative alliance between domestic and foreign elites. The 
types of tax incentives offered by the Romanian state to foreign business services 
investors include: tax exemption for profits reinvested in certain new non-current assets, 
an additional deductible allowance of 50 per cent for eligible expenses related to R&D 
activities, tax deferral related to the use of accelerated tax depreciation for specific 
categories of assets, the postponement of VAT for imported goods (VAT reverse-charge 
mechanism for import) and a customs duties suspension procedure (ABSL, 2015).  
Tax incentives are institutional support mechanisms that are prevalent throughout the 
entire CEE region and not solely restricted to the configuration of the Romanian 
business services sector. The fact that there is a robust similarity across the portfolio of 
incentives – land provision, cash incentives and tax incentives – used across the CEE 
political economies to attract foreign capital, indicates a high level of institutional 
coherence between these states in terms of the nature of state implication and what is 


































Institutional State Support in the Romanian Business Services Sector: The ‘Special’ 
Income Tax Exemption for Software Development 
According to 9 out of 20 industry representatives, the principal institutional support 
measure implemented by domestic political elites was the income tax exemption of 16 
per cent for employees participating in software development works.
75
 This institutional 
measure was designed and implemented in 2001 (Accace, 2014; ZDNet, 2014). The 
income tax exemption as an institutional measure was not, however, specifically 
designed for the business services sector (Outsourcing Portal, 2016). Instead, the 
Romanian government initially proposed and implemented it to support the ICT sector, 
before it was extended to the business services institutional order. Starting from 2001 to 
2013, Order 835/2015 of the Ministry of Public Finance clearly highlighted 14 
specialisations as part of the income tax exemption scheme (City Square, 2017). 
 
Between 2013 and 2015, the institutional measure underwent a process of tailoring, and 
as of the 1
st
 of September 2015 the legislation was relaxed (Accace, 2015a). The newly 
revised institutional support measure provided a wider and more inclusive occupational 
delimitation for the legislation, rather than it being solely restricted to 14 specialisations 
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in the ICT sector. As of January 2017, an auxiliary legislative procedure that came in 
support of the institutional measure was passed, thus eliminating one of the financial 
conditions of the income tax exemption incentive – more specifically, the condition of 
earning an annual income of at least $10,000 for each employee subject to the 
exemption (Start Up, 2017; Hot News, 2017). Starting from 1
st
 of February 2018, 
employees who do not hold an ICT-related diploma (but that were enrolled in university 
or a higher education short-term course) can be included in the income tax exemption 
for software development (Avocatnet, 2018). Hence, domestic political elites attempted 
to loosen up the application of the institutional support measure even further.
76
   
What has been strongly emphasized by my industry representatives is that the 16 per 
cent income tax exemption offers the Romanian business services sector a considerable 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis the other CEE political economies. The executive 
director of a business services MNC in Timişoara outlines the effect of this incentive 
very well (interview code BS_8): 
“This was and is a huge competitive advantage for Romania. I don’t know 
whether this is fair to the other countries in the EU which don’t have such 
incentives for the business services industry. You can underline that this 
incentive should not be seen as a tax exemption but as an investment. The 
Romanian government [...] thought of this [incentive] as an investment – it’s 
not taking from us [MNC] 1 Romanian Leu and as a result we generate 
between 6 and 15 Romanian Lei value added. A calculus was made and the 
return on investment is from 6 to 15 Romanian Lei.” 
The most important aspect that the quote highlights is the fact that this institutional 
measure was designed and implemented by the state in order to support the 
development of the business services sector. Thus, what can be seen is a strong state 
presence rather than the weak state support and the lack of state implication. The 
relationship between domestic and foreign elites, as emphasized previously, is one 
based on collaboration – the state is attempting attract and retain foreign capital by 
offering a range of institutional support measures in order to create a wholesome 
institutional context and perhaps compensate for existing insufficiencies present in the 
                                                          
76
 The financial condition of earning an annual income of at least $10,000 for each employee to be subject 
to the exemption was however reintroduced in July 2017 (Jurnalul, 2017). 
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wider political economy. According to the executive director of a business services 
MNC based in Bucharest (interview code BS_2): 
“A very important decision made by... frankly my political knowledge 
doesn’t allow me to remember who was the decision-maker behind this. A 
very important decision was the elimination of the income tax for IT 
graduates in software exporting companies. This gave us a lot as an 
industry, because from here a lot [of MNCs] started to come in. The 
moment that companies started to be able to offer higher salaries to IT 
graduates by not paying these taxes [income taxes], they [MNCs] started to 
come more and more to Romania and I think that that’s where it all began. 
It’s an important factor. A legislation that allows companies to open 
subsidiaries here and that gives them some fiscal incentives for specific 
areas such as the IT area in this case.” 
The interviewee emphasizes a very significant aspect here – the power that the state or 
domestic political elites have to create, shape and direct legislation in such a way that it 
alters the institutional configuration of an industry and consequently, the institutional 
outcome for industry players. The state apparatus drives institutional change, and it is 
neither weak nor absent.  
7.4.2 MNCs, Education and Institutional Change in the Business Services 
Sector 
When analysing the institutional particularities of the business services sector, we 
observe how the educational system moulded itself and was moulded by representatives 
of foreign capital, in order to respond to firms’ needs and to create a form of 
institutional support for the representatives in the sector. Hence, my argument is that 
education acts as a force of change with which the MNCs engage and interact within the 
institutional context of the industry. Together the two elements have driven a variety of 
institutional measures, shaping the direction of the industrial order as I shall elaborate 
below. 
Despite my interviewees’ continuous emphasis of the fact that domestic elites are 
insufficiently involved in supporting the development of the sector, eight out of 20 
industry representatives noted that in recent years, especially since 2012-2013, there has 
been a greater willingness of the governing bodies to open channels of communication 
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and engage in development programmes with the representatives of business services.
77
 
However, it has been pointed out by these informants that the stimulation and support of 
the industry has been very limited and has been facilitated very late, with the all the 
‘heavy-lifting’ actually being undertaken by the MNCs from industry inception in 2003-
2004 and throughout the entire period of institutional growth. These statements must not 
be taken for granted. As I demonstrate below, the Romanian state plays a significant 
role within the institutional structure of the sector via the educational partnerships 
established and the support given to MNCs via the educational system.   
My interview data makes it clear that MNCs have established and are establishing 
channels of communication and collaborative networks with various state authorities 
and institutions, in order to create an institutional support mechanism that underpins the 
entire business services sector. These channels of communication and collaborative 
networks include: 1) joint university programmes and tailored university curricula, 2) 
collaborations with local and regional training and recruitment agencies, and 3) 
consultations with governing bodies on improving transparency within the broader 
legislative system, the standardisation of accounting practices and financial data 
disclosure, the simplification of tax structures and the elimination of bureaucracy. The 
executive director of a MNC subsidiary located in Timişoara illustrates this situation 
very well (interview code BS_9):  
“We are trying to develop this communication with the supporting 
horizontal bodies. We are engaging in a dialogue with universities and 
training agencies. This dialogue takes place on an ad hoc basis, meetings 
take place.” 
What is highlighted in the quote is the special importance given to the alliance 
established with the educational institutional pillar. Nine out of 20 industry 
representatives argue that the most important collaborative institutional arrangements in 
the sector are the educational programmes established by MNCs in cooperation with 
universities.
78
 According to my interviewees, this institutional collaboration should take 
place between three categories of players: the industry (MNCs), the state (domestic 
political elites) and educational institutions, which in fact are state-owned institutions 
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and an extension of domestic political representatives. The executive director of the 
business services MNC located in Timişoara argued (interview code BS_9): 
“Communication and collaboration should take place between three classic 
pillars: the industry, the educational institutions and the state. But we cannot 
say that the state exists in this equation. The state is constantly chasing votes 
or who knows what, so the state is an actor that we rarely come across in 
these equations.” 
Again, the issue of an absent state and lack of state implication should not be taken for 
granted. What is important here is the recognition of the three institutional spheres. My 
argument is that these ‘spheres’ of the political economy interact and mesh together, 
similar to how institutions communicate and form institutional complementarities 
within the VoC framework, thus creating an institutional support mechanism for the 
industry (Aoki, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Koen, 2005; Jackson and Deeg, 2006; 
Hall and Gingerich, 2009). This reinforces my earlier argument that the state engages in 
a form of collaboration with the industry and its players, and through this collaboration 
it provides various institutional support mechanisms. The business services industry has 
focused on developing strong ties with local educational institutions, primarily 
universities.  
The dialogue between the business services industry and the educational system exists, 
and institutionally speaking it takes place at two levels: 1) the meso level – between the 
industry and Romanian educational system as a whole, and 2) the micro level – between 
individual firms and various universities and training centres. At the micro level, the 
majority of MNCs within the sector have established some form of partnership or 
channel of communication with at least one university. Thirteen industry representatives 
have a working collaboration with at least one university, engaging in activities such as: 
offering consultation on the design and implementation of the curriculum of computer 
science-related courses, actual involvement in the design and delivery of applied IT and 
business management courses, the organisation of labs/workshop sessions, and the 
provision of part-time internships to undergraduate students starting even from their 
first year.
79
 Furthermore, the two senior representatives of the educational system that I 
interviewed – the Dean and Vice Dean of the Polytechnic Timişoara – highlighted the 
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existence of several educational partnerships between their institution and (foreign and 
domestic) business services players in the regional Timişoara hub (interview codes 
BS_19, BS_20). My review of the business press substantiates the interview data. One 
example of such a partnership is the formation of the joint programme between the 
Mathematics and Computers Department of Babeş-Bolyai University and two MNCs 
from Cluj – AROBS Transilvania Software and Fortech (Actual de Cluj, 2018). The 
educational partnership sought the delivery of ‘business management’ related modules 
within the context of IT, more specifically Project Management, Team Work, 
Entrepreneurship and Communication and Presentation Skills. Another example of 
educational partnership is that between the Academy of Economical Studies in 
Bucharest and MNCs such as Microsoft, E&Y and Genpact (Market Watch, 2015; 
Ziarul Financiar, 2016). Furthermore, the executive director of a MNC subsidiary based 
in Timişoara illustrated the existence of these firm-university educational partnerships 
very well (interview code BS_9): 
“In terms of the quality of human resources, there is an actual dialogue 
between the industry and the educational system. We teach three modules at 
the Polytechnic University, we organise lab training, we have 150 students 
on placement with part-time contracts.” 
Thus, the relationship between MNCs and universities is a strong one, with the 
representatives of the sector clearly being focused on nurturing these ties in order to 
have a higher degree of control over the institutional structure of the sector. 
Furthermore, the case can be made that the institutional configuration of the traditional 
educational system doesn’t provide MNCs with all the necessary support mechanisms. 
To compensate for these insufficiencies, MNCs aligned themselves with the educational 
state institutions to fill the institutional gaps and provide an educational system attuned 
to industry needs. I would like to emphasize the fact that the formation of alliances is 
not restricted to only MNCs and universities; instead, domestic business services 
companies also engage in collaborative arrangements with educational institutions.   
It has emerged in five of my interviews that the intensity of this relationship between 
educational institutions and MNCs is driven by the MNCs rather than the educational 
institutions. The same can be said about the dynamic between educational institutions 
and domestic business services firms – the intensity of the relationship is driven by the 
private domestic firms rather than the representatives of the educational system. 
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According to my interviewees, the ‘push’ comes from the MNCs, whereas universities 
often have a certain reluctance to engage in collaboration. What the industry players 
want to highlight again is the lack of implication that characterises the domestic elites 
and the fact that the context is defined by a weak political apparatus. According to one 
sector representative (interview code BS_8): 
“The relationship is strong but from our side towards them. What we see 
with the Polytechnic and other universities in general to a smaller or larger 
extent is a reluctance, an unjustified conservatism. It is probably in the 
culture of these institutions. Considering our historical legacies, sometimes 
personal interest dominates and as a result the actions of the institution are 
at time illogical.” 
Similarly, the executive director of a MNC based in Bucharest stated (interview code 
BS_2): 
“I create the jobs, I add value to the economy, I design the development 
programme, I do all of the work, I put it [development programme] in your 
lap, and you [the state authorities] throw it out the window. So I do all of the 
work and this is how you treat me as an investor in your economy? I create 
the jobs and I come with an optimisation solution, and you don’t give me 
anything back.”    
This type of assessment must again not be taken at face value. From my research it has 
become evident that in the majority of cases propositions of optimisation of the 
institutional context are initiated by foreign capital, with the few remaining cases being 
initiated by domestic capital and its representatives. Initiatives are then advanced to 
domestic political elites, who may or may not translate them into practical institutional 
measures. This process has been described by 11 of my research candidates as a case of 
one-sided communication that often results in business services representatives being 
disconcerted by the lack of proactivity and willingness of the governing bodies to 
jointly pursue and participate in the development of the sector.
80
 I believe that industry 
representatives have an expectation for them to be the ones pursued by domestic 
political elites with propositions for institutional optimisation and growth. Moreover, I 
believe that this failed expectation is the reason behind my interviewees’ claim that 
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there is a lack of state implication. State implication does exist, but perhaps not to the 
extent and in the way in which industry representatives would want it to be. That 
however does not mean that institutional participation and support is not there. I have 
given ample examples from both my interview data and the industry press of micro-
level institutional collaboration between MNCs and educational institutions. One 
industry representative after emphasizing that there is a lack of state implication 
asserted (interview code BS_12): 
“I was surprised to see that the state authorities are open to discussions. 
There are various meetings with ministers, counsellors, secretaries of state.” 
Similarly, another executive director after claiming that the state does not exist argued 
(interview code BS_9): 
“At the Polytechnic, there is an executive committee that is formed from the 
local representatives of the industry.” 
What the two quotes highlight is the clear presence of the state within the development 
of the industry through the provision of educational support. There is a clear 
collaboration between MNCs and domestic political representatives, and MNCs and 
education, which is translated into discussions and consultations, but also the 
implementation of actual programmes and adapted curricula. Business representatives 
are integrated into educational state institutions in order to ensure that industry needs 
are passed on and incorporated into the education and training of graduates. 
Evidence of state implication and the collaboration between the two institutional 
spheres emerges at the meso level as well – between the industry and Romanian 
educational system as a whole. To compensate for the institutional insufficiencies and 
inadequate support provided by the traditional educational system, a group of 
executives from a few of the major business services MNCs formed an industry-wide 
body called the Association of Business Service Leaders in Romania (ABSL), in order 
to push for the desired level of institutional support. In other words, due to an 
inadequate institutional framework provided by the educational system or the existence 
of an institutional void, MNCs decided to create their own private representative body 
that could interact directly with the state and its related institutions and in the process, 
provide the sector with the institutional support that it needed. According to one 
executive director and founding member of ABSL (interview code BS_14): 
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“So I would actually strongly say that the sector has emerged inspite of the 
government, not because but inspite (laughs), because business has grown 
but there has been no support in fact, what we did, what I did, many years 
back I got together with other players in the industry and we even created a 
body called ABSL, the Association of Business Services.”  
From my interviews with four senior level ABSL members,
81
 it has emerged that the 
association focuses on the development and implementation of three major institutional 
measures. The first measure is knowledge sharing amongst ABSL members. What the 
association is trying to achieve is the creation of a continuous informational transfer 
between market players on issues such as market intelligence, technological 
innovations, and legislative and fiscal practices.  
The second measure focuses on educational partnerships. ABSL seeks to re-model the 
curricula of computer science schools and develop joint programmes with universities, 
in order to ensure the delivery of more practical and market-oriented modules to 
students, so that when that they graduate their skill sets are much more tailored to what 
business services employers are looking for. The aim of ABSL is to act as a facilitator 
of institutional support between industry players and universities at the micro-level, as 
well as to push for communication and collaboration between the industry as a whole 
and the Romanian educational system. Thus, ABSL’s educational partnerships 
programme is an additional support mechanisms that complements the independent 
collaborative arrangements that a wide array of MNCs have established with different 
universities.  
The third and last measure concentrates on managing relations with the governing 
bodies. What ABSL attempts to do is establish joint partnerships and an on-going 
consultation process with the government and the regional and local level authorities, in 
order support the development of the industry. According to my interviewees, this 
interaction is sought because economic players need predictability and stability.
82
 In 
order to have such an institutional context, MNCs need to receive a constant flow of 
information from domestic elites, but also to communicate their needs to these political 
officials so that they in return can implement different measures. The argument that can 
be made is that the interaction between MNCs and domestic political elites is a strong 
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one. There is a continuous collaboration between the two institutional spheres, with 
MNCs coming to the state apparatus to ask for the implementation of various support 
measure to compensate for institutional insufficiencies, and with the state providing 
MNCs with a series of incentives to attract foreign capital and support the development 
of the industry.  
Thus, my argument is that the interaction between MNCs – or the representatives of 
business services – and education has resulted in a series of institutional changes. More 
precisely, this institutional collaboration has created a support system, or in fact a 
bifurcation in the educational system in the form of a joint educational partnership 
between MNCs and universities, which exists in parallel to the traditional system of 
education and complements the existing learning resources.  
7.4.3 MNCs, Labour and Institutional Change in the Business Services 
Sector 
In order to capture a rich picture of all the social actors permeating the institutional 
configuration of the business services sector and to thickly describe the internal 
dynamics between these actors (Geertz, 1973), I analyse the role and position of labour 
vis-à-vis MNCs and domestic elites. By investigating the diverging identities of these 
different types of actors, I can develop a better understanding of the elite in relation to 
non-elite categories, and as such the diverging hierarchical positioning of actors, their 
roles and the extent of their powers.  
To understand what kind of interaction takes places between these two categories of 
players and how this interaction influences the institutional setting, I have analysed the 
type of labour legislation that defines the sector and the transformative labour policies 
that have been implemented by political players and pushed for by industry 
representatives. Furthermore, I have examined the power of labour to organise and 
consult and in the process, exert changes on the institutional configuration of the sector, 
as well as the overall sector-wide sentiment towards the formation of trade unions.  
In the following section, I focus on the flexibilisation of labour legislation through the 
implementation of informal work contracts. Business services MNCs have stimulated 
the creation of a new variant of labour market institutions alongside the more 
protectionist coordinated model, oriented towards informal work and institutional 
frameworks. In comparison to the complex hierarchical networks organising industrial 
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sectors such as coal mining and automobile manufacturing, the business services sector 
displays large degrees of mobility and flexibility (Capik and Drahokoupil, 2011). The 
literature also highlights that untrammelled flexibility and a high turnover are typical 
characteristics defining the business services sector (Dølvik and Waddington, 2002). To 
put it differently, there is a prevalence of LME institutional particularities such as a high 
incidence of flexible work – part-time and teleworking contracts – and a high proportion 
of pre-determined working contracts – a fixed-term work agreement that is valid only 
temporarily for a specified time indicated by the employer (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 
2009; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Ban, 2013; Martin, 2013;). The findings in all of 
my interviews confirm this broader regional trend: the sector in Romania is 
characterised by a high proportion of informal work contracts in the form of part-time 
work, teleworking formats and pre-determined or fixed term contracts. All 11 sample 
firms included in my research have implemented informal work contracts. This central 
finding is corroborated by the Romanian business press, which emphasizes the 
significant proportion of informal work, especially part-time contracts, within the IT 
enabled services sector (Adevărul, 2018). According to a study undertaken by Accace 
(2015b), flexi work is the institutional work format that defines the business services 
sector. Furthermore, the study highlighted the fact that the industry is highly diverse 
when it comes to work formats, with the majority of industry players opting to set-up 
pre-determined work contracts that last for the duration of the project or task at hand, 
implementing flexible work formats such as flexi-time or teleworking during these fixed 
term contracts (Wall Street Journal, 2015).  
According to 7 out of 20 representatives of the sector,
83
 the lack of cohesion between 
the institutional make-up of the sector and the institutional underpinnings of the classic 
work contracts and formats that were of a more protectionist and coordinated nature, 
resulted in MNCs pushing for the formation of informal work contracts. The classic 
labour model in Romania is defined by complex structures and cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures. The work formats are characterised by rigidity, with well-
defined timeframes and fixed locations. In contrast, the institutional configuration of 
labour proposed by the business services sector is situated at the opposite end of the 
spectrum (Fifekova and Hardy, 2010; Sass, 2010; Capik and Drahokoupil, 2011). 
Instead of institutional rigidity and a clear-cut structure, the work format is defined 
loose legislative frameworks and flexible spatial-temporal parameters. Thus, the classic 
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labour model did not provide the sector with an adequate institutional context to 
undertake its activities profitably.  
To overcome the complex structure and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures imposed 
by the classic labour model, business services MNCs lobbied domestic political elites, 
pushing for the design and implementation of a flexible legislative framework for 
employment (Ban, 2013). The executive director of one of the main business services 
players in Bucharest illustrates this lobbying effort (interview code BS_12). According 
to him: 
“There is a greater degree of mobility that defines the current work 
framework, whereas the classic work model based on a fixed working 
schedule and location is no longer the rule.” 
The interviewee points out that what can be observed is the de-localisation and the de-
temporalisation of work, with work being undertaken remotely and based on the 
availability of the employee.  
I will now move on to discuss the flexibilisation of labour legislation through the 
implementation of temporary work. The creation of a new variant of labour market 
institutions alongside the classic labour model was further driven by the introduction of 
temporary employment which is an institutional element associated with the deregulated 
labour market model typical of liberal market varieties (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Krippner, 2005; Clark and Almond, 2006; Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Deeg, 2012; 
Doellgast, 2012; Gospel and Edwards, 2012). Three business services representatives 
highlight that there is an increasing phenomenon amongst the players in the sector to go 
through a temporary work agency and hire temporary employees.
84
 The CEO of one of 
the companies in my research sample and founding member of ABSL emphasized the 
fact that this flexibilisation provides a ‘work-around’ from formal procedures of hiring 
and firing, but especially when it comes to firing, shifting the risk and the burden to the 
temporary work agency (interview code BS_12). The interviewee highlighted that this 
significantly simplifies the process of firing based on performance criteria, as the MNC 
is exempted from the Labour Code firing procedures and the obligation falls on the 
agency to either completely withdraw their employee or replace him.  
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The findings emanating from my interviews are mirrored by information that I have 
unearthed within the business press. According to Cariere (2016), the number of 
temporary employees has risen throughout all industries in Romania; however, the 
industries that utilise the highest proportion of temporary employment are the IT and 
business services industries. Furthermore, the publication highlights that temporary 
employees are utilised for an entire range of activities and positions from lower-end 
basic jobs to senior managerial positions. According to the CEO of a major business 
services MNC in Bucharest (interview code BS_12), around 20 percent of the industry’s 
total workforce is contracted through temporary work agreements. However, the 
interviewee highlighted that this is a relatively recent phenomenon within the Romanian 
context and that we are likely to observe a growth in this trend as time will pass. 
Furthermore, the interviewee emphasized that the proportion of temporary work 
contracts varies with each job position and that some areas of business services have a 
higher incidence of informal work arrangements. More specifically, the interviewee 
claimed that temporary work contracts are more prevalent in the more downstream, low 
value-added, support-related activities and that companies usually like to have tight 
control and retain people in the more upstream, high value-added, creative activities 
such as design and development.   
The implementation of these flexible labour procedures shifts the balance of power 
towards the employer vis-à-vis the institutional framework of the classic labour model, 
where the employee benefits from greater protection and a stronger safety net. As I have 
highlighted, the classic labour model displays a higher incidence of CME-like 
institutional traits such as a regulated labour market, ‘employee friendly’ legislative 
changes and a more significant scope for ‘employee voice’ ( all and Soskice, 2001; 
Vogel, 2006; Bosch and Weinkopf, 2008; Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Jackson, 2009; 
Jackson and Sorge, 2012). 
Along with the flexibilisation of work formats, MNCs intensively lobbied for the 
reduction of bureaucratic procedures, in order to ease the process of hiring and firing 
employees. It has emerged in 14 of my interviews with industry representatives that the 
bureaucratic context is dominated by excessive procedures and documentation for 
companies, thus preventing employers from having a timely response to the MNC’s 
needs.
85
 According to six executive directors, there is an urgent need to eliminate some 
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elements of state bureaucracy in order for MNCs to have access to a steady supply of 
human capital.
86
 The current legislative structure makes it very difficult for managers to 
fire employees. One senior director illustrates this scenario very well (interview code 
BS_12): 
“Regarding the introduction of legislation and the need to introduce policies 
that offer the employer more flexibility […] if you ask me I feel that 
legislation should be more flexible. I was telling you earlier; it shouldn’t 
take me 3 months to terminate an employment contract after having to go 
through 10,000 improvement plans, disciplinary committees and committee 
documentation.”  
Similarly, the executive director of a major subsidiary in Bucharest and founding 
member of ABSL reinforces this aspect (interview code BS_14):  
“A very far from ‘hire and fire’ culture. We have a ‘hire’ no ‘fire’ 
[interviewee laughs]. ‘ ire and keep’ [interviewee laughs]. It’s impossible 
to get rid of people and regardless whether it’s for performance grounds or 
for business reasons. So if my business is winding down and I need to 
separate employees by paying them compensation etc, I mean we can do 
that but not if the employee goes on medical leave and they can continue 
going on medical leave, so every few days they can go on medical leave. 
And I have people who are doing that for three months – can’t do anything! 
[...] The rules need to be more relaxed or made business friendly. And I 
don’t mean the American way. In America if I don’t like your face I say 
‘you’re fired! You’re out’ – I don’t mean going that way, but definitely 
where we are right now is the opposite, it’s the other extreme. But it’s 
improving, there are things like... for example there was a relaxation in 
terms of notice periods I think last year or the year before. Earlier for many 
years an employee could leave you with a 15 day notice, now in most cases 
for our business and it depends more and more on how complex the job is... 
it takes you three months to train an employee and he can leave you in 15 
days. So three months to train, two weeks to find, you are all the time 
training people – you become like a training shop. So some things were 
improved – the notice period was adjusted, it became between 21 days 
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minimum by law up to 45 days at a managerial level, so some things 
became a little better, but there are still huge issues on which we can work.” 
In terms of implementing a ‘hire and fire’ culture, the Romanian political economy has 
not converged towards the liberal market variety of capitalism, where liberalising forces 
overpower the neo-corporatist alliance between labour and capital, and all sense of 
labour protection is dismantled (Cernat, 2006; Nölke and Vligenthart, 2009; Ban, 2013; 
Bohle and Greskovits, 2013). As my interviewees point out, there are still pro-labour 
institutional measures in place that offer employees a degree of protection. While 
domestic political elites facilitated the flexibilisation of work formats and labour 
legislation – in the process, dismantling a large proportion of cumbersome practices and 
streamlining bureaucratic processes – the state apparatus didn’t allow (foreign) capital 
to completely dominate domestic labour. I analysed the Labour Code to verify my 
interviewee’s claims and there has indeed been an extension of the notice period. 
According to Article 75 of the Labour Code, employees need to give employers a notice 
period no shorter than 20 days in order to terminate their individual work contract 
(Codul Muncii, 2018a). Furthermore, Article 75 also states that upon establishing the 
individual and collective work contract, employers can ask employees for a notice 
period longer than the 20 days stipulated by law. The relaxation of notice periods and 
the capacity of employers to extend them indicate an incremental and adaptive 
institutional change that domestic political elites have implemented in response to the 
industry’s needs. In my opinion, this evidence shows that the state is trying to create an 
institutional environment that is favourable to employers – domestic and foreign 
business services companies – without however completely deligitimising labour by 
creating an institutional configuration that is fully open and deregulated as we observe 
in the LME model. 
My research findings mirror those of the wider literature on the fact that the institutional 
configuration of industrial relations within business services is weak. All 11 sample 
firms I examined have institutionalised collective bargaining at the firm-level, 
effectively blocking the institutional possibility for any higher level of labour 
organisation. The level of unionisation is very low throughout the entire sector. 
According to one executive director (interview code BS_12), there is no exact data 
regarding union density; however, the figure is below 10 per cent. Moreover, out of my 
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sample of 11 firms only two had a trade union – this is another indicator of the low level 
of unionisation prevalent throughout the sector.
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The institutional configuration of industrial relations was further weakened by the New 
Labour Code that introduced an institutional alternative to unionisation. I will provide 
evidence below how this addition to the existing institutional framework resulted in a 
further downgrading of the powers and legitimacy of labour vis-à-vis (foreign) capital.  
Employees’ representatives are a form of collective organisation designed in 2011 
during the period of modification of the labour and social dialogue legislation. Five out 
of the 11 business services MNCs that I investigated have a so called employees’ 
representatives body.
88
 Based on my analysis of the legislation underpinning trade 
unions versus the legislation underpinning employees’ representatives,
89
 my assessment 
is that employees’ representatives are a weaker form of organisation than trade unions. I 
have identified seven elements where the new legislation weakens the position of 
workers in the labour institutional configuration. First, the role of employees’ 
representatives is insufficiently defined in the Labour Code – that is, the extent of their 
powers and attributions is not clear. Second, in negotiations with employers’ 
associations, trade unions can receive support from trade union federations and 
confederations, whereas employee’ representatives receive no formal external assistance 
when dealing with the employer, thus reducing their capacity to pool expertise and 
resources. Third, trade unions can assist their members before a disciplinary committee, 
in a court of law or in any other state institution, while employees’ representatives do 
not have this institutional capacity. Fourth, an employees’ representatives body cannot 
financially support its members or raise a collective fund, nor can it undertake training 
courses to ensure the qualification of its members. Fifth, employees’ representatives are 
not allowed to form alliances with the employees’ representatives of another company 
in order to form a federation or to influence collective bargaining at the group- or 
sector-level. Sixth, employees’ representatives cannot engage in social dialogue with the 
government and employers’ associations to negotiate sector- and national-level working 
conditions. Finally, the composition of employees’ representatives is not clearly defined 
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in the Labour Code, with managers having the possibility to join this form of collective 
labour organisation. 
The behaviour of industry representatives towards trade unions is another aspect that I 
want to examine, and more precisely, whether in the context of Romanian business 
services we can observe the presence of anti-trade union behaviour. Capik and 
Drahokoupil (2011) highlight the existence of anti-trade union behaviours present in 
some of these foreign-owned business services companies in the CEE region, which 
they claim reinforces a context defined by poorly-organised industrial relations and 
atypical work relationships. Similarly, Galgóczi (2003) talks about MNC subsidiaries 
across the CEE region in which trade union leaders were threatened by management. 
Although I have not come across anti-trade union behaviours during my interviews, I do 
recognise that my firm sample is limited and thus, it can fail to capture the whole extent 
of qualitative insights representative of Romanian business services. What I did unearth 
in my interviews is the complete lack of knowledge of several MNC senior executives 
regarding unionisation within the sector. The executive director of a MNC in Bucharest 
captures the story of the lack of knowledge about trade unions and industrial relations 
very well when answering the question “What can you say about organised labour 
within the Romania business services sector?” (interview code BS_13): 
“[Long period of silence, then interviewee sighs] I don’t have any 
knowledge on this subject.” 
I further probed asking “What are the unionisation tendencies that characterise the 
sector?”, upon which the informant asserted: 
“It’s a legal matter. There are companies that have them [trade unions], 
there are companies that neither have trade unions nor employees’ 
representatives. I believe that this is a legal issue and it is for employees to 
decide whether to organise and form these consultation bodies whether they 
are employees’ representative associations or trade unions.  owever, I have 
no information on this topic.”  
Four out of 20 industry representatives couldn’t offer any insights to my questions 
“What can you say about organised labour within the Romania business services 





 This inability of MNC executives to provide information about trade 
union activity is evidence in itself of the marginal role played by trade unions and the 
weak self-organisation of labour working in the sector.  
During my investigation of the business press, I have uncovered multiple instances of 
anti-trade union behaviour exerted by MNC managers within the business services 
sector. According to Economica (2018) and Profit (2018), IT and business services 
MNCs in Romania are against the formation of trade unions, as this makes the process 
of establishing a collective labour agreement (CLA) more difficult. According to the 
publications, there are several very prominent MNCs within the Romanian business 
services sector that have been avoiding to sign a CLA. The lack of a collective labour 
agreement enables MNCs to maintain a salary system without a formalised pay scale 
that allows for massive salary imbalances between employees occupying the same 
positions.  
In conclusion, my argument is that the interaction between MNCs and business services 
labour has had transformative effects on the labour model of this industrial order. The 
interaction between the different categories of players has resulted in a flexible 
institutional template, defined by a prevalence of informal work contracts and 
temporary work, more streamlined procedures to hire and fire, relatively weak and 
fragmented industrial relations with low trade union membership and the dismantling of 
the unique CBA system, and the existence of anti-trade union behaviour. 
7.4.4 MNCs, Industrial Upgrading and Institutional Change in the Business 
Services Sector 
The dynamic exchanges between MNCs and industrial upgrading and their effects on 
the configuration of the sector are elements that require analysis. The aim is to capture 
how the interaction between MNCs and industrial upgrading results in institutional 
change and to examine the nature and extent of this instance of institutional change.  
The Value Chain Evolution of Romanian Business Services over Time 
Initially, in order to demonstrate that the transformative effects of the MNC-industrial 
upgrading interplay of the internal dynamics of the sector I analyse the value chain 
evolution of business services. Technological and skills upgrading has been driven by 
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the foreign investors that have created and captured this industrial order since the 
inception of the industry in 2003-2004. As a result, there has been an incremental shift 
and evolution in the value chain, with greater emphasis being place on value rather than 
cost efficiencies. The executive director of a leading business services MNC in 
Bucharest illustrates this value chain shift very well (interview code BS_12): 
“At the beginning in 2002-2003 and a few years after that it was only about 
costs, that so called labour arbitrage. Instead of undertaking some operations 
with German labour, companies preferred to undertake them with Romanian 
labour who spoke German at a much lower cost. Throughout the years the 
aspect of cost mattered but to a much lesser degree, I mean cost is still 
among the top two competitive advantages. But something new entered the 
equation, more precisely the aspect of process upgrade that has been pushed, 
or driven as I like to say, by the foreign companies. Currently when 
companies search for a location to set up shop, aside from looking at costs 
they look at the capability of labour to best contribute to optimisation, 
productivity increase and process adjustment. The way I see it, that value 
chain has shifted from the emphasis on cost to an emphasis on value.” 
By pursuing the process of technological and skills upgrading, business services MNCs 
have changed the institutional makeup of the sector in terms of the complexity and 
orientation of activities being performed (Profiroiu et al., 2008). Driven by foreign 
capital, the composition of activities has evolved from low and medium value added IT-
enabled services to medium and high value added. According to the senior director of a 
major business services MNC in Bucharest (interview code BS_18), externalised work 
in Romania evolved from being task-oriented, to being project-oriented, to finally being 
platform-oriented. ABSL (2017, 2018a) argues that at the beginning the development of 
the Romanian sector was not focused on high value-added software product 
development, advanced business and financial support, critical human resources 
services, and high-end customer relations processes. Instead, the employers’ association 
body highlights an initial specialisation in low- to medium-end business services. The 
quoted reason behind this is the ’embryonic’ status of the sector and its relatively early 
phase of development. Furthermore, a different report by ABSL from 2015 corroborates 
the information provided by my interviewee (interview code BS_12), highlighting that 
initially MNCs established business services centres in Romania based on cost 
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differentials. The re-orientation towards more complex and higher added value activities 
is an indicator of institutional evolution and maturity.  
Investment reports (ABSL, 2015, 2017, 2018a) award the Romanian education system a 
solid ranking, with a strong focus on information technology, and finance-, accounting- 
and business-related fields, and therefore providing a steady, inexpensive flow of skilled 
human resources to satisfy the growing demand of ITO, R&D, BPO, SSCs, BIFS, HR 
and finance and accounting MNCs. According to ABSL (2017), more than 120,000 
university graduates form the talent pool of the sector. The high level of education is 
complemented by strong foreign language proficiencies, covering English, French, 
Spanish, Italian, German, Hungarian, Portuguese, Czech, Slovak and Bulgarian.  
The composition of the product portfolio was re-oriented towards more complex and 
advanced software products, advanced business and financial support processes, critical 
human resources services, and high-end customer relations activities (ABSL, 2017). In 
eight out of the 20 interviews with industry executives, it has also emerged that the 
spectrum of activities delivered by the sector has been extended, with Romania now 
delivering a more comprehensive range of business services activities that is focused on 
the medium to high value-added end of the spectrum.
91
 One sector representative 
captures the story of the enlargement of business services portfolios delivered by MNCs 
very well (interview code BS_14):  
“So if I look at the BPO side, I am doing simple work from talking to 
customers, solving basic issues like password resets, to complex HR, admin 
and payroll activities, to highly complex ITO and R&D level 3 work such as 
designing product embedded systems for customers like [name of world-
leading computer technology MNC]”. 
The significant increase in the proportion of research and development (R&D) activities 
is probably the strongest indicator of the evolution towards the higher value added end 
of the value chain orchestrated by foreign investors. According to the executive of a 
business services subsidiary in Timişoara (interview code BS_8):  
“I would say that strategic direction has started to take shape in Romania, I 
have heard of investments in legitimate R&D centres in Bucharest, Cluj and 
Timişoara. In Timişoara we have a business incubator, which aside from 
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promoting entrepreneurship also promotes R&D. But think about the fact 
that we in the 90s were just a pool of resources. We, the ones who worked 
in IT, were just a bunch of engineers put to execute a range of activities. 
After the 2000s, the Romanian software ‘factories’ started to exist […] the 
next step is now R&D.” 
The interviewee further expands:  
“Our colleagues have registered patents here […] The MNC owns [name of 
R&D lab], if you have heard about it. It is one of the biggest private R&D 
centres in the world and practically it is owned by us. I must admit that the 
majority of innovations that get to be developed further through the products 
of [name of MNC] come from [name of R&D lab]. We [MNC subsidiary in 
Timişoara] collaborate with [name of R&D lab]. Practically they design a 
prototype, in between the prototype and the manufacturing stage there are 
some more industrialised R&D phases. They come to us [MNC subsidiary 
in Timişoara] and we extend the research and development, and come up 
with a product that can be put into production. Now, I cannot say that we 
innovate to such an extent that we revolutionise the entire [name of MNC]; 
however on some segments we do, on some strategic directions we have the 
independence to come up with the product design, to innovate, to perform 
improvements – this is what we are actually doing.” 
Nine out of my eleven sample firms are performing R&D activities currently.
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Furthermore, all eight firms indicated that they have pursued a gradual transformation 
throughout time of their portfolio of IT-enabled services in terms of their complexity 
and added value. Thus, by improving their technological resources, individual MNC 
players gradually started to perform R&D activities, which combined at a sector-level 
resulted in a value chain evolution and overall process of industrial upgrading – this 
constitutes an instance of incremental institutional change. 
So far, the proportion of R&D activities is limited within the industry. This is due to the 
relative infancy of the industrial order. The nine firms from my sample that are 
undertaking R&D activities have a varying content of R&D. R&D content recorded as 
percentage of employees involved in R&D activities out of total employment (of the 
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subsidiary) fluctuates from 10 to 60 per cent. The companies with the highest R&D 
content have a longer established presence within the Romanian market and thus, my 
argument is that they had more time to undergo industrial upgrading and shift their 
value chain from low value added activities to complex, innovative activities.  
Nölke and Vligenthart (2009) hypothesise a national variety in CEE, more precisely the 
Visegrád group, characterised by external dependency – the dependent market economy 
(DME). Based on their findings, the authors make the assumption that the institutional 
configuration of CEE economies is designed in such a way that the highly innovative 
parts of the value chain, such as R&D, are undertaken at the MNC’s headquarters. As 
such, these parts are not sliced and relocated to a country such as Romania that doesn’t 
have the institutional complementarities to support such activities. Högselius argues that 
“the types of activities performed in the CEE region are oriented towards downstream, 
non-analytical and non-R&D activities such as testing and standards” (2003, 22). 
Similarly, Ban (2013) argues that Romania fits the DME profile well, finding itself 
captive in the ‘dependent innovation systems’ trap through its specialisation in labour-
intensive, downstream production that caters to the needs of the hungry multinational 
sector.  
My findings regarding the business services sector contradict this economic paradigm 
based on labour-intensive production capacities, downstream-oriented value chain 
activities and externally-dependent innovation systems. In line with this, the execuive 
director of a business services MNC in Bucharest talks about the existence of 
indigenous innovative capabilities and how a system for nurturing and expanding these 
innovative capabilities has developed in Romania (interview code BS_17):  
“Yes, it happens here that any of our delivery units can develop something 
[creative innovation]. We have a department that is in charge of this... from 
Chişinău. They validate. If you develop something, we actually have an 
initiative – people who are not assigned to a specific project may for a 
period engage in research. One guy comes with an idea, others adhere to it 
and they form a team. They usually use the latest technology, nothing is 
imposed, they can choose what they want, they can learn what they want 
because this is actually the goal – to learn. It doesn’t always matter if the 
project finalises or if the innovation gets implemented [...] of course it is 
desirable that the innovation gets implemented somewhere, and if it’s good 
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it can get implemented in other delivery units and even in other parts of the 
company [other subsidiaries]. A file is made [for the innovation], the file is 
accepted by the department in Chişinău, which evaluates it and allocates 
funds. The innovation is further developed and is implemented where it is 
needed.”  
As the quote indicates, the Romanian business services industry is undertaking 
innovative value chain segments, which indicates the fact that the institutional 
configuration of the sector went through a process of industrial upgrading and is now 
able to sustain high value added activities of a creative nature. Furthermore, what the 
quote shows is that the institutional framework of innovative activities is maturing. 
Innovation hubs of MNCs aren’t independent, single entities operating in isolation and 
interacting solely with the headquarters. MNCs have designed and implemented a 
system to promote innovative activities across the CEE region, with different innovation 
hubs communicating and working together to develop ideas and apply them to different 
subsidiaries that are part of the value chain. My research indicates that Ipsos has 
implemented an even more complex and diversified network in CEE, having subsdiaries 
in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Its R&D 
units differ in size and specialisation across each CEE location; however, there is a clear 
communication and collaborative network between subsidiaries. This further 
substantiates my claim regarding the formation of a foreign-based system designed to 
promote innovative activities in the CEE region and the fact that these players have 
triggered institutional change through technological upgrading and value chain 
evolution. All eleven sample firms have established multiple subsidiaries within the 
CEE region and undertake creative activities. There is a clear communication and 
interaction between the innovation hubs of every MNC within the CEE region; 
however, the complexity of networks and the size of the innovative system varies for 
each MNC.    
Technological Transfer in the Romanian Business Services Sector 
I now move on to discuss the aspect of technological transfer. The process of 
technology transfer was facilitated by the foreign investors who created and drove the 
development of the business services sector. Furthermore, the evolution of the structure 
and volume of technological transfers was also influenced by the representatives of 
foreign capital. By facilitating technological transfers, I argue that MNCs triggered a 
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process of industrial upgrading and informational inflow and as such, had a 
transformative effect upon the institutional configuration of the industry. 
According to the literature, within an institutional hierarchy MNCs are situated at the 
top, while domestic companies act as suppliers and depend on the multinational sector 
for continuous work and the trickling down of foreign practices into the domestic sector 
(Pavlinek, 2004; Greskovits, 2005; Bohle and Greskovits, 2006; King, 2007). This 
model defined by hierarchical centralised control and external dependency is in line 
with Nölke and Vliegenthart’s work (2009). In the early stages of the Romanian 
business services industry, the institutional setting was defined by a large informational 
gap. According to my interviewees,
93
 the indigenous capacities were skewed towards 
low to medium value added activities, the existing standards were low, the utilised 
architecture was simplistic and there was a very low number of patents in the region. As 
a result of these institutional conditions, technology transfers were imposed by the 
MNCs who established operations within the Romanian national political economy. 
Technology was transferred to Romania and the entire CEE region under the strict 
control of the MNC headquarters. During this initial stage, MNCs imported new 
technologies within the institutional context that were specialised in more basic or 
downstream non-analytical activities rather than medium- to high-end development 
processes. Thus, I can argue that foreign investors are one of the principal driving 
elements behind the technological progress of the industrial order. The industry 
experienced institutional growth and diversification as learning and informational 
accumulation ensued. The value chain shifted towards more complex and creative 
activities. As the process of industrial upgrading carried on and the shift towards 
medium- and high-end analytical activities took place, the technologies transferred to 
Romania by MNC headquarters modified their composition as well, becoming more and 
more oriented towards the high value added end of the spectrum, including creative 
activities such as R&D and design. One industry representative captures the evolution 
of technology transfers very well (interview code BS_18): 
“It’s an evolution. They will recruit people and impose the processes; 
however, as you [the subsidiary] start to work and develop a variety of new 
roles are created, such as: ownership-, technology-, user-, architecture-
oriented etc. But these are all coordinated by the HQ, so that they adhere to 
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the levels and standards imposed by HQ. The degree of autonomy is 
approved by the  Q.”  
The interviewee highlights that with the technological evolution of the sector and the 
accumulation of information there is a diversification of job roles and working 
platforms within organisations – this is another instance of institutional change that was 
triggered by foreign capital through the process of industrial upgrading. The level of 
technological complexity attained gives subsidiaries more autonomy in their interaction 
with the headquarters. Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that the relationship has 
moved beyond the initial ‘forced transfers’ that permeated the initial stages of industrial 
development to a scenario in which the subsidiaries do not rely solely on technological 
transfers but instead develop internal production capacities in the form of processes, 
solutions, platforms and architecture. The executive director of a MNC subsidiary in 
Timişoara emphasizes this evolution of technological transfers but also the changing 
dynamics between the subsidiary and the MNC headquarters (interview code BS_8): 
“They [the company’s technologies] are sort of imposed to be developed 
here in Romania. You can include here first of all the wireless solutions. 
Second of all, the 4G communications which is the latest generation, I am 
sure you have heard of it, we promote it together with long-term evolution  
[...] We are involved in this strategic product and from what I understand we 
will start working on 5G, this is in the not so distant future. Then we have 
the IP and platforms side. And we also have the many customer experience 
activities with the entire range of customer experience solutions [...] The 
strategy is indeed imposed by those at the central level [the HQ]. Either the 
Chief Technical Officer or the marketing side. So strategy is imposed, but 
design and execution is at our discretion.”     
What the quotation highlights is the emergence of a greater degree of decision-making 
power for Romanian subsidiaries – or the subsidiary managers – in their relationship 
with the top of the hierarchy. However, the model of hierarchical centralised control and 
external dependency has not been dismantled. This new ‘looser’ subsidiary-MNC 
headquarters relationship is still dominated by the MNC headquarters. Control and 
imposition are still enforced, with the MNC headquarters controlling the company 
strategy and imposing the aspects relating to it. What the issues of a ‘looser’ subsidiary-
MNC headquarters relationship and greater subsidiary autonomy highlight is that now 
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the execution and implementation of the strategy fall under the responsibility of the 
subsidiary.   
Development of Managerial Talent in the Romanian Business Services Sector 
The story of managerial talent in the Romanian business services sector is one defined 
by evolution. Similar to the institutional tranformation of the structure and orientation of 
the value chain and the nature of technological transfers, managerial talent went through 
a process of institutional change in the form of learning and maturation. 
According to my six industry representatives,
94
 in the early stages of the sector senior 
managerial and supervisory positions were held by expatriats. The MNC headquarters 
would select and impose a team of foreign senior managers that would be relocated in 
Romania, in order to set-up the operations, and supervise and control the direction of 
the subsidiary. This indicates a high level of external dependency of the subsidiary and 
at the same time, a high level of centralised control that the headquarters exerted 
through the imposition of foreign managerial resources. The Romanian business sevices 
sector was captive to the decisions and hierarchical order imposed by the central 
leadership at the headquarters, thus having no autonomy to decide the direction of 
indigenous subsidiaries.  
The transfer of foreign managerial talent determined a process of informational transfer 
and learning. The inflow of foreign managerial skills and practices laid the foundations 
for the formation of domestic managerial talent. At the same time, the institutional 
configuration of business services underwent a process development and informational 
accummulation on its own. As the industry matured, we saw the expansion of existing 
skill sets and the emergence of new ones. Thus, as knowledge transfer and skills 
upgrading ensued, the story of managerial talent started to change – expatriats in senior 
managerial positions were gradually replaced by Romanian managers. These domestic 
players were specifically trained and prepared for the process of taking over some of the 
leadership positions and attributions that had been held by foreign managers during the 
initial development phases of the business services MNCs. According to the executive 
director of a MNC subsidiary in Bucharest (interview code BS_17): 
“The company where I was working before went through a process of 
development. We had managers from Romania, but the senior positions 
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were still occupied by them [foreign managers] or at least they were from 
[name of country where headquarters is based]. Even if we had Romanian 
colleagues that were directors or vice-presidents, they were located in the 
country of origin of the headquarters.” 
The quote shows that domestic managerial talent started to develop within the 
Romanian business services sector. Another executive director of a MNC in Bucharest 
illustrates this very well (interview code BS_18): 
“Teams of Romanian leaders get formed and are helped to grow. The GM is 
still from the country of origin of the company, where the HQ is. But there 
are now domestic intermediary management players that were formed as the 
companies grew. These are the Romanian business people.” 
Similarly, the executive of a leading MNC subsidiary in Bucharest reinforces this aspect 
(interview code BS_17): 
“I know that in companies the bosses are from the country of origin of the 
company, at least at the beginning. […] we always had someone locally or 
we had remote management, meaning that they resided in their country of 
origin and we communicated via email, via telephone or they used to visit 
us.” 
The transfer of managerial practices through the imposition of foreign capital 
representatives in senior positions together with the institutional growth of the industry 
have driven the formation of domestic managerial talent – a social category that did not 
exist before, as those roles and positions were occupied by foreign actors. What this 
shows is that the degree of external dependency of Romanian subsidiaries has decreased 
and the level of centralised control exerted by the headquarters is lower. Romanian 
subsidiaries have developed indigenous decisional powers and due to this, they have 
gained a certain degree of autonomy of their activities and operations from the 
centralised control imposed by the headquarters. However, as the executive director of a 
MNC subsidiary in Bucharest accurately identifies in the first quotation, this managerial 
category is an intermediary one – a class of leadership separating (and in-between) 
senior managerial positions that are still occupied by foreign actors and the lower 
hierarchical positions, including low-end managers, team leaders and labour. External 
dependency is still present and centralised control is continuously exerted by the 
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headquarters through the imposition of a foreign GM or CEO, who quite often is from 
the country of origin of the headquarters. The issue that corporate managers of CEE 
subsidiaries are responsible to internal supervisors in other countries has been discussed 
by Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) and Radosevic (2003); however, the degree of 
centralised control that these authors envisage for the CEE region is much higher than 
what I have actually observed in Romanian business services. Similarly, Czaban and 
Henderson (2003, 182) and  olman (2002, 414) use language such as “close control on 
managerial decisions”, “the application of tight budgets” and “the heavy reliance of 
foreign companies on their appointees to the board of directors” to construct a picture of 
extreme dependency of the CEE subsidiary and domestic management on the 
headquarters and foreign management.  
I argue that the story of the Romanian business services sector is a bit more nuanced 
than what the literature tells us. The degree of external dependency is not so high, with 
the sector having developed significant levels of autonomy in various areas of 
operation. According to seven industry representatives who described the situation 
within their own subsidiary,
95
 domestic managers are now the players in charge of how 
to implement and execute the strategy created at the central level. What this means is 
that the headquarters provides the direction; however, the subsidiary can implement its 
own personalised approach to achieving the targets. Furthermore, nine industry 
representatives highlight the existence of reverse transfers
96
 – more specifically, 
processes, solutions or innovations designed by Romanian subsidiaries that are adopted 
by MNC headquarters for their efficiency and competitiveness, and then further diffused 
to other subsidiaries in the value chain. This is in line with the literature advanced by 
Ferner et al. (2004), Ferner and Varul (2000), Edwards (1998a, 1998b), who argue that 
reverse transfer facilitates dissemination, which acts as a mechanism of regime 
competition, as the competitive advantages of subsidiaries and the national political 
economies where they are located can be extracted by MNCs and then transferred to the 
other parts of the value chain. This institutional upgrading of the position of Romanian 
business services companies within the value chain of MNCs indicates that Romanian 
subsidiaries have greater influence over the institutional structures of MNCs and greater 
decisional power in the interaction with the MNC headquarters.  
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This chapter has shown that foreign strategic investors and entrepreneurs as 
representatives of foreign capital are the central players behind the creation of 
Romanian business services, as well as the main drivers of institutional change since the 
establishment of the sector. Domestic elites in the form of representatives of the 
political sphere are also present within the institutional configuration of the sector. 
However, domestic political players form their own distinct power group or elite sub-
coalition that is different from representatives of foreign capital. Unlike the coal and 
auto industries, where domestic elites acted as the central institutional drivers alongside 
other secondary institutional players, the power of domestic elites is lower within the 
internal dynamics of business services.  
Having said that, we must be careful not to underestimate the role and positionality of 
domestic political players. Understanding the interaction between MNCs and the 
political sphere, more precisely the different push and pull factors between the 
managers of foreign business services companies and the domestic political players, 
allows us to capture the structural particularities and the inner functioning of the 
industry. Domestic elites have acted as facilitators of this industrial order by designing 
and implementing a range of policies that have driven the institutional evolution of 
business services since its inception. Despite the existence of a highly bureaucratic 
environment with cumbersome procedures that has often resulted in MNC managers 
believing that domestic political players do very little to support the development of the 
industry, the political sphere has a direct impact on the establishment and development 
of the sector through the granting of licenses and permits. Hence, domestic elites have 
the power to decide whether FDI is realised or not. The interaction between MNCs and 
the political sphere is not solely limited to the facilitation of licenses and permits; 
instead, domestic elites support the development of the sector through a whole range of 
incentives – the allocation of land and/or office space, cash incentives and tax 
incentives.  
When analysing the interaction between the business services industry and the 
educational system, there is a certain level of coordination between the two institutional 
spheres which mesh together neatly and result in a form of institutional 
complementarity (Aoki, 1994; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Koen, 2005; Hall and Gingerich, 
2009). More specifically, there is a considerable level of collaboration and dialogue 
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between the industry and educational system in the form of the design and 
implementation of curricula, the formation and delivery of courses and modules, the 
organisation of labs/workshop sessions, and the provision of part-time internships and 
integration into the job market. Furthermore, there is a considerable level of state 
dialogue and implication in the development of the industry through the provision of 
educational support. To augment the level of institutional support received, the business 
services industry has established an industry-wide private body that can interact directly 
with the state and its related institutions, and push for more coordination between the 
industry and the Romanian educational system. These structural particularities 
presented highlight the fact the Romanian political economy supports a CME-oriented 
interaction or coordination between the business services industry and the educational 
system.  
Labour in business services is in stark contrast to that in coal mining and auto in terms 
of power and positionality. If the two historical industries are characterised by an 
industrial relations framework with CME-like features, industrial relations in business 
services are skewed towards more LME-like characteristics. Business services MNCs 
together with domestic political players have created a new variant of labour market 
institutions (through the flexibilisation of labour legislation) that co-exist alongside the 
more coordinated labour models present in coal mining and auto. More specifically, the 
institutional configuration of the sector has become permeated by a high incidence of 
flexible work and pre-determined working contracts, as well as a growing trend of 
utilising temporary work. In terms of creating a ‘hire and fire’ culture, despite the push 
of MNC managers for greater convergence towards the neoliberal spectrum, the 
domestic political sphere did not allow foreign capital to completely control labour. The 
political apparatus still maintains a layer of protection over labour, indicating that the 
business services labour model is not fully skewed towards the LME spectrum. This 
emerging evidence of institutional divergence between sectoral economies within the 
same national political economy allows me to further highlight the importance of 
breaking down national models and recognising the existence of sectoral difference. As 
I have emphasized when discussing the application of a nested spatial scale method, by 
breaking the institutional structure into different scales, I can zoom in on the different 
spatial configurations and capture their structural particularities and elements of 
institutional distinctiveness.  
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In comparison to the two other industrial orders that I analyse, business services has the 
most fragmented collective bargaining system and the lowest trade union membership. 
One can almost characterise the sector as a ‘union free’ sphere of economic activity. 
The legislative framework of unionisation has become further weakened by the 
implementation of an alternative model of organisation and consultation which offers its 
members weaker powers and attributions. The story is even better contoured when we 
take into consideration the general lack of knowledge regarding unionisation and 
unionisation levels within the sector. The inability of MNC executives to provide 
information about trade union activity constitutes compelling evidence of the marginal 
role played by trade unions and the weak self-organisation of labour working in the 
sector. Furthermore, the industry is characterised by multiple instances of anti-trade 
union behaviour and cases in which the management of certain MNCs avoided signing a 
collective labour agreement. This institutional context strongly contrasts the story of 
industrial relations in coal mining and auto, where trade unions are institutional players 
with considerable legitimacy and powers in the collaborative-antagonistic relationship 
with management.  
The interaction between the players who constitute the dominant elites within this sector 
and industrial upgrading reveals a similar paradigm to what we observed in the chapters 
on coal mining and auto – more precisely, the fact that technological upgrading, value 
chain evolution, knowledge transfer and managerial talent formation were all driven by 
international forces. The business services sector underwent a process of value chain 
evolution that was driven by the representatives of foreign capital. What can be seen is a 
shift in the complexity and added value of activities and processes undertaken by 
Romanian business services subsidiaries, with there being a clear move from repetitive, 
non-analytical downstream activities to creative, analytical upstream segments of the 
value chain. Furthermore, as I have shown there is an increase in the proportion of R&D 
content among the industry players. This indicates that the institutional configuration of 
the sector went through a process of industrial upgrading and is now able to sustain high 
value added activities of a creative nature. With the development of indigenous 
technological capabilities and the increase in task complexity, Romanian subsidiaries 
are now less dependent on external industrial upgrading and knowledge transfer. 
Another central argument that I put forward is that foreign capital has also driven the 
inflow of foreign managers and as a consequence, the transfer of foreign managerial 
skills, which in turn has led to the formation of domestic (intermediate) managerial 
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talent. The accumulation and development of domestic managerial skills indicates that 
the degree of external dependency of Romanian subsidiaries has decreased and there is 
a rise in the decision-making powers of indigenous managers vis-à-vis foreign 
managers.  
Considering the role it plays in the institutional context of the business services sector, I 
argue that the interaction between MNCs and the other forces of change permeating the 
internal dynamics – domestic elites (in the form of representatives of the political 
sphere), education, labour, and industrial upgrading, has had a transformative influence 






















‘Traditional’ comparative political economy literature is not able to accurately 
comprehend the inner functioning of former Socialist CEE political economies, which 
are simply institutionally distinct from Western high-income economies (Feldmann, 
2007; Hanck , 2007; Lane, 2007; Mykhnenko, 2007; Birch and Mykhnenko, 2009; 
Martin, 2013). An underlying assumption of the thesis is that one cannot simply take 
models conceptualised for advanced, high-income economies and extend them with 
minimal structural adjustment to medium-income, less advanced economies that 
underwent a period of 40 years of Socialism followed by a massive neoliberal 
adjustment programme (Lane, 2011; Myant and Drahakoupil, 2011; Martin, 2013). 
Instead, the theoretical approach that I have designed recognises the importance of the 
structural particularities of the CEE region – more specifically, the necessity to 
incorporate a range of local institutional forms and their effects when attempting to 
explain the concepts of institutional formation and institutional change.  
New Drivers of Institutional Change 
My study has demonstrated the existence of the pervasive role of the state and the 
power of state representatives,
97
 the theoretical importance of historical legacies
98
 and 
the effect of international forces
99
 as key characteristics or context-specific explanatory 
variables that should have a wider and deeper incorporation within the conceptualisation 
of national political economies and institutional change in CEE (Peck and Tickell, 2002; 
Peck and Yeung, 2003; Peck, 2004; Peck and Theodore, 2007). Consequently, the 
analytical framework that I have designed and implemented throughout my study of 
institutional change in the Romanian political economy introduced a more dynamic, 
relational, historically-based, context-specific and agent-driven theory of institutional 
transformation. My operationalisation of this approach has demonstrated the existence 
of dominant elites, the presence of international forces and the role of labour as the main 
drivers of institutional change in Romania. The effect of these drivers, or elements of 
change, has been captured through the construction of a historical institutional narrative 
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of the Romanian model and the identification of the key moments of institutional 
change throughout time.  
Furthermore, the study has continuously shown that the dominant elites have captured 
the Romanian state and its institutional configuration, and in the process, they have 
captured the distinct sectoral economies – coal mining, auto and business services. 
Throughout the different chapters of my study, I have demonstrated that the dominant 
elites as a category of social actors are stable, but by no means static in their 
membership and configuration as a social group. Thus, the fundamental finding 
emanating from my study constitutes the ‘continuity of elites’ as a regional institutional 
characteristic specific to CEE, but more importantly in this case – a structural 
particularity defining the internal dynamics of the Romanian political economy from the 
Socialist regime into the post-transition capitalist variety. As I have highlighted 
previously, there was no such thing as a rigorous process of lustration, in which the 
political players, representatives of the former Socialist regime, were completely 
removed from the newly established institutional structure upon the transition from plan 
to market or during any other key historical turning point for that matter (Cernat, 2006; 
Gallina, 2008; Martin, 2013). 
Another central finding that was continuously highlighted throughout my study is the 
fact that the dominant elites often held multiple positions or fulfilled a range of roles 
within the power structure of the Socialist state.  Through my investigation of historical 
materials, I have demonstrated that representatives of the political sphere held multiple 
positions within the national-level state institutions. At the same time, the institutional 
context was punctuated by continuous exchanges and alliances between the political and 
economic spheres of the state structure. Such intensive interaction and high level of 
collaboration prevented the independence and separation of political and economic 
social agents. The concept of ‘multiplicity of roles’ in combination with the constant 
association and congruity between different elite players created an institutional 
configuration with highly concentrated power. Consequently, this links back to my 
argument of state and industrial order capture, as well as North et al.’s assumption that 
elites always seek to establish alliances in order to create rents and to limit the ability of 
citizens to form organisations by conferring this right solely to members of the 
dominant coalition (2007, 2009, 2013). 
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Throughout my empirical chapters, I presented the identity of the elites shaping and 
controlling the structure of the three sectoral economies included in my study. In coal, 
the social actors controlling the structure and direction of the industry were the 
dominant elites from the political sphere – the members of the Central Committee (CC) 
under Socialism followed by the members of state in the capitalist era. Due to the 
continuous inward-orientation and state-ownership of the industry from the Socialist 
regime into the post-Socialist capitalist variety, the composition of the dominant elites 
has remained considerably stable. The situation is different in auto. Despite the fact that 
the presence of international forces – technological imports and licensing – within the 
internal dynamics of the industry dates back to the Socialist period (Ion Mihai Pacepa in 
Historia, 2017a; Lupul Dacic, 2014), the institutional configuration of the sector was 
primarily controlled by domestic elites from the political sphere between the 1960s and 
mid-1990s. Starting from the mid-1990s onwards, foreign capital captured the 
institutional structure of the auto industry. More specifically, Daewoo, Renault and Ford 
occupied the dominant position within the control and ownership structure of the 
industrial branch, with domestic elites taking a more backseat role within the structure 
of the overall elite coalition.  
In contrast, the ownership structure of the business services sector was dominated from 
its inception by foreign investors and MNCs such as Nokia (previously Alcatel Lucent), 
IBM, Ipsos, Stefanini, HP and Genpact.
100
 Hence, the primary players driving the 
creation and evolution of the institutional configuration of the Romanian business 
services sector are the representatives of foreign capital – MNC executives. However, 
despite the fact that the representatives of foreign capital have been the dominant elites 
controlling the structure and direction of auto (since the mid-1990s) and business 
services (since industry inception in 2003-2004), domestic political players still played 
a direct role on the establishment and development of these two sectors. More precisely, 
domestic political players facilitated the displacement of the auto industry and the 
creation of business services by FDI. Furthermore, the Government provided 
representatives of foreign capital with the necessary licenses and permits to operate 
within the national context, and even created a system of institutional incentives aimed 
at attracting new FDI and/or stimulating the development of already established 
industry players. 
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My study has demonstrated that the dominant elites do not exist in a vacuum; more 
precisely, these social agents controlling the state institutional order are not insular 
forces separated from the other actors, forces and phenomena within the Romanian 
institutional context. Instead, dominant elites are situated within the institutional setting 
alongside other categories of social agents with diverging roles and positionalities. 
Interactive exchanges between these different levels of players are on a continuous 
basis, with the nature of exchanges being both collaborative and conflictual depending 
on the historical institutional period (Streeck, 2007; Bohle and Greskovits, 2013). The 
institutional configuration of the state is conceptualised as highly dynamic, permeated 
by the continuous presence of push and pull factors, the formation of alliances, the 
emergence of social struggles, and the presence of creative and disruptive forces. There 
are constant fluctuations within the composition of both the dominant elites and the 
other competing elite sub-coalitions of social actors. In this sense, some sub-coalitions 
of elites achieve dominant elite status, while others lose their legitimacy within the 
ruling state structure and are downgraded to a non-elite status. As I have shown in 
Chapter 5, this was the outcome of the polity vs. labouring class conflict in the coal 
mining sector during the late 1990s (the Mineriadas). More specifically, the coalition 
between political officials and representatives of capital removed organised labour and 
trade union leaders from the power structure of the state. By downgrading and 
delegitimising the positionality of the labouring class, the polity-capital coalition 
concentrated power and institutional access in the hands of fewer social agents, 
ultimately enhacing their own position and identity strength within the power structure 
of the state.  
The main theme running throughout my empirical chapters emphasizes the fact that the 
institutional configuration of these industrial branches is permeated by a series of 
interactions between the dominant elites and different forces of change, which have 
driven institutional transformation across the Romanian national political economy over 
time. Although the three sectoral economies I analysed have considerably different 
structures in terms of size, spatial and temporal configuration, ownership structure and 
historical legacies, there is a strong overlap in terms of the different forces of change 




Capitalism from without: 
FDI, MNCs and 
international institutions 
Note: The institutional effects of the Washington Consensus were triggered by both the World Bank and the IMF; however, the materials 
that I reviewed spoke primarily about the role of the World Bank. For the purpose of my study, I do recognise the fact that the effect of 




The first interaction analysed is that between the dominant elites of the respective 
sectoral economy and industrial policy (coal) and industrial upgrading (auto, business 
services). Unlike the auto and business services industries, where MNCs and FDI have 
played a significant role in shaping the institutional configuration of the two industrial 
branches, coal mining is defined by the absence of such international forces. Out of the 
three industries I analysed, coal presents the highest degree of inward-orientation and it 
is the only remaining Romanian industry fully owned and controlled by the state. 
However, despite this inward-orientation, the institutional configuration of the sector 
has not been completely isolated from international forces. Using archival materials, I 
examined the different types of industrial policies pursued during the Socialist regime 
and their effects on the institutional configuration of the industry. During the 1960s and 
early 1970s, the dominant elites – the members of the CC of the Romanian Communist 
Party – facilitated the creation of an institutional framework with a high dependency on 
technological imports and foreign collaboration; thus, making the process of 
technological upgrading highly dependent on the perpetuation of this open, import-
dependent economic paradigm.
101
 However, from the mid-1970s onwards the members 
of the CC implemented a new industrial policy programme that shifted the orientation 
of the sector. The new industrial policy package focused on reducing imports and 
minimising the dependency on technological imports in conjunction with promoting the 
development of internal production capacities. Consequently, the institutional context 
shaped by the dominant elites was one characterised by autarchic production capacities 
and the utilisation of old technological reserves. Thus, my findings in Chapter 5 
revealed that by eliminating technological exports and foreign collaboration, the 
members of the CC obstructed the technological upgrading and diversification of the 
sector and in the process, they orchestrated the decline of coal. The CC did not aim to 
trigger the ossification of the sector; instead, this was the unintended consequence of the 
creation of an autarchic system. Furthermore, in the post-Socialist era the dominant 
elites initiated the restructuring of the industrial order via a series of institutional 
measures: 1) the implementation of two emergency ordinances, and 2) the development 
of a vertical integration programme that sought the termination of loss-making sites and 
the re-organisation of profitable sites. Via the implementation of these institutional 
measures, the dominant elites triggered the death of Romanian coal. 
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The situation of auto mirrors that of coal throughout the Socialist regime. By the early 
1990s, the institutional configuration of auto was undergoing a severe process of 
industrial decline and economic crisis, with the industry requiring urgent inflows of FDI 
to prevent it from a path of institutional decline. Rather than allowing this historical 
sector to embark on a path of decline, the domestic elites from the political sphere – the 
principal government
102
 and State Property Fund representatives – facilitated the 
privatisation of the industry by allowing MNCs to acquire the two national players 
Dacia and Olcit. Chapter 6 demonstrated that FDI displacement triggered an extensive 
process of industrial upgrading, knowledge transfer and the re-organisation of other 
value chain segments such as the components industry. More precisely, the intervention 
of foreign capital – Daewoo, Renault and Ford – drove a process of industrial re-
construction via the creation of new production lines, the modernisation of existing 
capacities, the re-organisation of production, the supply and installation of new 
construction machinery, the introduction of new standards of quality and productivity, 
the transformation of distribution systems, the introduction of new servicing/repairs 
models, and the implementation of extensive training programmes.  
Business services display the highest degree of external dependency and level of 
interaction with international forces out of the three industries I investigate. As I have 
shown previously, this sector of economic activity has been driven by the presence of 
foreign investors and FDI. More precisely, Romanian business services is almost 
completely privately owned and concentrated around MNCs. However, the role and 
influence of domestic elites from the political sphere must not be ignored. Domestic 
elites have attracted FDI via the allocation of a range of financial incentives and have 
facilitated access to representatives of foreign capital via the granting of licenses and 
permits. Hence, the creation of this industrial branch was driven by the collaborative 
exchanges between domestic elites and international forces. 
The institutional configuration of the sector underwent a process of value chain 
evolution that was driven by the MNCs and their executive management. Chapter 7 
demonstrated that the presence of FDI has determined a clear increase in the complexity 
and added value of activities and processes undertaken in Romania, with the industry 
portfolio moving from repetitive, non-analytical downstream activities to creative, 
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analytical upstream segments of the value chain. Moreover, my findings highlighted the 
fact that the presence of FDI stimulated the rise in the proportion of R&D content 
within the structure of the industry. Taking into account the growing complexity of 
activities undertaken, my findings regarding business services contradicted the 
economic paradigm associated with CEE political economies as based on labour-
intensive production capacities, downstream-oriented value chain activities and 
externally-dependent innovation systems (Högselius, 2003; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 
2009; Ban, 2013). Non-analytical and downstream business services activities are still 
undertaken by MNCs across Romania; however, they are not the sole specialisation of 
foreign investors, with MNCs undertaking a more diversified portfolio of tasks ranging 
from low to high value added activities. I also showed that the presence of FDI drove 
the inflow of foreign managers and as a consequence, the transfer of foreign managerial 
skills – a process that stimulated the formation of domestic (intermediate) managerial 
talent. Based on the above mentioned, the institutional configuration of business 
services went through a process of industrial upgrading driven by the presence of FDI.  
When appraising the trajectory of development of auto and business services, one can 
argue that overall Romania is a success story. After the fall of Socialism, Romania’s 
transition from plan to market and politico-economic transformation were more 
problematic than the changing dynamics experienced in the Visegráds and the Baltic 
states (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011). The length and depth of the transition recession 
in the Romanian political economy was more severe than in Visegráds and the Baltic 
states (Cernat, 2006), experiencing a sharp drop in economic growth in the first 
transitional years, followed only by a gradual and incomplete recovery (Martin, 2013). 
Essentially, Romania went from being a laggard case in the first decade post-Socialism 
to embarking on a process of industrial revitalisation in the second and third decades 
post-Socialism. The industrial re-development and creation of new production 
capacities was orchestrated by foreign elites – FDI – whose presence upgraded various 
industrial branches across the Romanian political economy. This was not what I 
expected to find when I began my research. The regional literature and media had 
shaped my opinion, making me believe that Romania was still very much a laggard case 
or at least a DME-oriented capitalist variety that possessed comparative advantages as 






 The iterative process of studying the history, theory and fieldwork revealed a 
new set of particularities defining the Romanian political economy and its industries, 
with various industrial branches stepping away from the DME-like format and  
Despite the restructuring and de-industrialisation of Romanian coal, the presence of 
international forces has driven the politico-economic transformation of the post-
Socialist capitalist variety by implementing a series of structural and market-oriented 
reforms, as well as revitalising various industrial branches such as auto and business 
services. Thus, I would argue that the presence of neoliberalising forces was successful 
not only at shaping the institutional structure of the Romanian state, but also at 
triggering the partial re-construction and industrialisation of the Romanian industry. 
The second interaction that I analysed across my empirical chapters represents the 
institutional interplay between dominant elites and labour. My analysis of coal has 
revealed that coal miners have always distinguished themselves among the more unique 
sub-categories of the Romanian proletariat. Before the restructuring of coal began, the 
configuration of industrial relations was defined by a strong labour model, with a high 
level of unionisation, average wages greatly exceeding the national average and the 
prevalence of strong ties between the representatives of organised labour and the polity 
(Cernat, 2006). In order to capture the power and positionality of coal miners, I 
examined the relations and collaborative arrangements between the dominant elites 
from the political sphere and organised labour during the Mineriadas of the 1990s. My 
findings indicated that coal miners were utilised by the dominant elites as an instrument 
of manoeuvring to implement various measures and forms of institutional change. The 
allowance made by dominant elites for miners to act as control and security 
mechanisms, substituting for law and order, led to the emergence of an enlarged elite 
coalition; more specifically, the leadership of organised labour – the Executive Bureau 
of the League of Free Mining Trade Unions “Jiu Valley” – was positioned alongside the 
domestic elites from the political sphere within the power structure of the Romanian 
political economy.
104
 The dominant elite-organised labour collaborative arrangement 
influenced institutional change by suppressing any form of political opposition and 
securing the continuity of the ‘old’ elites, members of the former Socialist regime. 
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However, the end of the 1990s was marked by the end of this collaboration between 
dominant elites and coal miners. Having served their purpose as either instruments of 
delegitimising the political opposition or mechanisms for downgrading the status of the 
competing labour sub-coalition, the dominant elites sought to limit the size of the 
dominant sub-coalition. My findings revealed that organised labour representatives 
were eliminated from the elite coalition and integrated amongst non-elite social agents. 
Naturally, coal miners struggled to retain their powers and positionality in the elite 
structure; however, the dominant elites succeeded in taking away their collective powers 
and cancelling their privileged status within the overall labour class structure.
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Similar to coal, the labour model of Romanian auto contradicts the typical CEE 
industrial relations literature, which characterises organised labour in post-Socialist 
economies as weak and fragmented. More specially, the institutional configuration of 
industrial relations is strongly skewed towards the CME type, with organised labour 
clearly acting as an elite force by challenging the representatives of foreign capital in 
the post-Socialist era. By using a series of instances of labour unrest at Dacia, my study 
demonstrated that organised labour had the power to exert institutional change on the 
structure of the firm. More precisely, organised labour acted as a counter-elite force by 
challenging foreign elite power in the second and third decades post-Socialism.
106
 The 
evidence indicated that the interactive exchanges between organised labour and 
representatives of foreign capital were of a competitive and conflictual nature, as each 
category of social agents tried to capture and maintain control over the institutional 
structure of Dacia. The trade union succeeded in increasing its powers and legitimacy 
vis-à-vis Dacia’s management and in the process, re-negotiated working conditions and 
limited the powers and degree of control of Dacia’s management over the structure of 
the enterprise. At the same time, the analysis of labour revealed that the institutional 
configuration of the sectoral economy is not homogenous, with different firm players 
presenting diverging labour models. To be more specific, I did not observe a similar 
model of labour unrest at Ford’s subsidiary, as organised labour wasn’t able to position 
itself in such a way as to challenge foreign elites. 
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The story of labour in business services is in stark contrast to that in coal mining and 
auto in terms of power and positionality. If the two historical industries are 
characterised by an industrial relations framework with CME-like features, industrial 
relations in business services are skewed more towards the LME blueprint. My study 
revealed that the institutional configuration of the sector has become permeated by a 
high incidence of flexible work and pre-determined working contracts, as well as a 
growing trend of utilising temporary work. Furthermore, my investigation highlighted 
that out of the three sectoral economies I examined, business services had the most 
fragmented collective bargaining system and the lowest trade union membership. The 
analysed data showed that sector is an almost ‘union free’ sphere of economic activity. 
In addition, the model of unionisation was further weakened, when the domestic elites 
from the political sphere implemented an alternative model of organisation and 
consultation, which offered its members weaker legitimacy and attributions (Ciutacu, 
2011; Trif, 2012). The overall weakness of business services labour was even further 
reinforced, when I took into consideration the general lack of knowledge regarding 
union structures and unionisation levels within the sector. The fact that the senior MNC 
executives I interviewed were unable to provide information about trade union activity 
in their subsidiary indicates the marginal role played by trade unions and the weak self-
organisation of labour in the sector. The general lack of knowledge regarding trade 
union activity was coupled with various instances of anti-trade union behaviour and 
cases in which management avoided signing a collective bargaining agreement that are 
prevalent throughout the industry. The comparison of collective bargaining, 
unionisation levels and organised labour strength across the three sectoral economies in 
my study further highlights the existence of sectoral divergence within a national model 
and the fact that each sectoral unit is institutionally diverse and has its own structural 
particularities. Business services labour clearly does not act as an elite force and is not 
able to either suppress an opposing political group or challenge the representatives of 
foreign capital. Unlike labour in coal mining and auto, business services labour cannot 
exert institutional change on the configuration of the sector or even on the structure of 
the firm for that matter.  
The third interaction that I examined in my study constitutes the institutional interplay 
between the dominant elites and the sphere of education. This type of institutional 
interplay was embedded with the institutional configuration of auto and business 




in automobile construction in order to provide institutional support to Dacia and Olcit. 
More precisely, the growth of the car and components industries triggered the 
diversification of the educational system, which in order to keep up with the 
qualification demands of the two complementary industries expanded its portfolio of 
specialisations. The interview data and archival records revealed that the institutional 
context is defined by a high degree of institutional collaboration or strong 
complementarity between Romanian car manufacturers and educational institutions. 
The existence of joint research programmes, the involvement of industry players in the 
development of curricula and the creation of R&D labs, and the re-establishment of the 
apprenticeship programmes are clear examples of the strong degree of interaction 
between the sectoral players and the different educational institutions. Furthermore, my 
analysis indicated that there is continuous communication and knowledge transfer 
between two main educational institutions – the University of Piteşti and the University 
of Craiova – as well as a variety of alliances between the two main educational hubs and 
the technical colleges located in the Piteşti (Argeş) and Craiova (Dolj) region 
respectively. These ‘interactions’ between the sectoral players and the educational 
sphere in conjuction with the ‘interactions’ between the different educational 
institutions reinforce the existence of a form of institutional complementarity similar to 
the one proposed by the VoC framework. Moreover, based on the structural 
particularities of these institutions and the way the mesh together, the educational 
sphere in Romanian auto converges towards the CME end of the spectrum.  
Business services revealed the same type of interaction between the different sectoral 
players and the educational sphere. More specifically, my interview data and collection 
of online newspaper articles indicated that there is a considerable level of collaboration 
and dialogue between the industry and educational system in the form of the joint 
creation and implementation of curricula, the delivery of modules by industry 
representatives, the organisation of joint labs/workshop sessions, the supplying of new 
computers and lab equipment, and the provision of part-time internships. Furthermore, 
my findings illustrated that in order to compensate for the institutional voids and 
inadequate state support various industry representatives created an industry-wide 
private association that would interact directly with the state and push for the level of 
institutional support required by the industry. The existence of this industry-wide 
association drove a series of institutional changes across the sector that include 1) 




of joint educational programmes with universities, and 3) the improvement of relations 
with state authorities at the local-, regional- and national-level. Considering the 
structural particularities of these institutions and the degree of coordination between 
them, my argument is that the educational sphere in Romanian business services 
converges towards the CME end of the spectrum. 
Contribution of the Study 
A considerable body of research has tried to explain institutional change in CEE 
political economies by utilising the classic elements of change that have been 
hypothesised by the comparative political economy literature for high-income, 
industrialised Western economies (Feldmann, 2007;  anck , 2007; Lane, 2007; 
Mykhnenko, 2007; Birch and Mykhnenko, 2009; Martin, 2013). While this research has 
provided a number of important insights, it has failed to recognise the importance of the 
structural particularities of the CEE region. This thesis was concerned with developing a 
distinctively interdisciplinary theory-based research process based on the incorporation 
of three approaches: economic geography, historical institutionalism and comparative 
political economy. While I did not analyse all of these approaches in full, I 
deconstructed them, selected their relevant ‘moving parts’ and operationalised them by 
incorporating them into my own theoretical framework. In doing so, I implemented a 
bottom up grounded approach to theory and constructed a grand theory of institutional 
change in CEE. The combination of these different disciplines allowed me to capture 
and incorporate the different regional characteristics that distinguish the CEE region 
from other spatial configurations, thus allowing me to make theoretical contributions to 
the study of institutional change.   
My contribution to theory is through the extension, refinement and synthesis of existing 
theories – a process of iterative theory development. According to Lofland et al. (2006), 
new reports of previously explored settings may also make original contributions by 
virtue of focusing on topics or units or aspects of those topics. Theoretical newness can 
be achieved in a study via theoretical extension – more specifically, the extension of 
pre-existing theoretical or conceptual frameworks to social groups or settings other than 
those in which they were first developed or intended to be used (Snow and Anderson, 
1987; Cal Morrill, 1995). Furthermore, an original contribution can be made through 
theoretical refinement – that is the modification of existing theoretical perspectives 




1998; Burawoy et al, 1991). In my study, extension occurred in conjunction with 
refinement. The utilisation of the Romanian case study allowed me to extend emergent 
theory on the CEE region, refine and add on to an existing theoretical case (since the 
Romanian institutional framework is distinct and does not fully replicate the 
institutional configuration of the other CEE political economies), and also identify a set 
of structural particularities (institutional similarities) that are prevalent across the entire 
CEE region. Furthermore, my theoretical framework was developed through an iterative 
process of studying the history, the literature and my fieldwork (both in-depth 
interviews and archival materials). 
One of the key theoretical contributions of my study is that it adds to the debate that 
national political economies are not institutionally homogeneous; instead, one can see 
the persistence of internal systemic diversity and the co-existence of institutionally 
distinct sectoral economies within a national order. This goes against the VoC central 
argument that national configurations are defined by institutional coherence and 
homogeneity. By studying the presence and influence of a set of drivers of institutional 
change longitudinally, I observed institutional variegation across the three sectors 
incorporated in my study. The analysis of labour has revealed significant institutional 
differences. The institutional structure of coal and auto exhibits a strong labour model 
that converges towards the CME end of the spectrum due to the strong trade union 
model, high unionisation rate and comprehensive CBAs. My analysis also revealed that 
in an attempt to gain more control over the structure of the two industrial orders, labour 
implemented a series of offence strategies – in the form of strikes and sometimes even 
violence – and in the process, was able to challenge dominant elite power. 
Contrastingly, labour in business services is skewed towards the LME type due to the 
high incidence of flexible work arrangements, the prevalence of weak CBAs, the low 
unionisation rate and the anti-trade union behaviour across the sector. Thus, my findings 
bring to the fore the concept of institutional heterogeneity within the national 
configuration. The central idea is that in every national model there is far more variety 
than just one dominant institutional path.  
Furthermore, I was able to capture the existence of institutional divergence within a 
sector – this was not what I expected to find when I began my research. I was surprised 
to see the degree of differentiation between the institutional configurations of the two 




process of industrial re-construction and upgrading at both firms, the complexity of 
activities and the value chain segment undertaken is distinct across the two firms. 
Renault’s subsidiary specialises in the full spectrum of economic activities, with the 
complexity of production covering both downstream, non-analytical value chain 
segments and upstream, creative ones. Contrastingly, production capacities at Ford’s 
subsidiary are skewed towards non-analytical and non-R&D activities, with only 
recently there being a shift towards more sophisticated value chain segments because of 
technological upgrading. The development of firm-specific skills via comprehensive in-
house training is pursued much more methodically at Renault, whereas at Ford the level 
of investment in training is lower and the emphasis is on the development of more 
general, portable skills. Consequently, the internal company dynamics of Renault 
converge towards the CME model, while the institutional configuration of Ford 
resembles the LME model. My finding reinforces the possibility of distinct institutional 
logics existing in parallel within a sector.  
Reflecting on the issue of coding, the creation of initial codes from the synthesis of the 
literature and history helped me analyse the data collected through in-depth 
interviewing and archival research. The ideas emerging from the collected data 
reinforced my ‘grounded’ codes, but also refined, sharpened and extended the 
preliminary ideas that I had constructed via an inductive process. There were also 
instances that the findings emerging from the collected data disproved my initial ideas 
about the data. For example, the synthesis of the theory and history revealed that 
Romania was a laggard case vis-à-vis other CEE typologies. However, the interview 
data indicated that Romania had succeeded in revitalising some of its industry and 
shifting the trajectory of the political economy from institutional decline in the first 
decade post-Socialism to institutional growth in the second and third decades post-
Socialism. It took several iterations of synthesising the theory, history and fieldwork 
data to fully construct the overarching themes for each of my sectors, including the 
propositions and ideas subordinated to them. Overall, I feel that this process of iterative 
theory development allowed me to pursue theoretical sensitivity (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). Birks and Mills define theoretical sensitivity as “the ability to recognise and 
extract from the data elements that have relevance for the emerging theory” (2015, 181). 
Furthermore, I believe this process of iterative theory development enabled me to apply 




In terms of the methodological contribution, my study provides a synthesis of five 
overarching approaches to the study of institutional change within the context of the 
CEE region: 1) varieties of capitalism (VoC), 2) Polanyian varieties, 3) economic 
geography, 4) historical institutionalism, and 5) the theorisation of the concept of elites. 
My study has undertaken a systematic review of these five literatures – summarising the 
central findings of each approach; shedding light on the shortcomings of the different 
literatures; and highlighting the advantages of each approach, extracting them and 
incorporating them in the foundations of my own theoretical framework. 
Furthermore, my study recognises the importance of scale, as it allows me to monitor 
and assess the different types of exchanges between the existing spatial configurations 
(Jessop, 1994; Collinge, 2005). More specifically, I conceptualised my research design 
in such a way as to capture the relations between the different scales and “the pattern of 
institutional integration” (Jessop, 1994, 14). My study views the institutional setting 
relationally, marked by the presence of a multitude of interacting actors, institutions and 
forces that operate at diverging levels – micro-, meso-, macro- and international-level. 
Thus, the contribution of my study is that it brings the macro and meso levels together 
and sometimes even the micro level, all the while that the national political economy is 
situated within an international order shaped by supranational institutions and 
transnational agents. Breaking the institutional structure into different integrated scales 
allowed me to capture how the institutional changes occurring at one level influenced 
the transformation of other levels. For example, by examining how the coal mining 
labouring class struggled to retain its powers vis-à-vis dominant elites, I was able to 
observe that the central players of the state apparatus drove the process of labour market 
deregulation and the weakening of industrial relations at the sectoral and national scale. 
Hence, the instances of labour unrest at the sectoral-level – the Mineriadas – influenced 
institutional transformation not only at the sectoral-level but also across the wider 
national political economy. 
I will now focus on the empirical contribution of the present work. The comparative 
longitudinal study of the three sectors enabled me to chart the institutional changes 
accompanying the decline of coal mining, the re-construction of auto and the rise of 
business services. My study of coal mining represents the first study of this industrial 
branch since 2006. Cernat’s book Europeanization, Varieties of Capitalism and 




configuration of coal mining during the first decade post-Socialism, with a strong 
emphasis on labour issues (the Mineriadas). Hence, my work is the first longitudinal 
research study of coal during the timeframe 1960s-2010s that incorporates a 
comprehensive account of the different forces of change influencing the industrial 
branch: elites, industrial policy, international forces, and labour.  
My work also represent the first field study research of the business services sector in 
Romania. As I have emphasized in Chapter 7, this industrial activity is not even 
formally recognised in the Romanian Occupation Classification and it is quite often 
mistakenly grouped with ITC. My analysis of Romanian business services can match 
other studies of business services in national political economies such as India or 
Poland, complementing the existing body of knowledge on the institutional structure 
and evolution of the sector.  
Furthermore, my work constitutes the first field study research analysing both firm-level 
case studies within the institutional configuration of auto. As I have highlighted in 
Chapter 6, out of the two firms, Dacia has always been considered the national success 
story and as a result, the firm has attracted a greater degree of attention from the press as 
well as academia. The story of Olcit has not been so straightforward, with the company 
being plagued by a conflictual collaborative arrangement with Citroën (1976-1991), 
multiple financial crises throughout the years, and the failure of the first instance of FDI 
displacement (Daewoo). Hence, my study is the first longitudinal analysis of Romanian 
auto during the timeframe 1960s-2010s that incorporates a comprehensive analysis of 
both firms, ultimately recognising the uneven institutional development and institutional 
heterogeneity across the sectoral economy. My study of the Romanian auto sector can 
complement the existing studies of auto across the CEE region, especially those focused 
on Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where the presence of FDI has also 
driven a process of re-construction and expansion of auto production capacities. The 
analysis of the Romanian case study can enable future research to chart a more 
comprehensive comparative analysis of the institutional transformation and upgrading 
of auto across the different national political economies of CEE.  
Limitations of the Study 
The main limitation of my analysis of the coal industry was the inability to secure 




the entire sector – whether they are coal miners, managers of exploitation sites or trade 
union leaders – to speak to researchers or members of the press. This is primarily 
because of the sensitive nature of the material. The instances of labour unrest during the 
Mineriadas are still a very sensitive topic in Romania. More specifically, there is an 
ongoing legal investigation regarding the events during 1990, 1991 and 1999 
respectively, with many institutional players – managers and trade union leaders – 
awaiting to stand trial for their actions during those crisis moments. Thus, a major 
source of limitation is due to the sensitive nature of the material I investigated. Despite 
not interviewing any industry representatives, I filled this gap in my study by using 
mixed methods.  
The study of auto presented a similar limitation to that of coal mining – more 
specifically, the limitation associated with the inability to secure access. It is important 
to emphasize the fact that the auto industry is an ‘active’ and growing sector vis-à-vis 
coal mining which has been gradually restructured since the late 1990s. Furthermore, 
the Romanian state views auto as a nationally important industrial branch. This renders 
the nature of internal industry documents as highly sensitive. Not so surprisingly then, 
while I was undertaking the archival research in relation to the study of auto, I 
experienced multiple instances when the archival documents that I wanted to review 
were still classified. This prevented me from analysing the auto case study as 
comprehensively as I would have liked. Furthermore, the inability to access some of 
these historical documents made me question whether there are any themes or moments 
of institutional change that I failed to incorporate in my study. However, the fact that I 
supplemented archival data with interview data and a variety of newspaper articles and 
technical reports allowed me to fill this gap in my study.  
The principal limitation in the analysis of business services was the weakly covered 
perspective of labour. The reason behind this is due to the weak and fragmented 
institutional configuration of industrial relation across the sector. Business services has 
an extremely low level of unionisation, the model of unionisation has been replaced by 
an alternative framework that has further weakened the powers of employees to 
organise and negotiate, and there are various instances of anti-trade union behaviour 
which limit even further the willingness of employees to exercise voice. Unionisation in 
business services constitutes a relatively sensitive topic. My experience interviewing 




regarding trade union activity coupled with a general lack of willingness to talk about 
the issue of organised labour. People shut down when you want to discuss labour issues, 
either because they do not know or because they don’t want to talk about them with an 
outsider.  
The insufficiently covered perspective of labour is a weakness running through all my 
empirical chapters. The issue in relation to labour is two-fold: technical and theoretical. 
Technically, I could not analyse the labour theme as comprehensively as I would have 
wanted due to access issues. More precisely, I was unable to secure interviews with 
trade union leaders in any of the three industries, despite having a range of personal ties 
to industry representatives (managers) and being provided with the contact details of 
various organised labour leaders by my gatekeepers. As I emphasized previously, labour 
issues are regarded as highly sensitive. The large number of labour-related high-profile 
legal cases and corruption scandals in the last few years has exacerbated this ‘secrecy’ 
clause on the topic of labour issues. Theoretically speaking, my study set out to analyse 
labour relationally across the three sectoral economies. The fact that I could not gain 
access to labour representatives meant that I could only achieve the partial development 
of the initial theme of labour. However, despite having a weaker coverage of the labour 
perspective, by utilising mixed methods I did achieve to capture the fact that labour can 
be a driver of institutional change, although not as powerful as elites and international 
forces.  
The impression of success emerging from the institutional evolution of the auto and 
business services sectors might be because I only managed to capture a partial view of 
the institutional actors shaping the internal dynamics of the Romanian political 
economy. The insufficiently covered perspective of labour resulted in a more capital-
centric approach to explaining institutional formation and transformation across the 
national political economy and three sectors I investigate.  
Future Research  
 
Due to the insufficiently covered perspective of labour running through my study, a 
study of labour across the Romanian national variety of capitalism is an area of 
potential furture reseach. More precisely, future research could focus on a comparative 
analysis of industrial relations across different sectoral economies of the Romanian 




transformation of industrial relations across the two industries with a ‘star status’ – auto 


























ABSL (Association of Business Services Leaders), 2015. ‘Business Services in Central 
and Eastern Europe’. [pdf]. Available at: 
<https://www.absl.cz/docs/CEE_report_final.pdf> [Last accessed May 2018] 
ABSL (Association of Business Services Leaders), 2017. ‘CEE Investment Report 
2016’. [pdf]. Available at: 
<https://www.skanska.pl/4a5217/siteassets/oferta/biura/raporty-i-standardy/cee-
investment-report-2016/cee-investment-report-2016-mission-to-outperform.pdf> [Last 
accessed May 2018] 
ABSL (Association of Business Services Leaders), 2018a. ‘Business Services Sector in 
Romania 2018’. [pdf]. Available at: 
<https://www.absl.ro/download/99/reports/5317/absl-romania-industry-report-
2018.pdf> [Last accessed June 2019] 
ABSL (Association of Business Services Leaders), 2018b. ‘Artificial Intelligence, the 
“performing engine” in Romania’s business services industry’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.absl.ro/artificial-intelligence-the-performance-engine-in-romanias-
business-service-industry/> [Last accessed April 2019] 
ACAROM (Association of Automobile Constructors in Romania), 2015. ‘Fabricatia de 
componente auto, un sector industrial cu potential robust de dezvoltare in Romania’. 
[pdf]. Available at: <http://siar.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/1.-Constantin-STROE-
ACAROM-Industria-auto-in-Romania-2015.compressed.pdf> [Last accessed October 
2018] 
Accace, 2014. ‘Romania acorda printre cele mai mari facilitati fiscale din regiune 
angajatilor din IT|Comunicat de presa’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://accace.ro/romania-acorda-printre-cele-mai-mari-facilitati-fiscale-din-regiune-
angajatilor-din-it/> [Last accessed August 2018] 
Accace, 2015. ‘Noi reguli privind scutirea angajatilor din domeniul IT de la plata 
impozitului pe venit | News Flash’. [online]. Available at: < https://accace.ro/noi-reguli-
privind-scutirea-de-la-plata-impozitului-a-angajatilor-din-domeniul-it-news-flash/> 
[Last accessed August 2018] 
Accace, 2015b. ‘Care sunt cele mai avantajoase tipuri de contracte de munca pentru 
angajatori?’. [online]. Available at: <https://accace.ro/care-sunt-cele-mai-avantajoase-
tipuri-de-contracte-de-munca-pentru-angajatori/> [Last accessed July 2018] 
Actmedia, 2016. ‘Romania's business services industry employees has got close to 
70,000’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.actmedia.eu/companies/romania-s-
business-services-industry-employees-has-got-close-to-70-000/62230> [Last accessed 
February 2018]  
Actual de Cluj, 2018. ‘Înapoi la şcoală. Companii de IT din Cluj, parteneriat cu UBB 
pentru curs de antreprenori’. [online]. Available at: < https://actualdecluj.ro/inapoi-la-
scoala-companii-de-it-din-cluj-parteneriat-cu-ubb-pentru-curs-de-antreprenori/> [Last 




Adăscăliţei, D and Guga, Ş., 2015. ‘Decentralization, Union Power and Contention 
Episodes: the Case of Dacia Workers’. Marie Curie Changing Employment ITN 
Research Paper Series [2015/001]. [pdf]. Available at:  
<https://publications.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/publications/cps-working-paper-
changing-employment-adascalitei-guga-2015.pdf> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Adevărul, 2015. ‘Mărirea şi decăderea autoturismului Oltcit produs la Craiova. Când a 
dispărut cea mai modernă maşină construită în comunism’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://adevarul.ro/locale/craiova/marirea-decaderea-autoturismului-oltcit-produs-
craiova-disparut-cea-mai-moderna-masina-construita-comunism-
1_5646fb317d919ed50e3655d7/index.html> [Last accessed October 2018] 
Adevărul, 2016. ‘Daimler a investit 13 milioane de euro într-o nouă fabrică la Cugir. 
150 de angajaţi produc conducte pentru motoare’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://adevarul.ro/locale/alba-iulia/daimler-investit-13-milioane-euro-intr-o-noua-
fabrica-cugir-150-angajati-produc-conducte-motoare-
1_57b696565ab6550cb8e39b0e/index.html> [Last accessed October 2018] 
Adevărul, 2018a. ‘Ford a devenit cel mai mare angajator privat din Dolj. 4.419 salariaţi 
îşi desfăşoară activitatea la uzina din Bănie’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://adevarul.ro/locale/craiova/ford-devenit-mai-mare-angajator-privat-dolj-4419-
salariati-isi-desfasoara-activitatea-uzina-banie-
1_5a8d01addf52022f75c9623c/index.html> [Last accessed November 2018] 
Adevărul, 2018b. ‘Care vor fi trendurile în IT în 2018 în România şi în lume’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://adevarul.ro/tech/internet/care-vor-trendurile-it-2018-romania-
lume-1_5ab0faebdf52022f75ce7e6b/index.html> [Last accessed July 2018] 
Albo, G., 2005. ‘Contesting the ‘new capitalism’’ in Coates, D. (eds), Varieties of 
Capitalism Varieties of Approaches, pp. 63–82. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Allen, C., 1997. ‘Spies Like Us: When Sociologist Deceive Their Subjects’. Lingua 
Franca [e-journal] (November): 31-39. 
AMBASADA ROMÂNIEI în Republica Azerbaidjan, 2012. ‘Exporturile României 
către ţările din afara UE au crescut cu 55,8% în primele două luni’. [online]. Available 
at: <https://baku.mae.ro/romania-news/479> [Last accessed September 2018] 
American Sociological Association, 1997. Code of Ethics. Washington D.C.: American 
Sociological Association. 
Amos News, 2003. ‘Scrisoarea BNS şi SAD către directorul general al Grupului 
Renault’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.amosnews.ro/arhiva/scrisoarea-bns-sad-
catre-directorul-general-al-grupului-renault-06-02-2003> [Last accessed October 2018] 
Amsden, A., Kochanowicz, J. and Taylor, L., 1994. The Market Meets Its Match: 
Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
ANIS (Employers’ Association of the Software and Services Industry), 2016. ‘Software 
and IT Services in Romania 2016’. [pdf]. Available at: <https://www.anis.ro/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Software-and-IT-Services-in-Romania-2016_General-




ANIS (Employers’ Association of the Software and Services Industry), 2017. 
‘Overview of the Software & IT Services Industry in Romania’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://softwareindex.ro/industry-overview/> [Last accessed Decmeber 2017] 
Aoki, 1994. ‘The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional 
Complementarity’. International Economic Review [e-journal] Vol. 35, Issue 3, pp. 657-
676. 
Aoki, M., 2000. ‘What is Comparative Institutional Analysis?’ in Information, 
Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Auto Industry, 2013. ‘Grevă spontană la Uzinele Dacia. Conducerea susține că este o 
acțiune ilegală’. [online]. Available at: <http://autoindustry.ro/stiri-auto/greva-spontana-
la-uzinele-dacia-conducerea-sustine-ca-este-o-actiune-ilegala-2034> [Last accessed 
September 2018] 
Automotive Meetings, 2018. ‘Automotive & Romania’. [online]. Available at: 
<http://romania.automotivemeetings.com/index.php/automotive-and-romania> [Last 
accessed September 2018] 
Avocatnet, 2018. ‘Reminder: Scutire impozit IT 2018: De azi, aceasta va putea fi cerută 
pentru mai mulți salariați’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.avocatnet.ro/articol_47391/Scutire-impozit-IT-2018-De-azi-aceasta-va-
putea-fi-cerut%C4%83-pentru-mai-mul%C8%9Bi-salaria%C8%9Bi.html> [Last 
accessed September 2018] 
Babbie, E.R., 2003. The Practice of Social Research. 8
th
 edition. Belmont: Thomson 
Wadsworth. 
Babbie, E.R., 2007. The Practice of Social Research.  11
th
 edition. Belmont: Thomson 
Wadsworth.  
Babbie, E.R., 2008. The Basics of Social Research. 4
th
 edition. Belmont: Thomson 
Wadsworth.  
BalkanInsight, 2008. ‘Ford Acquires Romania’s Automobile Craiova’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2008/03/21/ford-acquires-romania-s-
automobile-craiova/> [Last accessed August 2018] 
Ban, C., 2012. ‘Sovereign Debt, Austerity, and Regime Change: The Case of Nicolae 
Ceausescu’s Romania’ East European Politics and Societies and Cultures [e-journal] 
Vol. 26, Issue 4, pp. 743-776. 
Ban, C., 2013. ‘From Cocktail to Dependence: Revisiting the Foundations of Dependent 
Market Economies’, Working Paper.  
Banks, M., 2001. Visual Methods in Social Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Barbuceanu, Ş., 2012. ‘Annual Review 2011on Labour Relations and Social Dialogue 
in South East Europe: Romania’. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Labour Relations and Social 
Dialogue in South East Europe. Available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/belgrad/08911.pdf>. 
Bartlett, D.L., 1998. ‘The Political Economy of Dual Transformation: Market Reform 
and Democratization in  ungary’ in Martin, R., 2013. Constructing Capitalism: 





BBC, 2008. ‘Ford a preluat oficial Automobile Craiova’. [online]. Available at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2008/03/080321_ford_craiova.shtml> 
[Last accessed August 2018] 
Beck, U. and Willms, J., 2004. Conversations with Ulrich Beck. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, ch.1, 2. 
Becker,  .S., 1953. ‘Becoming a Marijuana User’. American Journal of Sociology [e-
journal] Vol. 59, pp. 235-242. 
Becker, J., and Jäger, J., 2010. ‘Development Trajectories in the Crisis in Europe’. 
Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe [e-journal] Vol. 18, 
Issue 1, pp. 5–27. 
Bennett, T., Savage, M., Silva, E. B., Warde, A., Gayo-Cal, M. and Wright, D., 2009. 
Culture, Class Distinction. London: Routledge, ch.1. 
Berend, I.T., 1996. Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993. Detour from the Periphery 
to the Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 




Berry, J. M., 2002. ‘Validity and reliability issues in elite interviewing’. Political 
Science and Politics [e-journal] Vol. 35, pp. 679-682. 
Birch, K. and Mykhnenko, V., 2009. ‘Varieties of neoliberalism? Restructuring in large 
industrially dependent regions across Western and Eastern Europe’. Journal of 
Economic Geography [e-journal] Vol. 9, pp. 355-380. 
Birks, M. and Mills, J., 2015. Grounded theory: a practical guide. 2
nd
 ed. London: 
Sage, 2015. 
Blyth, M., 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in 
the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boboc, M., 2009. Mina Petrila – 150 de ani. Oameni, Fapte, Întâmplări. Craiova: 
Editura Craiova.  
Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B., 2006. ‘Capitalism without Compromise: Strong Business 
and Weak Labor in Eastern Europe’s New Transnational Industries’. Studies in 
Comparative International Development [e-journal] Vol. 41, Issue 1, pp. 3–25. 
Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B., 2013. Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery. [e-
book]. Cornell University Press. Kindle Edition. 
Bosch, G. and Weinkopf, C., 2008. Low-Wage Work in Germany. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
Bourdieu, P., 1985. Distinction. London: Routledge. 
Bourdieu, P., 1989. ‘Social space and symbolic power’. Sociological Theory [e-journal] 
Vol. 7, pp. 14–25. 
Boyer, R., 2005. ‘Complementarity in regulation theory’, pp. 366-368 in Crouch, C., et 
al. 2005. ‘Dialogue on ‘Institutional complementarity and political economy’. Socio-




Bradley, D.S. Boles, J. and Jones, C., 1979. ‘From mistress to hooker. Qualitative 
Sociology [e-journal] Vol. 2, Issue 2, pp. 42-62. 
Brenner, N., Peck, J. and Theodore, N., 2009. Variegated neoliberalization: 
geographies, modalities, pathways’. Global Networks [e-journal] Vol. 10, Issue 2, pp. 
182–222. 
Buchen, C., 2005a. ‘Institutional Complementarities in Transition: The Case of Estonia 
and Slovenia’, Paper presented to the European School on New Institutional Economics, 
Càrgese, Italy, May. 
Buchen, C., 2005b. ‘East European Antipodes: Varieties of Capitalism in Estonia and 
Slovenia’, Paper presented to the Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries 
Conference, Paisley, Scotland, September. 
Bulmer, M. (ed.), 1982. Social Research Ethics: An Examination of the Merits of Covert 
Participation Observation. New York: Holmes and Meier.  
Burakow, N., 1981. ‘Romania and Greece – Socialism vs. Capitalism’. World 
Development [e-journal] Vol. 9, Issue 9/10, pp. 907-928.  
Burawoy, M., 1998. ‘The Extended Case Method’. Sociological Theory [e-journal] Vol. 
16, Issue 1, pp. 4-33.  
Burawoy, M., Burton, A., Ferguson, A.A., Fox, K.J., Gamson, J., Gartrell, N., Hurst, L., 
Kurzman, C., Salzinger, L., Schiffman, J. and Ui, S., 1991. Ethnography Unbound: 
Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.  
Bursa, 2014. ‘15 ani de la întoarcerea DACIEI în familia RENAULT’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.bursa.ro/15-ani-de-la-intoarcerea-daciei-in-familia-renault-
82588429> [Last accessed August 2018] 
Bursa, 2016. ‘ŞASE COMPANII STRĂINE VOR PRIMI 621 MILIOANE LEI DE LA 
BUGETCioloş finanţează multinaţionalele şi ignoră antreprenorii autohtoni’. [online]. 
Available at: < https://www.bursa.ro/sase-companii-straine-vor-primi-621-milioane-lei-
de-la-buget-ciolos-finanteaza-multinationalele-si-ignora-antreprenorii-autohtoni-
88206039> [Last accessed November 2018] 
Bursa, 2018. ‘Evoluţie spectaculoasă a pieţei imobiliare, în 2017’. [online]. Available 
at: <https://www.bursa.ro/evolutie-spectaculoasa-a-pietei-imobiliare-in-2017-
44074432> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Business Magazin, 2007. ‘Cum au ajuns sa produca in Romania doi giganti: Renault si 
Ford’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.businessmagazin.ro/cover-story/cum-au-
ajuns-sa-produca-in-romania-doi-giganti-renault-si-ford-1055715> [Last accessed June 
2018] 
Business Magazin, 2016a. ‘Industria auto românească a crescut de cinci ori în zece ani’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.businessmagazin.ro/analize/transporturi/industria-
auto-romaneasca-a-crescut-de-cinci-ori-in-zece-ani-15501505> [Last accessed 
September 2018] 
Business Magazin, 2016b. ‘Industria auto din România, tot mai sus’. [online]. Available 
at: <https://www.businessmagazin.ro/analize/transporturi/industria-auto-din-romania-




Business Review, 2015. ‘The number of employees in business services industry to 
grow 60 pct by 2017’. [online]. Available at: < http://business-review.eu/featured/the-
number-of-employees-in-business-services-industry-to-grow-60-pct-by-2017-89163> 
[Last accessed May 2018] 
Business Review, 2016. ‘ABSL: Romania business services sector might reach 200,000 
jobs by 2020’. [online]. Available at: <http://business-review.eu/news/absl-romania-
business-services-sector-might-reach-200000-jobs-by-2020-124043> [Last accessed 
April 2018] 
Business Review, 2018. ‘Thousands of jobs available for young people in Romania’s 
business services sector’. [online]. Available at: <http://business-
review.eu/featured/thousands-of-jobs-available-for-young-people-in-romanias-business-
services-sector-163897> [Last accessed May 2019] 
Capik, P., and Drahokoupil, J., 2011. ‘Foreign Direct Investments in Business Services: 
Transforming the Visegrád Four Region into a Knowledge-based Economy?’. European 
Planning Studies [e-journal] Vol. 19, Issue 9, pp. 1611-1631. 
Capital, 2008. ‘Greva de la Dacia pune pe cric industria auto’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.capital.ro/greva-de-la-dacia-pune-pe-cric-industria-auto-108156.html> 
[Last accessed October 2018] 
Capital, 2009. ‘Ford va lansa o ofertă de preluare la Automobile Craiova, pentru 10,9 
mil.lei’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.capital.ro/ford-va-lansa-o-oferta-de-
preluare-la-automobile-craiova-pentru-109-millei-122348.html> [Last accessed August 
2018] 
Capital, 2016. ‘Industria auto accelerează în 2016’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.capital.ro/industria-auto-accelereaza-in-2016.html> [Last accessed 
October 2018] 
Carieră, 2015. ‘Facultățile care îți aduc cele mai mari salarii la angajare’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://cariera.ejobs.ro/facultatile-care-iti-aduc-cele-mai-mari-salarii/> 
[Last accessed June 2018] 
Cariere 2016. ‘Munca temporară, în creştere în 2016. Cum arată piaţa muncii, la final de 
an’. [online]. Available at:  <https://cutt.ly/uwF53Mt> [Last accessed July 2018] 
Cernat, L., 2002. ‘Institutions and Economic Growth: Which Model of Capitalism for 
Central and Eastern Europe?’. Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development and 
Transition [e-journal] Vol. 6, pp. 18-34.  
Cernat, L., 2004. ‘The Politics of Banking in Romania: Soft Loans, Looting and 
Cardboard Billionaires’. Government and Opposition [e-journal] Vol.39, Issue 3, pp. 
451-475. 
Cernat, L., 2006. Europeanization, Varieties of Capitalism and Economic Performance 
in Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Charmaz, K., 2001. ‘Grounded Theory’ pp. 335-252 in Contemporary Field Research: 
Perspectives and Formulations. 2
nd
 edition. Edited by Denzin, N.K. Greenwich: JAI 
Press. 
Chavance, B. and Magnin, E., 2000. ‘National Trajectories of Post-Socialist 




2000. Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons for the Social 
Sciences. [e-book]. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
City Square, 2017. ‘Scutirea impozitului pe venit din salarii 16%, în domeniul IT’. 
[online]. Available at: <http://citysquare.ro/blog/resurse-umane/scutirea-impozitului-pe-
venit-din-salarii-16-in-domeniul-it> [Last accessed November 2017] 
Ciutacu, C., 2011. ‘National unique collective agreement ended by law’. Dublin: EIRO. 
Available at: <http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/other-
industrial-relations/national-unique-collective-agreement-ended-by-law> 
Clark, I. and Almond, P., 2006. ‘Overview of the US Business System’ in Almond, P. 
and Ferner, A. (eds) American Multinationals in Europe: Managing Employment 
Relations Across Borders. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Climate Analytics, 2019. ‘Coal phase out in the European Union’. [online]. Available 
at: <https://climateanalytics.org/briefings/eu-coal-phase-out/> [Last accessed June 
2019] 
Coal Marketing International, 2019. ‘Coal Basics’. [online]. Available at: 
<http://www.coalmarketinginfo.com/coal-basics/> [Last accessed June 2019] 
Codul Muncii (actualizat), 2018a. ‘Titlul II – Contractul individual de muncă. Capitolul 
5 – Încetarea contractului individual de muncă’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.codulmuncii.ro/art_75_1.html?fbclid=IwAR0sjvlZitgdyea_4U-
qfQK0abqG-m5F5G-5nkjo6Br8EhcVMZOuFxrlNrQ> [Last accessed July 2018]  
Codul Muncii (actualizat), 2018b. ‘Legea 53/2003 din 24 ianuarie 2003 (republicată). 
Capitolul II – Sindicatele. Articolele 214-220’. [pdf]. Available at: 
<http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/images/Documente/Legislatie/2018/2018-04-13_legea-
53din2003-republicata-Codul_Muncii.pdf> [Last accessed June 2018] 
Codul Muncii (actualizat), 2018c. ‘Legea 53/2003 din 24 ianuarie 2003 (republicată). 
Capitolul II – Reprezentanţii salariaţilor. Articolele 221-226’. [pdf]. Available at: 
<http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/images/Documente/Legislatie/2018/2018-04-13_legea-
53din2003-republicata-Codul_Muncii.pdf> [Last accessed June 2018] 
Coffey, A. and Atkinson, P., 1996. Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary 
Research Strategies. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Collinge, C., 2005. ‘The diff rance between society and space: nested scales and the 
returns of spatial fetishism’. Environment and Planning: Society and Space [e-journal] 
Vol. 23, pages 189-206. 
Comunismul În România, 2015. ‘Instaurarea regimului comunist (1944 – 1947)’. 
[online].  Available at: <http://www.comunismulinromania.ro/index.php/instaurarea-
regimului-comunist-1944-1947/> [Last accessed January 2018] 
Conti, J., and O’Neil, M., 2007. ‘Studying power: Qualitative methods and the global 
elite’. Qualitative Research [e-journal] Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 63-82. 
Continental, 2018. ‘19.700 de angajati Continental din Romania lucreaza pentru viitorul 
industriei auto’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.continental.com/ro-
ro/presa/comunicate-de-presa/19-700-de-angajati-continental-din-romania-lucreaza-




Coyle, J., & Williams, B., 2000. ‘An exploration of the epistemological intricacies of 
using qualitative data to develop a quantitative measure of user views of health care’. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing [e-journal] Vol. 31, pp. 1235-1243. 
Creswell, J. W., and Plano Clark, V. L., 2007. Designing and conducting mixed 
methods research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Crouch, C., 2005. Capitalist diversity and change: Recombinant governance and 
institutional entrepreneurs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Crouch C., Schröder M. and Voelzkow  ., 2009. ‘Regional and sectoral varieties of 
capitalism’. Economy and Society [e-journal] Vol. 38, Issue 4, pp. 654-678.  
Crouch, C. and Voelzkow, H., 2009. Introduction: Local and Sectoral Diversity Within 
National Economic Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Crowley, S. and Ost, D., 2001. ‘Conclusion. Making Sense of Labor Weakness in 
Postcommunism’ in Crowley, S. and Ost, D. (eds.), Workers After Workers' States. 
Labor and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, pp. 219-233. 
Crowther, W.E., 1988. The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism. New York: 
Praeger. 
Curierul Naţional, 2003. ‘Greva generala de la “Dacia-Renault” continua’. [online]. 
Available at: <http://curierulnational.ro/old/Eveniment/2003-02-
22/GrevageneraladelaDacia-Renaultcontinua> [Last accessed October 2018] (Article is 
no longer available) 
Czaban, L. and  enderson, J., 2003. ‘Commodity Chains, Foreign Investment, and 
Labour Issues in Eastern Europe’. Global Networks [e-journal] Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 171–
96. 
Dabbs, J.M., Jr., 1982. ‘Making things visible’ in Maanen, J. Van, Varieties of 
Qualitative Research (Ed.). Beverly Hills: Sage.   
Dacia Group, 2013. ‘Protestul spontan este ilegal’. [online]. Available at: 
<http://www.daciagroup.com/presa/comunicate-de-presa/2013/protestul-spontan-este-
ilegal> [Last accessed July 2018] 
DACIAN77RO, 2015. Mineriada 25 Septembrie 1991 partea 1-10. [video recording, 
Youtube]. Viewed 8
th
 of June 2017. Available at: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wtRRZqWynyI> [Last accessed January 2018] 
De Broeck, M. and Koen, V., 2000. ‘The Great Contractions in Russia, the Baltics and 
Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union: A View from the Supply Side’. Working 
Paper WP/00/32. Washington DC: IMF. 
Deleanu, N., 1955. Nedeia din Poiana Miresei. Bucureşti: Editura de Stat Pentru 
Literatură şi Artă din Bucureşti. 
Denzin, N.K., 1978. The Research Act. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Denzin, N.K., 1989. The Research Act. 3
rd
 edition. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.  
Digi24, 2015. ‘ROMÂNIA FURATĂ | Jaf de miliarde în Valea Jiului’. [online]. 
Available at: <http://www.digi24.ro/special/campanii-digi24/romania-furata/romania-




Digi24, 2016. ‘Industria auto, jumătate din exporturile României’. [online]. Available 
at: <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/economie/industria-auto-jumatate-din-exporturile-
romaniei-472897> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Doellgast, V., 2012. Disintegrating Democracy at Work. Cornell University Press.  
Doltu, C., 2000. ‘The Evolution of the Banking System in Romania’. RCEP Working 
Paper 8/October 2000. Budapest: Central European University.  
Dølvik, J.E. and Waddington, J., 2002. ‘Private sector services: challenges to European 
trade unions’. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research. [pdf]. Available at: 
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/102425890200800304> 
Domnişoru, C. 2012. ‘Decent work policy options for the Romanian economy’ 
(Working Paper Nr. 105) for Policy Integration Department International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Geneva July 2012. [pdf]. Available at:  
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
integration/documents/publication/wcms_191573.pdf>. 
Dragomir, C., 2008. ‘Viaţa cotidiană în comunism: biografii sociale; Studiu de caz: 
Drobeta-Turnu Severin’. Sociologie romaneasca [e-journal] Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 80–104. 
Drahokoupil, J., 2008a. Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Politics of Foreign Direct Investment. London: Routledge. 
Drahokoupil, J., 2008b. ‘The rise of the competition state in the Visegrad four: 
internationalization of the state as a local project’ in Apeldoorn, B.V., Drahokoupil, J. 
and Horn, L. (eds) From Lisbon to Lisbon, pp. 186–207. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Dudian, M., 2011. ‘Innovative Clusters: The Case Of Romania’. Management Research 
and Practice [e-journal] Vol. 3. Issue 3, pp. 1–11. 
Earle, J. S. and Telegdy, Á., 2001. ‘Privatization and Productivity in Romanian 
Industry: Evidence from a Comprehensive Enterprise Panel’. IZA Discussion Papers 
326, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [online]. Available at: 
<https://ideas.repec.org/e/pte66.html> [Last accessed December 2017] 
Economica, 2015. ‘Ce înseamnă industria auto pentru România’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.economica.net/ce-inseamna-industria-auto-romaneasca-in-
cifre_102895.html> [Last accessed October 2018] 
Economica, 2016. ‘Daimler a investit peste 300 de milioane de euro la Sebeş, în 
producţia celei mai performante cutii de viteze’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.economica.net/daimler-a-investit-peste-300-de-milioane-de-euro-la-
sebes-in-productia-celei-mai-performante-cutii-de-viteze_117508.html> [Last accessed 
October 2018] 
Economica, 2017. ‘ arta industriei auto din România, un domeniu cu afaceri de 20 de 
miliarde de euro pe an’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.economica.net/harta-
industriei-auto-din-romania--un-domeniu-cu-afaceri-de-20-de-miliarde-de-
euro_134502.html> [Last accessed September 2018]  
Economica, 2018. ‘Sindicaliştii din IT&C: Multinaţionalele folosesc tertipuri la limita 






accessed August 2018] 
Edwards, T., 1998a. ‘Multinational companies and the diffusion of employment 
practices: a review of the literature’. Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations, no. 61. 
Coventry: IRRU, University of Warwick. 
Edwards, T., 1998b. ‘Multinationals and the process of reverse diffusion’. International 
Journal of Human Resource Management [e-journal] Vol. 9, pp. 969-709. 
Edwards, T., Marginson, P. and Ferner, A., 2013. ‘Multinational Companies in Cross-
National Context: Integration, Differentiation, and the Interactions between MNCS and 
Nation States: Introduction to a Special Issue of the ILRReview’. ILRReview [e-journal] 
Vol. 66, Issue 3, pp. 547-587. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’. Academy of 
Management Review [e-journal] Vol. 14, Issue 4, pp.532-550. 
Elmann, M., 1978. ‘The Fundamental Problem of Socialist Planning’. Oxford Economic 
Papers, New Series [e-journal] Vol. 30, Issue 2, pp. 249-262. 
Elmann, M., 1979. Socialist Planning. London: Cambridge University Press.  
Emerson, R., (ed.) 2001. Contermporary Field Research: A Collection of Readings. 2
nd
 
edition. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press.   
ePiteşti, 2017. ‘Veste pentru uzina Dacia. E pentru prima oară. [online]. Available at: 
<https://epitesti.ro/stiri/economic/veste-pentru-uzina-dacia-e-pentru-prima-oara> [Last 
accessed September 2018] 
Euracoal, (2015), ‘Romania’. [online]. Available at: <http://euracoal.eu/info/country-
profiles/romania/> [Last accessed February 2018] 
Euracoal, 2017. ‘Romania’. [online]. Available at: <http://euracoal.eu/info/country-
profiles/romania/> [Last accessed February 2018] 
Europa, 2018. ‘EU coal regions: opportunities and challenges ahead’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/eu-coal-regions-opportunities-and-
challenges-ahead> [Last accessed December 2018] 
European Commission, 1997. ‘Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Romania’s 
Application for Membership of the European Union’. [pdf]. Available at: 
<https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/romania_EC-Romania%20opinion-1997.pdf> [Last 
accessed November 2018] 
European Commission, 2001. ‘Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s 
Progress Towards Accession’. Brussels: EC. 
European Commission, 2001. ‘Reports on Progress Towards Accession by each of the 
Candidate Countries’. Brussels: EC. 
European Commission, 2010. ‘EUROPE 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth’. 
European Economic and Social Committee, 2016. ‘Indigenous coal in the EU energy 
transition’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-
information-reports/opinions/indigenous-coal-eu-energy-transition-own-initiative-




European Institute in Romania, 2004. ‘Politica de control a ajutoarelor de stat acordate 
in sectoare specific – Industria carbunelui, siderurgie, constructii de nave, industria 
autovehiculelor (The economic impact of prohibiting state aid for the Romanian steel 
industry’. [pdf].  
Available at: <http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Pais2_studiu_10_ro.pdf> 
[Last accessed June 2019] 
Evenimentul Zilei, 2009. ‘Primul Ford “made in Romania”’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/866808/Primul-Ford-made-in-Romania-/> [Last 
accessed August 2018] 
Evenimentul Zilei, 2010a. ‘20 de ani de la mineriada din 13-15 iunie. Lucruri care nu s-
au spus’. [online]. Available at: <http://evz.ro/exclusiv-evz-mineriada-din-13-15-
lucruri-care-nu-s-au-mai-spus-897822.html> [Last accessed February 2019] 
Evenimentul Zilei, 2010b. ‘Mineriadele anului 1990, democraţia sub bâte’. [oline]. 
Available at: <http://evz.ro/mineriadele-anului-1990-democratia-sub-bate-
898037.html> [Last accessed February 2019] 
Evenimentul Zilei, 2011. CRONICA TV. Adevărul despre mineriada din '91, ţărănişti şi 
Iliescu. [video recording, Youtube]. Viewed 8
th
 of June. Available at: 
<http://evz.ro/cronica-tv-adevarul-despre-mineriada-din-91-taranisti-si-iliescu-
947273.html> [Last accessed April 2018] 
Eyal, G., Szelényi, I. and Townsley, E., R., 1998. Making Capitalism Without 
Capitalist: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-communist Central Europe. 
Verso. 
FRD Center, 2014. ‘Sector Brief Demo: The Romanian mining sector 2014’. [pdf]. 
Available at: <http://www.frdcenter.ro/assets/Romanian-Mining-Sector-2014-DEMO-
report-by-FRD-Center.pdf> [Last accessed February 2018] 
Feldman, M.S., Bell, J. and Berger, M.T., 2003. Gaining Access: A Practical and 
Theoretical Guide for Qualitative Researchers. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press.  
Feldmann, M., 2006. ‘Emerging Varieties of Capitalism in Transition Countries: 
Industrial Relations and Wage Bargaining in Estonia and Slovenia’. Comparative 
Political Studies [e-journal] Vol. 39, Issue 7, pp. 829–54. 
Feldmann, M., 2007. ‘The Origins of Varieties of Capitalism: Lessons from The Post-
Socialist Transition in Estonia and Slovenia’ in Hancké, B., Rhodes, M. and Thatcher, 
M., 2007. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and 
Complementarities in the European Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ferner, A. and Almond, P., 2006. American Multinationals in Europe. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ferner, A., Almond, P., Clark, I., Colling, T., Edwards, T., Holden, L. and Muller, M., 
2004. ‘The Transmission and Adaptation of “American” Traits in US Multinationals 
Abroad: Case Study Evidence from the UK’. Organization Studies [e-journal] Vol. 25, 
Issue 3, pp. 363-392. 
Ferner, A. and Varul, M.Z., 2000. ‘“Vanguard” subsidiaries and the diffusion of new 
practices: a case study of German multinationals.’ British Journal of Industrial 




Fifeková, M. and  ardy, J., 2010. ‘Business Service Foreign Direct Investment in 
Central and Eastern Europe: trends, motives and impact’, Project Report for Economy 
and Trust Society.  
Foray, D., David, P. and  all, B., 2009. ‘Smart specialization: the concept’ in 
‘Knowledge for Growth: Prospects for science, technology and innovation’, Report 
EUR24047, European Union pp. 25-36. 
Fortwengel, J., 2011. ‘Upgrading through Integration? The Case of the Central Eastern 
European Automotive Industry’ Transcience Journal [e-journal] Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp. 1-
25. 
Friedman, J. and Orru, M., 1991. ‘Organizational access to research settings: Entering 
secondary schools. The American Sociologist [e-journal] Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 117-136. 
Funk, L. and Lesch,  ., 2004. ‘Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Organisational Characteristics, Co-determination and Labour Disputes’. Intereconomics 
[e-journal] September/October 2004, pp. 264-270. 
Galgóczi, B., 2003. ‘The impact of multinational enterprises on the corporate culture 
and on industrial relations in  ungary’. SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in 
Eastern Europe [e-journal] Vol. 6, Issue 1/2, pp. 27-44 
Gallagher, T., 2005. Theft of a Nation: Romania since Communism. London: C. Hurst 
and Co. 
Gallina, N., 2008. Political Elites in East Central Europe: Paving the Way for ‘negative 
Europeanisation’?. Opladen: Budrich UniPress Ltd.  
Gaspar, P., 1998. ‘Fiscal Difficulties in Transition: The Case of  ungary between 1990 
and 1995’ in Martin, R., 2013. Constructing Capitalism: Transforming Business 
Systems in Central and Eastern Europe’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gazeta de Informaţii, 2017. ‘Mărirea şi decăderea autoturismului Oltcit produs la 
Craiova. Când a dispărut maşină construită în comunism’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.gazetadeinformatii.ro/marirea-si-decaderea-autoturismului-oltcit-produs-
la-craiova-cand-a-disparut-cea-mai-moderna-masina-construita-in-comunism/> [Last 
accessed December 2017] 
Gazeta de Sud, 2008. ‘Peste 7.500 de angajaţi de la Uzina Dacia au intrat în grevă’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.gds.ro/Actualitate/2008-03-24/Peste-7-500-de-
angajati-de-la-Uzina-Dacia-au-intrat-in-greva/> [Last accessed Novermber 2018] 
Gazeta de Sud, 2009. ‘Ford cumpără toate acţiunile Automobile Craiova’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.gds.ro/Actualitate/2009-07-18/Ford-cumpara-toate-
actiunile-Automobile-Craiova/> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Gazeta de Sud, 2016. ‘Ford riscă să restituie ajutorul de stat plătit de țara noastră’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.gds.ro/Local/2016-08-27/ford-risca-sa-restituie-
ajutorul-de-stat-platit-de-tara-noastra/> [Last accessed November] 
Geertz, C., 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Gelb, A. . and Gray, C., W., 1991. ‘The Transformation of Economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Issues, Progress, and Prospects’. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
General Director Liviu Tănăsescu, 2016. ‘Document intern privind investiţia Daewoo la 




Ghose, A.K. and Bose L.K., 2003. Mining in the 21
st
 Century. [e-book]. A.A. Balkema. 
Available at:   
<https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=lEvyTy0IqckC&pg=PA917&hl=ro&source=gbs
_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false> [Last accessed June 2019] 
Giddens, A., 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity; Self and Society in the Late Modern 
Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gilbert, N., 2001. Researching Social Life. Newbury Park: Sage. 
Glaser, B., 1978. Theoretical Sensitivity. Mill Valley: Sociology Press. 
Glaser, B. and Strauss, A., 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Mill Valley: Sociology Press.  
Gold, R., 1958. ‘Roles in Sociological Field Observation’. Social Forces [e-journal] 
Vol. 36, pp. 217-223. 
Goldthorpe, J. H. and McKnight, A., 2004. ‘The economic basis of social class’, LSE 
CASE Paper 80. 
Gospel,  . and Edwards, T., 2012. ‘Strategic Transformation and Muddling Through: 
Industrial Relations and Industrial Training in the UK’. Journal of European Public 
Policy [e-journal] Vol.19, Issue 8, pp. 1229-1248. 
Greskovits, B., 2005. ‘Leading Sectors and the Variety of Capitalism in Eastern 
Europe’. Actes du gerpisa [e-journal] Vol. 39, pp. 113–28. 
Grusky, D. B., 2012. ‘What to do about inequality’. Boston Review, available at: 
<http://bostonreview.net/grusky-forum-inequality>. 
Guga, Ş., 2017. Low-cost Fordism? The Antinomies of Class in the Romanian 
Automobile Industry, 1989-(2016)? [pdf]. Available at: 
<http://www.etd.ceu.edu/2017/guga_stefan.pdf> [Last accessed April 2019] 
Guha, A.B., 1974. ‘Romania as a Development Model’. Journal of Peace Research [e-
journal] Vol. 11, Issue 4, pp. 297-323.  
Hagan, F.E., 2006. Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology. 7
TH
 edition. 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 all, S., 2003. ‘New Labour's double-shuffle’ Soundings [e-journal] Vol. 24, pp. 10-24. 
 all, P. and Gingerich, D., 2009. ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional 
Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis’ in  anck , B. (ed) 
(2009) Debating Varieties of Capitalism: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hall, P. and Soskice, D., 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hamlin, R. and Cobarzan, B., 2006. ‘Financial Incentives to Restructure Coal Mining 
Industry. Comparative Case Study Romania and State of Michigan, U.S.’. 
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 18 E/2006, pp. 68-79.  
 anck , B., 2007. Beyond varieties of capitalism: conflict, contradictions, and 




 aney, M. and Shkaratan, M., 2003. ‘Mine Closure and its Impact on the Community: 
Five Years After Mine Closure in Romania, Russia and Ukraine’. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3083, June 2003. 
 arvey, W. S., 2011. ‘Strategies for conducting elite interviews’. Qualitative Research 
[e-journal] Vol. 11, pp. 431-441. 
Hertz, R. and Imber, J.B., 1995. Studying Elites using Qualitative Methods. London: 
Sage. 
 ipo, 2018. ‘BPO – domeniul ccu cea mai mare rata de angajabilitate’ . [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.hipo.ro/locuri-de-munca/vizualizareArticol/1140/BPO-
domeniul-cu-cea-mai-mare-rata-de-angajabilitate> Last accessed March 2018] 
 irshman, M., 2009. ‘Blood And Velvet In Eastern Europe's Season Of Change’ in 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2009. Available at: 
<https://www.rferl.org/a/Velvet_And_Blood_In_Eastern_Europes_Season_Of_Change/
1870373.html> [Last accessed June 2019] 
Historia, 2010. VIDEO Petre Roman: A existat o legătură cauzală între puciul de la 
Moscova și mineriada din septembrie. [video recording]. Available at: 
<https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/video-petre-roman-a-existat-o-
legatura-cauzala-intre-puciul-de-la-moscova-si-mineriada-din-septembrie> [Last 
accessed April 2018] 
 istoria, 2017a. ‘Cum investea Franţa în România lui Ceauşescu’. Available at: 
<https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/cum-investea-franta-in-romania-lui-
ceausescu> [Last accessed April 2018] 
 istoria, 2017b. ‘Istoria Tezaurului românesc, povestită de Ceauşescu’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/istoria-tezaurului-
romanesc-povestita-de-ceausescu> [Last accessed July 2018] 
 istoria, 2017c. ‘Ceauşescu: Dacia, suficient de bună pentru idioţi!’. [online]. Available 
at: <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/ceausescu-dacia-suficient-de-buna-
pentru-idioti-video> [Last accessed December 2017] 
 olman, O., 2002. ‘Die Neue Europäische Peripherie: Ost- und Süderweiterung der 
Europäischen Union im Vergleich. [The New European Periphery: Eastern and 
Southern Enlargment Compared]. Prokla  128 (September), pp. 399–420. 
 otNews, 2008. ‘Angajatii de la Dacia-Renault continua greva generala’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-ultima_ora-2686289-angajatii-dacia-
renault-continua-greva-generala.htm?nomobile=> [Last accessed November 2018] 
 otNews, 2017. ‘A aparut procedura de scutire de impozitul pe venitul din salarii 
pentru programatori/ A fost eliminata conditia ca firma sa fi avut venituri din vanzarea 
de softuri de 10.000 USD’. [online]. Available at: < https://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-
finante_banci-21523589-aparut-procedura-scutire-impozitul-venitul-din-salarii-pentru-
programatori-fost-eliminata-conditia-firma-avut-venituri-din-vanzarea-softuri-10-000-
usd.htm> [Last accessed August 2018] 
Howell, N. (eds.), 1990. Surviving Fieldwork: A Report of the Advisory Panel on Health 




Högselius, P., 2003. ‘Can East European Countries Innovate?’ Paper presented at the 
Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics (druid) Winter Conference, Aalborg, 
Denmark, January 16–18. Available at:  
<http://www.druid.dk/conferences/winter2003/Paper/Hogselius.pdf>. 
 unt, S.A. and Benford, R.D., 1994. ‘Identity Talk in the Peace and Justice Movement’. 
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography [e-journal] Vol. 22, pp. 488-517. 
 unter, A., 1995. ‘Local knowledge and local power: Notes on the ethnography of local 
community elites’ in  ertz, R. and Imber, J.B. (Eds.), Studying elites using qualitative 
methods (pp. 151-170). Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Hurmerinta-Peltomaki, L. and Nummela, N., 2006.’ Mixed methods in international 
business research: A value-added perspective’. Management International Review [e-
journal] Vol. 46, pp. 439-459. 
Iankova, E. A., 2002. Eastern European Capitalism in the Making. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Iliescu aduce minerii în Bucureşti în frunte cu Miron Cozma! Mineriada 28-29 ianuarie 
1990!, 2014. [video recording]. Bucharest: Mesaj pentru România.  
Income Magazine, 2009. ‘Alcatel: 1 din 6 angajati europeni vor fi concediati, 560 din 
Romania’. [online]. Available at: <http://incomemagazine.ro/articles/alcatel-1-din-6-
angajati-europeni-vor-fi-concediati-560-din-romania> [Last accessed October 2017] 
Inouye, B.D., 1999. ‘Integrating nested spatial scales] implications for thecoexistence of 
competitors on a patchy resource’. Journal of Animal Ecology [e-journal] Vol. 68, pp. 
150-162. 
Ionete, C., 1993. Criza de sistem a economiei de comandă şi etapa sa explozivă. 
Bucharest: Editura Expert. 
Iosof, S.I. and Vasloban, E., 2013. ‘The Evolution of Services Sector in Romania’s 
GDP’. Academica Science Journal, Economica Series, Dimitrie Cantemir University, 
Faculty of Economical Science [e-journal] Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 58-63 
Jackson, G., 2003. ‘Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Liberalization 
Pressures and Responses during the 1990s’ in Yamamura, K. and Streeck, W. The End 
of Diversity?: Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism. Cornell University 
Press. 
Jackson, G., 2009. ‘The Japanese Form and its Diversity’. Economy and Society [e-
journal] Vol. 38, Issue 4, pp. 606-629.  
Jackson, G. and Deeg, R., 2006. ‘ ow Many Varieties of Capitalism? A Review of 
Comparative Approaches to Institutional Diversity’. MPIfG Discussion Paper. 
Available at: <http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19930/1/dp06-2.pdf> [Last 
accessed September 2017] 
Jackson, G. and Sorge, A., 2012. ‘The Trajectory of Institutional Change in Germany, 
1979-2009’. Journal of European Public Policy [e-journal] Vol. 19, Issue 8, pp. 1146-
1167. 
Javorcik, B.S. and Spătăreanu, M., 2015. Disentangling FDI spillover effects: what do 





Jessop, B., 1994. ‘The transition to post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian workfare 
state’, in Towards a Post-Fordist Welfare State Eds R Burrows, Loader, B. London: 
Routledge.  
Jurnalul, 2017. ‘Pe ce criterii sunt scutiţi IT-iştii de impozite’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://jurnalul.antena3.ro/it/pe-ce-criterii-sunt-scutiti-it-istii-de-impozite-
751388.html> [Last accessed  January 2018] 
Jürgens, U. and Krzywdzinski, M., 2009. ‘Work models in the Central Eastern 
European car industry: towards the high road?’ Industrial Relations Journal [e-journal] 
Vol. 40, Issue 6, pp 471-490. 
Khan, S., 2010. Privilege, in Savage, M., 2015. ‘Introduction to elites From the 
‘problematic of the proletariat’ to a class analysis of ‘wealth elites’’. The Sociological 
Review [e-journal] Vol. 63, Issue 2, pp. 223-239. 
Kirchner, S. and Jürgen, B., 2014. ‘Coming to Terms with Firm-Level Diversity: An 
Investigation of Flexibility and Innovative Capability Profiles in the Transformed 
‘German Model’’ in Hauptmeier, M. and Vidal, M. (eds.). Comparative Political 
Economy of Work London: Palgrave. 
King, L., 2002. ‘Postcommunist Divergence: A Comparative Analysis of the Transition 
to Capitalism in Poland and Russia’. Studies in Comparative International Ddvelopment 
[e-journal] Vol.37, Issue 3, pp.3-34. 
King, L., 2007. ‘Central European Capitalism in Comparative Perspective’ in  anck , 
B., Rhodes, M. and Thatcher, M., 2007. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, 
Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
King, L. and Szeléleni, I., 2005. ‘Postcommunist Economic Systems’, in Smelser, N. 
And Swedberg, R., 2005. Handbook of Economic Sociology. [e-book]. 2
nd
 edition. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
King, L. and Sznajder, A., 2006. ‘The State-Led Transition to Liberal Capitalism: 
Neoliberal Organizational, World Systems, and Social Structural Explanations of 
Poland’s Economic Success’. American Journal of Sociology [e-journal] Vol. 112, pp. 
751-801.   
Koen, C., 2005. Comparative International Management. Maidenhead: McGraw Hill. 
Kolodko, G.W., 1999. ‘Transition to a Market Economy and Sustained Growth. 
Implications for the Post-Washington Consensus’, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies [e-journal] Vol. 32, Issue 3, pp.233-261. 
Kolodko, G.W., 2000. From Shock to Therapy: The Political Economy of the Post-
Socialist Transformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kolodko, G.W., 2002. Globalization and the Catching-up in Transition Economies. 
New York: University of Rochester Press. 
Kotkin, S. and Gross, J.T., 2009. Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the 
Communist Establishment. Modern Library Chronicles. 
Krippner, G., 2005. ‘The financialization of the American Economy’. Socio-Economic 




Lamont, M., 1992. Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of 
Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lane, C. and Wood, G., 2009. ‘Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism’. 
Economy and Society [e-journal] Vol. 38, Issue 4, pp. 531-551. 
Lane, D.S., 2000. ‘What kind of capitalism for Russia? A comparative analysis’. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies [e-journal] Vol. 33, pp. 485–504. 
Lane, D.S., 2007. The Transformation of State Socialism: System Change, Revolution 
or Something Else?.[e-book]. London: Palgrave. 
Lane, D.S., 2011. Elites and Classes in the Transformation of State Socialism. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Larionescu, M., Rughiniş, C. and Rădulescu, S. M., 1999. Cu ochii minerului: reforma 
mineritului in Romania: (evaluari sociologice si studii de caz). Bucureşti: Gnosis. 
Laurila, J., 1997. ‘Promoting research access and informant rapport in corporate 
settings: Notes from research on a crisis company’. Scandinavian Journal of 
Management [e-journal] Vol. 13, pp. 407-418. 
LeCompte, M.D. and Schensul, J.J., 1999. Analyzing & Interpreting Ethnographic 
Data. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press.  
Lee, R.M., 1993. Doing Research on Sensitive Topics. Newbury Park: Sage.  
Legex, 2017a. ‘ORDONANTA DE URGENTA   Nr. 9 din 14 aprilie 1997’. [online]. 
Available at: <http://www.legex.ro/OUG-9-1997-11153.aspx> [Last accessed March 
2019] 
Legex, 2017b. ‘ORDONANTA DE URGENTA Nr. 22 din 19 august 1997’. [online]. 
Available at: <http://www.legex.ro/Ordonanta-22-1997-11316.aspx> [Last accessed 
March 2019] 
Le Roux, B., Rouanet,  ., Savage, M. and Warde, A., 2008. ‘Class and cultural division 
in the UK’. Sociology [e-journal] Vol. 42, Issue 6, pp. 1049–1071. 
Libertatea, 2018. ‘Ai acțiuni la Automobile Dacia Pitești? Află ce valoare mai au și ce 
dividende poartă’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.libertatea.ro/stiri/actiuni-la-
automobile-dacia-pitesti-2204944> [Last accessed August 2018] 
Lillie, N. and Greer, I., 2008. ‘Industrial Relations, Migration, and Neoliberal Politics: 
The Case of the European Construction Sector’. Politics and Society [e-journal] Vol. 35, 
Issue 4, pp. 551-581. 
Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G., 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage.  
Lista Firme, 2018. ‘FORD ROMANIA SA’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.listafirme.ro/ford-romania-sa-6488696> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Liu, Y. and Grusky, D., 2013. ‘The payoff to skill in the third industrial revolution’. 
American Journal of Sociology [e-journal] Vol. 118, Issue 5, pp. 1330–1374. 
Lofland, J., 1977. Doomsday Cult: A Study of Conversion, Proselytization, and 
Maintenance of Faith (enlarged ed.). New York: Irvington. 
Lofland, J., Snow, D., Anderson, L. and Lofland L.H., 2006. Analyzing Social Settings: 




Lupul Dacic, 2014. ‘Istoria cea mai putin stiuta. NOI ASPECTE PRIVIND 
COLABORAREA ROMANIEI CU FIRMA “CITROEN” (1976-1991) – prima parte’. 
Available at: <https://lupuldacicblogg.wordpress.com/2014/12/16/istoria-mai-putin-
stiuta-noi-aspecte-privind-colaborarea-romaniei-cu-firma-citroen-1976-1991-prima-
parte/> [Last accessed March 2019] 
Lyle, G., 2015. ‘Understanding the nested, multi-scale, spatial and hierarchical nature of 
future climate change adaptation decision making in agricultural regions: A narrative 
literature review’. Journal of Rural Studies [e-journal] Vol. 37, pp. 38-49. 
Mann, M., 1984. ‘The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and 
results’ European Journal of Sociology [e-journal] Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 185-213. 
Market Watch, 2015. ‘ABSL si ASE lanseaza un program de masterat in Business 
Services’. [online]. Available at:  
<http://www.marketwatch.ro/articol/14472/ABSL_si_ASE_lanseaza_un_program_de_
masterat_in_Business_Services/> [Last accessed April 2019] 
Martin, R., 2013. Constructing Capitalism: Transforming Business Systems in Central 
and Eastern Europe.. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McCall, G.J. and Simmons, J.L., (eds.), 1969. Issues in Participant Observation. A Text 
and Reader. Reading: Addison-Wesley.   
McDowell, L., 1998. ‘Elites in the city of London: Some methodological 
considerations’. Environment and Planning [e-journal] Vol. 30, pp. 2133-2146. 
McKim, C.A., 2017. ‘The Value of Mixed Methods Research: A Mixed Methods 
Study’. Journal of Mixed Methods Research [e-journal] Vol. 11, Issue 2, pp. 202-222. 
McKinsey & Company, 2006. ‘McKinsey on IT: Winter 2006, McKinsey’. [pdf]. 
Available at:  
<www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/bto/pointofview/pdf/MoIT10_eastern_euro.pdf> 
[Last accessed May 2018] 
Mediafax, 2008a. ‘Greva angajaţilor de la Dacia s-a încheiat după trei săptămâni (Video 
ProTv)’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.mediafax.ro/social/greva-angajatilor-de-
la-dacia-s-a-incheiat-dupa-trei-saptamani-video-protv-2542044> [Last accessed 
November 2018] 
Mediafax, 2008b. ‘Greva generală de la Dacia Piteşti este legală şi continuă’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.mediafax.ro/social/greva-generala-de-la-dacia-pitesti-este-
legala-si-continua-2534800> [Last accessed November 2018]  
Mediafax, 2008c. ‘Proteste la Dacia Pitesti’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.mediafax.ro/social/proteste-la-dacia-pitesti-2454767> [Last accessed 
November 2018] 
Mediafax, 2010. ‘Dacia distribuie dividende pentru prima dată de la preluarea de către 
Renault’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.mediafax.ro/economic/dacia-distribuie-
dividende-pentru-prima-data-de-la-preluarea-de-catre-renault-6423141> [Last accessed 
September 2018] 
Mediafax, 2013. ‘Dacia: Protestul este ilegal. Participanţii la grevă nu vor fi plătiţ’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.mediafax.ro/social/dacia-protestul-este-ilegal-




Mediafax, 2015. ‘Nokia cumpara Alcatel-Lucent pentru 15,6 miliarde euro, cea mai 
mare tranzactie din industrie din 1999’. [online]. Available at: 
<http://www.mediafax.ro/economic/nokia-cumpara-alcatel-lucent-pentru-15-6-miliarde-
euro-cea-mai-mare-tranzactie-din-industrie-din-1999-14121722> [Last accessed March 
2018] 
Mediafax, 2017. ‘Dosarul Mineriadei, trimis în judecată în ziua în care se împlinesc 27 
de ani. Fostul preşedinte Ion Iliescu, judecat pentru crime împortiva umanităţii’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.mediafax.ro/social/foto-dosarul-mineriadei-trimis-
in-judecata-in-ziua-in-care-se-implinesc-27-de-ani-fostul-presedinte-ion-iliescu-judecat-
pentru-crime-importiva-umanitatii-16452873> [Last accessed January 2018] 
Menz, G., 2005. Varieties of Capitalism and Europeanization: National Response 
Strategies to the Single European Market. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mikecz, R., 2012. ‘Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues’. Qualitative 
Inquiry [e-journal] Vol. 18, Issue 6, pp. 482-493.  
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M., 1984. Qualitative Data Analysis. London: Sage. 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M., 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. 2
nd
 edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Miller, S.M., 1952. ‘The Participant Observer and Over-rapport’. American 
Sociological Review [e-journal] Vol. 17, pp. 97-99.  
Mineriada ianuarie 1999 (Part 1 to Part 10). 2010. [video recording] Bucharest: Jiu 
Valley Portal. 
Mineriada Piaţa Universităţii 13-15 iunie 1990. 2014. [video recording] Bucharest: Jiu 
Valley Portal. 
Ministerul de Finanţe, 1999a. ‘Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s 
Progress Towards Accession’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/dfdd7616-e2a4-40e8-
9bb2-609db216730d/language-en> [Last accessed November 2018] 
Ministerul de Finanţe, 1999b. ‘Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s 
Progress Towards Accession’. [pdf]. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/romania_en.pdf> [Last 
accessed November 2018] 
Mitchell, T., 2013. Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. [e-book]. 2
nd
 
edition. Verso Books. 
Moghioroşi, V., 2014. ‘Contextul european al prăbuşirii comunismului. Cauzele 
Revoluţiei Române’. Buletinul Cercului de Ideologii Politice şi Mentalităţi, no.3, 
Editura Universităţii din Oradea. [online]. Available at:  
<https://www.academia.edu/15451946/Contextul_european_al_pr%C4%83bu%C5%9F
irii_comunismului._Cauzele_Revolu%C5%A3iei_Rom%C3%A2ne> [Last accessed 
October 2018] 
Morrill, C., 1995. The Executive Way: Conflict Management in Corporations. Chicago: 




Morse, J.M. and Chung, S. E., 2003. ‘Toward holism: The significance of 
methodological pluralism’. International Journal of Qualitative Methods [e-journal] 
Vol. 2, Issue3, pp. 1-12. 
Morse, J.M., 2007. ‘Sampling in grounded theory’ in Bryant, A. and Charmaz, K., 2007 
(eds) The Sage handbook of grounded theory. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Mrozowicki, A., 2011. ‘Trade union organization in Eastern Europe: A viable pathway 
to trade union revitalization? – A case study of the automotive sector’. Employment and 
economy in Central Eastern Europe Working Paper. 
Mrozowicki, A., 2014. ‘Varieties of trade union organizing in Central and Eastern 
Europe: A comparison of the retail and automotive sectors’. European Journal of 
Industrial Relations [e-journal] 2014, pp. 1-19. 
Mudavaflex, 2010. Mineriada februarie 1999 Stoeneşti (Part 1-3). [video recording, 
Youtube]. Viewed 9
th
 of June 2017. Available at: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51llDglO-WE> 
Mudavaflex, 2017. Mineriada 25-28 septembrie 1991. [video recording, Youtube]. 
Viewed 7
th
 of June 2017. Available at: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_rYxlZYOn0> 
Mutchnick, R.J. and Berg, B.L., 1996. Research Methods for the Social Sciences: 
Practice and Applications. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Myant, M., 2007. ‘The Czech Republic: from ‘Czech’ capitalism to ‘European’ 
capitalism’ in Lane, D. and Myant, M., 2007. Varieties of Capitalism in Post-
Communist Countries. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Myant, M. and Drahokoupil, J., 2011. Transition Economies: Political Economy in 
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Mykhnenko, V., 2007. ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of `Weak' Coordination: Economic 
Institutions, Revealed Comparative Advantages, and Socio-Economic Performance of 
Mixed Market Economies in Poland and Ukraine’ in Hancké, B., Rhodes, M. and 
Thatcher, M., 2007. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and 
Complementarities in the European Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research, 1978. The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (DHEW Publication No. OS 78-
0012). Washington D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.  
National Federation of Mining and Energy, (2010). ‘Report: The Future of Miners’. 
[pdf]. Available at: 
<http://www.fnme.ro/_files/Raport%20%20Viitorul%20minerilor%20%20Ungaria%20
2010.pdf> [Last accessed April 2018] 
Neuman, W.L., 2000. Social Research Methods for the Social Sciences: Practice and 
Applications. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
News, 2016. ‘Ministerul Finanţelor a aprobat şase ajutoare de stat pentru 
multinaţionalele care investesc în România. Pe listă se află Pirelli, Arctic şi Bosch’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.news.ro/economic/ministerul-finantelor-a-aprobat-
sase-ajutoare-de-stat-pentru-multinationalele-care-investesc-in-romania-pe-lista-se-afla-




Newmann, L., 2000. Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
4th edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
North, D. C., 1991. ‘Institutions’ Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 5, Issue 1 
Winter 1991, pp. 97-112. 
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., Webb, S. B., and Weingast, B. R., 2007.  ‘Limited Access 
Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to Problems of Development’. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4359. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J. and Weingast, B. R., 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. [e-book]. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., Weingast, B. R. and Webb, B. R, 2013. In the Shadow of 
Violence, Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nölke, A. and Vliegenthart, A., 2009. ‘Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe’. World Politics [e-
journal] Vol. 61, Issue 4, pp. 670-702. 
OECD, 1993a. ‘Trends and Policies in Privatisation’. Vol. I, No.1. Paris: OECD. 
OECD, 1993b. ‘Trends and Policies in Privatisation’. Vol. I, No.2. Paris: OECD 
Oficiul Naţional al Registrului Comerţului, 2018. ‘Legea Nr. 359/2004’. [online]. 
Available at:  
<https://www.onrc.ro/documente/legislatie/08.04.2014/LEGEA%20NR.%20359%20-
%20%202004.docx> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Okumus, F., Altinay, L., & Roper, A., 2007. ‘Gaining access for research: Reflections 
from experience’. Annals of Tourism Research [e-journal] Vol. 34, pp. 7-26. 
O’Leary, Z., 2005. Researching Real-World Problems: A Guide to Methods of Inquiry. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Onaran, Ö., 2011. ‘From Transition Crisis to the Global Crisis: Twenty Years of 
Capitalism and Labour in the Central and Eastern EU New Member States’ Capital & 
Class [e-journal] Vol. 35, Issue 2, pp. 213–231. 
Ost, D., 2005. The Defeat of Solidarity. Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe. 
[e-book]. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Ostrander, S., 1995. ‘“Surely you’re not in this just to be helpful”: Access, rapport, and 
interviews in three studies of elites’ in  ertz, R. and Imber, J.B. (Eds.),  Studying elites 
using qualitative methods (pp. 133-150). Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Outsourcing Portal 2016. ‘Legislaţia din România facilitează dezvoltarea sectorului 
outsourcing’. [online]. Available at: <http://www.outsourcingportal.eu/ro/legislatia-din-
romania-faciliteaza-dezvoltarea-sectorului-outsourcing> [Last accessed November 
2017] 
Outsourcing Today, 2015. ‘Business services: Romania’s ace in the sleeve’. [online]. 





Owens, B., 2005. ‘Personal Communication at the Western Society of Criminology 
Meeting’. Oahu,  awaii, February 2005.  
Papadimitriou, D. and Phinnemore, D., 2004. ‘Europeanization, Conditionality and 
Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania’. 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies [e-journal] Vol. 42, Issue 3, pp. 619–639. 
Papadimitriou, D. and Phinnemore, D., 2008. Romania and The European Union: From 
Marginalisation to Membership?. [e-book]. 1
st
 edition. Routledge.  
Papadimitriou, D., Baltag, D. and Surubaru, N-C., 2017. ‘Assessing the performance of 
the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe and in its neighbourhood’. East 
European Politics [e-journal] Vol. 33, Issue 1, pp. 1-16. 
Partidul Comunist Român, 1975. Programul Partidului Comunist Român de Făurire a 
Societăţii Socialiste Multilateral Dezvoltate şi Înaintare a României Spre Comunism, 
Partidul Comunist Român. Bucureşti: Editura Politică. 
Pavlinek, P., 2004. ‘Regional Development Implications of Foreign Direct Investment 
in Central Europe’. European Urban and Regional Studies [e-journal] Vol. 11, Issue 1, 
pp. 47-70. 
Pavlinek, P., Domanski, B. and Guzik, R., 2009. ‘Industrial Upgrading through  Foreign 
Direct Investment in Central  European Automotive Manufacturing’ European Urban 
and Regional Studies [e-journal] Vol. 16, Issue 1, pp. 43-63. 
Peck, J., 2004. ‘Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism’. Progress 
in Human Geography [e-journal] Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 392–405. 
Peck, J. and Yeung, H.W-C., 2003. Remaking the Global Economy. [e-book]. SAGE 
Publications. 
Peck, J. and Theodore, N., 2007. ‘Variegated capitalism’. Progress in Human 
Geography [e-journal] Vol. 31, Issue 6, pp. 731-772. 
Penrod, J., Preston, D.B., Cain, R.E. and Stark, M.T., 2003. ‘A discussion of chain 
referral as a method of sampling hard-to-reach populations’. Journal of Transcultural 
Nursing [e-journal] Vol. 14, Issue 2, pp. 100-107. 
Piketty, T., 2014. ‘Capital in the 21st Century’ in Savage, M., 2015. ‘Introduction to 
elites From the ‘problematic of the proletariat’ to a class analysis of ‘wealth elites’’ The 
Sociological Review [e-journal] Vol. 63, Issue 2, pp. 223-239. 
Plummer, K., 2001. Documents of Life 2: An Ivitation to Critical Humanism. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage.  
Polanyi, K., 1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Polit, D. and Beck, C.T., 2007. Nursing Research: Generating and Assessing Evidence 
for Nursing Practice. Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.  
Politico, 2016. ‘Europe’s last coal miners struggle for lifelines: Producers in the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Romania try to stay afloat as losses mount’. [online]. Available at: 





Pollner, M. and Emerson, R.M., 1983. ‘The Dynamics of Inclusion and Distance in 
Fieldworkd Relations’ pp. 235-252 in Emerson, R.M., Contemporary Field Research: A 
Collection of Readings. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Polytechnic University Bucharest, Faculty of Electric Engineering, 2010. ‘Proiectarea 
unui Automobil’. [online]. Available at:  
<http://itee.elth.pub.ro/~coroimar/TCP/Proectarea%20unui%20Automobil.doc> [Last 
accessed February 2019] 
Portal Legislativ, 2017a. ‘ORDONANTA DE URGENTA   Nr. 9 din 14 aprilie 1997’. 
[online]. Available at: <http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/10914> [Last 
accessed December 2018] 
Portal Legislativ, 2017b. ‘ORDONANTA DE URGENTA Nr. 22 din 19 august 1997’. 
[online]. Available at: <http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/11085> 
[Last accessed December 2018] 
Prima mineriadă: 28-29 ianuarie 1990. 2014. [video recording]. Bucharest: Jiu Valley 
Portal. 
Profiroiu, M., Andrei, T., Profiroiu, A. and Stancu, S., 2008. ‘The Evolution of the 
Service Sector in the Context of Romania’s Accession to the European Union’. 
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences [e-journal] 24E/2008 pp. 98-110.  
Profit, 2018a. ‘Daimler și-a ridicat substanțial afacerile din Sebeș, de peste 5 ori 
comparativ cu 2016’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.profit.ro/povesti-cu-
profit/auto-transporturi/daimler-si-a-ridicat-substantial-afacerile-din-sebes-de-peste-5-
ori-comparativ-cu-2016-18146584> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Profit, 2018b. ‘Majoritatea salariaților Atos România, una dintre cele mai mari 
companii IT, se pregătesc de grevă, nemulțumiți de noul contract colectiv de muncă’. 




PUNCTE CARDINALE – Minerida de la Costesti. 2015. [video recording] Bucharest: 
Art Studio. 
Pyke, F. and Sengenberger, W., (eds.) 1992. Industrial Districts and Local Economic 
Regeneration. Geneva: ILO.  
Radio Free Europe, 2001. ‘Romania: France's Renault  as Ambitious Plans For Dacia’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/1095943.html> [Last accessed May 
2019] 
Radosevic, S., 1998. ‘The transformation of national systems of innovation in Eastern 
Europe: Between restructuring and erosion’ Industrial and Corporate Change [e-
journal] Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 77-108. 
Radosevic, S., 2003. ‘Foresight within  ungarian and Czech Republic S&T and 
Innovation Policies’. Working Paper. Sofia, Bulgaria: Foretech Project. 
Radosevic, S. and Rozeik, A., 2005. ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Restructuring in 
the Automotive Industry in Central and Eastern Europe’. SSEES University College 




Ragin, C.C. and Amoroso, L. M., 2011. Constructing Social Research. 2
nd
 edition. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Realitatea de  unedoara, 2018. ‘Un deceniu de la exploziile care au curmat 13 vieți la 
mina Petrila’. [online]. Available at:  
<https://realitateadehunedoara.net/index.php/2018/11/14/un-deceniu-de-la-exploziile-
care-au-curmat-13-vieti-la-mina-petrila/> [Last accessed January 2019] 
Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K., 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly. Princeton University Press. 
Research Romania, 2016. ‘ Industria auto din România a crescut cu peste 7% în 2015’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.researchromania.ro/2016/02/industria-auto-din-
romania-a-crescut-cu-peste-7-in-2015/> [Last accessed October 2018] 
Revista22, 2004. ‘Greva minerilor din Valea Jiului, 1977’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://revista22.ro/istorie/greva-minerilor-din-valea-jiului-1977> [Last accessed 
February 2018] 
Rhodes, M., Avdagic, S. and Visser, J., 2010. Social Pacts in Europe: Emergence, 
Evolution and Institutionalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ribarova, E., 2012. ‘The social power of trade unions in the new market economies: 
why is it in decline?’. Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe [e-
journal] Vol. 3, pp. 295-302. 
Riemer, J., 1977. ‘Varieties of Opportunistic Research’. Urban Life [e-journal] Vol. 5, 
pp. 467-477. 
Romania Insider, 2015.’Romania’s Business Services Sector to reach 100,000 
Employees by 2017’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.romania-
insider.com/romanias-business-services-sector-100000-employees-2017/> [Last 
accessed May 2018] 
Romanian Academy, 2011. ‘Archives of Oltenia: Nicolae Ceauşescu şi Datoria Externă 
a României’. [online]. Available at:  
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330170431_Nicolae_Ceausescu_si_datoria_
externa_a_Romaniei_in_Arhivele_Olteniei_serie_noua_nr_25_Editura_Academiei_Ro
mane_Bucuresti_2011_p_213-231> [Last accessed June 2019] 
Romanian Car, 2014. ‘Olcit. Romanian Car’. Available at: 
<https://romaniancar.com/ro/olcit> [Last accessed February 2018] 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1971. Import Export Direction, File 3064/27/1971. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1971. Import Export Direction, File 3064/112/1971. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1972. Import Export Direction, File 3064/22/1972. [archival 




Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1972. Import Export Direction, File 3064/40/1972. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1972. Import Export Direction, File 3064/67/1972. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1972. Import Export Direction, File 3064/81/1972. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1973. Import Export Direction, File 3064/33/1973. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1973. Import Export Direction, File 3064/99/1973. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1973. Import Export Direction, File 3064/108/1973. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1974. Import Export Direction, File 3064/19/1974. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1975. Import Export Direction, File 3064/26/1975. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1975. Import Export Direction, File 3064/73/1975. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1975. Import Export Direction, File 3064/74/1975. [archival 
document]. National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1976. Import Export Direction, File 3064/52/1976. [archival 
document] National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Ministry of Exterior Commerce and International 
Economic Cooperation, 1976. Import Export Direction, File 3064/104/1976. [archival 
document] National Romanian Archives, Study Room no.1. Bucharest. 
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1981. 
Economic Section, File 3294/163/1981. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1982. 
Economic Section, File 3294/7/1982. [archival document]. National Romanian 




Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1982. 
Economic Section, File 3294/65/1982. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1982. 
Economic Section, File 3294/122/1982. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1982. 
Economic Section, File 3294/198/1982. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1982. 
Economic Section, File 3294/234/1982. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1982. 
Economic Section, File 3294/268/1982. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1983. 
Economic Section, File 3294/280/1983. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1984. 
Economic Section, File 3294/390/1984. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1986. 
Economic Section, File 3294/4/1986. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1986. 
Economic Section, File 3294/48/1986. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1986. 
Economic Section, File 3294/150/1986. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1986. 
Economic Section, File 3294/176/1986. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1986. 
Economic Section, File 3294/238/1986. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1986. 
Economic Section, File 3294/309/1986. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1987. 
Economic Section, File 3294/53/1987. [archival document]. National Romanian 




Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1987. 
Economic Section, File 3294/71/1987. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1988. 
Economic Section, File 3294/154/1988. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1988. 
Economic Section, File 3294/172/1988. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1989. 
Economic Section, File 3294/110/1989. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1989. 
Economic Section, File 3294/177/1989. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1989. 
Economic Section, File 3294/329/1989. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1980. 
Chancellery Section, File 3354/38/1980. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1981. 
Chancellery Section, File 3354/46/1981. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1982. 
Chancellery Section, File 3354/54/1982. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1982. 
Chancellery Section, File 3354/65/1982. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1985. 
Chancellery Section, File 3354/13/1985. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1987. 
Chancellery Section, File 3354/3/1987. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1987. 
Chancellery Section, File 3354/10/1987. [archival document]. National Romanian 
Archives, "Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu" Funds and Collections. Bucharest.  
Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 1988. 
Chancellery Section, File 3354/26/1988. [archival document]. National Romanian 




Rosenfielde, S. and Kuboniwa, M., 2003. ‘Russian Growth Retardation Then and Now’. 
Eurasian Geography and Economics [e-journal] Vol.44, Issue 2, pp. 87-101. 
Roth, J., 1966. ‘ ired  and Research’. American Sociologist [e-journal] Vol.1, pp.190-
196. 
Russu, C., 2015. ‘Structural Changes Produced in the Romanian Manufacturing 
Industry in the Last Two Decades’. Procedia Economics and Finance [e-journal] Vol. 
22, pp. 323-332.   
Sabot, E.C., 1999. ‘Dr. Jekyl, Mr.  (i)de: The contrasting face of elites at interview’. 
Geoforum [e-journal] Vol. 30, pp. 329-335. 
Sass, M., 2010. ‘International Fragmentation of Tradable Business Services: the Case of 
 ungary’, IE AS Discussion Papers, No. MT-DP - 2010/24 (Working Paper). 
Sass, M. and Fifeková, M., 2011. ‘Offshoring and Outsourcing Business Services to 
Central and Eastern Europe: Some Empirical and Conceptual Considerations’. 
European Planning Studies [e-journal] Vol. 19, Issue 9, pp.1593-1609. 
Savage, M., 2000. Class Analysis and Social Transformation. Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press. 
Savage, M., 2015, ‘Introduction to elites From the ‘problematic of the proletariat’ to a 
class analysis of ‘wealth elites’’ The Sociological Review [e-journal] Vol. 63, Issue 2, 
pp. 223-239. 
Schmitter, P.C., 1974. ‘Still the century of corporatism?’. Review of Politics [e-journal] 
Vol. 36, pp. 85-131. 
Schneiberg, M., 2007. “What’s on the path? Path dependence, organizational diversity 
and the problem of institutional change in the US economy, 1900–1950”. Socio-
Economic Review [e-journal] Vol. 5, pp. 47–80. 
Schwartz, M.S. and Schwartz. C.G., 1955. ‘Problems in Participant Observation’. 
American Journal of Sociology [e-journal] Vol. 60, pp. 343-353.  
Sebestyen, V., 2009. Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire. [e-book]. 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Shafir, M., 1985. Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Shaffir, W.B., Stebbins, R.A. and Turowetz, A., 1980. Fieldwork Experience: 
Qualitative Approaches to Social Research. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Shaffir, W.B. and Stebbins, R.A., 1991. Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of 
Qualitative Research. Newbury Park: Sage.  
Shenton, A. and  ayter, S., 2004. ‘Strategies for gaining access to organisations and 
informants in qualitative studies’. Education for Information [e-journal] Vol. 22, pp. 
223-231. 
Sieber, S. D., 1973. ‘The integration of fieldwork and survey methods’. American 
Journal of Sociology [e-journal] Vol. 78, pp. 1335-1359. 
Skeggs, B., 2015. ‘Introduction: stratification or exploitation, domination, dispossession 




Smith, C.D. and Kornblum, W. (eds.), 1996. In the Field: Readings on the Field 
Research Experience. New York: Praeger.  
Snow, D.A., 1993. Shakabuku: A Study of the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist Movement in 
America, 1960-1975.New York: Garland Publishing Co.  
Snow, D.A. and Anderson, L., 1987. ‘Identity Work Among the Homeless: The Verbal 
Construction and Avowal of Personal Identities’ American Journal of Sociology [e-
journal] Vol. 92, Issue 6, pp. 1136-1371. 
Snow, D.A. and Anderson, L., 1993. Down on Their Luck: A Study of Homeless Street 
People. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Snow, D.A., Morrill, C. and Anderson, L., 2003. ‘Linking Ethnography and Theoretical 
Development’. Ethnography [e-journal] Vol. 2, pp. 181-200.  
Spector, M., 1980. ‘Learning to Study Public Figures’ pp. 98-110 in Field Work 
Experience: Qualitative Approaches to Social Research, edited by Shaffir, W.B., 
Stebbins, R.A. and Turowetz, A. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Stanojević, M. and Klarič, M., 2013. ‘The impact of socio-economic shocks on social 
dialogue in Slovenia’. Transfer [e-journal] Vol.19, Issue 2, pp. 217–226. 
Start Up, 2017. ‘Programatorii, miza noului Guvern: veniturile IT-iștilor cu studii medii, 
neimpozabile’. [online]. Availablea at: <https://start-up.ro/programatorii-miza-noului-
guvern-veniturile-it-istilor-cu-studii-medii-neimpozabile/> [Last accessed August 2018] 
Statistical Directory of the Romanian Socialist Republic, 1979, pp. 105 in National 
Romanian Archives, Bucharest.  
Stephens, N., 2007. ‘Collecting data from elites and ultra elites: Telephone and face-to-
face interviews with macroeconomists’. Qualitative Research [e-journal] Vol. 7, pp. 
203-216. 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J., 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory 
Procedures and Techniques. Newbury Park: Sage. 
Streeck, W., 2007. ‘Globalization’: Nothing New Under the Sun?’. Socio-Economic 
Review [e-journal] Vol. 5, Issue 3 (July 2007), pp. 537-547. 
Streeck, W. and Thelen, K, (eds) 2005. Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Subiectiv, 2008. ‘Greva de la Dacia: Despre cum rămînem ce-am fost’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.subiectiv.ro/greva-de-la-dacia-despre-cum-raminem-ce-am-
fost.htm> [Last accessed November 2018] 
Ştiinţă şi Tehnică, 2016. ‘Constantin Stroe “Omul Dacia”’. Available at: 
<https://stiintasitehnica.com/constantin-stroe-omul-dacia/> [Last accessed June 2016] 
Sweet, A.S., 2004. The Judicial Construction of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
Swyngedouw, E.A., 1997a. ‘Neither global nor local: `glocalisation' and the politics of 
scale’ pp. 137-166 in Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local, 




Swyngedouw, E. A., 1997b. ‘Excluding the other: the production of scale and scaled 
politics’ pp. 167-176 in Geographies of Economies, edited by Lee, R. and Wills, J. 
London: Arnold. 
Ştirile ProTv, 2013. ‘45 de ani de când prima maşină Dacia ieşea pe porţile uzinei de la 
Colibaşi, azi Mioveni’. [online]. Available at: <http://stiri.tvr.ro/45-de-ani-de-cand-
prima-masina-dacia-iesea-pe-portile-uzinei-de-la-colibasi--azi-
mioveni_34017.html#view> [Last accessed July 2018] 
Ştirile ProTv, 2014. ‘Renault scoate profitul Dacia din tara. Compania distribuie 
actionarilor dividende de 320,8 milioane lei, echivalentul a 95% din totalul castigului’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://incont.stirileprotv.ro/auto/automobile-dacia-distribuie-
dividende-de-320-8-milioane-lei-echivalentul-a-95-din-profit.html> [Last accessed 
August 2018] 
Tashakkori, A., and Teddlie, C., 2003. Handbook of mixed methods in social and 
behavioral research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Termene, 2018. ‘Profilul companiei FORD ROMANIA SA’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://termene.ro/firma/6488696-FORD-ROMANIA-SA> [Last accessed September 
2018] 
The Diplomat, 2015. ‘Business services: Romania's ace in the sleeve’. [online]. 
Available at: <http://www.thediplomat.ro/articol.php?id=6089> [Last accessed April 
2018]  
Thelen, K., 2014. Varieties of Liberalization: The New Politics of Social Solidarity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Thuesen, F., 2011. ‘Navigating between dialogue and confrontation: Phronesis and 
emotions in interviewing elites on ethnic discrimination’. Qualitative Inquiry [e-journal] 
Vol. 17, pp. 613-622. 
Tickell, A. and Peck, J., 2003. ‘Making global rules: globalization or neoliberalization?’ 
in Peck, J. and Yeung, H. (eds), Remaking the Global Economy, pp. 163–181. London: 
Sage. 
Toscano, A. and Woodcock, J., 2015. ‘Spectres of Marxism: a comment on Mike 
Savage’s market model of class difference’. The Sociological Review [e-journal] Vol. 
63, Issue 2, pp. 512-523. 
Totu, V., 1977. Progresul Economic in Romania 1877-1977. Bucharest: Editura 
Politica. 
Transelectrica, 2017. ‘Despre noi’. [online]. Available at: 
<http://www.transelectrica.ro/web/tel/prezentare> [Last accessed December 2017] 
Transilvania Business Magazine, 2017. ‘Creștere cu două cifre pentru Bosch în 
România’. [online]. Available at: 
<http://testare.transilvaniabusiness.ro/2017/05/26/crestere-cu-doua-cifre-pentru-bosch-
romania/> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Trif, A., 2007. ‘Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe: Case Study Evidence from 





Trif, A., 2012. ‘Romania: Collective Bargaining Institutions under the  ammer’ 
Working Paper. 
T&T (Tehnică şi Tehnologie), 2015. ‘Evoluţia industriei auto în România’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.ttonline.ro/revista/t-t-plus/evolutia-industriei-auto-in-
romania> [Last accessed September 2018] 
T&T (Tehnică şi Tehnologie), 2016. ‘Tendinţe în dezvoltarea industriei auto din 
România’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.ttonline.ro/revista/t-t-plus/tendinte-in-
dezvoltarea-industriei-auto-din-romania> [Last accessed September 208] 
Tunnell, K.D., 1998. ‘ onesty, Secrecy, and Deception in the Sociology of Crime: 
Confessions and Reflections from the Backstage’ pp. 206-220 in Ethnography at the 
Edge: Crime, Deviance and Field Research edited by Ferrell, J. and Hamm, M.S. 
Boston: Northeastern University Press. 
Turner, R.H., 1953. ‘The Quest for Universals in Sociological Research’. American 
Sociological Review [e-journal] Vol. 24, pp. 605-611.  
U.S. Library of Congress, 2017a. ‘Economy of Romania: Energy’. [online] Available 
at: <http://countrystudies.us/romania/50.htm> [Last accessed December 2017] 
US Library of Congress, 2017b. ‘Romania: a country study’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.loc.gov/item/90006449/> [Last accessed December 2017] 
Velica, I. and Shreter, C., 1993. Călătorie prin Vârstele Văii Jiului. Deva: Editura 
Destin. 
Vidal, M., 2014. ‘Incoherence and Dysfunctionality in the Institutional Regulation of 
Capitalism’ in  auptmeier, M. and Vidal, M (eds.) Comparative Political Economy of 
Work. London: Palgrave. 
Visegrad Plus, 2015. ‘Romanian coal mining industry’. [online]. Available at: 
<http://visegradplus.org/analyse/romanian-coal-mining-industry/> [Last accessed 
December 2018] 
Voelzkow, H., Crouch, C. and Leuenberger, T., 2006a. ‘Local production systems in 
Europe’ (Unpublished report to Volkswagen Stiftung). Frankfurt am Main: VW 
Stiftung. 
Vogel, S., 2006. Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry Are Reforming 
Japanese Capitalism. Cornell University Press. 
Voica, M.C., 2016. ‘Changes of EU Industrial Policy and its Effects on Romania’s 
Industrial Paradigm’.  Industrija [e-journal] Vol.44, Issue 4, pp. 197-210. 
Voelzkow, H., Schröder, M., 2006b . ‘Governance of the furniture industry in 
Ostwestfalen-Lippe and its national context: A local economy conforming to the 
‘German model’?’ in Voelzkow, H., Crouch, C. and Leuenberger, T., ‘Local production 
systems in Europe’ (Unpublished report to Volkswagen Stiftung). Frankfurt am 
Main: VW Stiftung. 
Wall Street Journal, 2013. ‘Dacia: Protestul este ilegal, participantii la greva nu vor fi 
platiti’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.wall-street.ro/articol/Auto/146040/dacia-
protest-spontan-greva.html#gref> [Last accessed November 2018] 
Wall Street Journal, 2015. ‘Cele mai avantajoase tipuri de contracte de munca pentru 





pentru-companii.html#gref> [Last accessed July 2019] 
Wakeling, P. and Savage, M, 2015. ‘Entry to elite positions and the stratification of 
higher education in Britain’. The Sociological Review [e-journal] Vol. 63, Issue 2, pp. 
290-320. 
Webb, E., Campbell, D.T., Schwartz, R.D., Sechrest, L., and Grove, J.B., 1981. 
Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences. 2
nd
 edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  
Weick, K., 1985. ‘Systematic Observational Methods’ pp. 567-634 in Handbook of 
Social Psychology (Vol. 2, 3
rd
 edition), edited by Gardner, L. and Aronson, E.. New 
York: Random House.  
Welch, C., Marschan-Piekkari, R., Penttinen,  ., Tahvanainen, N., 2002. ‘Corporate 
elites as informants in qualitative international business research’. International 
Business Review [e-journal] Vol. 11, pp. 611-628. 
Williamson, J., 1994. ‘The Political Economy of Policy Reform’. [pdf]. Washington, 
D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 
Wolcott, H.E,, 1994. Transforming Qualitative Data: Description, Analysis, and 
Interpretation. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Woolfson, C., 2007. ‘Labour Standards and Migration in the New Europe: Post-
Communist Legacies and Perspectives’. European Journal of Industrial Relations [e-
journal] Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 199-218. 
World Bank, 1998. ‘Mine Closure, Environment and Social Mitigation Project’ in 
Hamlin, R. and Cobarzan, B., 2006. Financial Incentives to Restructure Coal Mining 
Industry. Comparative Case Study Romania and State of Michigan, U.S.’. 
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 18 E/2006, pp. 68-79.   
World Bank, 2018. ‘Doing Business 2017’. [pdf]. Available at: 
<https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2017> [Last 
accessed September 2018] 
Wright, E.O., 2000. ‘Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests and Class 
Compromise’. American Journal of Sociology [e-journal] Vol. 105, Issue 4, pp. 957-
1002. 
Wright, E. O., 2005. Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wright, E.O., 2009. ‘From Grand Paradigm Battles to Pragmatist Realism: Towards an 
Integrated Class Analysis’. Working Paper forthcoming New Left Review.    
Wright, E.O., 2013. ‘Class Struggle and Class Compromise in the Era of Stagnation and 
Crisis’. Available at: <https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Class-Crisis-Stagnation.pdf> 
[Last accessed December 2017] 
Yin, R.K., 1981. ‘The Case Study as a Serious Research Strategy’. Knowledge: 
Creation, Diffusion, Utilization [e-journal] Vol. 3, Issue 1, pp. 97-114. 




ZDNet, 2014. ‘The land where skilled IT workers don't pay tax. Yes, it really exists’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-land-where-skilled-it-
workers-dont-pay-tax-yes-it-really-exists/> [Last accessed November 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2003. ‘Pentru Alcatel, Romania este o insula de crestere’. [online]. 
Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/business-hi-tech/pentru-alcatel-romania-este-o-insula-
de-crestere-2987719/> [Last accessed November 2017] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2007. ‘Brandusa Carciog, director de resurse umane al Ipsos 
Interactive Services: Angajatii pe care ii cautam nu exista in acest moment in piata’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/profesii/brandusa-carciog-director-de-resurse-
umane-al-ipsos-interactive-services-angajatii-pe-care-ii-cautam-nu-exista-in-acest-
moment-in-piata-3057572> [Last accessed May 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2010. ‘Alcatel Lucent mai angajează 200 de ingineri la Timişoara’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/business-hi-tech/alcatel-lucent-mai-
angajeaza-200-de-ingineri-la-timisoara-6558216> [Last accessed November 2017] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2011. ‘ uawei România şi-a dublat afacerile şi suflă în ceafa Alcatel’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/business-hi-tech/huawei-romania-si-a-dublat-
afacerile-si-sufla-in-ceafa-alcatel-8646331> [Last accessed October 2017] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2012a. ‘La revedere Dacia Logan, maşina de la Piteşti care a 
revoluţionat industria auto. Logan 2 intră pe ultima sută de metri’. [online]. Available 
at: <https://www.zf.ro/auto/la-revedere-dacia-logan-masina-de-la-pitesti-care-a-
revolutionat-industria-auto-logan-2-intra-pe-ultima-suta-de-metri-9570143> [Last 
accessed September 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2012b. ‘„Laboratorul de cercetare“ al Ipsos: 625 de români culeg date 
online pentru studii folosite de multinaţionale în Europa’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.zf.ro/companii/laboratorul-de-cercetare-al-ipsos-625-de-romani-culeg-
date-online-pentru-studii-folosite-de-multinationale-in-europa-9136006> [Last accessed 
April 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2012c. ‘Care sunt cele mai mari 50 de centre de afaceri din Bucureşti 
în care lucrează peste 100.000 de “corporatişti”’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.zf.ro/proprietati/care-sunt-cele-mai-mari-50-de-centre-de-afaceri-din-
bucuresti-in-care-lucreaza-peste-100-000-de-corporatisti-9167203> [Last accessed 
September 2017] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2013a. ‘Dacia: Protestul de miercuri al angajaţilor este ilegal’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/auto/dacia-protestul-de-miercuri-al-
angajatilor-este-ilegal-10680361> [Last accessed Novermber 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2013b. ‘ arta Producătorilor de component auto. Cine sunt “greii” 
industriei auto”’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/auto/harta-producatorilor-
de-componente-auto-cine-sunt-greii-industriei-auto-10805313> [Last accessed 
September 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2014. ‘Dacia 2014 vs. Dacia 1999, cum s-a schimbat uzina de la 
Mioveni după 15 ani de la privatizare’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.zf.ro/auto/dacia-2014-vs-dacia-1999-cum-s-a-schimbat-uzina-de-la-
mioveni-dupa-15-ani-de-la-privatizare-12876836> [Last accessed July 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2015a. ‘Industria auto din România a urcat la peste 16 mld. euro în 





2014-sustinuta-puternic-de-dacia-dar-si-de-mercedes-benz-13786090> [Last accessed 
October 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2015b. ‘Economia şi exporturile României devin tot mai dependente 
de industria auto’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/zf-24/economia-si-
exporturile-romaniei-devin-tot-mai-dependente-de-industria-auto-13787252> [Last 
accessed October 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2015c. ‘Tranzacţia Nokia - Alcatel Lucent în România: „peştele mic îl 
înghite pe cel mare’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/business-hi-
tech/tranzactia-nokia-alcatel-lucent-in-romania-pestele-mic-il-inghite-pe-cel-mare-
14123208> [Last accessed March 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2016a. ‘Delphi a ajuns la 10.000 de angajaţi în cinci fabrici. „Mai 
facem câteva sute de angajări“’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.zf.ro/companii/delphi-a-ajuns-la-10-000-de-angajati-in-cinci-fabrici-mai-
facem-cateva-sute-de-angajari-15272713> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2016b. ‘Alcatel-Lucent şi Nokia devin Nokia România: „România e o 
ţară strategică în care vom continua să investim“’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.zf.ro/business-hi-tech/alcatel-lucent-si-nokia-devin-nokia-romania-
romania-e-o-tara-strategica-in-care-vom-continua-sa-investim-15448378> [Last 
accessed March 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2016c. ‘”Suntem discriminaţi la noi acasă. De către statul român. 
Companiilor străine li se întinde covorul, în timp ce noi, antreprenorii români, suntem 
«aruncaţi la câini». Noi de ani de zile facem profit, iar multinaţionalele raportează 
numai pierderi şi nimeni nu le întreabă nimic”’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.zf.ro/eveniment/discriminati-acasa-catre-statul-roman-companiilor-
straine-intinde-covorul-timp-antreprenorii-romani-aruncati-caini-ani-zile-facem-profit-
iar-multinationalele-raporteaza-numai-pierderi-nimeni-le-15195142> [Last accessed 
September 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2016d. ‘Universităţile care colaborează cu angajatorii livrează pe piaţa 
muncii angajaţi productivi încă de la început’. [online]. Available at: 
<https://www.zf.ro/profesii/universitatile-care-colaboreaza-cu-angajatorii-livreaza-pe-
piata-muncii-angajati-productivi-inca-de-la-inceput-15794508> [Last accessed June 
2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2017. ‘Afacerile grupului Continental în România au urcat la 2,7 mld. 
Euro’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/companii/afacerile-grupului-
continental-in-romania-au-urcat-la-2-7-mld-euro-16318752> [Last accessed September 
2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2018. ‘Terenuri pentru investitori, subvenţii la limita legii europene, 
prioritate şi acces la autostradă - cum vrea Slovacia să devină campionul mondial 
absolut la producţia de maşini’. [online]. Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/business-
international/terenuri-pentru-investitori-subventii-la-limita-legii-europene-prioritate-si-
acces-la-autostrada-cum-vrea-slovacia-sa-devina-campionul-mondial-absolut-la-
productia-de-masini-17148730> [Last accessed September 2018] 
Ziarul Financiar, 2019. ‘Renault Technologie Roumanie ia fonduri europene pentru 





dezvoltarea-virtuala-a-viitorului-logan-17994806> [Last accessed June 2019] 
Zuckerman,  . A., 1972. ‘Interviewing an ultra-elite’. Public Opinion Quarterly [e-
journal] Vol. 36, pp. 159-175. 
14 iunie 1990 – Venirea minerilor la Bucureşti, 2011. [video recording] Bucharest: 
Capete Înfierbântate 13-15 iunie 1990. (Narrated by Alexandru Potocean). 
4Tuning, 2017. ‘Top 10 masini comuniste conduse de parintii si bunicii nostri’. 
[online]. Available at: <https://www.4tuning.ro/old-school-cars/top-10-masini-
comuniste-conduse-de-parintii-si-bunicii-nostri-20591.html> [Last accessed December 
2017] 
 
